In the history of Japanese-Canadian relations, immigration from Japan to Canada remained an important issue, particularly in the early part of the twentieth century. On the occasion of renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Britain and Japan in 1911, the Japanese immigration problem was the issue which deferred Canada's decision to adhere to the Treaty for almost two years. Canada did not adhere to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, when it was ratified in 1894, fearing that Japanese immigration might be encouraged by it. But in 1906, at the time when trade relations between Canada and Japan were growing, Canada accepted the Treaty without any alteration in the article giving the subjects of each country full privileges in each other's territories. For the Laurier government had gained “assurances” of the Japanese government to restrict emigration for Canada. The opposition party, led by Robert L. Borden, attacked the government complaining that the control of immigration had been taken out of Canada's hands. Since then the control of immigration became the central theme in the debates on immigration between Japan and Canada, as well as in the Canadian government. When the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was renewed between Britain and Japan in 1911, the Canadian government was not willing to adhere to it, though the Japanese government expected them to The Canadian government, sensitive to the public sentiment, which was becoming increasingly restrictive against immigrants as a whole, wanted to retain the right to restrict immigrants entering Canada. Canada would adhere to the new Treaty between Britain and Japan, if it did not affect or repeal any of the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1910 which sanctioned the prohibition on “the landing in Canada…of immigrants belonging to any race deemed unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada, or of immigrants of any specified class, occupation or character, ” which showed the general sentiments of the government as well as the public of Canada then. The Canadian government, with Borden as Prime Minister since the fall of 1911, suggested that the Japanese government offer a written assurance that the limitation on immigration would be continued, as Japan had done at the time when the United States and Japan ratified the American-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in 1911. Borden thought it would be helpful to persuade the Parliament and the public if Canada followed the way the United States had solved the similar problem. Borden, always sensitive to British opinion, did not want to hurt the feelings of Japan, who was closely related with Britain. At the same time, however, Borden considered it most important for Canada to retain the control over the immigrants entering Canada. The Japanese government, on the other hand, wanted Canada to adhere to the new Treaty because Canada was growing to be important as her trade partner. And Japan wanted to keep friendly relations with Canada because Canada was a part of the British Empire with which Japan had special relations as can be seen in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. At the same time, in accordance with their diplomacy towards the United States, the Japanese government did not want their immigrants to be barred from entering Canada by the legislations on the Canadian side. The matter of their primary concern was to preserve Japan's “honor.” Thus the Japanese government accepted Borden's suggestion of a written assurance that the limitation on emigration would be continued. And Canada adhered to the new Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in April, 1913, after a long period of negotiations. In the process, the presence of Britain played an important role. Both Canada.
The years between 1921 and 1928 marked an important decade in the history of Japanese-Canadian relations. Following the policy expressed by Canada at the 1921 Imperial Conference, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was abrogated at the Washington Conference in 1922. Subsequently, upon opening legations in the United States and France, Canada established formal diplomatic relations with Japan in 1928. The intent of this paper is to reveal, through the representative opinions of John Wesley Dafoe, an influential journalist at the Manitoba Free Press, the views of Canadian opinion leaders vis à vis Japan in the 1920's. In 1935, Professor John B. Brebner was the first to acknowledge the importance of Dafoe's views on the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, although he, and later others, did not clarify why Dafoe had opposed this alliance. However, in his editorials in the Manitoba Free Press, Dafoe clearly explained his opposition to the Alliance based on the following: 1. The structure of international relations, which had originally necessitated the formation of the Alliance in 1902, had completely changed following the First World War. 2. The existence of the Alliance became redundant with the formation of the League of Nations in 1920. 3. The American people were opposed to the Alliance. 4. The renewal of the Alliance must have meant that Japanese imperialistic invasion of China would have been approved by Britain. 5. Because Canada was the only North American and Pacific member of the British Empire, she had the obligation to initiate policies toward the Pacific region. 