This paper analyzes the effects of the development of the market for corporate control upon organizational structures or management processes. Researches on the market for corporate control have focused on the effects upon shareholder value. But we guess that the market for corporate control will urge executives not only to increase their shareholder value, but also to undertake corporate management that will facilitate buying or selling business units of the company. In this paper, we focus on the latter effects and analyze the aspects of organizational structure or management process that ease buying or selling business units. Some key aspects of that are examined by the case study of R. P. Scherer Corporation, softgel capsules manufacturer, which was resold to Cardinal Health Inc. by Shearson Lehman Hutton Holdings. R. P. Scherer under control of Shearson Lehman Hutton was transformed into "the modular-corporation" which means the corporation divided into small business units, decentralized, and standardized. Dividing the corporation into small units brings down the acquisition price of each individual unit. Decentralized organization minimizes the influence of the change of headquarters upon the sold business units. Standardized management process decreases the need of learning the way of managing the sold divisions. These aspects of the modular-corporation increase the ease in buying or selling business units. The modularization of corporation facilitates buying or selling business units, but shrinks a synergy effect that is one of goals of purchasing business units. In order to gain the synergy effect, middle managements need to share management resources of each unit. But, if the acquirer also considers selling any business units in the future and decentralizes the organizational structure, coordination between middle managements will not be made by upper managements and the synergy effect will not be realized enough. This "unrealized synergy effect" problem is an important insight to be drawn from the analysis in this paper.

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This objective of this paper is to discuss organization innovation. First, we review the factors and processes required for organization innovation. As the result, we show that factors required for innovation exist in an organization, an organization context and outside an organization. Moreover, we found that, in the process of innovation, the search activities and communication activities on the inside and outside of an organization are key, and that innovators whose function is the external and/or internal communication of an organization in those activities are its human resources. However, we also consider the eventual occurrence of prevention factors for organization innovation. Based on this review, we propose a conceptual framework for considering organization innovation in the IT environment. The framework suggests that it is possible for firms to cause innovation by changing their dealing partners. At the same time, the framework also suggests that it is dangerous for firms to restrain innovation by unintentionally changing their dealing partners. Based on this framework, we found that it is theoretically difficult and unsuitable for one person to fulfill all innovator functions. Conversely, we found that many members who may have a part in conducting innovator functions potentially exist in an organization. Therefore, many firms may be able to generate innovation, by positively seeking out potential innovators in the organization.

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In the age of globalization, corporations have to deal with many challenges such as diversity of output and efficiency. Several organizational structures have been created and many researchers have discussed them. Front-Back Organization is an organizational structure presented by Galbraith (1993, 1995, 2000), and is considered to be suitable for the progress of globalization. Is the front-back organization a new and distinctive organizational structure? And will it be an alternative for global corporations? In this paper, we deal with these questions. Firstly, we discuss the definition of front-back organization and the background of the introduction of the front-back organization. The idea of front-back organization goes back to Corey & Star (1971). The importance of their idea that corporations have to consider the variety of markets has been noticed in recent years, because the progress of globalization makes global corporations to adapt to several regions of the world. Secondly, we refer to the two types of front-back organization presented by Galbraith; coordination type and market mechanism type, and describe the characteristics of each. Thirdly, we compare front-back organization with other organizational structures; multi-divisional organization and global matrix organization, and show that there are differences between them in term of allocation of functions, management cost, number of command line, and degree of achievement of duality. In addition, we show the relationships between these organizations. When a company's globalization progresses, its organizational structure changes firstly from multidivisional to front-back organization, and next from front-back organization to global matrix organization. With these analyses, we clarify the characteristics and future possibility of the front-back organization.

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The purpose of this article is to develop a framework explaining how organizational actors manipulate institutional rules, cause deinstitutionalization, and accomplish institutional change in their organizational environment. Institutional theorists, in their studies of organization-environment relations, have focused on passive features of organizational activities accepting expectations and requirements from institutional environment, and have tended to overlook the role of active agency. Organizational actors, however, are able to exert active agency to manipulate institutional rules diffused in their environment. Such agencies may be most likely to be observed in which organizational actors attempt to decline institutional rules, that is, deinstitutionalization, and in which they intend to change the institutional environment by their efforts to diffuse, legitimate, and institutionalize the alternative symbolic elements in the organizational field. But organizational actors challenging to decline institutional rule will conflict with other organizational actors that have interests for its status quo. Therefore, author argues that whether organizational actors achieve deinstitutionalization and institutional change in their environment or not depends on the process of the interorganizational conflict about the institutional rule for their interests and its legitimacy. In this article, the processes of deinstitutionalization and institutional change in organizational environment are explained as unfolding in three stages: "recognition of irrationality" to one institutional rule in organizational level, "conflict of interest", and "symbolic conflict" about the institutional rule among organizational actors in the field. Author applies the framework to analyze the interorganizational conflict, from 1970s to 1993, about uniform taxi fare regulation ("one district, one fare principle") enforced by Ministry of Transport in Japan, and demonstrates the process that taxi fare deregulation was caused by the set of organizational actors attempting to deinstitutionalize the regulation in order to change their institutional environment.

