In this symposium, conceptions of "legal subject" in contemporary jurisprudence are discussed from three view-points. First, so-called "narrative conceptions of subject" are further inquired and they are collated with "rational conceptions of legal subject". Secondly, the discussion focuses on whether these new conceptions of subject can (or will) provide fixed foundations to legal practices. Third, it is discussed how their critical potential can be actualized in confrontation with "the institutional reasoning".

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Why do claims for recognition of identity never subside, even under liberal societies where each individual is treated equally? Are these to be understood as negations of liberal society? With the intention of making a contribution to discussions about the subject of rights/law, this article approaches the question from two perspectives: philosophical and historical.
First, by tracing the genesis and development of the "self" in the light of philosophical anthropology in the 20th century, this article articulates how the structure of "persona", which means both "personality" and "masquerade", is constitutive of "I". It also shows that recognition by others plays a crucial role, so that recognition should be counted as one of the human conditions. Second, the reason why the claims for recognition of identity are peculiar in modern society can be explained by the history of "the ethics of authenticity", which reflects the change of sources of identity, from socially derived to inwardly derived ones. This articulates the logic of "the politics of recognition" that, while inspiring autonomy, criticizes difference-blind policy in liberal society as a type of alienation.
If our society should be both liberal and decent, it has to consider how it can meet the need for recognition. It is not only because non- or misrecognition seriously distorts "persona", but also because the supposedly neutral liberal subject is a "persona", and therefore demanding each individual to be such a subject is itself a kind of violence which is imposed upon them. This article suggests that liberal society needs to inquire into the possibility to treat each individual not as a subject "already become" but as a subject "always becoming", and in this sense as if he/she is always an "alien" or "stranger" living in society.

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In this paper, I will examine Kenneth Gergen's self-narrative theory and try to make clear what differences there are between that theory and modernistic view of self. According to his theory, self is constructed as a narrative or story within or through various kinds of social interaction. That is a narrative about his/her own life in the past and future prospective. That is, any self-narrative can be characterized by the following three features:
1) Various events in his/her life are chosen and structured by him/herself (reflexive)
2) This structuring or storying depends on temporary sequence (diachronic)
3) That self-narrative is always told to others (relational)
Therefore in the self-narrative view self is understood to be more reflexive, more diachronic and more relational than a modernistic view has supposed it to be.
This view does not make any difference as long as people believe in a modern story about 'subject', which is told about mechanical/synchronic/individual self. In 'postmodern' societies, however, it is gradually considered to be of less advantage than the narrative view of self, that is, a story about self told from a narrative perspective. It is more advantageous especially in those two respects as follow:
1) Relational understanding of self
2) Access to uniqueness or singularity of each individual
But, nevertheless, it is difficult to reject the concept of 'subject' completely because we need that concept in order to attribute responsibility to an agency of various acts. Narrative theory of self faces difficulty in this regard. On the one hand, relational view tends to dissolve the concept of 'responsibility' itself because 'responsibility' can be dispersed into infinite social relations in this view. On the other hand, any kind of agency cannot be identified because uniqueness or singularity can be grasped only negatively in self-narrative theory.

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Human entities are of a psychic existence. They are of a pathos-like, passive existence and as such, need to act towards the outside world. The autonomous existence of an entity emerges when it actively engages the world, and through a common actual engagement with the world emerges the autonomy of an organisational entity. However, as a mechanistic way of thinking develops, the actual psychic existence of the entities comes to be replaced by a physical psychic existence. In such circumstances, although entities are still autonomous and make decisions on their own, they are unable actively to engage with the outside world. They are merely elements in an operational sequence, and the autonomous existence of not only the individual entities, but also of organisational entities is denied in such a situation. In recent years, with the growing influence of spiritualism, people increasingly become a virtual psychic existence. Here, the distinction between reality and the virtual world becomes blurred, and occasionally, a forceful, possibly even violent, realisation of the virtual world is attempted, although this does not mean that there is any actual commitment to the world.
Law cannot be immune from such transformation of entities, but the legal system has, however, so far been unable to cope with such entities in transformation. Problems such as the appropriateness of using brain-death as a criterion for medical death, refusal of blood transfusions by Jehovah's witnesses, and the control imposed on Aum-Shinrikyo as an organisation should be understood in this context.

