巻号一覧
1978 巻 (1978)
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1978 巻, 58 号
選択された号の論文の12件中1～12を表示しています
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日英関係の史的展開安岡 昭男1978 年 1978 巻 58 号 p. 1-14,L1
発行日: 1978/03/10
公開日: 2010/09/01
ジャーナル フリーSakhalin is called “Alsace-Lorreine of the East Asia”. The Yedo-Bakufu (the Shogunate) failed to solve the northern boundary probrem with Russia, and Sakhalin remained under a sort of joint occupation. But more and more Russians were coming to the island. British Minister to Japan Sir Harry S. Parkes supplied the Japanese new government with information about Russian settlement in Sakhalin. He advised the Japanese high officials to throw forces into Hokkaido and not to quarrel about Sakhalin. On his advice the Japanese government settled Sakhalin Question by the territorial exchange treaty in 1875. This Treaty, which temporarily bringing peace between Russia and Japan means on the other hand the success of British diplomacy in the Far East.抄録全体を表示PDF形式でダウンロード (1666K) -
日英関係の史的展開村島 滋1978 年 1978 巻 58 号 p. 15-31,L1
発行日: 1978/03/10
公開日: 2010/09/01
ジャーナル フリーThe aim of this thesis is to examine the historical relationship between the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Russo-Japanese War, by shedding light on some problems concerning the first military arrangements concluded between Japan and Britain in July 1902.
In that year, these conferences between the naval and military representatives of Japan and Britain were held to discuss cooperation in time of peace and joint action in the event of war. These conferences were held in Yokosuka (May), London (July, two arrangements were signed), and Tokyo (November). On the basis of the General Staff papers, compiled during these meetings, which are called “The Miyazaki Papers”, I should like to examine these negotiations between the two Powers, and try to clarify my theme by examining two or three points in detail.
During these negotiations, not only was an outline of cooperation in time of peace and joint action in the event of war given a concrete form, but the strategic functions of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were also clarified. The object of Admiral Yamamoto, the Navy Minister, who played an active part in the negotiations, was to strengthen the strategic position of Japan by cooperating with Britain, rather than to attempt a war against Russia.
I think that it is alo a matter of the greatest importance to study the attitude of the Japanese army towards the Alliance. Especially, the attitude of Major T. Utsunomiya, the Japanese military attaché in Britain and Major General Y. Fukushima, who represented Japan at the London Conference. Their active speech and bejavior, which had a far-reaching influence on the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, may have also influenced a positive attitude on the part of officers of medium standing in the Japanese army just prior to the 2nd World War.
It has been shown that as a result of these arrangements, that the armies of both Powers could not take part in a joint action in the Far East. This made the Japanese military leaders realize the limitations of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a military alliance. Consequently, it may be hard to state from these aspects of the military arrangements, that the Japanese military leaders took the Anglo-Japanese Alliance for a means by which to drive their government into the war against Russia.抄録全体を表示PDF形式でダウンロード (2193K) -
日英関係の史的展開臼井 勝美1978 年 1978 巻 58 号 p. 32-44,L2
発行日: 1978/03/10
公開日: 2010/09/01
ジャーナル フリーThe object of this article is to understand the policy of the Japanese Government towards the Chinse Revolution of 1911. Yuan Shih-kai, recalled by the Manchu Dynasty, arrived in Peking on November 13 and organized his cabinet. As Dr. Lowe has indicated Britain placed great trust in Yuan Shih-kai and believed the new Chinese Government, monarchical or republican, could only work effectively if Yuan controlled it. Japan favoured retention of the Manchu Dynasty under a constitutional monarchy and urged Yuan to support the monarchical course. But Japan regarded Yuan as basically Anti-Japanese and did not place much trust in him. So Japan proposed to Britain joint intervention to achieve constitutional monarchy in China, but the latter opposed any steps beyond protecting its nationals. Finally, the trade interest of Britain in the Yangtze valley and in south China sacrificed the Manchu Dynasty from obtaining early peace and Japan was not strong enough financially to defy British intentions. On December 28, Japanese chargé d'affaires in London stated to Sir E. Grey that the Japanese Government would not take any further action, but would await development of Chinese political situation.抄録全体を表示PDF形式でダウンロード (1654K) -
日英関係の史的展開原口 邦紘1978 年 1978 巻 58 号 p. 45-68,L3
発行日: 1978/03/10
公開日: 2010/09/01
ジャーナル フリーCanadian Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King said that the new agreement had been possible to consummate through the expression of goodwill given their neighbours on the Pacific by the substitution for exclusion of the policy of settlement by negotiation and of an exchange of ministers between Japan and Canada, at a banquet tendered him by the Toronto Board of Trade in November, 1928.
This new agreement was the revised Lemieux Agreement reached in the spring of this year after negotiations between the Governments of Japan and Canada extending over three years (1925-1928) at Ottawa. For the Canadian Government, this revision was the realization of the substantial restriction for Japanese immigration, but for the Japanese Government, it was a result of being obliged to accept most of the Canadian proposals in order to prevent the enactment of the exclusion act, just as like the Japanese Exclusion Act enacted by the United States in 1924, and to preserve the dignity of Nation.
So-called Lemieux Agreement was an informal agreement, that was, Gentlemen's Agreement for the restriction of Japanese immigration to Canada maintained between the Governments of Japan and Canada since 1908. Its distinctive feature was that the restrictions were to be carried out by the Japanese Government, not by the Canadian Government. But by the revision of 1928, Japanese Government agreed to limit the total number of passports issued to the immigrants to Canada within one-hundred and fifty annually including wives and children of Japanese residents in Canada who had never been restricted until then, and at the same time “picture bride” was prohibited. Moreover she agreed the Canadian Immigration Act and procedure including provisions for viseing of passports and preinvestigations would be administered by Canadian officials.
