Since the end of the Second World War, the international system has changed under the impact of scientific and technological revolution. These changes are clearly linked to developments in science and technology, that is; nuclear arms build-up, growing interdependencies among nations accelerated by the impact of telecomunications and transportation technologies, ongoing commercialization and militarization of outer space, explosive increases of population, and so on. As a matter of course, the development of science and technology has been affected by the political, economic and social environment. On the one hand, this is most typically reflected in military technology, on which the very survivability of nation states has been, and usually is, deeply dependent. Economic considerations have, on the other hand, also been a fundamental element in the advancement of science and technology particularly because comparative advantage in science and technology capabilities of one country vis-a-vis any other developed countries has been a decisive factor in economic competition in the world market. In this introductory note, some aspects of changes in the international system mentioned above will be briefly analyzed from the view-point of whether the structural attributes of the Western State System have been gradually withering away or not in this age of scientific and technological revolution. At the same time, the impact of science and technology on the international political system will be referred to in terms of militarization, or a “gray area” of high technology and politicization of technology transfer. All articles contributed to this edition will be organised and given short comments respectively in line with these contexts.
S & T (science & technology) has the dual use or the use diversion between welfare and war. Peace is in the field of politics, while R & D (research & development) is in the field of academism. S & T has a intimate relationship through the dual use or the use diversion. Especially, the high technology has a greater influence on not only the international politics but also international economy. Now, the international competitiveness depends mainly on more S & T than capital and cheap labour, and the military power depends also decisively upon S & T. The paradigm of advancement of S & T is linked with the paradigm of national security by the dual use or the use fiversion. The contents are as follows, (1) relationship between both paradigms of the advancemnent of S & T and the security, (2) S & T competition related to security, (3) paradigm transformation and a new order, (4) role of Japan in new paradigms. The focus is on an analysis of the relationship between the advancement of S & T and the security of nation. Though, the dimention is not the same between S & T and peace, it can be said that S & T has been a servant for the politics. The world security has been decisively affected by the strategies of both supreme nations, U. S. A. in the West, U. S. S. R. in the East, which based on the thesis of balance of power. The competition for the balance of power drives S & T into the R & D competition for the expansion of armaments. It is commonly believed that much welfare has been sacrificed for the competition. It has also become evident that we can not ensure the lasting peace of the world by depending upon only the power game between U. S. A. and U. S. S. R. or, without changing the existing world order of security. Now, we are requested to ensure it without the competition for the expansion of armaments. In conclusion, we are necessary to meet following requests with due regard to the relationship between S & T and security. First, S & T should have her autonomy to the politics, and for the sake of this, scientists should have a free communication system among them, and a countervailing activity by strengthening the solidarity among them so as not to be compeled to take the cooperation for the military R & D. I proposed to make the peace declaration of world scientists and engineers in 1979. Second, it is to establish the world-wide complete communication network among member scientists. Because any war would not break out in the area where there is the complete network among related nations. Third, as the fields of security are expanding and diversifying with the progress of S & T, it is requested to work actively for such several fields of securities as energy, foods, natural resources, environmental conservation and so on, from the side of S & T. It is becomming important to give some appropriate securities against international disasters besides war. We should have a concerted attack to secure such securities with international needs by the cooperation among scientists in the world. Generally speaking, such world-wide security projects are requested to invest a large amount of/higher grade of R & D resources. In order to answer these requests, we are necessary to transform the existing international order based on the game of balance of power between both supreme systems of the West and the East to a new order, and to establish the ethics of scientists and engineers for peace.
The world order in these days are changing rapidly by the factor of science and technology. Science and technology is now a commodity to sell and buy and has powers on the modern society and industry. Thus, it is necessary to discuss the forms of political control that new technologies bring with various debates. The more an individual becomes dependent on a commodity owned and controlled by others, the more vulnerable he or she becomes to the ends that others seek to achieve through the ownership. Science and technology is no exception. The renewed enthusiasm to control science and technology on the part of industrial, military, and political leaders has occurred since World War II. The patterns of influence and control that permeate American science and technology and its applications have worldwide implications. Almost half of the western world's research and development is carried out in the United States. Therefore the U. S. has been world leader of science and technology. But today the situations in these fields that could keep U. S. superiority on the world order. Science and technology has become a currency for diplomatic barter with the U. S.controlling the science and technology as power.
Since the late 1960's, technology transfer has become an issue of special importance. For North, especially TNC, it was an indispensable part of their global strategy in which those affiliated in developing countries, LDC, had to be an integrative part of the world-wide operation. For South, governments concerned in particular, it was also pertinent to their national development strategy, i. e. rapid industrialization. However, there are a number of differences in evaluating technologies involved, the process of their transfer, their outcomes, and their implications. Here, two views are looked into in detail. The first is one which stresses technology transfer as the way for “diffusion of innovation”, the term used by E. M. Rogers. According to this view, technology is a qualitative production element, i. e. “innovation”, and its transfer does promote technology development in LDC through “immanent changes” as well as “contact changes”. Yet, as D. Spencer argues, technology transfer in the form of a “package deal” may create the “world technological (hierarchical) system” which reflects unequal and hierarchical order of the world today, economic, political and military. As against this, the second view, such as one by C. V. Vaitsos, places more emphases upon the unequalness inherent in technology transfer. Thus he prefers to call it as “technology purchase”. By seeing technology today as “commercialized goods”, this view concentrates on the analysis of the process of “commercialization” of technology, and suggests in conclusion that the transfer is ideed deepening the already existing LDC's dependence upon North. In many ways. both views commonly point out the facts that, firstly technology transfer is an increasingly important integrative part of TNC's globalization effort. Secondly technology transfer in its present form does not bring about a significant challenge to the domination system of North. Thirdly technology transfer does reinforce LDC's dependence not merely in technology but also economic, political and military order today. In order to get out of dilemmas inherent in technology transfer, therefore, of importance to LDC especially are not just a search of “new international technology order”, but also the transformation of unequal structure within and without, i. e. North-South inequality structure.
