In today's dynamic business environment, firms emphasize multi-sourcing as an outsourcing strategy. Generally, firms evaluate suppliers from a multidimensional perspective and accordingly determine whether to opt for single-sourcing or multi-sourcing. Multi-sourcing potentially enables firms to reduce the risks of failure from outsourcing and obtain best-of-breed services and agility.

　Multi-sourcing is quite different from single-sourcing in terms of interdependence between tasks performed by multiple suppliers. The characteristics of multi-sourcing with low interdependence between tasks are similar to single-sourcing. Conversely, it is difficult for firms to encourage multiple suppliers in a competitive relationship to collaborate with each other for multi-sourcing with a high interdependence between tasks. However, previous studies do not pay attention to multi-sourcing with high interdependence, wherein suppliers are required to collaborate with each other.

　In this paper, we study the case of joint development for rolling stock in Japan, in order to clarify the collaborative factors among suppliers in such a setting. We deduce that buyers should encourage multiple suppliers to communicate without buyers’ participation by appointing one supplier who possesses higher knowledge of the concerned product as a lead supplier, and not force multiple sup-pliers to collaborate with each other in such a setting.

　Previous research has explored the factors which facilitate subsidiary evolution and the processes associated with these evolutions. However, the processes and the reasons for failure of subsidiary evolution have not been adequately examined. There are foreign subsidiaries which have succeeded in evolving once, but failed in subsequent evolutions. The reasons for their inability to realize sustainable evolution have not been examined.

　Consequently, this paper examines the process of failure in subsidiary evolution and discusses the reasons why foreign subsidiaries fail in their evolutions. It considers, in particular, "subsidiary initiative" which appears to facilitate subsidiary evolution.

　The paper focuses on the processes associated with Nihon Schering, once a Japanese subsidiary of the German pharmaceutical company, Schering AG. In this case, the subsidiary had evolved, but was not successful in carrying out their next subsidiary evolution. Moreover, Nihon Schering had undertaken subsidiary initiative, but could not make a sustainable evolution. Why did it fail at subsidiary evolution in spite of undertaking subsidiary initiative?

　The results from the analysis of this case conclude that subsidiary initiative does not always facilitate subsidiary evolution. Preceding subsidiary evolution sometimes results in the misunder-standing of the actual capabilities of the subsidiary. In this situation, the subsidia1y evolution fails even with subsidiary initiative.

　This study examines how to legitimize innovation activities when a firm introduces a department promoting innovation (like R&D). Uncertainty is the nature of innovation and this produces various problems. Firms have dealt with such problems by setting up full-time departments in manufactures, but, there is a problem about mobilizing resources. Prior research has claimed that entrepreneurs have to legitimize their activities by getting collaborators in order to achieve mobilization. However, prior research still has problems: legitimation process convergent top-down legitimation, getting the cognition of authorities even though existing studies on the legitimation process and distinguish between top-down legitimation and manipulation strategy. Next, getting collaborators is regarded as a mere instrument for legitimation that doesn't have practical value. However, getting collaborators may have practical value in the front office of service providers. This study claims the importance of a front-based legitimation process, while prior research tends to pay attention to the top-down process.

　So the purposes of this article are (1) to reconsider the legitimation process by analyzing the case of setting up a new department (2) to examine the practical value of getting collaborators. This investigation is a case study. It is the case that MOS Food Services introduced the ‘Jisedai MOS development department’. The data sources are mainly a) 6 interviews with 5 people from MOS Food Services; b) participant observation of a collaborative program between the university and the firm; c) lectures and discussion with Mos Food Services.

　As a result of analysis, this study claims that top-down legitimation is not enough and front-based legitimation is more important when the front office has an important role to serve customers and resources are divided between money and others. In addition, the acceptance of collaborators may have practical value when various stakeholders can relate with innovation activities. This article is novel and original in analyzing the legitimation process from the view of the front office and pointing out the front-based process as well as the top-down process.

　This research aims to indicate the possible incremental process causing radical organizational change, which existing literature has not examined, by studying the case of Yokohama city.