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The firm that announces a format and forms a standard group is called a sponsor. It is often the case that the sponsor obtains the initiative in the defacto standard cases. However, the emergence of voluntary standard tells a different story. This research examines the process through which a non-sponsor obtains the initiative and has its technology adopted as the standard within a voluntary standard group. The research addresses an alternative view for adequately understanding the interaction mechanism in the voluntary standard process based on the notion of resource dependence perspective. Although a dynamic view is required, until now this perspective studies have been conducted using static analysis. This research proposes a conceptual framework that enables us to capture the process in a dynamic context. In conclusion, there are three findings on how non-sponsor Matsushita obtained the initiative in DVD standards groups. First, the essentiality of Matsushita's DVD-related technology and family relationships (subsidies, alliance partners etc.) constituted its power base, as it bargained to participate in the standard group (SD group). These resources were to contribute to SD group's advantage against rival group (MMCD group), enabling Matsushita to co-sponsor the format with Toshiba. Second, Matsushita strengthened its power within SD group by gradually enlarging the essentiality and the concentration of its resources in both technology and supporter aspects. The high essentiality of Matsushita's resources led its technology to be adopted by the group. Since the unification standard of DVD was developed on SD format, Matsushita's technology was incorporated into DVD standard. Third, the re-writable DVD standard discussed in the next stage was SD-RAM format, which was submitted by Matsushita. Matsushita reduced the substitutability of SD-RAM with other formats by licensing its re-writable technology in early stage to other participants in the DVD consortium. By doing so, Matsushita took the initiative and SD-RAM was widely adopted as the standard.

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The purpose of this study is to examine practical difficulties of modularization of the European automotive industry. Chapter 2 presents realities and actual effects of modularization of the automotive industry. In this chapter, I present the background of modularization in European OEM, for example, DC and VW, and the specific endeavor for modularization at MCC Hambach. In the end of this chapter, I present a hypothesis that, in fact, it is likely that the modularization of European automotive industry is not match for the Japanese cooperative OEM-supplier relationship, although the original intent of modularization of European automotive industry is to introduce the Japanese cooperative OEM-supplier relationship to their own industry. Chapter 3 presents the underlying assumptions of this study. These assumptions are based upon Wenger [1998] which attempts to apply the theory of situated learning to organizations. In this chapter, I state the necessity of approaching work practices in terms of the "KAIZEN" activities. Chapter 4 presents a case of factory-A implementing the module manufacturing system in Europe. In this chapter, I pay attention to the way of manufacturing activities, price contracts, meetings and "KAIZEN" activities. OEM-tire 1 supplier collaboration is necessary in these activities. I also state some problems arising in practice. In chapter 5, I discuss the OEM-supplier relationship in detail, intending to compare and contrast the European way with the Japanese way, especially, that of Toyota. In this chapter, I present the results of our survey showing that factory-A takes different ways from the Japanese in terms of the OEM-supplier contract and the leadership of an OEM to its suppliers. Finally, presenting the problems of the European way of transactions and contracts that I have specified, I state the necessity to keep know-how of technology and cost of automotive parts, and then state a future direction of this study.

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This paper is a study about corporate governance system of the Chinese listed firms from the viewpoint of the listed regulations. There are two main characteristics in the system. One of them is the training system of the independence director candidate and a permission system by Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC). Another one is that firms can establish both an auditor system and a committee system. A firm must establish an auditor system which "the company law" stated. But the firm also can choose the establishment of four committees of nominating, compensation, auditing, and strategic management, which is decided in a general meeting of shareholders. In this case, There is a problem that a corporate governance system have two auditing entities. This causes auditing entities to be unclear as to their functions. And its extent of authority and responsibility become not clear. So it seems to be need for an integrated auditing system. Further more, It needs institutionalized penal regulations and disclosure systems about corporation, which make Chinese corporate governance effectively work.

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