Kagaku tetsugaku
Online ISSN : 1883-6461
Print ISSN : 0289-3428
ISSN-L : 0289-3428
Volume 46, Issue 1
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Displaying 1-9 of 9 articles from this issue
an essay
  • Hisashi Nakao
    2012 Volume 46 Issue 1 Pages 1-16
    Published: 2012
    Released on J-STAGE: January 13, 2016
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    For the last two decades, since Barkow et al. (1992), evolutionary psychology has been fiercely criticized by many philosophers of science and other scientists. This article aims to rebut these criticisms and defend the research program of evolutionary psychology. I mainly focus on three criticisms: (1) we have not evolved as many modules in the changing environments as evolutionary psychologists have assumed, (2) massive modularity hypothesis fails, and (3) it is difficult to infer the present from the past. Through rebutting them, I conclude that evolutionary psychology is methodologically valid, and also empirically promising to some degree.
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  • Yasushi Nomura
    2012 Volume 46 Issue 1 Pages 17-33
    Published: 2012
    Released on J-STAGE: January 13, 2016
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    Bertrand Russell has found the paradox that bears his own name in the spring of 1901 and offered a version of the so-called “simple” theory of types as measures against it in an appendix to The Principles of Mathematics (1903). This theory was devised to deal with the class-version of that paradox. But he formulated it also in terms of “predicates” and the type theory has no effect to this formulation. In this paper, I shall show that Russell offered measures also against the “predicate”-version of that paradox in the Principles and it is very interesting in a sense that it enables to avoid the paradox without forbidding self-predications of predicates in general.
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  • Takashi Aso
    2012 Volume 46 Issue 1 Pages 35-51
    Published: 2012
    Released on J-STAGE: January 13, 2016
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    After the epic essay “Epistemology Naturalized” by Quine, various kinds of naturalistic epistemology has been advanced. While Goldman and others advocated reliabilism in the traditional epistemological context, Laudan pronounced naturalistic philosophy of science. Reliabilism held by Goldman and scientific antirealism held by Laudan may seem to be incompatible with each other. In this article I show that these two views are conformable to each other.
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  • Daisuke Nakamura
    2012 Volume 46 Issue 1 Pages 53-68
    Published: 2012
    Released on J-STAGE: January 13, 2016
    JOURNAL FREE ACCESS
    This paper aims to elucidate what intuition is regarded to be in Jean Cavaillès’ philosophy of mathematics, by investigating his study of the emergence of Cantorian set theory. Cavaillès construes the emergence to consist in three steps: first, Georg Cantor invented point-set derivation to solve a problem for analysis; second, he also showed that point-set derivation can produce infinitely ascending derived sets without arriving at any continuum; third, by replacing point-set derivation with two generating principles and a restricting principle, Cantor established the existence of transfinite ordinal numbers. Cavaillès finds a central role of mathematical intuition in the emergence of set theory thus construed.
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Critical Notice
Memorial Writing
Program of the 45th Annual Meeting (2012)
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