The fourth round of the Arab-Israeli War was started on 6 October 1973 by the Arabs. Before the War, the Arabs deliberately prepared their military build-up. Israeli intelligence noted these preparations along the ceasefire lines. But the military elite misinterpreted the intentions of the Arab leaders, believing that the Arabs would never renew the fighting because of their poor military capabilities and the opposing Israeli superiority in the military balance. Should the Arabs intend to surprise Israel, Israeli early-warning systems would founction, a standing army would hold the enemy forces, and the rapid mobilization would be carried out.
In the early morning of 6 October, the decisive information that the war would break out that evening reached the military elite. Chief of Staff Elazar took the necessary steps immediately. He met the Defence Minister and proposed a pre-emptive strike and general mobilization of reserves. The political elite, such as the Prime Minister, Defence Minister and Vice Prime Minister, however, turned down the former proposal, but concerning the latter one they authorized Gen. Elazar to mobilize 100, 000 men. These two decisions were based on a political consideration. The factors which induced the political elite to adopt these decisions were mainly their image of the external environment and the political decision-making system itself. The Israeli political elite had viewed their environment as follows: (1) regionally, Israeli military supremacy and the maintenance of the ceasefire in the border areas ruled out any possibility of warfare; but (2) globally, her political position in the international area was symbolized by her isolation. Especially in 1973, two dramatic incidents, the downing of a Libyan airplane by Israeli warplanes in February and the hijacking of an Iraqi jet liner in August, deepened the isolation. In the latter case, the US Government condemned the Israeli action. The decisions not to pre-empt and not to call up all the reserves are explained by Israel's deteriorating pnlitical environment. Moreover there was no machinery in the decision-making organization to check the evaluations presented by the military intelligence.

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The aim of this article is to construct several plausible models of war expansion in the major power system, to test them against the empirical data, and to obtain implications from these models for our ever continuing efforts to control war expansion.
Among the models developed, the Polya model turns out the best. In the Polya model, it is assumed that once a war occurs, each remaining non-participant major power has an equal probability of entering the war, and that this probability increases as the number of the major powers that have entered the war increases.
We find from the Polya model that the major power that makes a decision first whether it enters the war or not has the crucial role in war expansion and that in a multipolar system as compared to a bipolar system, while the probability of a world war will decrease, wars into which one or two major powers enter from the non-participant status will become more likely to occur.

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This paper will deal with some important problems facing the current study of conflict. There are, as generally known, controversial issues in theorizing conflict situation. One is over the social role of conflict. We can observe two different ideas in this issue as follows.
The first is the negative approach; where it is possible to consider conflict an abnormal behavior. This should be eliminated from international relations. The second is, to the contrary, the positive approach; where we regard conflict as a useful social means. In this case, conflicts tend to function to contain opposing interests within the intra-social system, thereby contributing to harmonize the conflict situation.
Another is over the nature of conflict. There are again twofold ideas. The first is a personal conflict whose root lies in human minds. The second is a structural one whose cause is correlated with social mechanism. Along with theoretical developments in models of “linkage” and “integration”, our study has also been sophisticated to clarify the meaning, the role, and the function of conflict. As a matter of fact, there is still no appropriate way of explaining how conflicts actually operate.
For this heuristic purpose, the “Barringer Model” was newly proposed to handle controversial issues mentioned above. We find many important implications in the “Barringer Model” of conflict. For example, it argues that there must be an empirical difference between the phases of ending and that of resolving conflicts. This is certainly an interesting proposition. Therefore, we shall introduce this innovative model into the analysis of conflicting environments in international relations.
In this paper, we will make efforts to examine respective ideas observed in Barringer's model. In so doing, a theoretical contribution may be possible for rebuilding the theory of conflict. However, an empirical test of this model remains to be seen. Thus, this preliminary attempt was made in this essay.

