Clément Juglar (1819-1905) was credited by Joseph Schumpeter as the founder of modern business-cycle theory. Schumpeter praised Juglar for identifying the cyclical character of economic fluctuations and for having been seminal in the combination of theoretical, statistical and historical analysis, and also named the classical business cycle after the French economist. Strikingly, the latter's pioneering work is hardly known today. The paper reexamines Juglar's explanation of cyclical fluctuations and compares it with Schumpeter's one. One important difference is that for Schumpeter the classical business cycle is driven by technological innovations of medium size, whereas for Juglar the cause for an overheated boom is speculation fuelled by easy credit.

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In The Spirit of the Laws Montesquieu discusses two important regimes from the perspective of the historical formation of the realm of the “civil”: on the one hand England, and on the other, the French monarchy. In the case of the former, with regard to the formation of the “civil, ” he recognizes the emergence of republican government through the development of commercial society from the end of the 15th to the latter half of the 17th century. In the case of the French monarchy, the “civil” developed in context of the formation of feudal society itself, principally from the decline of the Roman Empire to the end of the 10th century; it was this period that gave birth to the class of nobility that sustained the juridical system and constituted the intermediate power in this regime. Here, present a clear, explicit statement of the objectives and argument of the paper.
In this context, a comparison between Montesquieu and James Harrington appears to have crucial meaning for the reconsideration of republicanism, which is usually thought to be inherited from Greco-Roman tradition. Harrington, in The Commonwealth of Oceana, wants to revive ancient republics in the modern world and presents a theoretical model for contemporary 17th-century England. In contrast to Harrington, Montesquieu, in a more strictly historical approach, traces the foundations of both the contemporary English and French regimes back to feudal society and there finds the origin of institutions such as the representation system and independent judicial power, which form the basis of moderate government in both countries. In this context, Montesquieu situates the German tribes especially as described by Caesar and Tacitus at the starting point of feudalism.
Montesquieu attempts to demonstrate that modern Europe was formed after the decline of Roman Empire through a process of historical contamination from both Roman and German inheritances, and it is through this perspective that we can reconsider the above-mentioned republicanism, whose genealogy until now has been limited to the Greco-Roman tradition.

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Ricardo redesigned the labour theory of value in his Principles, which was published in 1817. Robert Torrens produced numerous works (1818, 1821, 1822a, 1822b, 1822c, 1829) and “Fragments on Torrens Concerning Value” (1818, in the Works of David Ricardo, IV), but as early as 1818 he was already attempting to refute Ricardo's theory by proposing his own “capital theory of value.” This paper focuses on Torrens's refutation of the Ricardian labour theory of value and considers the several numerical examples he employed in his refutation.
There is general consensus on two points in particular regarding Torrens's theory of value: first, his capital theory of value was just another representation of the labour theory of value, and second, his refutation of the Ricardian labour theory of value is valid to a certain extent. This paper scrutinizes the process through which many commentators on Torrens's theory of value have reached their conclusions, although it does not find any objections to those conclusions.
Torrens based each of his works on different definitions of “labour, ” which lets us understand the various ways in which the embodied concept of “labour” can be reckoned. With each successive work, noted above, Torrens corrected mistakes in previous works. This paper begins by building models based on his last numerical example, given in Corn Trade (1826-29), and then shows the process of his corrections. In this way we can reestablish the limits of his refutation of the labour theory of value and of his own value theory, making possible the argu ment that he would play the role of Auflösung der Ricardoschen Schule.

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John Stuart Mill was strongly influenced by Charles Babbage in his analysis of the firm. However, research has not yet fully clarified the relationship between Mill and Babbage. The purpose of this paper is to point out features of Mill's thought on management through a contrast with Babbage's analysis of the company.
When Mill made his analysis of the firm, he applied to it his own original perspective and ideas, while drawing on what he learned from Babbage. First, he attempted to demonstrate that an administrator's management capability and efforts created a difference in profits through “wages of superintendence, ” which was one component profit. Second, in evaluating the appropriateness of introducing limited liability, he not only looked at the issue of creditor protection but also considered the promotion of the establishment of associations. Third, he showed that cooperation was a factor that could lead to increases in the efficiency of an organization. Since humans have an innate desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures, we have an inherent capability for cooperation. However, in order to strengthen this capability, activities must be carried out in an association, the locus for independent workers to pursue profit of the whole based on their own judgments. Unlike Babbage, Mill believed it indispensable that independent individuals cultivate their humanity through cooperation. It is likely that on this point, he did not easily accept Babbage's approach, which was based on ideas of scientific management.