　Existing literature on radical organizational change is classified into two arguments. One is represented by ‘the punctuated equilibrium theory’, which is, frame-breaking change that comes at once and discontinuously, and is usually lead by executive leadership. The other is represented by a case study on the process of radical organizational change in a U.S. church. The radical organizational change emerges from incremental small change occurring unintentionally. Accumulation of these small incremental changes results in an amplification effect, and leads to radical organizational change.The latter argument, however, has two main drawbacks. The first is that ‘unintentionally’ triggered radical organizational change is unable to stipulate organizational effectiveness. The second is that this body of literature presupposes that radical organizational change occurs in minor inertia, in that the organization easily changes radically; thus, suggesting very little.

　These indications prompt a very simple question: whether or not the latter indicated process will be realized ‘intentionally’ and in ‘major inertia’. Existing literature has not examined the above-mentioned possibility.

　The case study of Yokohama city demonstrates that the latter process is realized by strong leadership with a clear intention in such major inertia that is usually observed in public organizations. In this case, a newly founded team with a mission to realize public-private partnership gradually implemented the function of ‘boundary spanner’, making way for the latter indicated process to come into operation. Finally, this process led to overall radical organizational change in Yokohama city.

　Thus, this research clarifies the mechanism that causes the latter indicated process, both intentionally and in major inertia, and rethinks the function of the leadership described in this body of literature.

　The purpose of this research is to clarify the influence of clients on resource accumulation and organizational performance. More specifically, we analyze how client scope affects resource scope and organizational performance. Previous studies revealed that organizations’ resource accumulation is highly influenced by their clients. Defining client scope, therefore, is a fundamental strategic choice for organizations. Though relations among client, resource and organizational performance are of great importance, previous studies are confined to normative analyses and qualitative case studies. Thus, we performed a quantitative analysis of professional service firms (PSFs) in a knowledge-intensive industry.

　Based on previous research, the following six hypotheses are built and tested.

　Hypothesis 1a: The broader the client scope, the broader the resource scope will be.

　Hypothesis 1b: The broader the client scope, the narrower the resource scope will be.

　Hypothesis 1c: Client scope has marginal effect on resource scope.

　Hypothesis 2a: The broader the client scope, the better the organizational performance will be.

　Hypothesis 2b: The broader the client scope, the worse the organizational performance will be.

　Hypothesis 2c: Client scope has marginal effect on organizational performance.

　Our targets are the top 100 patent firms in China. The data was collected from the “Chinese Patent Firm Yearbook 2015” published by HATSUMEI-TSUSHIN SHA. Because of missing data, the final dataset contains 79 patent firms.

　As the results of our two regression analysis Hypothesis 1a, 1c, 2a and 2c are supported. In other words, we found that organizations which have broader client scope tend to have broader resource scope and organizations which have broader client scope tend to have higher performance. However, we observe similar effects, known as being “stuck in the middle”, between customer scope and organizational performance. Unless the client scope exceeds a certain point, organizational performance is decreasing.

　How do Japanese institutional investors exercise voting and have a dialogue with investee companies to fulfill stewardship responsibilities and fiduciary duties? Additionally, when institutional investors entrust their custodies, who sets voting policy, votes on shareholder measures, and has a dialogue?

　In February 2014, Japan enacted a Stewardship Code prescribing a set of principles governing institutional investors' actions. Japan's Stewardship Code requests “stewardship responsibility” because institutional investors have a significant impact on the investee companies. In the current Japanese stock market, the rate of investments by foreign institutional investors is above 30%; moreover, the rate of Japanese institutional investors is also increasing.

　Institutional investors today own the highest percentage of publicly listed stocks in Japan. However, securities filings identify “Japan Trustee Services Bank” and “The Master Trust Bank of Japan” as major shareholders because institutional investors often assign their shares to trustees performing different levels of tasks for their institutional clients. We need to know who sets voting policy and votes on shareholder measures.

　I submitted a questionnaire to institutional investors who accepted Japan's Stewardship Code to investigate how they vote and have a dialogue when they entrust administration. The investigation results showed that many institutional investors set guidelines for voting or examine each shareholder measure themselves to fulfill their stewardship responsibilities. If asset owners entrust the management or administration with their assets, they engage with asset managers to decide on the vote after monitoring the investee companies and having a dialogue with them.

　I also inquired about the rate and frequency of dialogue with the investee companies and discovered that although the frequency of dialogues depends on each institution, many Japanese institutional investors proactively engage in dialogue. Japanese institutional investors intend to fulfill the stewardship responsibilities by monitoring companies' situations, and they (real investors) have changed to engage with the investee companies.