The purpose of this paper is to examine Keynes as a philosopher in view of the relation among A Treatise on Probability (1921), Ramsey's criticism (1926), Keynes' acceptance of Ramsey's criticism (1931), “My Early Beliefs” (1938), and Keynes' criticism of Tinbergen (1939).
The conclusion is as follows:
(1) In his youth, Keynes firmly believed in human rationality, as described in his philosophical work, A Treatise on Probability and his memoir, “MyEarly Beliefs.” However, in the midst of the chaos of post-WW 1 Europe he became more and more skeptical of human rationality and showed a greater awareness of the emotional aspect of human nature, which is typically shown in his criticism of the market society and his advocacy of the New Liberalism in The End of Laissez-Faire (1926). As the years went by, Keynes' skepticism became deeper and deeper and came to stress the importance of custom and tradition, while he came to revalue the market society in face of the realities of the Soviet society.
(2) Keynes abandoned the most essential part of his A Treatise on Probability, which regards probability as degrees of rational belief between propositions, and the justification of induction based on it, in the face of Ramsey's criticism. This is evidently recognizable in his obituary of Ramsey and “My Early Beliefs”. However, he did not abandon his theory of probability completely, which is shown in his critical review of Tinbergen (1939). In Part V (The Foundations of Statistical Inference) of A Treatise on Probability, Keynes had criticized the mathematical use of statistical frequencies (Methods of Laplace) and defended the inductive use of them (Methods of Lexis). Keynes' criticism of Tinbergen's method is mainly based on this stance. We have Keynes who accepted Ramsey's criticism on the one hand, and retained the Methods of Lexis on the other. A logical fissure seems to run between Part III (Induction and Analogy) and Part V.

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Between the late 18th and the early 19th century, the Scottish Society experienced rapid industrialization and urbanization which caused various kinds of urban problems. Glasgow, especially, was notorious as “the unhealthiest city in Britain”. Moreover, since the poor relief system of Glasgow was increasingly burdened by the increase of costs and prices due to the Napoleonic wars, economic distress and epidemic, it was seriously complained of. In 1819, Thomas Chalmers was appointed minister of St. John's in Glasgow and attempted, as the Evangelical clergy, a new experiment in poor relief. Most scholars have regarded the experiment as less than successful. Though their evaluations still have some validity, this paper is concerned with Chalmers' intention regarding poor relief in terms of theory and thought as well as practice. It will clarify the historical significance of Chalmers' views of poor relief through examination of the relation of his experiment to his theory and thought.
Chalmers criticized the poor relief program of Glasgow for being complicated, and having a physical and mental distance between the recipients and the providers of relief. Thus he built up at his parish a poor relief system which was structurally and financially independent of any other organization. He expected that poor relief should be provided by the parish itself, and the morality of the poor be improved. Meanwhile, he identified the final cause of poverty as a tendency for a population to increase beyond the natural limit of food production. He pointed out that there were two sorts of measures to solve this problem: “an external remedy” and “an internal remedy.” He went on to assert that the former, for instance, a home colonization and an increase in the productivity of manufacturers, would be useless without the latter. “An internal remedy” meant that laborers should contemplate the futures of their families and defer marriage by excising their “prudence and principles from within.” At the same time he explained that whether labor wages were high or low would depend on labor supply which depended on the laborers' decision in turn. Thus he concluded that poor relief ultimately depended on the laborers' behavior. We can understand that the conclusion as such was interrelated with his experiment.
Chalmers' theory, thought and practice were agreeable to the landlords who demanded the reduction of their burden of the poor relief and to the New Whigs who claimed the complete protection of property. However, his original intention consisted in the argument that the laborers had to transform themselves into the adequate actors in order to survive in the new industrial and urban society.

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Sugiyama's major contribution to mercantilism studies is that he succeeded in clarifying the details and historical meanings of Land Bank projects in English mercantilism. In the process of his thorough scrutiny, he made clear some features common to mercantilist economic arguments by reviewing a number of original writings, and came to recognize what was referred to as a “broad sense of mercantilism.”
His contribution is due to his unique empirical approach to the history of economic thought, leading him to criticize the Ohtsuka School of history for its schematic dichotomy. He was also opposed to the concept of “Essential Mercantilism” proposed by the school. His thought is truly suggestive of what mercantilism studies should be.
His broad sense of mercantilism consists of several features, of which he particularly emphasized “the acquisition of money (wealth) by foreign trade” and “the view of international confrontation based on nationalism.” He put particular importance on the international and imperialistic trade cycles of mercantilism. Sugiyama's perspective could provide a basis for many informative and meaningful future studies of mercantilism.

