This paper is intended as an investigation of A. C. Pigou's ethics. Thus far, few attempts have been made to investigate his philosophical (ethical) side. The point I want to make is that, contrary to the ordinary interpretation, Pigou's ethical idea does not belong to the traditional hedonistic utilitarian view espoused by Bentham, J. S. Mill, and Sidgwick, but to the ideal (i. e., non-hedonistic) utilitarian view originated by G. E. Moore.
First, it is notable that Pigou, following Moore, recognizes that “good” is indefinable; he clearly makes a distinction between “What is good?” and “What is the good?” Pigou's response to the latter is as follows.
In the hedonistic utilitarian view, the only intrinsically good thing is “pleasure.” Pigou, in his early article (1907), completely disagrees with this thesis. He asserts that pleasure is not the sole good, and that there are plural elements (i. e., not only pleasure but also love, good will, and so on) which are intrinsic goods; they compose a state of conscious life. A state of conscious life, Pigou says, is a complex of many factors such as those remarked above. In describing how a state of conscious life as a complex whole does have intrinsic value, Pigou relates that the goodness of conscious states is, to use a mathematical phrase, a function of several variables, some of which can be specified (i. e., pleasure, love, good will); the dependent variable represents the intrinsic value of the complex whole.
In a later article (1932), Pigou discusses a problem quite different from that laid out above: what sort of actions ought to be performed? This is, to put it briefly, a problem of the relation between good and right. In short, Pigou defines right as “the cause of a good result”, which is thus identical with “useful”; he positively affirms that the end (i. e., the intrinsic good) always will justify the means, and any action that is not justified by its consequences can not be right. This is a typical teleological view.
It follows from what has been said above that Pigou and Moore make use of the same ethical reasoning when answering two questions: “What is the good?” and “What kind of action ought to be performed?” That is to say, Pigou, as well as Moore, adopts teleology (consequentialism), plurality in the theory of value, and commensurability of plural goods. Further, the commensurability is based on the intuitive idea of good, and then this is a kind of idealism. On these grounds, I have come to the conclusion that Pigou is the ideal utilitarian.

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This paper deals with three issues which will be considered in terms of waiting, developed as liquidity preference function problems after J. M. Keynes. Firstly, expectation is halved with time expectation in reflective expectation by reinterpretation of Lucas critique, and uncertainty of the reflective expectation formation is considered. Secondly, as an applied example of reflective expectation, it is considered why Keynes used a term of marginal efficiency of capital rather than marginal efficiency of investment. Thirdly, it is shown that the rational expectation formation would not contain expectation formation with waiting in Keynes' meaning.
The argument is as follows. In section I, the problem of waiting is discussed as one of expectation formation. Then, our concept of waiting is defined as an expansion of it used in Keynes' General Theory, referring to Hicks' interpretation of liquidity preference function. In section II, Lucas critique is compared with Keynes' famous metaphor of a beauty contest, in order to examine the relationship between waiting and reflective expectation. The basis of the reflective expectation formation is pursued by using Lucas critique. In the traditional interpretation of Keynes, reflective expectation has been thought of in light of the metaphor of a beauty contest only in money market. However, reflective expectation also works in commodity market. While some regarded these problems as self-evident, others failed to deal with appropriately. It explains how they failed to recognize them as problem of action theory and how relevant theories remained to be lacking in their micro-foundation. The metaphor of a beauty contest and the differences between its implications and Lucas critique are also examined. In section III, it is explained that the marginal efficiency of capital plays a different role from marginal efficiency of investment by taking account of reflective expectation.
Hence, it will be concluded that waiting could be conceptualized in a way that supports the marginal efficiency of capital as well as liquidity preference function, and that its concept deviates from the rational expectation formation.

