Disarmament has been a subject of utmost importance for humanity since the days of Isaiah whose words “they shall beat their swords into plowshares…” were regarded as a prophesy, through the early part of the Modern Ages when Immanual Kant wrote the “standing army shall be gradually abolished” as one of the preliminary clauses for eternal peace, “Zum ewigen Frieden” (1795), and the periods of the League of Nations and the United Nations which embodied Kant's idea of the union of nations, also written as one of his definitive clauses, until this moment when a great many members of the human world are conscious of the fatal significance of the “Nuclear Era, ” let alone the atom-bomb survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or Christians who believe in the Final Jedgement.
The Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSD-I) of 1978 was generally considered as an epochal event as it could successfully produced a Final Document which expressed a new way of thinking, “the time has come… to seek security in disarmament, ” pertinent principles and programmes of action for future work aiming at general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, as a priority matter. But, SSD-II of 1982 was not successful, as it could merely re-confirm the Final Document of SSD-I and adopt a World Disarmament Campaign Programme, which in fact may be interpreted as a symptom of the inability and limitation of the United Nations in dealing with disarmament questions. In any case, since the latter half of the 1970s non-governmental organizations and popular movements working for the realization of nuclear disarmament or general disarmament have been gaining momemtum and influence.
In the joint statement of January 8, 1985, the US Secretary of State and the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed to negotiate on nuclear and space arms, and expressed their belief that “ultimately the forthcoming negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.” The negotiations started from March 12, 1985, and it is generally expected that they might change the political atmosphere of international society, at least from the “new cold war” to the direction of detente. But, it is recalled that during the period of detente in the 1960s and 70s, the two super-powers could not go beyond the range of limitation of arms or “arms control” with respect to their nuclear armaments. The world should not leave the matter of disarmament to the super-powers, and should try to revitalize the United Nations' activities lest SSD-III of 1987 or 88 should repeat the fate of SS-II. But, how?
It should be noticed that thought and ideas could, or should, play an important role in achieving disarmament. This may seem a matter of course. But, we should distinguish between these thoughts and ideologies which simply reflect the existing state of affairs and institutions, systems, structure, etc. (establishments). To describe, explain, theorize or justify what already exists does not require any creative mental power, but, as to what does not exist, this is quite different. Maintenance or increase of armaments belongs to the former, as do the arguments and theories to support them. But, disarmament and thoughts on disarmament belong to the latter. In order to challenge confute the ideologies of armaments, to draw pictures of a disarmed situation, and to give a theoretical basis for them, we need creative power and the power of thought. Without such thoughts, disarmament will remain an unfinished dream of human beings.
Among important points to be studied in regard to “thought” as a founding factor of disarmament, there is the question concerning the difference or differentiation between ultimate aims and interim ones in the

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With the advent of the nuclear age, the theory and practice of deterrence changed drastically compared to the classical doctrine of deterrence. The pioneer of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, Bernard Brodie, in his first book on nuclear war, explained that “the first and most vital step in any American security program for the age of the atomic bomb is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves in case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind. Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win war. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert war.” Since then the truth of this doctrine has been accepted in the Western world as self-evident, and the national security policy of the United States and its allies continues to be based on the concept of nuclear deterrence. But the practices of this doctrine over more than 35 years have brought the world the kind of dangerous situation in which national security, in both East and West, is now being threatened seriously by the probability of nuclear war or at least the possible use of nuclear weapons. This is the inevitable outcome of the contradiction which lies in the very nature of the strategy of nuclear deterrence being complicated by the number and variety of nuclear forces and the development of missile technology: the growing accuracy of guidance systems, the minituarization of warheads and the MIRV-ed systems.
The strategy of nuclear deterrence has continually changed, from war-deterrence to war-fighting, as Brodie deplored in his last article: abandon deterrence strategy in favor of war-winning strategy. Problems of national security, international stability, disarmement and arms control policy became so much more complex than ever before that it became indispensable to reassess these problems from the viewpoint of a new approach differing from the traditional thought of power politics and national security policy.
At the time of the Second Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations held in 1982 (SSD-II), two reports were pesented to that session. The first, the “Study on Relationship between Disarmament and International Security, ” was presented by a group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The report puts special emphasis on the intimate relationship between disarmament and iternational security and asserts that parallelism and co-ordination of measures in both the disarmament and the security fields are the only logical and practical solution to the problem. Although this suggestion is important, the report overlooks the detrimental effects of national security policy or military strategy on the disarmament problem. The second is the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, the Palme Commission, entitled “Common Security.” According to the report, nations must begin to organize their security policies in cooperation with one another under conditions in which nations have an overwhelming common interest in avoiding nuclear war. The commission explicitly contrasted common security and deterrence. But common security and deterrence are in some respects complementary, particularly in concrete policy-maning. To avoid this dilemma, the philosophy of common security must have a prospect of a world in which the present military block division does not apply.

