This study is devoted to the overall view on Japanese-Korean relations from the eve of the Meiji Restoration to the annexation of Korea by Japan. In contrast to the friendly relationship which existed between Japan and Korea during the Edo period, Japan adopted an aggressive and militaristic scheme in Korea following the Meiji Restoration.
To realize this scheme, Japan fought a war with China which had been Korea's overlord, and removed her influence from Korea. After this, Japan was able to establish monopolistic control in Korea afrer eliminating the Russian influence as a result of the Russo-Japanese War. Japanese aggression in Korea brought about apprehension and disturbances there, and anti-Japanese riots occurred frequently in Korea as a consequence. Japan suppressed Korean anti-Japanese movements with military force, and ended up by annexing Korea.

抄録全体を表示

The Treaty of Amity and Friendship between Japan and Korea (commonly called the Kanghwa Treaty) signed in 1876 marked the beginnings of Korea's modern diplomatic history. Although Japan was able to force this treaty upon Korea, her attempts to establish unequal commercial terms favoring Japan in the treaty, patterned after the Western scheme in Japan, brought no satisfactory consequence. Korea's resistance to the Japanese imitation of the Western plans resulted in the failure of Japan to establish her extraterritorial rights as well as certain tariff privileges in Korea. It was, therefore, a task of the future Japanese diplomacy to accomplish those aims.
Negotiatons were carried out by Japan with Korea immediately after the signing of the Kanghwa Treaty in order to supplement inadquacies in regard to the commercial interests of the Japanese in Korean treaty ports. It was anticipated by Japan, however, that such negotiations entailed numerous difficulties. It was logical, therefore, that the Japanese Government should employ a technique known as “shotai gaiko, ” under which Japan invited Korea's goodwill missions.
In responding to the Japanese diplomacy, Korea dispatched her first goodwill mission, headed by Kim Ki-su, in April, 1876. Envoy Kim and his colleagues returned to Korea with favorable views on Japan, and upon his return to Seoul Kim memorialized to the King, advising him to promote trade relationship with Japan. His memorial not only relaxed anti-Japanese sentiments, but also resulted a major political change in Korea. Moreover, Korea's suspicion of Japanese intentions weakened.
Loosing no time, Japan dispatched her mission, headed by Miyamoto, to Seoul to negotiate for the supplementary agreements to the first treaty with Korea, as well as to conclude a commercial treaty. Subsequently, two treaties were signed in August, 1876, namely, Appendix to the Treaty of Amity and Friendship between Japan and Korea, and Regulations Governing Japanese Trade in Korea. This paved the way for Japanese penetration of Korea and marked the beginnings of the unequal treaty relationship between Japan and Korea.

抄録全体を表示

The nature of the Kapo internal reform, the by-product of the Sino-Japanese race for power in Korea, can be determined by the peculiar characteristics of the political and economic structure of Korea, the country which had been an object of semi-colonialization by China and Japan. I believe that the Kapo Refrom, which was thrust upon Korea by external elements, had its own particular meanings, not simply as a modernization process of the country's ancient system, but also as a product of the historical circumstances of the world at the time. In effect, the conditions under which the reform was initiated constitute an extremely significant factor. Furthermore, the backward Korean society had been penetrated by the sudden surge of forces of capitalistic powers, and Korea found herself become a stage for power struggle among nations.
This paper will attempt to examine the state of affairs, with an emphasis on the course of changes, involving the Sino-Japanese War and its termination, as well as the advancement of Russian influence in Korea, both of which are necessary factors for the understanding of the Kapo Reform itself.
As Mutsu, one time Foreign Minister, pointed out in his Kenkenroku, “whether it be Korea's internal reform or the problems involving the lord-vassal relationship between China and Korea, they are basically the outcome of the power struggle between Japan and China in Korea.” In other words, the Japanese policy, which attempted to reconcile two contradictory elements of “independence” and “internal reform, ” was aimed at the establishment of solid Japanese political control in Korea in order to settle, once and for all, the basic antagonism between Japan and China, It follows then that the reform plan itself possessed inherent self-limitations because of the aforementioned reason.
The reform program, to be sure, ended in complete failure after a year and a half, with little being accomplished. It had, however, an enormous impact upon Korea, for it threw the administrative mechanism into a decisive crisis. Moreover, it was an important incident which shook the foundations of Korea's social structure.

