In the new growing tensions from the late 1970s, we are now facing an era of new cold war in the 1980s. In this situation, the East Asian international environment has greatly. changed along with China's new trend toward de-Maoization. The period in which Mao sought his “utopia in poverty” is viewed by the Chinese masses as a dark and tragic era. No longer will they rally behind Maoist slogans. Now that the country is expanding its contacts with the outside world, its leaders realize that they must make China more affluent if they wish to retain the people's support. It seems likely, therefore, that the Deng Xiaoping-Hu Yaobang dictatorship of party bureaucrats will continue to plot the course of change in Chinese society. Now we should not expect that the political and social conflicts inherent in China today are so great that the country is likely to go through another process of political turbulence. It seems impossible to reverse the pragmatic trend against Mao Zedong's politics. De-Maoization is now steadily going on in China with Mao Zedong's political views completely undermined. The most important problem in this connection now is what actual effects such internal developments will have on Beijing's relationships with other countries, especially the Soviet Union. Along with these fundamental changes in China, the country is gradually turning away not only from Maoist internal administration but from Maoist foreign policy and world strategy as well. Recent Chinese moves toward a rapprochement with the Soviet Union are one result. After acting in concert with China in following its anti-Soviet, anti-hegemonist policy, and venturing into a tripartite alliance with the United States and China, Japan is forced to find Beijing itself greatly changing its mind and world strategy. Recent domestic changes in China seem to us to suggest that possibility.
“Independence and Initiative” are now called the “general guideline of our foreign policy formulated by the constitution.” This guideline, as early as 1982, became China's diplomatic strategy. In September 1982, Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, officially confirmed it in his report to the 12th Congress of the CCP. In the late 1970s and early 80s after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, China continued to hold on to the strategy of anti-Soviet hegemonism. In so doing, China urged the United States, Japan and Western Europe to build a strong anti-Soviet united front. This strategy is now fading. Instead, the “Independent and Initiatory” strategy has entered the stage. Such a diplomacy might have been developed as early as late 1978, before and after the Third Plenum of the CCP, though its application to actual diplomacy had to wait until 1982. As a matter of fact, Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian reconfirmed in December 1983, “Ever since the Third Plenum, we have firmly held on to the foreign policy of independence and initiative.” The Third Plenum is regarded as the “great turning point throughout the historic period of socialism.” Thereafter, China's domestic political and social changes took place on a full scale. In this context, the “Independent and Inititatory” diplomacy should be closely related with political and social changes. This article sets forth a preliminary analysis of the “Independent and Initiatory” diplomacy in relation to political and social changes within China. The contents, characteristics, and future of this diplomacy are examined.
The greatest aim of the Nixon Administration established in 1969 was to end the Vietnam War as soon as possible and to revive the American economy. To attain this aim, it pursued the policy of the rapprochement with People's Republic of China and of “detent” with the USSR. The rapprochement with it enabled the American Business Circle to exploit the Chinese market. However, the U. S. -China economic relations zigzagged, affected by the political relations since 1972. The economic relations can be divided into four periods as follows: the first period, 1972-74; the second period, 1975-77; the third period, 1978-80; the fourth period, 1981-84. The first and second periods were the one when the institutional network had not been formed yet and the economic relations were very unstable though Nixon Administration had lifted the ban on the export to the PRC. During the third and fourth periods, U. S. -China relations were institutionalized and the trade between the two countries sharply increased. The first period was characterized by the “China Fever” stirred by the American Business Circle and the efforts to expand the Russian market as the result of “detent.” During the second period, the Circle intended to expand the export to the PRC much harder. Because the Trade Act of 1974 which came into existence in January 1975 forbade the U. S. Government to provide the U. S. S. R. with the most favored nation treatment and the public credit and in opposition to it the USSR cancelled U. S. -Soviet Trade Agreement. But, as China at this time was suffering from political confusion caused by the Gang of Four, U. S. -China trade sharply diminished. The third period was the turning point when the pragmatist group headed by Deng Xiaoping gained in power and the newly formed Carter Administration decided to normalize the relations with the PRC. The fourth period since the inauguration of the Reagan Administration has undergone tremendous changes. As President Reagan closely connected with Taiwan was going to decide the sale of FX (F16/79 or F5G) bombers to it, China was getting ready to break the relations with the U. S. and reconcile itself with the USSR. On the contrary, Vice Presint George Bush, Secretary of State Alexander Haig asserted the strengthening of Sino-American relations from the standpoint of “power politics.” Reagan was driven to make the compromise with the power politics group and at last the administration turned over the crisis both by easing the limitations of the export to the PRC of lethal weapons and high technology and by continuing to sell the older type bomber F5E without exporting FX to Taiwan.