This article attempts to clarify the fundamental diplomatic relations between Japan and Canada in 1920's mainly by examining the process of the revision of the Lemieux Agreement negotiated from 1925 to 1928, and also to explain how British was concerned with this negotiations between Japan—Anglo-Japanese Alliance had already been terminated—and Dominion Canada which was in the course of establishing her autonomous diplomatic rights in British Empire.抄録全体を表示PDF形式でダウンロード (2897K) -
日英関係の史的展開細谷 千博1978 年 1978 巻 58 号 p. 69-85,L4
発行日: 1978/03/10
公開日: 2010/09/01
ジャーナル フリーThe essay is aimed at exploring, on the basis of the British archives at Public Record Office, as well as of the Japanese Foreign Office archives, an attempt for improving Anglo-Japanese relations in 1934 in the form of the Anglo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact.
Whereas the development of talks concerning the Anglo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact is examined, an emphasis is placed upon an analysis of domestic political processes in both countries in which their foreign policies of restoring old friendly ties were pursued.
The essay finds its another feature in employing an analytical framework of looking into interaction processes of three countries-Japan, Britain and the U. S. —at that time.抄録全体を表示PDF形式でダウンロード (874K) -
日英関係の史的展開波多野 澄雄1978 年 1978 巻 58 号 p. 86-104,L4
発行日: 1978/03/10
公開日: 2010/09/01
ジャーナル フリーLeith-Ross mission's visit to Far East (1935-36) was made along the Chamberlain-Fisher Line, and one of purposes of the visit was to attain an Anglo-Japanese cooperation on China issues through co-operative aid to monetary reforms in China.
The monetary crisis in China arose from America's 1934 silver policy. The policy makers in Japan, however, had a very optimistic view about the crisis and took Leith-Ross mission's proposals forming a line in the chain of past co-operative economic aid to China. Therefore Japan accepted the proposals within the frame-work of Japan's China policy as was represented by the Amau doctorine.
The Japanese Army particularly interpreted the decisive monetary reforms of November in 1935 as defense and expansion of England's rights and interests in China. As a result, the Army took measures to destroy the new monetary system by swiftly propelling the autonomous movement in North China which included the separation of monetary system in North China from Nanking government. The Army also helped the smuggling trade through the demilitarized zone in North China leading to the destruction of the maritime customs.
Leith-Ross mission holding the stabilization of the new monetary system as its first aim came to lack a strong confidence in the Army who conducted those political and economic maneuverings in North China. In addition to that, the policy makers in Japan still relying upon the logic of the Amau doctorine tried to treat the maneuverings in North China as domestic affairs of the Nanking government.
As far as those circumstances existed there couldn't be found favourable conditions to realize an Anglo-Japanese co-operation on China issues.抄録全体を表示PDF形式でダウンロード (2463K) -
ローゼクランス リチャード, 西原 正1978 年 1978 巻 58 号 p. 105-115,L5
発行日: 1978/03/10
公開日: 2010/09/01
ジャーナル フリーA recent debate in the United States has been focused on the “state-centric” and “transnational” approaches to the study of international relations. These two contending approaches are debated because they do not apply equally well to the international reality in all time periods and we do not know when and why one approach gives way to the other. History shows that nationalism and transnationalism alternated their primacy and that political nationalism and economic transnationalism have often existed side by side, as have political transnationalism and economic nationalism.
Among the factors that might account for such paradigmatic changes in the international system are: (1) warfares or international tensions, which greatly enhance the importance of the nation-state; (2) the peaceful hegemony of an imperial or world power (e. g., the Pax Britannica), which is likely to cause high economic interdependence; and (3) the low degree of structural balance in the international system, which is likely to lead to the transnational approach to international relations.
The theory of structual balance, being derived from social psychology, seems to explain well the rise of detente in the late sixties when hitherto hostile nations began to develop cross-cutting ties among themselves. As a state Japan greatly facilitates a reduction of tension and low structural balance in Asia by maintaining important ties with both China and the Soviet Union. Of all modern states, postwar Japan has perhaps to the greatest degree learned the lessons that transnationalism seeks to impart. The current setback of Soviet-American detente and the temporary growth of tensions caused by the oil crisis of 1973 may paradoxically prove to be a healthy step toward a flourishing transnationalism. (Prepared by M. Nishihara, translator)抄録全体を表示PDF形式でダウンロード (1435K) -
大山 梓1978 年 1978 巻 58 号 p. 116-118
発行日: 1978/03/10
公開日: 2010/09/01
ジャーナル フリーPDF形式でダウンロード (352K) -
元川 房三1978 年 1978 巻 58 号 p. 118-124
発行日: 1978/03/10
公開日: 2010/09/01
ジャーナル フリーPDF形式でダウンロード (865K) -
亀井 紘1978 年 1978 巻 58 号 p. 124-130
発行日: 1978/03/10
公開日: 2010/09/01
ジャーナル フリーPDF形式でダウンロード (822K) -
藤村 道生1978 年 1978 巻 58 号 p. 130-136
発行日: 1978/03/10
公開日: 2010/09/01
ジャーナル フリーPDF形式でダウンロード (863K) -
海野 芳郎1978 年 1978 巻 58 号 p. 139-140
発行日: 1978/03/10
公開日: 2010/09/01
ジャーナル フリーPDF形式でダウンロード (175K)
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