抄録全体を表示

The Kapo Reform of 1894 occupies a significant place, in various ways, in the modern history of Korea. It has warranted differring interpreations regarding its historical importance. As a prerequisite for the proper evaluation of the Kapo Reform, the author, focusing his view point on the Kunguk Kimuch'o, analized historical changes involving that office along with the pivotal role it played in carrying out the reform program.
In the fall of 1894, the Japanese troops in Seoul engineered a palace coup, and after occupying the palace they brought the Taewongun into power, hoping to over-throw the anti-Japanese Min faction and to provoke the Chinese into a war. The Taewongun, though anti-Min at heart, demonstrated his anti-Japanese attitude. The purpose of the establishment of the Kunguk Kimuch'o, therefore, was to check the power of the Taewongun and to carry out Japanese plans in Korea. Key roles were played by the members of the Japanese Legation in the establishment of that office, and the administration of its functionswas in the hands of the members of the pro-Japanese reform faction along with a few neutralists and those Taewongun faction members who were outside the Min faction.
The Kunguk Kimuch'o was delegated a broad power to administer national affairs through a majority vote of its members. Although the theory of majority rule was applied, in reality, the main purpose of voting was to deprive the Taewongun of power through concentrated manipulation of the strength of the pro-Japanese faction.
Following the establishment of the Kunguk Kimuch'o, hostility between the Taewongun and that office grew bitter, and as a result, most of the reform programs adopted by that office became either nullified or ineffective. Instability within the government and the stagnant state of Japanese policies in Korea resulted in the extremely disadvantageous diplomatic position of Japan. Her war with China also made her standing diplomatically unfavorable.
The Japanese Government, finding itself in an uneasy and embarrassing situation, dispatched Inoue Kaoru, one of the most influential and able statesmen, to Korea as Minister, instructing him to purge the Taewongun and abolish the Kunguk Kimuch'o. His coming to Seoul was followed by the restoration of political power to Uijongbu, the Council of State, as before.
From the foregoing analysis it can be concluded that the Kunguk Kimuch'o deserves no positive credit as an autonomous reform organ. Furthermore, although partial success resulted during the Kapo Reform under that office, it made rather negative contributions when one considers the broader aspects of the modernization attempts made in Korea since then. In other words, the Koreans after 1894 came to regard “modernistic” reform as “alien aggression” and resisted any such process. Moreover, the Kapo Reform lacked legitimacy either in its techniques or in its methods, and consequently failed to transform the people's energies into justifiable historical advancement and development.

抄録全体を表示

On October 8, 1895 (Meiji 28, the Year of Ulmi) a band of Japanese invaded the King's palace in Seoul and murdered the Queen. This event is known either as the “Case of Queen Min” or the “Ulmi Affairs.”
This crime was perpetrated by the Japanese Guards in Seoul, however, the arch-conspirator was the then Japanese Minister to Korea, Miura Goro. The actual murder of Queen Min was an act of Japanese ronin. Since the crime was committed under the direction of the Minister, the Japanese Governmsnt recalled Minister Miura and the staff officers of the Japanese Guards and a military tribunal held trials on them in Hiroshima. The tribunal, however, found the dependents not guilty on the ground of insufficient evidence.
As a result of this affair, Japanese prestige fell sharply in Korea and a way was opened for the increase of Russian influence there. The Japanese retreat, however, ended in 1900. The statement of Hara Kei which is examined in this paper demonstrates the negative policy of Japan in maintaing her state of retreat. In reality, Japanese diplomacy in Korea showed no particular change from the time of the decline of the Japanese prestige in 1895 to 1900.

抄録全体を表示

The Allied Nations publically announced their intentions to establish Korean independence through the Cairo and Potsdam declarations. Furthermore, the Allied Powers decided to apply trusteeship in Korea and not to land their forces for combat. Japan, on the other hand, in order to encounter the American-Soviet joint attack in Korea, increased military strength there while inducing the Koreans to cooperate with Japan in her war aims by improving their treatment and allowing them a certain amount of privilege to participate in politics.
Soviet troops invaded northeastern Korea immediately after the declaration of war against Japan. The Soviet participation in the war brought about U. S. -U. S. S. R. joint occupation of Korea for the purpose of demilitarization of the Japanese troops in Korea, establishing the 38th parallel as a border line between the two occupation armies. On the last day of the war the Secretary-General of the Government-Genreal in Korea invited the cooperation of a Korean leader, Yo Wun-hyong, in maintaining law and order. Yo organized the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence, and directed the people through his organization.
The Soviet troops which invaded northern Korea organized Korean People's Committees in each province and took over administrative power from the Japanese. The American troops, meanwhile, carried out a ceremony of the signing of surrender in in Seoul with the Japanese, and established the United States Army Military Government in (USAMGIK), patterned after the Japanese Government-General in Korea. Since then, both North and South Korean regimes carried out a separation process between Japan and Korea, involving repatration of Japanese nationals, and take-over of Japanese property. Meanwhile, approximately 1, 500, 000 Koreans returned home from Japan, leaving some 500, 000 behind.
Three years after the liberation of Korea, there emerged two independent nations in Korea, one in the North and the other in the South. After three years and eight months since the emergence of the two regimes in Korea, the Peace Treaty was signed between Japan and the Allied Powers, recognizing the independence of Korea.

