Camouflage is a widespread phenomenon in nature, yet it presents a challenge for researchers in animal communication. In this discipline, there are two main views on camouflage. The first excludes camouflage from research because animal signals presuppose detection by a receiver, whereas camouflage is an evolved behavior aimed at avoiding detection. The second lumps camouflage together with mimicry under the notion of lying or deception. I will argue that each of these views has its own shortcomings and that camouflage creates a dilemma that lies between them. To resolve this dilemma, I will address the development of the former view by introducing the notion of information masking.

    The fourth edition of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations was published in 2009. The most radical change from previous editions is that the portion that once formed Part II of the book has been discarded in this new edition. This article examines the reasons for eliminating the part given by von Wright and the new editors of the Investigations, attempting to show that those reasons are not convincing. I draw on letters and circumstances to show that Wittgenstein would not have published the manuscript TS227 as it stood. Instead, it is more plausible that the closest that Wittgenstein ever came to completing the Investigations is not the text of TS227 alone but that of TS227 supplemented with further material; the most finished form of the latter is TS234.

    The topic of this paper is practical knowledge, which an agent has about their intentional action. There is a puzzle of practical knowledge, namely, we have two conflicting intuitions about practical knowledge. On the one hand, practical knowledge seems not to be evidenced by theoretical reasoning and observation. On the other hand, it seems to be so. To this puzzle, I complement and develop by reference to the modified version of the two visual systems hypothesis the perception solution, according to which practical knowledge is evidenced by not observation but rather perception.

    Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the view that claims that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. As the reductionist approach to consciousness has seemed stuck, panpsychism and illusionism have raised as the alternatives. Recently, illusionism has attracted those who hesitate to hold panpsychism. Illusionism may liberate study of consciousness from the metaphysical preoccupations by debunking the hard problem of consciousness as a pseudo problem. Instead, illusionists suggests that what we should address is the illusion problem: why do we believe that phenomenal consciousness exists, even though it does not?