Kagaku tetsugaku
Online ISSN : 1883-6461
Print ISSN : 0289-3428
ISSN-L : 0289-3428
Search
Advanced search
OR
Browse
Search
Volume 41, Issue 1
Displaying 1-10 of 10 articles from this issue
Show all abstracts
    • |<
    • <
    • 1
    • >
    • >|
  • The Evolution of Altruism and Selective Explanation
    Senji Tanaka
    2008 Volume 41 Issue 1 Pages 1_1-1_13
    Published: 2008
    Released on J-STAGE: July 31, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.41.1_1
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Show abstractHide abstract
        Altruistic behaviors are quite impressive features in nature and call for selective explanation. Ever since Darwin, many biologists have appealed to group selection to explain altruism. In the 1960s, Williams knocked down these naïve group selectionists and alternatively promoted gene selectionism. However, group selection was highlighted again in the 1980s by Wilson and Sober, who suggested a hierarchical conception of evolution. Opposing to this conception, some philosophers, together with some biologists, proposed to adopt a pluralistic stance toward various models of selection. These three approaches give different explanations of the evolution of altruism. I compare them and show a pluralistic one is the most valid among them.
    View full abstract
    Download PDF (786K)
  • The Paradox of Coincidence and Sortal Concepts
    Ikuro Suzuki
    2008 Volume 41 Issue 1 Pages 1_15-1_28
    Published: 2008
    Released on J-STAGE: July 31, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.41.1_15
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Show abstractHide abstract
        The paradox of coincidence, a paradox about the relation between a material object and its stuff, has been paid a great attention to in recent metaphysics. In this paper, I compare two influential approaches to this paradox; sortalism and fourdimensional worm theory, and defend sortalism. I give the following two arguments. (1) Worm theory, like sortalism, must introduce sortal concepts to resolve the paradox. So both approaches owe the (almost) same theoretical burden to explain how sortal concepts work. (2) Worm theory, unlike sortalism, introduces sortal concepts in a very problematic way.
    View full abstract
    Download PDF (780K)
  • C.S.Peirce and the Early Phases of Model-theoretic Logic
    Masato Ishida
    2008 Volume 41 Issue 1 Pages 1_29-1_44
    Published: 2008
    Released on J-STAGE: July 31, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.41.1_29
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Show abstractHide abstract
        This paper focuses on C. S. Peirce's philosophy of logic and mathematics pertinent to the so-called model-theoretic tradition in formal logic. While it is common to trace the development of model-theoretic logic back to Peirce, closer textual study tends to reveal that there is a gap between the work of Peirce and what was later achieved by, among others, Löwenheim and Skolem. As Peirce's nonstandard model of the theory of reals suggests, however, Peirce does belong to the model-theoretic tradition at least in a broad sense. This paper thus makes efforts to better situate Peirce in the model-theoretic movement by considering Cantor's influence on Peirce, which most probably motivated Peirce to develop his nonstandard model of the reals. The paper also endeavors to shed light on Peirce's highly original ideas regarding the logic of mathematics seen in this particular context.
    View full abstract
    Download PDF (1599K)
  • Aristotle on Akrasia
    Maiko Yamamoto
    2008 Volume 41 Issue 1 Pages 1_45-1_57
    Published: 2008
    Released on J-STAGE: July 31, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.41.1_45
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Show abstractHide abstract
        It is known that Aristotle tackled the problems concerning akrasia. But how he solved them has not been made clear. I propose an interpretation of his idea.
        Aristotle presents two types of arguments. One is the 'grammatical' argument, where he shows that in some sense of 'know', acting against one's knowledge is possible. The other is the 'factual' argument, where he shows that an akrates does not need to have inconsistent judgments.
        Some scholars say that Aristotle does not refute Socrates' thesis that akrasia is impossible. But I argue that they are wrong, and that Aristotle succeeds in solving the problems concerning akrasia.
    View full abstract
    Download PDF (773K)
  • Does Knowledge Entail Belief?
    Masaharu Mizumoto
    2008 Volume 41 Issue 1 Pages 1_59-1_78
    Published: 2008
    Released on J-STAGE: July 31, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.41.1_59
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Show abstractHide abstract
        The "entailment thesis", or the principle that knowledge entails belief, is accepted by most epistemologists today. However, not everyone agrees. Some philosophers have presented at least prima facie convincing counterexamples. It seems, however, their challenges have been not so much answered as simply neglected. After examining two types of attractive, but not completely satisfying answers to such purported counterexamples, I will propose an alternative answer, which seems to be congenial to the spirit of epistemological naturalism.
    View full abstract
    Download PDF (176K)
  • The Frequency Hypothesis and Evolutionary Arguments
    Yuichi Amitani
    2008 Volume 41 Issue 1 Pages 1_79-1_94
    Published: 2008
    Released on J-STAGE: July 31, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.41.1_79
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Show abstractHide abstract
        Gerd Gigerenzer's views on probabilistic reasoning in humans have come under close scrutiny. Very little attention, however, has been paid to the evolutionary component of his argument. According to Gigerenzer, reasoning about probabilities as frequencies is so common today because it was favored by natural selection in the past. This paper presents a critical examination of this argument. It will show first, that, pace Gigerenzer, there are some reasons to believe that using the frequency format was not more adaptive than using the standard (percentage) format and, second, that Gigerenzer's evolutionary argument and his other arguments such as his historical description of the notion of probability are in tension with each other.
    View full abstract
    Download PDF (817K)
Critical Notice
  • On Takashi Iida's Book, Gengo-Tetsugaku Taizen, Vols.II and III
    Tomohisa Furuta
    2008 Volume 41 Issue 1 Pages 1_95-1_119
    Published: 2008
    Released on J-STAGE: July 31, 2009
    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.41.1_95
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Show abstractHide abstract
        In this review, I review both volumes II and III of Takashi Iida's Book: Gengo-Tetsugaku Taizen, and examine two arguments proposed in vol. II. One is concerning criticism against conventionalist's explanation of truths of logic which was approached by Quine. I think that truths of logic should be comprehended in Quine's holistic view of knowledge. The other is concerning criticism against Quine's holism which was suggested by C. Wright. I hold that the statement W:θ |- L I → P which Wright proposed can be also abandoned together with theory θ to which W relates if the θ is abandoned.
    View full abstract
    Download PDF (1097K)
Book Reviews
Program of the Annual Meeting
Summaries of the Workshops
    • |<
    • <
    • 1
    • >
    • >|
feedback
 Top