The axiomatic foundation of social choice theory, established by Arrow and extended through a game-theoretic perspective by Gibbard and Satterthwaite, demonstrates that under an unrestricted set of preference profiles, only dictatorial outcomes are possible. In this study, we translated these axiomatic conditions into logic programming with Prolog to systematically investigate the logical structure of the basic model, a social choice function (SCF) involving two individuals and three alternatives with linear-order preference profiles. In particular, we examined the Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type SCF, a strategy-proof, non-imposed surjective function defined over a restricted preference domain, revealing its greater structural complexity compared to the Arrow-type SCF. By analyzing and visualizing dictatorial sequences that ememge as the domain expands, we identified interactions between cyclical components, designated as α-rings, γ-rings, and π-rings, which partition the unrestricted domain. We generated all maximal domains obtainable through systematic preference pair deletions (18 for Arrow-type SCFs and 54 for Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type SCFs) and ranked them according to the relative frequency of non-optimal outcomes for individual 1, referred to as the inequality index. Furthermore, we applied the concept of narratorial forms, parameterized oracles, to clarify the principles of covariation between these maximal γ-possible domains and their possible SCFs. Maximal γ-possible SCFs were generated by the narratorial form centered on symmetric pairs from π-rings in the case of symmetric pair deletion, and even when they deviate, they remain variants of this form. The extent of deviation from the narratorial form correlates with the inequality index and shifts toward dictatorial outcomes.
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