Underlying the problem of “the conflict between law and justice” there is a presupposition that they should be consistent with each other, and that the foundational value for legal system is “justice.” This presupposition has been rooted in the culture of European legal tradition, and is currently inherited in the contemporary liberalism. The reason why the view that law and justice should be consistent and integrated is alive and appears attractive even today seems that it is strongly related with the idea that the legal system is, and should be, autonomous from other subsystems of society, such as politics and economy. The “justice” is supposed to be the ultimate value for the legal system, which is absolute and independent from any other values in society. To worship “justice” as the ultimate value seems to guarantee, for believers, the autonomy of legal system. Of course, this autonomy of legal system is simply a fiction. The three presentations in the symposium commonly showed a critical stance to this fictitious idea of autonomy of law. This is certainly understandable, because the standing point of sociology of law as an empirical science is entirely oppositional to the traditional self-identification of legal system as autonomous one. Nevertheless, it seems that taking a critical stance to the fictitious idea of autonomy of law does not necessarily mean that sociology of law should take an external view-point toward legal system. Indeed sociology is an empirical science. But it is still an enterprise within a society. Knowing that a society is composed of various fictitious ideas, sociology, including sociology of law, should still take an internal view to the society.
抄録全体を表示