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This article attempts to examine the present situation of the strategic nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. The analysis starts with the SALT I agreement signed in May 1972, because it is this agreement that provided with the framework of the ongoing U. S. -Soviet arms race.
First, section 1 examines the significance of the SALT I agreement, which fixed the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers. In so doing, special attention will be given to how the agreement relates to the concept of “assured destruction.” Then, we look at the fact that the Soviet efforts to modernize its strategic nuclear forces by deploying MIRV-ed heavy missiles within the ceiling of SALT I led to the signing of the SALT II agreement; it was signed in July 1979 and set quantitative limits on MIRV-ed ICBM's.
Next, section 2 analyzes the evolution of the U. S. strategic theories from Robert S. MacNamara's “flexible response strategy” to Richard Nixon's “realistic deterrence strategy”; each of them proposed the way to utilize MIRV-ed delivery systems in practice, the focal point of the U. S. -Soviet nuclear arms race in the 1970s. The close examination of each year's Report of the Secretary of Defense published during the 1970s will reveal how the United States gradually revised its strategic doctrine to adjust it to the new MIRV technology. First it introduced the concept of “strategic sufficiency, ” then “targeting system, ” and lastly completed its doctrinal revision by adopting “countervailing strategy.”
Finally, section 3, taking up the concept of “damage limitation, ” another major element in SALT I, shows what ideas brought about the agreement restricting the deployment of ABM's. Based upon this analysis, we also discuss the implication of President Ronald Reagan's initiative, i. e., the SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) program.

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The primary concern of this paper is to examine the recent trends in the political debates of the Soviet elite regarding national security issues. The existence of such debates has been pointed out by many Western scholars. Now, in the mid-1980s, when the system of mutual deterrence created by the United States and the Soviet Union over the past 15 years is about to collapse, what policy course is the Soviet Union trying to adopt? The best way to answer this question is to listen to what the Soviets themselves are saying on this matter.
The debates are conducted mainly among the second echelon of the Soviet ruling circles with the top leadership sometimes giving decisive cues in the course of the debates. Conservative Soviet writers say that the victory of socialism in a nuclear war is attainable, and a war is a continuation of politics by violent means, in spite of the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons; more reform-minded people argue that in the uclear age a war inevitably leads to the annihilation of human being, and an attempt to survive and win a nuclear war is a dangerous illusion. In this way the debates seem to be revolving around ideological or philosophical themes, but in effect they have highly political implications. For it is quite plausible to think that more realistic calculations are at work, such as resource allocation demands or consideration of the propaganda effect of these ideology-related arguments on both domestic and foreign audiences.
The paper consists of four sections. The first section presents a summary history of the debates from Stalin's death to the signing of the SALT II treaty. In the second section the recent trends in the debates expressed in various Soviet publications are examined. Then the analyses based on this examination are given in subsequent sections; the third section focuses on how the debates should be characterized, giving special attention to the gap between the Soviet statements made clear through the debates, and the actual military behavior of the Soviet Union; and finally the last section concludes the paper with a brief analysis on the course of the debates.

