There are many problems about causality and identity in Humeanism. Especially, a problem that “Humean Supervenience” allowing many possibilities of various external laws encounters is concerned with the difficulty whether such laws can be coherent with the intrinsic properties of causation. This problem is related to another one whether “Humean Supervenience” is compatible with objectivism in accordance with Hume's original intention. Struggling with a disharmony between Hume's pragmatic epistemology and his realistic ontology, many philosophers have tried to dissolve such a complicated problem. But I think their efforts wouldn't be successful and the disharmony doesn't need to be settled, because the prospective collapses of their efforts wouldn't reduce the meaning of Humeanism. In this paper, I conclude that the seeming incoherence should be retained, because it suggests a moderate scientific attitude to be placed between dogmatism and skepticism. I demonstrate it by emphasizing the significance of some parts included in Hume's Treatise.
We focus on artifact which is phenotype of a sort of genes “technological knowledge”. And we make clear the difference between science communication and technological communication mediated by artifact. Two points are essential, i. e. artifact and engineer. And then four key words are needed, requirement specification, inspection, technical standards, and manufacturing industry. We conclude that technological communication mediated by artifact is different from science communication. The point is the strangeness of “mediated by artifact”.
This paper discusses in what sense engineering knowledge is peculiar, in comparison with science. First, I trace the development of “epistemology of engineering knowledge” and introduce Walter Vincenti's analysis of normal design knowledge as one of the representative works in the literature. I propose four peculiarity theses of engineering knowledge as possible interpretations of his position. However, there are problems with these theses. First, scientific knowledge seems to have similar features as the ones Vincenti regards as peculiar to engineering knowledge. Second, in the context of the debate on the peculiarity of the engineering knowledge, Vincenti's approach seems to miss the point. We need a broader notion of peculiarity of engineering knowledge.
This paper aims to examine ethical implications of the cognitive enhancement based on neuroscience and neuro-technology: more specifically, its influences on the “self”. In order to do this, I begin with presenting the relevant conception of the self, and then examine how the cognitive enhancement could influence on the self. The opponents of the cognitive enhancement hold that it is self-destructive to accept cognitive enhancement since it will destroy our ordinary practices based on “folk psychology”. The proponents, however, may prefer new, neuroscientific practices, which do not need the concept of the self. Yet, the opponents still have ways out, resorting to our system of values. I will end this paper by pointing out some tasks which we must solve.
The nascent field of neuroethics consists of three main divisions: the neuroscience of ethics, the ethics of neuroscience, and the interface between neuroscience and society. This concept originated at the conference, “Neuroethics, Mapping the Field, ” in San Francisco in 2002, sponsored by the Dana Foundation. However, due to its enormity, this concept lacks clarity, and can be more accurately defined in two distinct ways: examining the conditions of neuroscience, and its comparison with the first appearance of the term “;neuro-ethics” in 1973 which was coined as a protest against an unethical neurological experimentation.
Lying is a complex cognitive process involving cognitive-emotional interactions, and exhibits features consistent with the use of the ‘higher’ or ‘executive’ centers of the brain. While the lie detector relies on the peripheral response and has brought very little insight into the neural mechanism of lying, functional neuroimaging techniques (especially functional magnetic resonance imaging) have recently been used to clarify the brain mechanisms for lying. These techniques have enabled to clarify the functional contributions of the prefrontal cortex during lying, however, its precise anatomy and accurate detection of deception await elucidation.