The normalization of Japan's political relationship with the People's Republic of China in 1972 was a drastic turning point in the history of international politics in East Asia district. In this paper, I try to clarify the following points: 1) Who was/were the actual decisionmaker/decisionmakers and who was/were his/their advisor/advisors in Japan? 2) What was the background of their behavior in Japan's domestic politics? 3) Was there any discrepancy between the Japan-China normalization and Japan-U. S. relations (especially Japan-U. S. Security Treaty)? In trying to answer these questions, I made a rather simple assumption on the decisionmaking process of Japan's postwar diplomacy and also tried to verify this assumption through a case study.
Even though Japan continued diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Japan was able to conclude the fourth “non-official” trade agreement with the People's Republic of China on March of 1958. It was through this agreement, Japan hoped to increase the volume of trade with mainland China and thereby stimulate her domestic economy. Mainland China, on the other hand, considered this agreement as a good opportunity to transcend her private relation with Japan toward official recognition. Taiwan, which did not want to recognize any relation Japan had with mainland China, strongly opposed the provision in the memorundom attached to the agreement allowing the Chinese trade mission to fly its national flag in Japan. Therefore, Taiwan threatened Japan using various resources including prohibiting trade with Japan. The first purpose of this paper is to describe how the strained relationship between Japan and Taiwan was solved. The second is to analyze the decision making process in the Japanese government, especially focusing on how each minister, LDP dietman and bureaucrat acted.
This paper deals with the following four movements that resisted against the pressures from foreign countries. They are; 1. the claim of Canton government for pro rate share of customs surplus of 1923, 2. the rebellion of the Canton Merchants' Corps of 1924, 3. the strike-boycotte of Canton-Hongkong of 1925, and 4. the seizure of the British Hankow concession of 1927. The former two movements may be understood as Sun Yat-sen's Diplomacy, while the latter two movements can be grasped as Revolutionary Diplomacy of the Nationalist government that was organized after Sun Yat-sen's death. In this Revolutionary Diplomacy, th Nationalist government attempted to abrogate the unequal treaties by the mobilization of mass movements into anti-imperialist struggle. The objective of this paper is, through the comparison with Sun Yat-sen's Diplomacy, to point out and examine the characteristics of this Revolutionary Diplomacy.
China in 1920's under unequal treaty order, had been recognized neither as a “Nation State” among international societies, nor as a “Partner” for diplomatic negotiations. In these circumstances, the Kuomintang Party achieved to establish diplomatic relations by impelling the National Revolution. Although Nationalism had been built up among the Chinese people as a result of strong anti-foreign movements led by the Kuomintang Party, but on the contrary, it caused the possibility to bring about some incidents, which were deemed to be uncontrollable for the Nationalist Government. In consequence of the developed labour movements at Hankow, it happened the incident between the Chinese mob led by the Chinese General Labour Union and the British marines on January 3, 1927, and the British Concession was took place of Chinese. On that account, the negotiation was held between O'Malley, the Counsellor of the British Legation at Peking and Eugene Chen, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Nationalist Government, however, Britain had to concede to China because of the restrictions imposed by the “Christmas Message”, and the British Concession was returned to China as a result. In the case of this Hankow Incident, the raised anti-foreign movements resulted in settling one of the Chinese diplomatic problems.
After the Wakatsuki Kenseikai Cabinet fell, on April 20, 1927, the Tanaka Seiyukai Cabinet was formed. It was a pressing need for the Tanaka Cabinet to establish a new policy about the Chinese rights-recovery movement, rising Chinese nationalism, Japan's relation with Chang Tso-lin, protection of Japan's interests in Manchuria when the Nationalist armies of China were marching on Peking. Tanaka emphasized the need for pursuing a “positive” policy in order to break through Japan's national “crisis” at home and abroad. He convened the Eastern Conference to deal with above mentioned problems in Tokyo from June 27 to July 7. This paper intends to analyze problems of the Eastern Conference, and examines intentions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Army, the detail of the conference, the course of negotiation concerned with questions pending of Manchuria. In the conclusion, this paper attempts to study specific characters of the early Tanaka Diplomacy to China in relation with the Washington System and Shidehara Diplomacy.