There have been some great wave motions in the Sino-Soviet relations during the past several years. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, China postponed the normalization talks with the Soviet Union. The treaty of alliance between the P. R. C. and the U. S. S. R. lost effect. Throughout the year of 1980, the relations between the two countries have remained frozen. In March 1982, Brezhnev, speaking in Tashkent, gave a signal of Soviet willingness to resume the negotiation with China. Throughout the several rounds of talks, China called for three preconditions for normalization (including the withdrawal or reduction of Soviet forces in the area bordering on China) and the Soviets proposed implementing “confidence building measures” in the border area. The result fell short of expectation. The focus of the talks is how to resolve the problem of the military threat in the border area. Since the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union has greatly increased its ground forces along the border. In order to respond to the tensions in 1979-1980, China began to shift its strategic posture from “defense in depth” to “forward defense” and changed its force deployment. The Chinese troops advanced to an intermediate area between the border and the “deep” depth. Since 1981, the Chinese militay leadership adopted a “combined arms operation” and began to study its applications in this theater. The main Chinese operation plan is to interdict a high-speed, deep penetretion attack of Soviet armoured forces, at the defence Zone organized in the intermediate area and to go on a counter-offensive by using light anti-tank guided weapon (ATGW) forces. The conversion of tactial concepts into “forward defense” and “point defense” (to intercept a Soviet surprise attack) means de facto abandonment of the Mao Zedong's military doctrine of “people's war.” So long as the Soviet Union makes military threat against China, China will not be able to afford the policy of “equidistance” between the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A. There will be much bigger tilt to the West, and detente with the Soviet Union will go slowly in the forseeable future. But some cardres who studied in the Soviet Union in the 1950s have gradually gained power and Chinese weaponry and strategic concepts are largely based on the Soviet model. If the Soviets pull back some troops from the border, there will be some probability of a drastic change in Sino-Soviet relations.
On January 10, 1984, North Korea formally proposed a “tripartite conference” with the U. S. and South Korea. As typified by the “equal basis participation” of South Korea, the proposal is more flexible and realistic than ever. Implicitly, however, Pyongyang's proposal for “threeway talks” mainly aims at the attainment of talks with Washington. North Korea therefore might not have direct dialogues with the South without the attendance of the U. S. South Korea, which harbors a strong suspicion about North Korea's intentions to solve the separation issue peacefully, soon rejected the proposal, whereas the U. S. did not oppose it straightforwardly. Considering this response by the U. S., together with the flexible posture towards North Korea in the past two years, we cannot deny the possibility that the Reagan Administration might eventually take up Pyongyang's proposal to bring some progress in the approach to detente on the Korean Peninsula. North-South unification is of course the most significant Korean issue, but so far there is no probability that unification can be accelerated. For the time being, groping for some way to detente is the only thing that can be done. Fortunately, the “mechanism to deter increased tension” seems to have been rooted on the Korean Peninsula. Detente can hardly be attained soon, though, at least the risk of war on the Korean Peninsula has decreased considerably. This observation is proved firmly by the fact that the bombing incident in Rangoon in October, 1983, did not escalate into a big dispute. In addition, movement to “de facto cross-recognition” by big powers has become conspicuous recently. As the situation changes like this, North Korea, which had been adopting a stubborn attitude, shows signs of flexibility. If North Korea continues to follow such policies, hope for detente on the Korean Peninsula may emerge in the late 1980s.