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Legal recognition of same-sex marriage is one of the biggest political issues of gay and lesbian movements in both Canada and the U.S. While same-sex marriage was legalized in July 2005 in Canada; the equal right to marriage for gays and lesbians is far from being established in the U.S., as suggested by the debates during the 2004 elections. What makes so much difference between the two countries on this issue? In searching for a key to answer this question, this paper intends to trace the difference to different understandings of "the politics of recognition."
Comparing theories of "the politics of recognition" in Canada and the U.S., as represented by two distinguished thinkers, Nancy Fraser and Charles Taylor, this paper explores the critical points made by each thinker and the inevitable dilemma which "the politics of recognition" reveals. Unlike Fraser's argument that claims for social justice since the 90s are increasingly divided into two conflicted claims-one seeking redistributive justice and the other, the politics of recognition-Taylor points out that "the politics of recognition" is deeply rooted in the modern liberalism, especially the politics of equal respect.
Following the Hegelian idea of constructing self-consciousness, Taylor views recognition by others as crucial for self-formation, and misrecognition as fatal to it, especially in the modern age. Through the recent changes in the gay and lesbian movement in Canada, we can realize that seeking equal rights under the law paradoxically de-politicizes the claims of the liberation movement of the 70s, and worse than that, forces the multiple actors into the single category listed in the law.
"The politics of recognition" à la Taylor discloses that "identity politics" does not result from claims for recognition, but from claims for equal respect. Or rather, a superficial understanding of self formation under the politics of equal respect and uncritical belief in the reversibility of a self and others gets claims for recognition more acute and serious in the modern age.

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Now, more than a billion of squatters are living in cities all over the world. It is projected that, within a generation, this number will grow to two billion. More than half of the people living in cities will be squatters. Under such a condition, the concept of the "Right to the City" will acquire all the more importance. This paper attempts to explain the importance of the concept of the "Right to the City" in the era of globalization.

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As all of us know, recent theories of justice have been developing the rich discussions about the relationship between the idea of person and the public framework of distribution. The starting point for this development was set by John Rawls' seminal work, "A Theory of Justice" (1971), which formulated the basic framework of liberal justice in giving the invaluable conditions for individuals as the moral person to pursue divergent goods. Seen from this angle, not only liberal standpoints Rawls represented but also, for example, a libertarian standpoint are active in claiming that we need simple negative justice while requiring strong individualism that encourages self-help and independence. Further, communitarianism has been emphasizing the importance of common good that people share in heeding to the social bond among them. Also active are the movements for social justice that concerns the discriminated and excluded people due to racial and sexual identities.
We may find the three theoretical issues in this trend. One is what are the factors that are constitutive of human agency: is it agency that excludes particular differences, or identities that enroll particular differences? The other is what the value of justice tries to protect: is it what governs the distribution of goods, or remedies the wider relations of powers in society? And the last is how these two issues are combined and solved institutionally: are these dealt systemically by a monistic hierarchy of laws whose summit is constitutional law or addressed in a more multiple legal space from various angles?
The solution to these issues depends on what kind of conceptions we construct as to how we determine and make connections between the conception of agency, justice, and law. And the entire connection of these conceptions will articulate the perspective how the society in question is to be maintained as decent. In this paper, I wish to support the liberal standpoint and to explore a more sensible liberalism by rethinking the significance and potential of the idea of liberal equality which underlies the depth of the thought of liberalism. And, in so doing, I reconsider the possibility of responsiveness of that view toward the social circumstances and legal claims of cultural minorities, and think about the connections between the idea of human agency that takes into account the multiplicity of persons, the idea of resource-based equality of distribution that takes into account the contextual sensitivity, and the idea of law.

