The aim of this introductory essay is to analyze the post-war developments in international relations theories and methods and to provide a general organizing framework for this volume of International Relations.
A theory in international relations can be defined as a set of concepts and propostitions (hypotheses) which aims at describing, explaining, interpreting, and predicting the phenomena of international relations. Such a theory not only guides research but also offers basic information and policy prescriptions to decisionmakers and citizens. International relations theories are intrinsically plural (i. e., more than one theories exists) and change over time due basically to heterogeneity and a lack of continuity in the realities of internationalr elations—international relations is like ‘clouds’ and not like ‘mechanical clocks.’ Plurality in I. R. theories tends to be perpetual since a theory in IR is not to be proved or disproved in its entire system by empirical evidence, but rather is only to be replaced by a new or revised theory if and only if the latter explains or interprets the events more deeply, and a wider range of events can be explained by the new theory than the present one. Changes in international relations theories can, besides the lack of continuity in the realities, be justified by the fact that they must provide reasonable interpretations regarding politically important current events to citizens and decisionmakers. But, because of this, there always exists the possibility that international relations theories are only ‘fashion’ reflecting the current situation in IR.
A methodology is concerned with how we develop and test a theory. Even though there is no agreed upon methodology in IR research, there seems to be basically two different types of methodologies: one is the “interpretative” method and the other is the “procedural” method. The “interpretative” method looks at the intentions and motivations of human beings, social institutions, conventions and customs and interprets, and extracts the meaning of, by impressionistic illustrations, behavior, events and the operation of social systems. The “procedural” method utilizes scientific procedures such as explanation by covering laws andtests by statistical techniques. Theories and methodologies are independent—for example. we utilize the “interpretative” method for constructing concepts, deriving hypotheses, and ‘testing’ such hypotheses; or we may use the “interpretative” method for concept formation and hypothesis derivation and use the “procedural” method for hypothesis testing.
In the nineteen fifties and sixties, the “procedural” method was widely and enthusiastically introduced, and such behavioral disciplines as psychology, social psychology, modern economics and statistics became major cognate fields of international relations. International relations thories in the fifties and sixties, being influenced by such phenomena, emphasized behavior rather than international institutions, the parts rather than the whole, and tended to be ahistorical. These characteristics reflect the realities of international relations in these periods. The U. S. preponderance, which shaped the world order, was immense and internaitonal economic institutions were stable. These factors were considered ones to continue as constants in international relations in the future. Under these conditions, it was natural that theories of international relations focused on behavior and on the parts rather than the whole.
However, in the late sixties and in the seventies, these factors became “variables.” The relative power of the United States had declined and international economic institutions were in a shambles.

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The aim of this paper is to re-evaluate the validity and relevancy of the balance-of-power theory, putting it to logical, empirical and practical tests.
First, the balance-of-power theory is proven to be amorphous with respect to power distribution, system level and the equilibrating process which it purports to denote. Disequilibrium easily enters into the common usage of balance, from which the ideology of balance derives. Provided with equilibrium or a modicum of disequilibrium, propositions could be empirically tested. But a description of the existing distribution of power or significant disequilibrium would not be subjected toempirical but practical tests.
Second, the methodology of a number of statistical and empirical tests are analyzed and proven to be deficient in any operationalizable concept of “power balance, ” even though this should be central to the theory.
Third, practical tests are carried out with respect to the attitudes of H. J. Morgenthau, J. H. Herz, H. A. Kissinger, K. N. Waltz and M. A. Kaplan toward the balance of power, nuclear deterrence, the Vietnam War and Nazism. While nuclear deterrence theory is inclined to be accepted by protagonists of the military balance without taking into account humane considerations, it is more or less rejected by those who lay greater stress on the political connotation of balance, however loosely defined.
Considering the above, readers abroad might well cast doubt on the validity of this research to the peace and war problems faced by Japan. A few additional remarks may illuminate the peace orientation behind this paper.
The principle of balance-of-power is not only very popular, but also most ambiguous, among Japanese statesmen and political scientists. As shown here, it is inherently composed of concepts which cannot be strictly defined and verified. Besides, Japanese politics has scarcely experienced the principle's application. Modern Japan could not afford to make political use of this principle, being a nascent imperialist power before 1945. Contemporary Japan has established military forces under the guise of the so-called Self-Defence Forces, without giving any consideration to the political connotation of the principle, despite years of diplomatic inactivity since 1945. The peace movements and “peace thought” in post-war Japan have also been somewhat ignorant of political realism.
To reap the harvest of our peace-orientation, this study, peace-oriented but conscious of political realism, aims to act as a fertilizer for regional and world peace.