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Harrod's Dynamics represented a methodological revolution because his trade cycle theory not only connects multiplier and relation (acceleration) with each other, but also rejects the explanation of trade cycle by sequence of temporary equilibrium. Harrod showed the originality of his dynamics as the difference between lag theory of Samuelson, Hicks, Tinbergen etc. and antinomy theory of his own. But few number of economist understood the essence of his antinomy theory.
Baumol, Alexander and many others regarded Harrod's theory as imperfect because his fundamental equation is merely identical equation, therefore it does not determine the behavior of the next moment. They thought the behavioral equation must be added in order to complete Harrod's model.
Shackle insisted Harrod's ‘one point in time’ approach excluded the essential uncertainty in decision-making. Okishio insisted that difference-differential equation is essential for the completion of Harrod's instability principle. Although Besomi, scholar of Harrod's economics, introduces the Harrod's methodology, he also regards the fundamental equation in Harrod's Essay as missing the consideration of expectations.
All critics above did not understand that his dynamics represents a direction of the movement at the very moment in time and need not have a behavioral equation. Harrod thought the moment analysis is more important than locus in the time sequence. But they held that the opposite of his intention was true.
Despite these critiques I insist that Harrod's antinomy theory is valid and his methodology is very useful. For my conclusion I criticize Okishio model, which is representative interpretation of Harrod's instability principle so far. The model has two behavioral equations for product-decision and investment-decision.
Harrod's fundamental equation expresses the antinomy of economic structure, which always exists, by the form of identical equation. Identical equation is objective, valid for qualitative analysis. His objective approach is similar to Keynes's approach which uses the fundamental equation in A Treatise on Money and the instantaneous multiplier in General Theory.
Harrod's antinomy theory has been lost because the objective approach to dynamics was not understood. It is to emphasize that the ultimate cause of misunderstandings is a strong leaning toward the micro foundation of modern economics. We incline to start with individually subjective decision-making, not objective structure.

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It is probably W. Bagehot who coined the term ‘economic man’. As is commonly acknowledged, however, ‘economic man’ played a substantial role in classical political economy long before the term was coined. This survey examines the literature treating the classical economic man from three aspects: motives and rationality, historical characteristics, and epistemological foundations. (1) The classical economic man was characterized by several motives and rationality. The motives included self-interest and the desire for wealth. Rationality indicated that economic man attempted to obtain additional wealth with as little sacrifice as possible. The motives, however, were deleted from the concept of neo-classical economic man set out in the 1930s, and rationality came to be considered as the essence of the notion. (2) Interpretations on the historical characteristics of economic man differ. Some regard the classical economic man as a real agent who appeared in a particular area and period. Others insist that the economic man is an abstract or hypothetical man, the features of which indicates a universal tendency applicable to all economic situations, although the realization of tendency is more or less interfered with by disturbing forces. The relations between society and the individual are another issue. The economic man is said to be based on methodological individualism, but the classical concept does not ignore the influence of society upon individual. (3) Classical methodologists such as N. W. Senior, J. S. Mill, and J. E. Cairns thought that the motives and rationality of economic man could be clarified through the processes of reflection and analogy. Senior, however, realized a defect in this method. Adam Smith suggested an interesting method by which to test the results of reflection and analogy. If the concept of economic man is accepted, it can be considered to stand as a true assumption of economic action.

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In considering the reasons why W. Petty devised political arithmetic and why C. Davenant, though critical of it, inherited it, it seems too easy to define political arithmetic simply as a practice of gathering numbers or general quantification. Political arithmetic indeed contained its own polemical and political issues, which are impossible to understand without considering its intellectual and socio-economic context. Recent studies have shown that the skepticism and instability of society, as described and presented by Thomas Hobbes, were the essential factors characterizing the society of early modern England. Hobbes and the early political arithmeticians lived in the same milieu; one characterized by instability and fear. In such a society it was hard to reach consensus about what was the truth or accurate knowledge. R. Tuck and C. Muldrew demonstrated how Hobbes tried to overcome this deeply penetrating skepticism by means of political realism and legal authority. S. Shapin and S. Shaffer insisted that in seventeenth century England, what was ‘truth’ was not self-evident, but had to be made clear through the artificial process of the gentlemen's society. Some other elaborate studies on the classical rhetoric of Renaissance England suggested it was doubtful that the abuse of rhetorical skill might distort knowledge, and, on the other hand, that the intellectuals of that time, including Hobbes, must have tried to persuade the audience, using rhetoric as one means to do so. This instability concerning knowledge in early modern England explains the background that political arithmeticians shared with their contemporaries. They sought to acquire more ‘accurate’ quantified data to use for the mercantile policy. J. Brewer and M. Okura set this new method of gathering numbers in the context of international conflict, in which it was used as a means to gain more relative power. To extend their political, economical, and military power, the mercantile states needed more useful and trustworthy information. This involved political arithmetic; knowledge gathering in this context was inherently political from its birth. Neither Petty nor Davenant constructed it solely to support purely scientific Baconian philosophy. They created it and used it with clear tactical intent. Thus, it is implied that there was more behind the birth of political arithmetic than Baconianism and so called civic humanism. For example, classical republicanism was just a part of humanism, which has multiple aspects, including Tacitism and classical rhetoric. In addition to Baconianism, there were various attempts to challenge epistemological and moral-political skepticism.

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