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According to Gilligan, women and men have different process of development in morality and conflicting ethical orientations. She expressed the difference in terms of 'ethic of care' and 'ethic of justice'. The debate between two ethics is called 'care/justice debate'. There are three positions. Many proponents of ethic of justice claim that ethic of justice is effective in public domain, while ethic of care can be applied to private domain. Many proponents of ethic of care criticize the modern concept of human being as autonomous and equal. Some radically exclude talk of justice. Noddings belongs to this stance. But caring without justice would raise difficult questions. Is there no moral obligation to strangers who cannot be cared by us? Should carers keep a relation, even if it does harm to her? Therefore, others appropriate justice orientation into ethic of care to invent a new political theory.
Noddings has also proposed social policies. Her idea of right relies upon needs: we should respond to needs of others without questioning entailment to be done so, because needs derive from human being as vulnerable living creature. We cannot necessarily know our real needs. Carers may infer needs of the cared through respectful caring relation. Our selves are relational. Noddings maintains that the aim of punishment consists in education, because there are no needs of pain.
How does man respond to Noddings in law? We could consider three ways parallel to three stances in care/justice debate. Some claims that law abides by retributive justice. But it is clear that it could not ensure repentance of wrongdoers and recovery of relation between them and their victims. Some introduce restorative justice. Could relation not, however, be restored, but only reconstructed? Law based on ethic of care would lead the concerned into reconstruction of a new relation.

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In this essay I argue methods in health care ethics (or biomedical ethics) so far proposed can be categorized into three approaches: principle-based, procedure-based, and narrative-based ones. Principle-based approach, widely known by the book of Beauchamp and Childress in which ethical principles (autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice) are given the key role in moral reasoning. The second approach, mostly developed in "clinical ethics," in which moral reasoning is attempted in the context of health care profession's procedure, as Jonsen and co-authors proposed a structured method in which four topics should be analyzed in clinical case studies (medical indication, patient preferences, quality of life, and contextual features). The third approach brings moral reasoning into the patient's life context, emphasizing role, paradigm, analogy, etc. The three approaches are mutually independent but at the same time complementary to one another. Principles will acquire contents and understandings in the context of physician's procedure or patient's life, while procedure and narrative will enjoy moral foundation (e. g. accountability or universalizability) with the help of universal principles. I demonstrate the relation of three approaches using a fictional case of an ALS (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis) patient, who wanted his life-sustaining treatments withdrawn.

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One of the most fundamental and long-felt issues for the people who engage in ADR process is how and to what extent they should get involved with the parties. This paper discusses what conditions would be necessary to help the disputants find the resolutions for themselves, or what kind of actions of the third parties might distort the autonomous activities of the disputants.
The analysis of a divorce mediation case suggests three perspectives, which could be some clue to searching for new models and skills for ADR. (1) Ability of the disputants should not be recognized in individual, but in interaction. (2) The third party should not introduce its own theme to the disputing process. (3) We should rather pay attention to the various ways of contacting or encountering of the disputants, which might activate the moves and voices of them.

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It is 10 years since I first visited Kamagasaki, which is the biggest slum in Japan. "Are there any human rights exist in Japan?" "Kamayan", a Kamagasaki daily based worker, responded to my self-introduction that I had been teaching human rights law in Japan.
"Kamayan" was quite right in his allegation. Kamagasaki workers and homeless people were "displaced persons" in the sense used by Hanna Arendt in her influential book "The Origin of the Totalitarianism": their human rights were not violated, but they lost the right to have human rights itself.
Since then, I have been street lawyer in Kamagasaki. Especially, I have been in charge of a forced eviction case against homeless people by Osaka City. We have been alleging in this case "a right to adequate housing" stipulated in the Social and Economic Covenant of Human Rights, because only these kinds of rights would confer "Kamayan" security of legal tenure beyond the scheme of Nation State, which was thought by Arendt as a hazard to human rights.
From my experience as a street lawyer, the right to adequate housing should be properly defined only when homeless people themselves join the negotiation process. The Committee of the Covenant has been using 'genuine consultation' to describe this process. "Kamayan" should be treated as a legal agency in the field of law.