抄録全体を表示

The Korean policy of the United States cannot be judged in isolation from the Korean policy of the Soviet Union or from the internal political development in Korea. These three and many other minor factors are interrelated in such a complex fashion that it is difficult to single out any one factor as being solely responsible for the continued impasse in Korean problems. This study, however, is concerned primarily with American foreign policy toward Korean independence and unification from the time of the Cairo Declaration to the eve of the Japanese surrender, and especially with how various policies were arrived at and why these policies ended in dismal failure by creating the 38th parallel.
Contrary to a widely held view that the division of Korea was another secret agreement either at Yalta or Potsdam, the truth would appear to be that the division had its origin in the War Department recommendation in Washington. Asthe war against Japan was moving rapidly to its conclusion after the first explosion of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and the subsequent declaration of war by the Soviet Union, War Department planners were busily working on instruction which General MacArthur was to present to the Japanese on the procedure for the surrender of their armed forces.
The 38th parallel as a dividing line in Korea had never been the subject of international discussions among the wartime leaders. President Truman made it clear that the line was “proposed by us as a practical soulution when the suuden collapse of the Japanese war machine created a vaccuum in Korea.” However, there was no thought, Truman recalled, of a permanent division of Korea. The choice of the 38th parallel as the line of division between the Soviet and American forces was thus taken “on purely military grounds with no thought of possible political consequences.”
The United States, however, made a grave mistake in proposing the 38th parallel as the boundary for military occupation. This mistake could easily have been avoided had the American Government previously had some arrangement with the Soviet Union on the problem of the military occupation of Korea and had they set up a concerte plan for a unified administraton as recommended by the State Department. Unfortunately, the policy planners under the Truman administration followed the path set by President Roosevelt and gave little attention to the future of Korea. They accepted the idea of a trusteeship, a cherished invention of Roosevelt's, without criticism or much scrutiny.
The war had made apparent the close connection between foreign policy and military policy. During the war, of course, foreign policy had, in a sense, been an adjunct of the military strategy of the United States, the War and Navy Departments had more to say about some foreign policy decisions than had the State Department. During the war, military consideration naturally and properly had priority. The military-minded foreign policy, however, inevitably created immense problems which could have been solved if they had been given a little political consideration in the process of their formulation.

抄録全体を表示

Korea, whose independence was promised by the Allied Powers during World War II., witnessed the division of the country into two as a result of American-Soviet disagreement. Moreover, in 1948, each section took necessary steps for independence while the country remained disunited.
Japan formally recognized Korea's independence when the Peace Treaty became effective. She had, however, acknowledged the existence of independent Korea even before the Peace Treaty was concluded. Furthermore, the Japanese Government was ready to accept the government of the Republic of Korea as the legitimate regime in Korea in view of American wishes and the resolution adopted by the Third General Assembly of the United Nations. Subsequently, as soon as the Peace Treaty was signed in 1951, the government of Japan entered into negotiations with the Korean Government on various problems which would arise when the treaty became effective.
The talks, however, brought about no result, and without any agreements between the two governments, the Peace Treaty went into effect. Since then, six sessions of intermittent talks were held between the two governments during the past eleven years. There are many reasons for the prolongation of the talks. These include, emotionalism among the peoples of Japan and Korea, as well as the extreme anti-Japanese sentiment which prevailed in Korea during the Rhee administration. Concrete causes for the failure, however, have been, among others, the questions of property settlement and fishery in which the fundamental differences of opinion of both parties have been evident.
The ROK government regarded the question of property as vital, and maintained the attitude that without the settlement of this issue other problems existing between Japan and Korea would remain unsolved. In the face of such a stiff argument of the ROK government, the Japanese Government made significant concessions on two occasions. The first was the withdrawal of the six-year old Japanese demand, in late 1957, for compensation for the property previously owned by the Japanese nationals in Korea. The second concession involved Japan's modification regarding her demand for property compensation based on legal principle. The new Foreign Minister Ohira hoped to settle this issue on the basis of political expediency rather than on legal basis. These concessions brought about a basic agreement regarding the property question which had been one of the greatest obstacles in the talks. This being accomplished, hopes for the conclusion of talks brightened.
Be that as it may, the future of the talks seems to depend on the degree of the concessions by the ROK government on the question of fishery (the removal of the Rhee Line) which the Japanese Government consider important.

抄録全体を表示