6. English-speaking countries around the Pacific region desired reductions in immigration from Asia, but the Alliance posed an obstacle to the implementation of such a policy. In other words, Dafoe took a unique position for the time in judging the Alliance as having prohibited Canada as a Pacific nation from pursuing her own policy vis à vis Japan and China. After the termination of the Alliance, Canadians were content with their relationship with Japan which was developed mainly in terms of trade and immigration considerations. During the 1920's, Canadian intellectuals concerned with Asia, especially Japan and China, found a focus for their activities in the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) which began as part of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in 1928. The driving force in the Canadian IPR was John Nelson, a resident of British Columbia and a supporter of the anti-Asian movement. Indeed, Nelson's exclusivism seemed the main reason for him joining the international IPR in 1925. A zealous Methodist interested in China since the beginning of the 20th century, Newton W. Rowell was also an influential member of the Canadian IPR. Although a member of the Canadian IPR also from its formation, Dafoe's interest in Japan and Asia was limited prior to September, 1931, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. In conclusion, judging from the prevailing opinions of Canadian spokes-people on Asian affairs, Canadian initiative to establish diplomatic relations with Japan was not based on a realistic image, but rather on illusions: a Canadian sentiment that regarded Japan's importance in the Pacific region merely in terms of Japanese immigration to Canada and a base of Canadian advance into China. In this respect, John W. Dafoe can be seen as representing the majority of Canadian opinion at the time and herein lies the significance of analyzing Dafoe's views vis à vis Japan during the 1920's. It should be noted, however, that the exchange of ministers between Japan and Canada marked the beginning of a real development of relationship between the two countries. Participation in diplomatic services and the activities of opinion leaders in the Canadian IPR enabled a few Canadians, such as Hugh L. Keenleyside and Henry F. Angus, to contribute to presenting
World Panic since 1929 had accelerated the tendency of protectionism and world-wide trade conflicts. Japan had banned the gold export and stopped gold standard system in 1931. But it resulted in the depreciation of exchange rate of yen and promoted advance of Japanese exportation. Neverthless Japanese exportation to Canada was declined on the contrary in this period. It was pointed out that the decline of Japanese exportation to Canada caused to the Canadian unjust taxation to the Japanese imports. In Japan, Trade Council was set up in 1933 as an advisory commitee to Foreign Minister and Trade Protection Law was enacted in 1934 which enabled the additional taxation of 50% as a reprisal against conflicting country with acknowledgement of Tariff Investigating Council, the advisory commitee to Finance Minister. Accompanying to the uprising of criticism against Canadian tariff as unjust system and the delay of Canada-Japanese negotiation the drive to invoke the Trade Protection Law was accelerated in Japan and that was asserted at the Trade Council, too. And the Law was applied to Canada since July of 1935. Japanese Government considered the application of Trade Protection Law to Canada is very effective as demonstration to other trade conflicting countries and they judged the chance of successis very high considering the internal effects inside Canada. Conservative Party was defeated at the general election hold in autumn as Japanese Government has expected. Mackenzie King Government of Canada took conciliatory attitude and negotiation with Japan was advanced. Thus Japanese Government cancelled the application of Trade Protection Law to Canada since Jan. 1st, 1936 in conformity of Letter of Exchange of Dec. 26, 1935. This article follows these processes mainly depending to the Archives of Japanese Foreign Ministroy.
When Canada participated in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, it began to play for the first time its independent foreign policy. But as soon as Canada became a member of the League of Nations next year, it found its position within the League to some extent to be embarrassing. Since then, Canadian main policy for the League had been reduced to the “isolated one”, and Canada sought earnestly to evade interfering openly with existing conflicts and to abstain from assisting to the heated discussions during 1920's and 1930's. When Manchurian Incident broke out in September 1931, Bennett's Cabinet in Canada, suffering from the economic blow, given by World Depression, had to first of all resolve its various domestic difficulties, and thereupon sent to Mr. Cahan, Canadian representative in Geneva, its conventional instruction. But Mr. Cahan who was dissatisfied with the orders of his Government, addressed in a session of the General Assembly the very different contents from them as British Foreign Minister suggested him. And another example came when Italo-Ethiopian War occured in October 1935 and the League adopted the measures of economic sanction for Italy, violator of the Covenant. At this time, Mr. Riddell, Canadian delegate and censurer for the behabiour of Mr. Cahan, emphasized the enlarged punishment despite his countrie's intention. After all, Canada could but deny in two cases its delegate's declarations in order to return to its original policy.