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Après avoir rencontré la notion de droit de la consommation au 20e siècle, les civilistes japonais se demandent pourquoi le droit protège les consommateurs. Si l'on prétend qu'ils sont protégés uniquement sous prétexte de leur faiblesse, la base philosophique du droit de la consommation est très fragile. Les juristes et les sociologues qui se passionnent pour trouver une signification plus solide du droit de la consommation vont alors mettre l'accent sur l'importance de l'idée selon laquelle l'on considère les consommateurs comme une catégorie tout à fait normale de citoyens.

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It is not the 'poaching' subject (actor) who will see law as instrument to be used or not used depending on particular situations but the self-deceiving subject who knows that law is fiction and dares to commit to law however, that will succeed in re-establishing the public sphere thorough communications on (legal) norms in modern urbanized and atomized society. It is because (s) he has to re-share inter-subjective order of meaning on norms for public relations. Though we can never see law as Kantian 'categorical imperative' any more, we should not diminish law to no more than instrument or resource for power.

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The autonomous nature of legal agents has been emphasized from the libertarian perspective in recent years. However, such arguments should be critically reconsidered.
First, the vulnerable parties, such as homeless people, have been increasing due to the de-regulation policy since the 1990s. Public lawyering is indispensable to achieve equal protection of legal agents in such contexts. Second, rational discourse among legal agents, i.e. disputants, is more often than not difficult to attain, even though it is presupposed for the rule of law. For example, child-custody disputes, and the conflicts among condominium owners are such emotional, non-rational cases.
Third, civil law norms conflict with one another. Therefore they cannot be explained away by the pro-liberal, autonomous principles.
Fourth, on the other hand, we are facing the renaissance of legal agents in a different sense in the post-modern risk society. The central legal control has now been considered illusory, because the scientific prediction of long-term causal consequences, especially in the environmental issues, has become critically doubted.
The reflexive, centrifugal legal regulations based on multi-polar legal agents, including various organizations, i.e. legal subsystems, have necessarily emerged in a post-modern, pragmatic sense.

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The aim of this paper is to articulate Masaji Chiba's theory on legal pluralism to the empirical legal research on dispute processes. Examining Chiba's three dichotomies theory, the author attempts a partial modification. A revised model is illustrated with a case study of family disputes observed at Kenyan formal and informal courts.
According to Chiba, the legal pluralism is never simplified as dual construction of state and non-state laws alone. We can observe the accommodation of transplanted laws within both official and unofficial settings, and at the same time the penetration of indigenous customary laws into the official state law. Therefore, empirical descriptions of the intra-structure of legal pluralism require more than a single set of dichotomy. As is shown in his papers, Chiba aptly observes the intertwinement of three series of dichotomies in the plural structure of legal system: (1) legal postulate/legal rule, (2) indigenous/transplanted laws, and (3) official/unofficial laws.
However, concerning the first dichotomy of legal postulate and legal rule, there is a room for a methodological modification. The author of this paper recognises that a defect of the dichotomy consists in its limited applicability in empirical research on dispute processes, since it is modelled on the layer structure of official legislation. Thus, this paper proposes replacing the original dichotomy of legal postulate and legal rule by an alternative dichotomy of substantial understanding and formal prescription, which represents different modes of argument in the courtroom. When Chiba's theory is applied to the analysis of adversarial dispute processes, the empirical legal research requires an analytic scheme for characterising different paradigms of argument, namely an alternative dichotomy of substantial understanding and formal prescription.

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In the legal argument concerning the regulation of reproductive technologies involving a third party in the process of reproduction, it is commonly recognized that the determination of the parentage of a child who is produced by those technologies is the most important issue. But such focusing on the determination of the parentage of a child concentration conceals another important issue. That is, in almost all cases, it is a woman who undergoes infertility treatment and bears physical and mental burdens, whether she is actually infertile or not.
This article critically examines the fact that women's experience in the process of infertility treatment has been concealed from an standpoint which emphasizes the gender ordering of a society, and suggests the importance of making women visible in the argument about the regulation of reproductive technology.

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