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The “hegemonic model” presupposes the existence of an economic “hegemon” for an open international trade system. According to the model, the United States in the postwar period, like Great Britain in 19th century Europe, played the role of a hegemon in the creation and maintenance of a free trade regime. However, the decline of American economic power since the late 1960s implied that the United States would increasingly depart from its free-trade position, letting the specter of protectionism haunt the world. The model is criticized for neglecting foreign-policy considerations for free trade.
The “bipolar system model” relates the postwar U. S. trade policy to the structure of East-West relations. The United States pursued a free trade policy in order to guarantee the cohesion of the Western coalition against the communist bloc. The United States benevolently opened its market to imports from the allied countries, while allowing these countries to be largely negligent in opening their own markets to U. S. products. As the cold-war system declined, however, the U. S. incentive for such a trade policy declined. The United States become less and less patient with its allies over bilateral economic conflicts and more susceptible to domestic protectionist pressures. Our close examination of the U. S. -Japan textile disputes during three different time periods (1947-60, 1961-68, and 1969-71) demonstrates that, as the cold-war tension subsided, these issues became progressively more complex and increasingly politicized, requiring more time for resolution, involving higher-level officials, and spilling over into other issue areas.
Neither the “hegemonic model” nor the “bipolar system model” sufficiently explains the U. S. trade policy since the mid-1970s. Despite the further decline of U. S. economic power and despite the demise of the traditional cold-war system, the U. S. executive branch —as opposed to domestic interest groups and Congress— has been upholding the principle of free trade. One can argue that, the relative decline of its economic position notwithstanding, the United States is still economically the most powerfule country in the world, and that, in spite of so-called “multipolarization, ” the basic East-West conflict remains unresolved and the U. S.-Soviet tension has even been rising again over the last few years. However, there seem to be more relevant explanations.
First of all, it may be pointed out that trade liberalism has developed into a bipartisan ideology among U. S. officials over the last three decades. There is a growing realization among executive-branch officials that the free trade regime established by the United States after World Wae II may actually disintegrate if things are left to take their own course, and this very realization seems to have the effect of increasing the legitimacy of the free-trade ideology. Moreover, America's growing dependence on foreign trade in recent years has made U. S. officials resist accepting trade-restrictionist solutions to avoid exacerbating the problem of inflation and recession at home, as seen in the 1977 steel trade issue with Japan. The trade-expansionist approach being emphasized by the American goverment is reflected in the U. S. demand that Japan and other allies open up their own markets U. S. products.
Whether or not the United States abandons its role —either as a bloc leader or primus inter pares (if not as a hegemon)— will depend on the ability of Japan and other major Western industrialized countries to help U. S. officials fight domestic protectionism. But these other countries also face increasingly self-assertive domestic groups. Consequently, a realistic model of trade policy will need to take into consideration the dynamics of domestic and alliance politics as well.

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This article attempts to clarify the intermestic political process of the OECD Steel Committee. In 1977, the OECD Council established an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Steel Industry to promote closer co-operation between governments in achieving a better understanding of the industry's critical problems and in developing policies to resolve them. The recommendation of this group was to create the Steel Committee.
According to the Annex of the Council's Decision to establish the Committee (October 1978), the world's steel industry is experiencing serious difficulties of a cyclical and structural nature. These difficulties are characterised by (1) persistent excess capacity, (2) an exceptionally low level of demand, (3) unjustifiably low prices on world markets, (4) marked changes in traditional trade patterns, (5) major dislocations of labor, frequently in areas already experiencing high unemployment, (6) depressed financial performance among producers, which holds down investments needed for modernisation and rationalisation of plants, (7) increasing governmental intervention in supply and demand, especially with foreign trade.
The major function of the Steel Committee can be summarised as to (1) develop common perspectives regarding emerging problems or concerns in the steel sector and establish, where appropriate, multilateral objectives or guidelines for government policies, (2) regularly review and assess government policies and actions in the steel sector in the light of the current situation, agreed multilateral objectives and guidelines and the GATT and other relevant international agreement. This essay explores the political dynamics among the major actors within the Steel Committee, the United States, the European Community and Japan.