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In the “standard” history of economics, Knight was positioned as an “orthodox” economist who contributed to the development of neo-classical economics, and as “an ideological opponent of institutional economics.” Indeed, Knight took a critical attitude to the attack on “Traditional Economics” by American institutional economists, especially in the 1920s. However, in recent years, the “heterodox” elements and affinities with institutionalists of his work have been emphasized by certain studies. Moreover, several times he called himself an “institutionalist.” The question we have to ask is why (and how) Frank Knight, who has institutionalist elements, criticized his contemporary American institutionalists. The purpose of this paper is to answer this question by examining his articles in the context of the American economic thought of his day.
Knight agreed with most of his contemporary institutional economists regarding the necessity for a “reconsideration” of Traditional Economics. However, he criticized the institutionalist criticism of Traditional Economics as being “irrelevant, ” because, he said, they didn't understand the significance of deductive theory. Knight recognized the limitations of deductive theory; nevertheless, he emphasized its meaning in economics. Knight although criticized the institutionalists regarding their attempts to make economics more “scientific” like other natural sciences. He argued that this claim stood on the misunderstanding of the difference between natural science and social science. Knight emphasized that social science addresses many elements which are irrelevant in natural science. Knight argued that economics is not only a science but also an art. In addition, he positioned institutional economics positively as a “philosophy of history, ” which treats the long-term changes in the datum of deductive and applied economics as the object of consideration.
It is important to note that clarifying such a methodological position as Knight's may help us to understand why his main themes shifted from economics, in the narrow sense, to the historical and philosophical consideration of social economic systems. Since the mid-1930s, this shift has reflected the historical changes of western civilization after the emergence of Fascism and the New Deal, which comprised the long-term changes in the datum of economics. His discreet attitude, which placed both deductive economics and institutional economics in their proper positions, isolated him from both the mainstream institutionalists and the neoclassicists. However, his methodological position itself was consistent throughout his academic life. His economics, in the narrow sense, and the institutional economics defined by Knight, held a common value in his economic thought.

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In The Theory of Business Enterprise (1904), T. B. Veblen pointed out that the modern entrepreneurs had not performed the classical role of coordinator in allocating resources, nor were they innovators, but had became Captains of Industry by conducting endless mergers and acquisitions in order to increase the value of their concern's capital. This new entrepreneurial activity, however, has essentially a “confidence game” character, it is not always connected with industrial serviceability. Even if he wins in “pecuniary” competition by superior marketing strategy, it doesn't necessarily follow “real” success. Conversely, he may sabotage the improvement of productivity by price-production control or collusion with the others, in case their asset value decrease. This is the reason why Veblen called them “parasites” of industrial society, and extended the theory of “chronic depression” that businessmen who lamented a desirable situation that social welfare in real-terms was rapidly growing looked as if they had suffered “a malady of the affection.” Veblen therefore expected that such entrepreneurs and their functions would fade way, and would finally be replaced by a “technocracy” in the far future.
In Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921), F. H. Knight insisted that an entrepreneur was the core of system of Big Business that had made possible not only the centralization of control, but also the diffusion of investment. In such a highly organized society, “moral hazard” or the principal-agent problem might not have been avoidable, so his special role was the selection of men: selecting some agents among specialists, assuring their fixed salary, and taking responsibility regardless of their results. To such decision-making and risk-taking activity Knight imputed profits, and concluded that the average profit was probably minus, or that the net result of the whole business activity might suffer loss. Nevertheless he also observed that business game would be continued by bold entrepreneurs having “confidence” in their ability or “luck, ” so that free enterprise should never fade way.
In sum, Veblen emphasized the scheme of so called Business vs. Industry and an entrepreneur's parasitic position. While Knight made allowance for the irrational character of the business game as Veblen, he also shed light on the humane aspect of entrepreneurship and its universality. In other words, their points of view were very close, and both revealed the crucial defects of the Big Business society, although their predictions for the future were divergent. Veblen and Knight stand back to back with each other.