This article deals with the background and development of Canada's involvement in the Pacific War. It reveals the framework of post-war ties between Japan and Canada, which lay deep in the roots of their belligerent relationship. The Japanese-Canadian relationship has been mainly told concerning commercial and missionary exchanges. Their relations began with trade, missions and the immigration of Japanese to Canada in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. While the Anglo-Japanese Alliance remained in force, the relations between Japan and Canada had been friendly but anti-Japanese persecutions occured in British Columbia. As Pacific Powers, Japan and Canada had antagonistically confronted each other after the First World War. The rise of patriotism in Canada stimulated its own national-identity, so Canada claimed its own interest in the Pacific-area reigion. In the 1920's and 1930's, the Federal Government in Ottawa adopted a policy of appeasement for Japan as did the U. K. A policy of appeasement and isolationism was prepondent in Canadian external policy during the two world wars. The outbreak of the Second world war urged Canada to decide on “Germany First” as the highest strategic priority. Canada preferred to become involved with the defeat of Germany in comparision with the expansion of Japan in China, and invoked U. S. involvement in the war through Anglo-American collaboration. It was not until the collapse of France that U. S. determined to help U. K. with Canada's mediation. In addition, Canadian-American military collaboration began with the Ogdensburg Agreement of Aug. 18, 1940 which set up the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, and completed with the Hyde Park Declaration of Apr. 21, 1941 which founded the Joint Economic Committee. Thus, PJBD had become the central agency of Canadian-American joint defence in the North American Continent. Just before the outbreak of the Pacific War, U. S. Military Forces were estimated to be the predominant power to deter war against Japan in the Pacific by U. K. and Canada. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor stirred a hysterical horror against Japan in Canada, especially in B. C. Therefore, Canada preceded both the U. S. and the U. K. to declare war on Japan. But Canada's participation in the Pacific War was restricted to the battles of Hong Kong, the Aleutian Islands' Kiska and others which Canadian forces served with the U. S. and Britsh Commonwealth forces in South East Asia. Near the end of the Pacific War, Canada was forced to intervene in the war to save the Allies' damages against Japan. But the Second World War came to an end after the atomic-bomb dropping with which Canada had an indirect involvement. Canada was present at the surrender of Japan and worked for the Allies' policy of occupation. In conclusion, Canada and Japan learned to understand themselves as members of the Pacific Community through the lessons of the Pacific War. And more, if Canada and Japan remain mutually conscious of their raison d'etre as Pacific destiny, then the two Pacific powers couldn't think but of the destiny of building peace in the Pacific.
Japanese-Canadian relations during the early postwar years have two distinguishing characteristics; first, the development of bilateral relations between the two nations has been based mainly on economic issues, second, political and diplomatic cooperation among Canada and Japan at the multilateral level has expanded widely. Canada has promoted active policies at the United Nations, and has identified itself as a middle power. In addition, Canadian attitudes towards external affairs have reflected globalism and universalism, as expressed in the U. N. Charter. Canada has defined its activism as “functionalism” that even middle or small powers should have the right to participate in the decision-making of international organizations, especially in those areas the middle or small powers can make strong contributions. The Canadian Government was quite indifferent to Asia and the Pacific regions until its participation in the founding of the United Nations after World War II. Canada's strong interest in the maintenance of world peace led Canada to take a part in certain Asia-Pacific affairs, including the peace settlement with Japan. Canadian interest in Japan was divided into two issues. One was the demilitarization and democratization of Japan, while the other was the development of bilateral trade. By 1950 the Canadian Government recognized that this first task was completed with the allied occupation. As for the second issue, Canada promoted the long-term healthy recovery of the Japanese economy and the maintenance of an open market for Canada. Ottawa then supported Japan's entry into GATT, and admitted most-favoured treatment for Japan in the 1954 bilateral trade agreement. This was one of the first equitable treatments for Japan, which had had to endure hard discrimination in trade relations with many other countries such as Britain and Australia. The Canadian Government also strongly supported Japan's entry into other multilateral organizations during the 1950's and early 1960's, while economic relations between them developed dramatically during the same period. Strong and friendly Canadian-Japanese relations are the result of their expansion in trade and their cooperation at the multilateral level. The Canadian support for Japan's political revival in the world was based especially upon the universalism of Canadian Foreign Policy.