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze economic development and state dominance in the contemporary Third World from the world-systems perspective. Based upon the paradigm that relates the national developmental process to the evolution of the capitalist world-system (Wallerstein, Bergesen, Chase-Dunn, etc.), this study explains changes in Third World polity and economy by focusing upon their relationship with the world economy as a whole. The central themes of this study, thus, inevitably overlap with some portions of dependencia theories, but efforts are made to overcome their theoretical ambiguities and limitations by introducing new perspectives.
The first part of this paper analyzes Third World economic development with special emphasis on primary commodity trade, the most dominant link between the Third World and the contemporary world economy. Pointing out the divergencies in recent empirical findings concerning the direct effects on economic development of primary commodity concentration in trade, this study shows that primary commodity concentration has negative effects on economic development via the process that limits one's participation in the world economy. By constructing a set of five panel regression models that are estimated individually with a sample of 64 non-oil-exporting LDCs, it is shown in the first model that primary commodity concentration in trade has negative effects on one's participation in the world economy, and in the second model that expansion of one's presence in the world economy has positive effects on economic development. Despite the fact that primary commodity concentration is an externally-oriented strategy, it pardoxically limits one's participation in the, world economy. There is a critical fallacy in assuming that Third World countries have been incorporated into the world economy as primary commodity producers. They are unable to develop because their primary commodity concentration prohibits them from being incorporated into the world economy, which offers opportunities for economic growth. Then the primary step in pursuit of economic development is to reduce primary commodity concentration. Third World countries have experienced varying degrees of success in this respect. The third model accounts for this variance. It says that direct investment has a negative effect in reducing primary commodity concentration. The theory behind it is that, in self-reliant capitalist economies, initial heavy concentration on primary commodities eventually declines as local enterprises compete for value added products to survive in the local economy. But this process does not necessarily take place in those countries in which primaty commodity production is carried out by multinational subsidiaries, which are protected by overwhelmingly strong external capital and which by themself do not need to compete in the local economy.
The latter half of the paper analyzes Third World state dominance in conjunction with the world-system. The origin of the contemporary surge of authoritarianism in the Third World can be traced back to the exogenous nature of state formation. States entering the world political system as newly independent states tended to internalize the dominant values of the world-system, which has basically been highly statist (Boli-Bennett). Being equipped with more power than society expects, new states inevitably conformed to the role assigned them by the world-system, which in turn has provided them with political ligitimacy and a power base. The role assigned was primary commodity production, and the states interveneed in society to fulfil this role. The rise of state dominance is inevitable in the course of industrialization as well, since states must now undo what it once did, namely periphery construction. But then, will Third World countries experience an endless increase of state dominance?

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Reviewing the rise and decline of regional integration theory over thirty years, and pointing out the accumulation of integration experiences in various regions of the world, this article posits a new perspective of regional integration, especially designed for activities by developing countries. It is an odd twist of history that while a score of regional integration schemes have been pursued, many of which belong to the Third World, most integration theorists have lost interest in integration theory. In order to analyze current integrative activities, an alternative theory is demanded. This paper briefly summarizes the thirty-year history of regional integration theory, and subsequently characterizes recent developments in regional integration attempts so as to discover important aspects to explain integration on the basis of an alternative perspective.
As for the new perspective proposed here, the first major aspect is the complex of orientations whose basic components are community (common culture), economy (common market) and security (common defense). Participants of regional integration schemes jointly enlarge or reduce their collective orientations. While neo-functional theory was concentrated on economy-community linkage, this proposed perspective also takes into consideration economy-security linkage and community-security linkage. The second aspect is the relationship between the regional organization and its participants in terms of power distribution and decision-making rules to pursue an integrative orientation. Emphasis is laid on participant-dominant organizational structure governed by the consensus rule, and on collective adaptation by recursive re-definitions of integrative orientations. The last major aspect is the hypothetical logic of (dis-) integration dynamics. Contrary to the frustration-guided spill-over process, succesful integration presumably takes place through the satisfaction-encouraged goal-challenging process. Therefore, the balance between participants' expectation and actual performance is hypothesized to be crucial. Accordingly, the organization premably follows epigenetic development or reversely degeneration.
In the last part, the six-country region of the original EEC and the five-country region of ASEAN are briefly compared from the abovementioned new perspective, especially in terms of the diffusion of orientations. In both cases, the commitment to create a community (ECSC vs. ASEAN) was followed by the experience of intraregional conflict (World War II vs. confrontation). Extra-regional security was virtually provided by one power or more outside the region (USA vs. USA and UK). Regional economy also depended on outside economies (USA vs. the industrial. countries). Common external economic relations were among the earliest concerns (OEEC vs. fora and dialogues). The commitment to regional economic integration came later in both cases (the Messina Conference vs. the 7th Ministerial Meeting). Thus, although a wide gap exists between the EEC region and the ASEAN region in terms of the level of development, the degree of economic integration, and the supranationality of regional organizations, the pattern of integrative process to enlarge the orientation of regional integration holds surprising resemblance between the two regions.