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The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that Edgeworth's Mathematical Psychics (1881) has been influenced by various intellectual contemporaries through the ‘Sidgwick-Barratt Controversy, ’ which concerned not only the adoption of physical methods to ethics but also the question of what is the first principle of the conduct. In this controversy, Barratt admitted the physical methods of ethics, but Sidgwick rejected them; and also, while Sidgwick arrived at the ‘Dualism of Practical Reason, ’ the conflict between egoism and utilitarianism, Barratt insisted the former was the only principle.
Edgeworth admitted the physical methods of ethics under the influence of Barratt beginning with the publication of New and Old Methods of Ethics (1877), at least up to Mathematical Psychics; which is clear from his adoption of the ‘Fechner's Law’ to measure the quantity of pleasure.
In Mathematical Psychics, through the analysis of the contract between egoistic agents, Edgeworth attempted to prove the limits of adopting egoism and its need of utilitarianism as the solution to the ‘Dualism of Practical Reason'; this endeavor is opposite to Sidgwick as well as Barratt, and it cannot be completed without reference to Jevons’ economics.
Though Edgeworth justified the utilitarianism, he criticized ‘equality’ tacitly implied in it. Edgeworth believed that the capacity for pleasure/work is roughly different among the different classes (people who generally tend to inherit the superior capacities belong to the higher), and also that those capable of pleasure should have more means and more pleasure. According to such ideas, unequal distribution is admitted as the ‘distributive justice’ for the greatest happiness of the society. Edgeworth called his utilitarianism ‘exact Utilitarianism, ’ and it was critical not only of Benthamism but also Sidgwick who accepted Bentham's formula.
Thus, Edgeworth's Mathematical Psychics is not only the economic but also ethical work influenced especially by the ‘Sidgwick-Barratt Controversy.’

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In 1924 Rudolf Hilferding, a German social democratic theorist and political leader, recognized the considerable stability that followed the currency reform, and fully aware of entrenched antidemocratic and anti-Semitic currents in the German populace, he was all the more determined to emphasize the importance of democracy. He won a seat in the parliament and published an academic monthly, Die Gesellschaft, which he hoped would help bridge the intellectual hiatus between schools of thought. He was also actively engaged in political education at the German College of Politics.
Regarding recent social changes, he pointed to a tendency toward “organized capitalism” that was in actuality based on expanding cartels and trusts: and as an alternative he urged the building of an “economic democracy, ” political democratization of the state, and “realistic pacifism, ” especially through supranational organizations. He treated these points not as part of a programmatic doctrine but as significant contemporary problems that needed to be explored carefully and in depth. Not completely certain about the direction of socialism in the future, he envisaged workers' participation in management.
When the Third Emergency Tax Decree was issued, Hilferding responded by calling for taxation on inflationary gains and the national legislation on housing rents, and he opposed the revaluation of mortgages. He advised the government to take comprehensive measures, including investigation of cartels and restrictions on credit. Hilferding seized on the regulation of reparations payments in the Dawes Plan as a way to achieve political and economic stabilization on the basis of territorial reunification and the transfer system, and he pushed for revision of related laws in the National Economic Council.
Thereupon he persuaded his party to adopt his resolution to accept the Dawes Plan, German participation in the League of Nations, and other social policies. Finally he was successful in persuading the parliament to accept the Dawes Plan in late August 1924. This was a precondition for the relative stabilization that brought Germany some social balance and rehabilitated it in the international society for the first time after the revolution and the hyperinflation. Thus, it is safe to say that Hilferding theoretically and practically contributed much to the realization of the relative stabilization, and furthermore, proposed a new significant vision of society in the future.