Canadian Interest in and interactions with the Pacific Region have increased dramatically since 1968 when Prime Minister Trudeau formed his first cabinet. The new development in Canadian relations with the Pacific is most noticeable in the economic sphere; in 1973 Japan replaced Britain as Canada's most important trading partner second to the United States, and in 1983, the Pacific region as a whole secured second place as Canada's most important market for exports, demoting Western Europe to third. It is against this background that this paper examines the impact of the Prime Minister on the development of Canadian relations with the Pacific in general and with Japan in particular. At the same time, it explores the relevance of individual level-of-analysis in explaining Canada's foreign behaviour. Generally the Canadian prime minister can exercise considerable power in foreign policymaking. Accordingly, the attitude and views of the prime minister toward diplomacy and external relations significantly affects Canada's relations with the outside world. Although Prime Minister Trudeau had neither a particular interest in foreign affairs nor a comprehensive and concrete vision concerning all external relations, he greatly influenced Canadian diplomacy in two ways. First, he transformed the framework of foreign policymaking. This means that his preferences greatly affected the delicate power balance among actors in the policymaking process. Second, he broadly defined the nature and direction of Canadian diplomacy. Prime Minister Trudeau was interested in the Pacific and made a great effort to develop and promote Canadian relations with Japan in particular and the Pacific in general. First, he increased the awareness that Canada is a Pacific power and that the Far East is ‘Canada's New West’. Second, by intensifying interactions with countries in the Pacific at all intergovernmental levels formally and informally through both bilateral and multilateral means, Trudeau skillfully broadened and strengthened the framework of Canadian diplomatic ties with them. From this starting point, economic, cultural, and other relations could be steadily cultivated. There are several factors which led Prime Minister Trudeau to develop Canada's relations with the Pacific. First, he wanted to reduce the overwhelming impact of the southern neighbour by developing Canadian ties with the Pacific in general and with Japan in particular so that the latter could function as a ‘counterweight’ to the United States. Second, the economic importance of the Pacific was increasing as exemplified in the growth of Canadian trade with the region. Third, the development of Pacific ties was designed to gain Western political support for the Liberals, since this was believed to symbolize the recognition of and support for the needs of the Western Provinces which were relatively highly dependent on exports to the Pacific and felt alienated from the Liberal government in Ottawa. Finally, this paper concludes with three hypotheses concerning the power of the prime minister in Canadian foreign policymaking. First, the Canadian prime minister can exert influence powerful enough to transform the machinery of policymaking. Second, if the prime minister has a concrete foreign policy or vision, it is likely that it would be incorporated into and implemented as a national policy. Third, even if he does not have a concrete foreign policy in all external relations, his attitude, perception or personality may greatly determine the nature and direction of Canadian diplomacy. These hypotheses require further examination and refinement through other case studies. However, if the Canadian prime minister is very influencial in foreign policy making, the approach which focuses on him may prove to be highly relevant and useful in explaining Canadian external behaviour.
This paper attempts to examine the factors determining, or conditioning, Canadian policy towards Japan in an historical and contemporary perspective. Since that relationship has largely economic in importance, much of the paper surveys the internal dynamics of the Canadian political economy as it affects the bilateral relationship. The Canadian economy is described as one which may be viewed as an aggregate of several regional economies, each with its own structure and interests and each supported by often very powerful provincial governments. Several of the regional/provincial economies are resource-based and export-driven; while others, particularly Ontario and Quebec, have a heavier concentration of secondary manufacturing and seek assured Canadian markets (as well, of course, as exports). There is, perhaps more than in many countries, conflict between export-oriented sectors seeking freer trade and manufacturing sectors favouring some measure of commercial protection. But in Canada these sectors also closely coincide with the regional/provincial economies. As a result, accomodation often involves conflict between groupings of provincial governments and the federal government which in the end must find or impose the necessary concensus. The problem is complex in the case of the Canada-Japan relationship because there is a divergent cost/benefit analysis of that relationship in the different regions of Canada. A very high percentage of Canadian exports to Japan originate in western Canada, particularly British Columbia and Alberta. But the centres of consumption of Japanese imports are in the heavily populated central Canadian provinces, which is also the area most threatened economically. Moreover, all sectors of the economy are currently assessing the costs and benefits, the potential and dangers, of sectoral or general free trade with the United States. The outcome of these negotiations, now major item on the national economic-political agenda, may have a profound impact on the bilateral Canada-Japan relationship (as well as the trilateral relationship), for it will put marketing, investment, and market access decisions into a different context. Until 1945 political relations were dominated by the sensitive issue of Canadian immigration policy and by the 1940's the approach of the Pacifc war. By the late 1930's Canada regarded the war as inevitable and from which they could not escape if either Great Britain or the United States was attacked in the Pacific theatre. The Canadian government was enormously relieved when both were attacked for not only did it bring the United States into the war at last, but also it brought into a more concrete wartime existence the North Atlantic Triangle that had been the foundation of Canada's peacetime foreign policy. But those two issues were no longer important after 1945, and Canada (and Japan) had to fashion a new relationship that transcended the narrowly economic. That policy was slow to emerge, and it was only in the late 1960's and the early 1970's that the scope and structure of that new relationship began to be identified and the institutions put in place. It is the implicit argument of this paper that while Canada is ON the Pacific, it is not OF the Pacific, and despite major and important bilateral consultations covering a wide range of international issues, the bilateral agenda is dominated by the economic relationship. Each country seems somewhat peripheral to the major concerns of the other, particularly their relations with the United States, and in Canada's case to the issues of western security. The bilateral relationship still must find a firmer foundation and a broader, more meaningful structure.