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Japan's so-called three non-nuclear principles-of not possessing, not manufacturing, and not permitting the entry into Japan of nuclear weapons-express its independent and characteristic position in the disarmament policy as well as its determined principle that it shall never become a military power threatening other nations. This paper tries, primarily through the Diet debates, to review how the Japanese disarmament policy with such non-nuclear principles as its basis has evolved in the face of reality.
The three non-nuclear principles were set up by the then Prime Minister Sato, first in December 1967 and again in January 1968 in the form of the answer to the question in the Diet debates. However, these principles were originally considered to constitute “the four nuclear policies.” In fact, the government and the ruling party decided to keep the three non-nuclear principles only if the Japanese national security is insured by the U. S. nuclear deterrence. This is how the Japanese disarmament policy started to evolve under the strange combination of the opposing policies, which adheres to the three non-nuclear principles on the one hand and continues to rely on the U. S. nuclear deterrence on the other.
At first the dilemma showed itself when ratification of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was put on the agenda of the Diet debates. The government made it clear to the ruling party to continue its reliance on the U. S. nuclear deterrence, but it also stressed to the opposition parties its adherence to the non-nuclear principles as well. And the second occation appeared at the first and second U. N. Special Sessions on Disarmament. While the Japanese government proclaimed to the international community that it would continue to keep the three non-nuclear principles, it declined, from the standpoint of nuclear balances, to support the U. N. resolutions on no use and no deployment of nuclear weapons.
The gap between its pursuit of the ideal of non-nuclear policy and its real course of action has increasingly widened particulary after the Afgan incident. The way Japan acted itself in the Williamsburg summit of May 1983, in connection with the INF negociations between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. made it clear that Japan stood on the side of the West in the field of the nuclear disarmament. Since then, the effectiveness of the nuclear deferrence and nuclear balances has been stressed much strongly, and it seems that the Japanese non-nuclear policy based on the three non-nuclear principles has declined in its importance.
It is also true that recently, out of deep concern for such trend, there has been voices to call out the danger of being rested on the nuclear balances and stress the importance of bringing down the nuclear balances to much lower level. What Japan needs to do now is to clarify once again its position as the only country which suffered atomic explosion, and establish an independent nuclear disarmament policy which clearly sees to the starting point of the non-nuclear policy, and promote the nuclear disarmament diplomacy which is firmly based on that policy.

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Military spending in the world has been increasing rapidly, especially through the 1970s. It will reach nearly a thousand billion dollars in 1985. Third World countries have most rapidly increased military spending. These expenditures have mainly been used to purchase weapons imported from industrialised nations. Some observers refer to this phoenomenon as the militarization of the Third World.
At the same time, efforts to reduce arms in the Third World have also been undertaken since most of these countries are faced with numerous problems. which are an inhibition on too much military spending.
Several causes for the increase in military expenditure in the Third World are overviewed in this essay: international tension, regional arms race, repression, and so on.
The efforts to reduce arms in the Third World are classified into four kinds according to the nature of the weapons concerned and the region expected to disarm: the disarmament of weapons the Third World countries do not possess, the disarmament of weapons Third World countries also possess, disarmament on a global scale, and disarmament within a certain region.
Findings were made as regards the diversity among Third World countries which was reflected in the tremendous difference in the amount of each country's military expenditure. The problem of disarmament in the Third World should not ignore this diversity. There is also a need to distinguish resourcerich countries, such as the oil producing Middle East nations, NICs with the ability to produce and export weapons of considerable quality, pariah states alienated inside each region, ‘big-powers’ seeking hegemony within each region and countries faced with international and internal tensions including armed conflicts, from other Third World countries.
Disarmament means the removal of the necessary condition for war. The main obstacle to disarmament, however, has the same roots as the sufficient condition for war. This is the reason why a lot of disarmament efforts have been made unsuccessfully. Therefore, we should try to tackle both of these conditions at the same time when we want to succeed in disarmament efforts: the process of the effort should not be called disarmament but demilitarization.

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In recent years, a new type of international actor, the pariah state, has entered the consciousness of those in nuclear nonproliferation circles.
Because of their cumulative isolation in the regional and/or internaitonal political arena, their precarious security position in terms of political or territorial integrity in conventional weaponry, their unfavorable regional military imbalances, and because they have become the targets of censure within international forums, some nations have been deemed deserving of such a label. Some pariah states have had a strong incentive or have been taking the first steps toward nuclear-weapons state status because of their political and military circumstances. Five states-Israel, South Africa, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Taiwan and Pakistan-feature most prominently in this regard. Each of these five states has been estimated to possess a high degree of nuclear development and South Africa have been said to possess the technological capability to produce their own bombs. Furthermore, the thrust toward nuclear status by pariah states threatens the nonproliferation regime through a chain effect. For all these reasons the pariah-states problem is now considerd to be a linchpin in the nuclear proliferation question.
Much effort has been made so far to strengthen the NPT regime, the IAEA safeguard systems, the restriction on supplier's export policies for sensitive equipment (INFCE, NNPA, Trigger List by the Zangger Committee or the London Group, etc.), nuclear free zones, limitation of arms transfers, and so on. Many of these constrains, however, have, at best, very limited impact on a pariah state's decision to go nuclear, because it has a perceived security value of national nuclear weapons, which seems directly related to a deterioration in security position.
In order to halt or control nuclear proliferation in these states, the great powers have a special responsibility-the control of the nuclear impulses of these states is needed. The halting of regional conflicts is especially important in this context. For this purpose, new approaches should be adopted such as the formation of a regionally oriented framework for managing the process of arms sales to the Third World, or a regional security system based on mutual non-intervention, the restriction of military actions that might lead to incidents, and the commitment of the great powers not to intervene in the region, and so on. Through such means, we should build crisis management systems and perform and enlarge confidence building measures without interruption.