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This paper is an investigation of the evolution of R. F. Harrod's theory of imperfect competition. Its central purpose is to show how Harrod shifted the focus of his theory from the market structure to decision-making by entrepreneurs under uncertainty.
In 1930, Harrod published an article in which he attempted to resolve the problem of the compatibility of competitive equilibrium with decreasing costs. He demonstrated that competitive equilibrium with decreasing costs in the short and long periods might be regarded as ‘normal’ to certain industries.
Joan Robinson argued in 1932 that long-period equilibrium under imperfect competition must necessarily be associated with excess capacity. Harrod challenged that view, saying that her theory was based on unrealistic assumptions concerning the freedom competitors had to find and enter the market as easily as pre-existent firms. Thus, with his theoretical focus trained on the market structure, Harrod's early criticism of ‘the doctrine of excess capacity’ centered on his doubt that ‘free entry’ was a sustainable assumption in the case of imperfect competition.
Thereafter, Harrod's thinking was heavily influenced by the work of the Oxford Economists' Research Group. He accepted the position that entrepreneurial activities were shrouded in a ‘thick mist of uncertainty, ’ and he tried to dispel some of the ‘mist’ by understanding and clarifying the intentions of entrepreneurs at the moment when they made pricing and investment decisions. He reconstructed his theory on the basis of extensive empirical observations, and he based his later criticism of ‘the doctrine of excess capacity’ on actual behaviors of entrepreneurs: full-cost pricing and subjective creation of excess capacity. Thus Harrod's later theory was mainly concerned with the decision-making of entrepreneurs under uncertainty. This paper suggests that the evolution in Harrod's theory corresponded to the change in his approach to the market phenomenon.

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Gunnar Myrdal is well known as a pioneer in development economics, but his theories have not been investigated thoroughly enough to enable comparison with other development economists who were his contemporaries. Apart from his famous work Asian Drama (1968), Myrdal's development economics has been almost forgotten.
The aim of this paper is to revisit and reevaluate Myrdal's theory on underdeveloped countries: the theory of cumulative causation. He has been often criticized as overly pessimistic. His theory has been dismissed as mere lists of facts and lacking concrete substance. Persuaded that those views are not justified, I attempt in this paper to demonstrate why Myrdal's theory merits greater attention.
Myrdal's theory on underdeveloped countries can be interpreted properly only after careful consideration of its relationship to his other studies, especially his methodology of “explicit value premises.” He criticized some development theories that incorporated colonial theory and Rostow's theory of the stages of growth, for example, for having implicit political bias. We can, then, understand Myrdal's critiques through the interpretation of his methodology.
The theory of cumulative causation constituted an alternative in at least two respects: First, it focused on the process of enlarging inequality, which resulted in making the notion of stable equilibrium relative to other kinds of equilibrium. Second, it gave serious attention to non-economic or institutional factors. Hence Myrdal called for an “institutional approach.” He considered overall linkage among factors and argued the possibility of another, more egalitarian process for growth.

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This paper considers the history of game theory since von Neumann and Morgenstern published their monumental work The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944. It points out changes in research themes and discusses what game theory has achieved up to the present. The aim of von Neumann and Morgenstern was “to find the mathematically complete principles which define rational behavior for the participants in a social economy, and to derive from them the general characteristics of that behavior.” Extending the theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern, Nash classified all games as either non-cooperative games or cooperative games and defined the notion of an equilibrium point for a non-cooperative game. Nash also suggested a research program, now called the Nash program, to analyze a coop erative game by constructing a non-cooperative game model for negotiations. The main field of game theory was cooperative games in the 1950s and the 1960s. Thereafter, research trends in game theory in the 1970s and the 1980s shifted from cooperative games to non-cooperative games, led by the seminal works of Harsanyi on incomplete information games and Selten on perfect equilibrium in extensive games. This socalled non-cooperative revolution greatly promoted applications of non-cooperative game theory to economics. At the same time, researchers became increasingly dissatisfied with the strong assumption of rationality in traditional game theory, and consequently research interest turned toward two new fields in the 1990s. One is evolutionary game theory, developing out of evolutionary biology, and the other is behavioral game theory, which collaborates with psychology. Evolutionary game theory investigates dynamic processes of evolution and learning in economic behavior, and it reformulates game equilibrium as a stable stationary state of those dynamic processes. Behavioral game theory studies the structures of motivation, cognition, and reasoning in human decision-making using the methodology of experiments. This paper shows how present-day research in game theory is developing in divergent fields that consider both traditional theory based on unbounded rationality and behavioral theory exploring human bounded rationality. Game theory continues to be one of the most active research fields in economics.

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The modern market economy which we seek to build should have a decidedly social constitution. Its social character is based primarily on the fact that it is able to offer a greater and more varied quantity of goods at prices determined by the demands of the consumer, the resulting low prices raising the real value of wages and thereby permitting a greater and more extensive satisfaction of human needs.

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