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Germany from the 16th to early 19th century was mostly influenced by cameralism. Generally speaking, cameralism has a broad and narrow sense, and two periods (before and after 1727). Cameralism is called a variant of mercantilism in Germany. This can be considered accurate if we interpret mercantilism in a wider sense. But first these definitions must be verified from various points of view.
Roscher was the first authority on cameralism. Roscher included cameralism among the category of economics. Criticizing Roscher, Small says, “cameralism was not a theory and practice of economics but of politics. Cameralism was a technique and a theory of administering a peculiar type of state in a society constructed out of peculiar types of purposes (Small 1909, 3).” Before and after Small, Marchet, Stieda, Nielsen, Zielenziger, Sommer, Tautcher, and Tribe have made their respective interpretations. Marchet's point of view is from that of public administration, while Stieda's is from the history of the university at which a chair for cameralism had been founded in 1727. Nielsen comes from the aristotelianism, Zielenziger and Sommer come from German and Austrian mercantilism, Tautscher comes from public finance, while Tribe comes from the instituted ‘cameralism as science’ at German universities. The subject of Tribe's cameralistic study is after 1727. Their main issues were whether or not cameralism is mercantilism, and whether or not cameralism is a science (such as economics or politics). Their interpretations may differ from each other's.
We can regard Seckendorff as a representative of old and new cameralists. He served at the court of Herzog Ernst in Gotha. What underlies his main book Teutscher Fürstenstat is his great deal of experience at Gotha. He wrote the book making use of his own practical experience and finally became a model cameralist; Small said that Seckendorff was the Adam Smith of cameralism (Small 1909, 69). Seckendorff's thought has been divided and refined into various branches by new cameralists (Gasser, Dithmar, Justi and Sonnenfels etc.), that is, economic science, the science of Polizei (the future public administration), and cameralism (the future public finance). Therefore, Seckendorff must be the center of attention in cameralistic study. Accordingly, our starting point is Seckendorff and his Teutscher Fürstenstat. The distinction between what new cameralists accepted from Seckendorff and what they didn't accept from him should be made clearly. This distinction can be held to characterize cameralism and at the same time determine cameralism's scope and limits.
Recently, students of early modern German history have rendered great service to our learned society. For example, Brunner, Oestreich, and Stolleis have revealed to us that absolute princes in those days had not always unlimited powers. It is necessary for us to trace once more the history of cameralism, paying more attention to the important results of historian research. A strong knowledge of the German condition in those days (state, government, religion, industry, concepts of ‘happiness, welfare, Polizei and Regalien, ’ and so on) is required for a comprehensive understanding of cameralism.
We have made sure and steady progress in our study of cameralism. But we should endeavor to obtain an authentic image of cameralism, adding many case and area studies to the study of cameralist literature.

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The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief survey of the recent development of Evolutionary Economics. This paper addresses four representative approaches of Evolutionary Economics—Neo-Austrians, Neo-Schumpeterians, Modern Institutionalism, and Structural Dynamics—and investigates their recent theoretical progress and policy implications.
The essential points are as follows: Neo-Austrians have gradually tended to shift their central concern from the market process theory to the cognitive or knowledge structure of the subject. It seems that their aim is to deepen the bounded rationality or the conception of subjectivity through the assistance of adjacent disciplines. It is not evident whether this tendency actually produces a new foundation for the alternative market theory. However, judging from the common interests with a faction of the Neo-Schumpeterians which introduces Genetic Programming, it is likely that this will become one of the more popular research programs of Evolutionary Economics.
Neo-Schumpeterians seem to have diverged in recent years. Therefore, this paper focuses on the development of replicator dynamics. However, it is also argued that replicator dynamics points out some faults of a newly fashioned laissez-faire principle which seems to be based on Evolutionary Economics. Replicator dynamics turns our attention to the contradictory relationship between innovation and market mechanism through a new perspective on the role of ‘variety.’
Modern Institutionalism has two types of cumulative causation; the one is theoretical and policy intended, and the other is methodological and philosophical. This paper indicates the recent shift from the former to the latter in Modern Institutionalisms' concerns.
Lastly, it is argued that Structural Dynamics seems to have revived some policy implications of Pasinetti's original model. The policy implication of that model was to apply the growth of productivity to the reduction of input materials including working time, not to increase of amount of goods as usual. This paper investigates some attempts to revive such a forgotten theme, and explores their implications for Evolutionary Economic Policy.