Hong Kong is a crown colony of Great Britain. It consists of three areas, Hong Kong Island (English territory by the Treaty of Nanking in 1842), the tip of Kowloon Peninsula (English territory by the Convention of Peking in 1860) and the New Territories (leased for 99 years by the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong in 1898). Also included is an area north of Kowloon up to Shum Chun River, and 235 islands. The Republic of China, established in the revolution of 1911, endeavored in vain to regain Hong Kong. The Nationalist Government had not enough power to negotiate with Great Britain, because they were fighting against Japan with the aid of the U. S. and the U. K. In 1949, the People's Republic of China emerged. The Communist Government recognized the status quo. They awaited a “suitable period” for the return of Hong Kong. Now we know the “suitable period” is the expiration of the lease, that is, June 30, 1997. The Sino-British Hong Kong Talks began after the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, visited China in September, 1982. Both sides agreed to maintain Hong Kong's stability and prosperity. Great Britain was, at first, intending to extend the lease. But Peking rejected that proposal decisively, and took a firm stand for regaining Chinese sovereignty over the whole of Hong Kong. After a year and a half of negotiations, Communist China demanded the return of sovereignty, as the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, stated at a press conference on May 20, 1984. Instead of this concession, Britain got a gurantee to maintain the present state of things in Hong Kong for at least 50 years. They are now negotiating how to maintain Hong Kong's status quo. How about the future of Hong Kong? I quite agree with Mr. James McGregor, director of the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce. He said, “I dont't believe that a communist country can successfully become responsible for a free-enterprise, free-trade territory and keep its hands off. It won't work.” (cf. “International Business Week”, March 5, 1984, p. 46)
The aim of this article is to clarify and analyze the factors determining the Chinese-Taiwanese relationship, especially on the Taiwanese side. Taiwan has rejected the call for unification by China since 1979. How long Taiwan's rejection can be sustained is the keypoint to determine the China-Taiwan relationship in future. Many reasons why Taiwan has rejected the unification call have been pointed out and one of these reasons, namely, Taiwan's self-confidence in its leadership, economy, and security has been emphasized by the Taiwan government itself as well as China watchers. However, examining these three fields in detail, some defects can be analyzed. First of all, its leadership has not been able to gain the confidence of the people mainly because of its double-structured administration. Secondly, despite its rapid progress, Taiwan's economy has structural weaknesses in the change of industrial structure, the size of capital, and isolation from the international money market. Thirdly, the circumstance of security around Taiwan is stable now, but Taiwan's security deeply depends on the U. S. policy, especially on U. S. arms sales. Therefore, if Sino-America relations change drastically, Taiwan will be faced with another security situation, different from the present stable one. From this analysis, we can point out that Taiwan was forced to evolve these structural weakpoints in its economy, leadership, and security, in order to sustain the present relationship with China.
The objectives of this article are: (1) to discover and define the trends and patterns of China's bilateral treaties since China's entry into the United Nations; (2) to compare China's national goals and foreign policy with China's treaty trends and patterns and to clarify how the former are reflected in the latter; (3) to establish the validity and value of treaty analysis to an understanding of China's foreign relations. Even though there are many indices of a state's actions in international society, the reasons for using treaties as a specific indicator of China's foreign policy are their importance, reliability, and public nature. This article constitutes a quantitative analysis of China's treaties concluded between, 1973 and 1982. Thecon crete methods of the quantitative analysis are bilateral treaty frequency, treaty frequency by country groupings, treaty frequency by singly partners, treaty frequency by topics. The period upon which this study is based consists of 1395 bilateral treaties of the People's Republic of China, derived from several sources including the official PRC treaty series. This study demonstrates that treaties are a meaningful and valuable consideration in studying the foreign relations of the PRC and provides several tentative conclusions. First, the more realistic Chinese leaders are, the more likely they are to adopt foreign policies according to national goals. For Deng Xiaoping, China's economic building based on the “Four Modernizations” is a vital national goal, and he immediately adopted a very realistic foreign policy called “Independent Foreign Policy”. Second, we usually pay attention to uniqueness and peculiarity in foreign relations, yet the quantitative treaty analysis aids in clarifying routine but important foreign relations. For example, in spite of the hostility of the two nations, China and the Soviet Union have maintained relations on trade, border river control, and so on; China-Asian relations are interdependent; and China-African relations are based on aid. Third, it is possible to analyze China's true foreign relations scientifically without being distracted by China's exaggerated political slogans. Lastly, we can with relative ease obtain treaties as data and thus we can understand overall foreign relations by using treaties, especially in a closed society such as China. In this sense the methodology is applicable to other nations in the international system.