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The purpose of this paper is to examine the conflicts caused by foreign direct investment from the theoretical viewpoint. In the first part various trends and problems of foreign direct investment are surveyed. In the second part the explanation of various conflicts referring to foreign direct investment is attempted. In order to analyze various phases of conflicts, it is important to examine the political climate of the world and the conflictive factors pertaining to foreign direct investment. And the two types of conflicts-horizontal conflict and vertical conflict-are investigated. Finally, the political significance of foreign direct investment in the future world politics is argued. Then, the paper emphasized the negative aspects-the peril of vertical transaction-of foreign direct investment, and proposed the control of foreign direct investment in that context.

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This paper is part of the results of theoretical and historical studies on crisis strategy. Most scholars have devoted much more attention to the escalation of crises and the strategy for war as the result of such escalation rather than to the de-escalation of crises and to crisis strategy. These scholars have tended to neglect the question of how crises are de-esclated or terminated.
In these days, however, any great power must accomplish its political objectives-terminating its its crises is one of these objectives-without resorting to war which is likely to bring about too much material and non-material damage on it.
It can be said, therefore, that crisis strategy is more important than war strategy from the view point of total strategy and peace-keeping. This writer has studied crisis strategy under the above-stated terms.
The first part of this paper deals with the premise of the study on crisis strategy, the essence of crises and the influence of stress on the decision making process in crises. The second part of the paper treats of the objectives of crisis strategy and the three, mutually related principles in crisis strategy: freedom of choice, empathy to the opponent, and control by politics.

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(1) Apparently, peace-building is still our key concern in world politics. The reality is, however, that global peace has been too vulnerable to be long established. In fact, there are ample evidence on this in the international milieu. Why is “peace” so difficult to be achieved? Not only well-documented historic data, but scientific analyses of them are greatly required for answering this question. Nevertheless, it seems quite possible here to approach to the subject matter in terms of the negative side of peace.
Hence, it may be reasonable to set up a structural hypothesis; the state of war would be likely to occur if there were no any international system where conflicts between nations could be controlled and/or resolved without violent forms. This hypothesis becomes really relevant when we look at the so-called “random” structure in the present international relations.
There have been various efforts to change or transform the substance of the “random” structure in actions as well as in thoughts. International integration may clearly be a case in point. For it has undertaken to introduce the logic of integration into its rule of political behaviors. It is especially be symbolized in the politics of European Community. We shall call this a dynamics of peace which is not necessarily be found in the traditional framework of world affairs. (2) The purpose of this essay is, therefore, to theorize any form of correlation between integration and dynamics of peace, thereby attempting to explore where it can empirically be proved in behaviors of the EC. In this paper, however, it is not assumed that integration necessarily leads to peace; vice versa. Our concern is clearly elsewhere. An analytical effort should be made toward questions of how and where dynamics of peace could be discerned in integration, and how and where it would have limitations.
To this end, we shall, first, try to argue implications of peace inherent in the behavioral rule of integration. Secondly. this calls for the analysis of relationship between integration and dynamics of peace based on the actual model of EC politics. So far as the “within-system” is concerned, the EC is highly unique in building and strengthening a peace-oriented behavior. The EC is now a mixed international system where both national and transnational actors are playing independent roles for resolving conflicted interests. As a consequence of this, an interesting dynamics is beginning to operate to fragment the tight structure of national interests. Thirdly, we shall discuss the problem of peace caused primarily by interactions between integration and non-integration systems. This point is very noticeable because the EC has recently expanded, to a greater degree, its external relations with outer systems. The latest Lomé Convention (1975) is just an example to this. This issue area has also been neglected, if not totally, in the literature of integration.
An important question is thus whether integration players would apply their behavioral rules establised within the system toward the outer world to newly create a symmetric structure. If this is the case, the EC will be likely to develope a structure of peace instead of posing a threat against peace. In order to handle this issue, much lights should be shed on the relationship between the EC and the Third World. For it has been strongly argued by some students of peace research that the EC has more or less imposed the pattern of dominance on the Third World. We shall, finally, examine the extent to which this provocative proposition could reflect the reality of the EC.

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