Since the end of the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, Japan's Far-Eastern policy had been primarily concerned with South Manchuria and East Inner-Mongolia. Its principal objective was aimed at the enhancement of the “special rights and interests” in those areas. Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the process of signing Twenty-One Demands, which touched off the Japan-U. S. conflicts in the era of World War I. From the standpoint of Sino-Japanese relations, the Demands was regarded as an inevitable consequence, stemming from Japan's territorial expansion policy toward continental China. Japan, which was victorious in both the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War, attempted to make the special rights and interests in South Manchuria and East Inner-Mongolia as fait accompli. The imposition of Japan's influence on China in fact was a vital part of its over-all mainland subjugation policy, because its colonial aspirations dictated such a grand scale expansionist policy. From an economic standpoint too, the treaty was one of the important events in the history of Japan-China relations which we should not overlook whenever we examine the relations in the era of World War I. The Nishihara Loans (1917-1918), which is considered an economic means of Japan's expansion policy toward China in that period, also requires our close examination. In this paper, the writer carefully examines the process of signing the Twenty-One Demands, because it vividly reveals both the political and economic aspects of the Japanese expansionist policy, which, in turn, led Japan to claim special rights and interests in the region. The paper also shows how the Japanese imperialism was accelerated since the Okuma cabient, which made the Twenty-One Demands successful, had been installed. Furthermore, the Demands had a far-reaching significance and impact on the Japan-U. S. relations, mainly because it became a prelude to Ishii-Lansing Agreement (1917). The primary goal of American foreign policy toward Asia during World War I period was to expand the sphere of her influence in China. In fact, American policy toward Asia totally depended on her China and Japan policy. Given the overlapping foreign policy objectives of Japan and the United States in China, a diplomatic conflict between the two countries was inevitable. Numerous researches on the subject have been carried out from the perspective of policy-making processess, using different analytical frameworks. From a benevolent viewpoint of Japan's China policy, Japanese policy objective is viewed as inevitable to promote her national development at that time. On the other hand, some other scholars tend to consider it as a part of the Japanese imperialists' scheme during the First World War. However, the writer, favoring neither approaches, attempts to analyze the matter on the basis of historical materials and data, which would finally leads towards an “objective” evaluation. In this study, Japan, China, and the United States are considered independent rational actors. More specifically about the level of analysis, the goals and objectives pursued by these three actors in relation to one another are investigated. The paper consists of six brief parts, excluding the introduction. In the first section, scrutinizing the nature of the special rights and interests claimed by Japan in both Manchuria and Mongolia, the writer examines the initial stage in Japan-China relations, refering to the specific demands made by the Okuma cabinet upon Yuan Shi Kai Regime in the second section. The writer also describes the negotiation process between the two governments, especially China's response to the Japanese demands, in the third section. The Wilson Administration's reaction to the Japan's foreign policy behavior on the Demands, which had ultimately developed into America's Asian policy, is analyzed in the fourth section. In an attempt to avoid a di
The purpose of this article is to clarify China and Russia's attitudes toward the Russo-Chinese negotiation concerning Mongolia in 1913. In 1911, the Mongols declared independence, and organized the Bogdo Khan government. Bogdo's Mongolia aimed to be a comlete independent state which united all Mongolians. However, Russia, just after the Mongol declaration of independence, aimed at creating an Autonomous Outer Mongolia. Opposed to these, China categorically opposed to the independence or autonomy of Outer Mongolia, but consented only to abolish the “New Policy” and reinstate the old Ch'ing administrative system in Mongolia. At first, Russia planned to mediate between Mongolia and China, but abandoned the plan because of China's over bigoted attitude. Then, Russia changed her attitude toward establishing a tentative diplomatic relations by concluding an agreement with Mongolia. Russian aim was to force China into negotiation with Russia. The Russo-Chinese negotiation concerning Mongolia, as Russia wished, was started in Reking in November 23, 1913, just after the Russo-Mongolian Agreement of November 3, in which Russian rights and interests in Outer Mongolia were widely recognized. In this negotiation, Russia, in exchange of her support of China's suzerainty over Mongolia, demanded China to recognize Outer Mongolia's autonomy and the validity of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement. China not only refused to recognize the Russo-Mongolian Agreement, but also demanded Russia to confirm China's sovereignty over Mongolia. Moreover, China wanted only to continue the old administrative system in Mongolia. The negotiation, once, was about to be settled. However, China's inordinate persistence to the reinstatement of the old system in Mongolia brought the rupture of the negotiation. Mongolia herself, kept an eye on the Russo-Chinese negotiation about her future status, and demanded Russia for Mongolia's participation in any negotiation which concern her fate. After an interruption, the Russo-Chinese negotiation was held again on September, 1913. Russia, at this negotiation, sought to establish only the principles to resolve the problems concerning Mongolia between China and Russia. The final settlement of the questions was to be entrusted to a future conference among Mongolia, Russia and China. In November 5, 1913, the Russo-Chinese Declaration was signed. The content of this declaration was that China gave up the reinstatement of the old regional system in Mongolia and confirmed the new one or the Autonomous Outer Mongolia under China's suzerainty. At th same time, the declaration also proclaimed the begining of the so-called Tripartite conference among Mongolia, Russia and China for the final settlement of the Mongol problems.
In 1871, the Japanese government sent a goodwill mission to the United States of America and the European countries. This mission was led by Tomomi Iwakura, vice-president of minister (Udaizin _??__??__??_). Takayoshi Kido, the member of council (Sangi _??__??_), was appointed a vice-ambassador of the mission. Kido who belonged to the Chôshû faction had rivaled with Toshimichi Ôkubo who was the minister of finance (Ôkura-kyô _??__??__??_) and belonged to the Satsuma faction. Kido had opposed Ôkubo's policies. So Ôkubo tried to reduce Kido's influence in the government. Then Ôkubo succeeded to isolate Kido from the government as a vice-ambassador of the mission.