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It has often been said that Adam Smith adapted his idea of the mechanism of the self-regulating market from physics. The regulating principle of natural price in his theory has the same explanatory role as the concept of gravitation has in Newtonian system. This view has been reinforced by the fact that young Smith wrote a serious study on the history of astronomy and, based on his methodological viewpoint, discussed the development of the science from the ancient to Newton. Contrary to this familiar notion however, he employed two kinds of metaphor in The Wealth of Nations, the one is of the machine, and the other is of the human body. Recent years have seen renewed interest in nature, and the function of metaphor has been seen in various domains of science and philosophy. The studies based on the method of cognitive sciences, especially of cognitive linguistics, are worth mentioning among the literature treating the subject, for they have persuasively demonstrated that metaphor must have been regarded not only as a form of figurative statement but also as an indispensable tool of the human cognitive process. Smith's usage of scientific metaphor in The Wealth of Nations could be well interpreted from this point of view. It has been observed in the literature on metaphor that the employment of metaphor endowed political discourse with persuasive power. It also has effectively been argued that metaphor was essential in a creative cognitive process in the way that it helped to reveal the unknown order of the subject of investigation, though it is still not certain that which of the explanations of its function, suggested by scholars in several different ways, is really working in the process.
Smith and Steuart seemed to agree that the machine was the adequate symbol of both the natural and political entity created by God. Explaining the property of the political body that attracted people's attention, Adam Smith frequently used the word “machine.” This symbolism seems to have been intended to represent visually the perfection of the complex mechanism of political institutions. James Steuart adopted this symbolism on several occasions. Along with the metaphor of machine, though, the image of the “body natural”, the human body, has played an important role in economic literature, representing the order of the economic system. Medicine provided metaphor, in a comparison of society to the human body, to the pioneers of economics, such as William Petty, Nicholas Barbon, John Locke, and François Quesnay, who were physicians as well. The metaphors depending on anatomy, circulation, reproduction, harmony, balance, symmetry, and the equilibrium of elements which constitute the natural body, the self-healing power of organism, etc., have been continuously employed in the history of economics up to the present by many economists, including Josiah Tucker and Adam Smith himself, who were not physicians. Thus, both metaphors contributed to the development of economic science and probably increased the persuasive power of economic writings at the same time.

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The Symposium on Austrian Economics held at South Royalton, Vermont, in 1974 was a pivotal event for the revival of the Austrian School of Economics. Graduate students of New York University have initiated various interesting studies under the instruction of Israel Kirzner in the 1970s. According to Kirzner, the doctrinal vitality of the Austrian Economics was revived through Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek and not through Fritz Machlup. Although a tension has been maintained between this group and neoclassical economics, it has created its own theories from within. In the 1980s, this school attracted interest in regard to its policy implications of so-called neo-liberalism. After the collapse of certain communist countries in 1989, this school was viewed as the main intellectual source for explaining why the ideology of socialism failed. Since the 1990s, this school has devoted its research to empirical matters and its methodological principles have been interpreted in a more pragmatic way. The Austrian Economists are now concerned with this school's development rather than its justification.
The core theory of the Austrian Economics lies in the fields “the knowledge theory” and “the process theory of the market.” Roughly speaking, there are three major versions of the core theory in the recent development of the Neo-Austrian School of Economics. The first is the Rothbardian catallactic theory, which emphasizes rational actions in every transaction in the market and is less concerned with the coordination problem of the market. The second is the Kirznerian entrepreneurial theory, which emphasizes the capacity of alertness rather than the action itself, and devotes much concern to the problem of market coordination. The third is the Lachmannian kaleidic process theory, which emphasizes radical uncertainty and an ever-changing market process where the coordinating forces of the market are not sufficient for attaining a stable and conventional market economy.
Based on these three versions of the Austrian theory, its current research proceeds in various directions. The basic question of this school regards how market order is possible under the condition of the insufficient coordination of the market process. The leading Austrians are now investigating this question from various points: for example, R. Koppl's phenomenological and linguistic game theory, Y. B. Choi's convention-paradigm theory, D. Lavoie's hermeneutic theory, and so on.
On the other hand, this basic question is related to the following question: how can we constitute a good condition for utilizing the function of “the invisible hand” for better growth of a society under the condition of insufficient coordination? D. Harper. P. Lewin, and so on now study this question. There is also a derived question regarding the ethics of a market economy, which M. Rizzo and L. Yeager are now studying.

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