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Japanese newspaper embarked on an all-out campaign against atomic bombs in the imediate postbombing time. Hiroshima City started peace memorial ceremony in August 1947. This was the peace movement based on experiences of the A-bombings. Anti-nuclear movement based on experiences of the A-bombings started in 1949. While these movement took the lead, they were not durable. The casualities resulting from the 1954 Bikini hydrogen bomb test provided the stimulus for evolution of a nationwide movement. The World Conference against A- and H-Bombs was backed by this movement. Fixation of this Conference as traditional ceremony caused anti-nuclear movement durable.
Anti-nuclear movement in Japan was led mainly by socialist groups before 1953. But since 1954, that was led by all political parties and various classes. From the latter half of the 1960s, Hiroshima City and mass media were concerned in various matters of the A-bomb disaster. Hiroshima City established the special field called ‘Peace Administration, ’ and mass media established ‘anti-A-bomb campaign.’
The movements against U. S. military bases, against the revision of the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty in 1960, for the return of Okinawa, against the war in Vietnam were the leading mass struggles related the problem of dismarmament in postwar Japan. Anti-nuclear movement strongly joined hands with these movements. This joint maintained the life of the Anti-nuclear movement, but that caused the split of the anti-nuclear movement into three competing movements. The anti-nuclear movement was gradually splitted and tied to the rival political parties. The splitted movement was unified by narrowing the problem of the anti-nuclear movement down to anti-nuclear and relief for A-bomb victims.
There are arguments for and against preserving A-bomb documents and informing about the facts of A-bomb damages between A-bomb victims or citizens. Japanese anti-nuclear movement located these one of important driving force and informed repeadly the facts of A-bomb damages. From the latter half of the 1960s, people who remarked the universal meaning of the facts and experiences of A-bomb damages, ascertained and informed these facts as movements different from anti-nuclear movement. As a result of these efforts, the experiences of A-bomb victims gradually become the national experiences.

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The nuclear freeze created one of the most debated issues in American nuclear policy. This paper tries to focus on the background factors for such a widespread movement, to analyze the impact of the movement on the making of nuclear arms negotiation policy, and to examine its implication for public participation in nuclear policy making in the future.
Citizens of the United States have lived with nuclear weapons for forty years, while being relatively indifferent to the nuclear question. The threat of nuclear fallout once lightened public concern, though this concern subsided with the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Americans generally felt that they were safe back in the “nuclear sanctuary” protected by their own deterrent forces.
Technological innovation and the shifting military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union challenged such public confidence. More attention began to paid to the nuclear question toward the end of the 1970s, though a certain vehicle to generate a political movement out of it was still lacking.
The Nuclear Freeze Movement, which started in the late 1970s in New England, was provided with such means as to overcome the technical, psychological, and political inhibitions which previously prevented the citizen's anti-nuclear weapon movements from reveiving grass-roots support. The Nuclear Movement depended on “common sense” as the basis for judgements, and encouraged the public to express their opinion on nuclear questions as their right as well as responsibility. Also, the movement tried to utilize local politics, especially referendums, in demonstrating public support for a nuclear freeze, while strengthening electoral control over Congress and the House, especially, through grass-roots lobbying.
Such a citizen's movement was matched by support in Congress, and a Joint Resolution requesting a mutual and verifiable nuclear freeze was introduced in both Houses. The House nearly passed the resolution, which made a nuclear freeze one of the most important issues in the 1982 electios. The results of the elections were supplemented by the majority support given to the nuclear freeze referendum across the country, and formed the basis for a stronger electoral influence in the Congress in 1983.
The direct achievement of the Nuclear Freeze Movement was limited to the House passage of a freeze resolution, but through mobilizing public and congressional attention to the nuclear question, the movement contributed greatly to the shift in political climate, and consequently led to the modified negotiation postures of the Reagan Administration.
While presenting a greater opportunity for public participation in nuclear policy-making, the movement at the same time reminded both the public and their elected representatives of the “political responsibility” involved in this particular question.

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