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The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that language is a very important part of political processes, that ‘physical’ processes go along with the manipulation of language, and that political conflicts or integration between different cultures or language systems may, on many occasions, be seen as the processes in which one language or culture ‘destroys, ’ or more modestly, takes over other languages or cultures.
Indonesia is one of the world's largest dual-language states. While people in Indonesia commonly share the Indonesian language (bahasa Indonesia) as the national language, almost all Indonesians have their own ethnic languages as their native tongues and use them in everyday life. The Javanese language is the commonest of the ethnic languages in terms of the population. The major characteristic of the Javanese language is that it has two major levels in terms of ‘respectability’: one is the language of krama and the other is the language of ngoko. The language of krama, which has been highly developed through Indonesian history, is a ‘honorific’ language and is used by lower status people to higher status people. The language of ngoko is a ‘commoners’ language and is used among close friends and by higher status people to lower status people. When a person uses ngoko and the other person uses krama, then there exists a ‘dominance-conformity’ relationship between them.
In this paper, we briefly describe the major characteristics, origins, and historical developments of these languages. Then, the “Mbah Suro” affair in 1967 is detailed. The affair is well known as one of the most salient resistance movements against the central government in Jakarta. One of the characteristics of the “Mbah Suro” affair is that it is a culturally based resistance movement. The event was widely publicized by the Jakartan government, whose objective was naturally to justify its action, and the newspapers reported the affair in detail. Next, the analysis focuses on how this event was reported in terms of the languages used in order to show the functions of the different languages in the political arena.
Mbah Suro, who was a religious and cultural leader in a local area, used the language of ngoko to his followers, which shows that he is their legitimate leader. However, after Mbah Suro was killed by the physical forces of the central governmnent, the event was reported in such a way that the central government official talked to Mbah Suro using the langiage of ngoko and Mubah Suro replied in krama. This shows the central government demonstrated that legitimacy was on its side and that Mbah Suro “knelt down” to the central government. This psychological and cultural persuasion by the central government was only possible by the use of the Javanese language which maintains a distinction between ‘vulgar’ and ‘honorific’ versions. And, the Javanese language was used when the newspapers reported the event, even though the newspapers usually use the Indonesian language (which does not have such a distinction).

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An information processing system to simulate the decision-making process of China's international conflict behavior is presented. This system, called CHINA-WATCHER, is designed to represent different models of Chinese cognitive process. Different models are specified in terms of the frame of reference (realist or revolutionary), the evaluation strategy (“dove”, “dawk”, or “hawk”), the support-side decision strategy (“dove” or “hawk”), and the involvement decision strategy (“dove” or “hawk”).
No matter how different models are specified in terms of the above criteria, CHINA-WATCHER has key procedures applied in any model. Essentially, CHINA-WATCHER “understands” an inputted case (international conflict, crisis, etc.) and “decides” what China would do. To “understand” the current case, CHINA-WATCHER updates the “world amity-enmity map” showing who are China's friends and who are China's enemies. Then, it detemines the relations of the parties in the current case, i. e. whether the case is a confrontation between friends and enemies, a confrontation between friends and friends, etc.
In addition, CHINA-WATCHER determines the contexts in which the current case is put. There are two contexts always to be determined no matter which model is specified; they are the narrative context and the precedential context. The narrative context is the preceding cases which constitute a longer, unfolding “stort, ” with the current case as its most recent episode. Setting the precedential context is the most important feature of the CHINA-WATCHER system. The essential, idea is to derive instructions for current action from an analysis of cases in memory that are similar to the current one in certain key respects. In other words, the decision-makers are assumed to understand the current case in part through the analogy of the past precedents.
The second essential operation of CHINA-WATCHER is to decide what to do in the current case. CHINA-WATCHER decides (1) which side in the case to support and (2) to what extent China involves itself. The latter involvement decision consists of verbal involvement and physical involvement. The support-side decision is made essentially from the examination of the party configuration of the current case. The involvement decision is made through the analysis of the precedential context.
As stated above, different models are specified in terms of the frame of reference, the evaluation strategy, the support-side decision strategy, and the involvement decision strategy. The frame of reference suggests the criteria of friends and enemies. to China and the criteria to determine the precedential context. The evaluation strategy is used to cope with uncertainty of friend-enemy evaluation. The support-side decision strategy is used to decide which side to support and the involvement decision strategy is used to decide the level of involvement based on the precedential context.
We examine how CHINA-WATCHER with different models process information on each of the 385 cases of Chinese international conflict behavior from 1949 to 1978 and predict the decision to be taken by the PRC in each of them. It is found that the model with the revolutionary framework and the evaluation strategy of a “dove” performed better in the periods from 1949 to 1953, from 1957 to 1958, from 1968 to 1969, and from 1974 to 1976. Also found is that the model with the realist framework and the evaluation strategy of a “dawk” performed better in the periods from 1954 to 1956, from 1959 to 1967, from 1970 to 1973, and from 1977 to 1978. But it was found that the Chinese were consistent in the “hawkish” strategy for taking sides and in their “dovish” involvement decision strategy.

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