Recently the technology transfer between East and West has recently gained a new meaning, because technology transfer has changed its direction from the civilian sector to the military sector. The U. S. A. has controlled exports to the Soviet Union, but the U. S. must control not only products, but also technology, i. e., software, know-how, and design. Traditionally it was the Department of Commerce that controlled exports to Communist countries under the authority of Export Administration Act. But the Defense Department increased its voice in this issue, as it was considered vitally important to the national interest to stop high technology transfers to Communist nations. Thus the Defense Department issued the Bucy Report in 1976 which called for the strict regulation of technology transfer, and urged an increase in the department's role in export administration. The first fruit of the Bucy Report was the Militarily Critical Technology List, made public in October 1980. The Department of Defense and the Department of Commerce were jointly responsible for making this list. This article analyses the Dresser Industry's export application which should have been included in this MCTL. This was the first test case of the effectiveness of the Export Administration Act after the Bucy Report. The main source materials for this article come from the Hearing held before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate on October 3, 1978. On the one hand, the Department of Defense aided by the Department of Energy, the National Security Council, and some group of Senators tried to stop the export by the reason of military diversion, but they were blocked by buraucratic inertia. On the other hand, the Department of Commerce muddled through this maze with unintentional help from International Security Affairs, Department of Defense. The Carter Administration was too divided on this problem to make a coherent policy. As they changed attitude too many times, Mr. Schultz severly critisized this “light-switch diplomacy”. Though defeated in the first round the Secretary of Defense, with the Secretary of Energy, used a special task force chaired by Mr. Bucy to reverse the decision. The Senate echoed this counterattack, and held the Hearing to check the process of export application. There was a hot debate in the Hearing on what national security means to the U. S. A., to what extent this technology transfered to the Soviet Union, whether this export had the danger of military diversion or not, what was foreign availablity, and so on. The industrial sector, including Dresser Industry, was strongly against the export embargo on foreign policy grounds, and demanded a coherent export policy. Even though the Department of Commerce gained a victory in this export application, the Department of Defense increased its power in the next phase-the Export Administration Act of 1979.
With the advent of the Modern Age, developoment in science and technology have grown into major factors in international relations with far reaching consequences for world politics. Industrial development and technological advancement have become almost synonymous and represent principal factors in the shifting balance of production and innovation underlying world economic and political power. Economic power, political power, technological development and international relations are intrinsically linked. Moreover, as Henry Nau suggested, technology cannot be abstracted from its social context; technology creates its own politics, a politics of technocratic elite control, and, historically, dominant groups have developed technology to serve their social aspirations. The basic argument is that in the Asian NICs the technocratic elite has harnessed technology development to two principal purposes, one to upgrade their industrial structure in the enduring process of catching up with the industrial countries, and second, to increase their military capabilities in view of the persisting security dilemma. In the Asian NICs the economies have been guided by the state bureaucracy in close consultation with the private sector. Technology advancement and developoment have been an integral part of their economic plans. In this paper it is attempted to discuss the role and function of science and technology development in the developmental experience of Taiwan and South Korea and their attempt to develop indigenous technology and assess the impact of their enchanced science and technology capabilities on the international system. The paper is structured into several distinct parts. First, we shall discuss the conceptual utility and relational aspects of technology development, Newly Industrializing Countries, and the International System. Second, the technological level of the two Asian NICs will be assessed in terms of their development of science and technology capabilities and the institutional environment in which S T policy must operate. And finally, the development of science and technology capabilities in these Asian NICs will be assessed in terms of their economic and strategic salience for the international system.
Since the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party in late 1978, China shifted its national goal to modernization and has been boldly pursuing the Open Door Policy in order to realize that goal. Especially since 1984 the Open Door areas are expanded to include fourteen cities in addition to Special Economic Zones and the Open Door Polity has been established as the “long term and unchangeable national policy”. In the course of this development there have been some theoretical “breakthroughs”. For one thing, the theory of “two world markets” which had not been challenged since the time of Stalin was now rejected and the new theory of “the single integrated world market” was proposed (Huan Xiang). Secondly, China started to recognize “interdependent relationship” involving China in the realm of international economy. In the 1980s China has just started to participate in the international relations of science and technology by taking such measures as full-fledged promotion of technology trasfer from the developed countries. This paper traces thirty years of the zig-zag process culminating in the current stage and examines China's assessment of and response to the new international relationship centered around science and technology as well as the constraints imposed on China's foreign policy by this new international relationship. China's foreign policy in the realm of science and technology evolved from total dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1950s to “self-reliance” in the 1960s and 1970s, and then to multi-directional cooperation with Western countries such as the United States and Japan. This paper analyzes the problems concerning the close cooperation with the Soviet Union in the area of military technology and its collapse, the “self-reliance” policy which followed with the consequence of being completely left behind the technological advances of the world, and the introduction of advanced technology from such countries as the United States. The following are the tentative conclusions of this paper: (1) Technology transfer can be an effective means of foreign policy for supllier of the technology. However, as the recent U. S. technology transfer to China indicates, bifurcation of the national security concept into military and economic aspects and the conflict between them can be clearly observed in the international and domestic controversy over technology transfer. (2) The technology transfer is far more irreversible than such economic relations as trade, foreign aid and investment and has long-term impact on both supplier and recipient countries. This is because it involves total transfer of culture, social systems and values. China jointed, on its own initiative, this international current of irreversibility. (3) The most serious problem for China, that has joined this international relationship of science and technology, is that its own foreign policy, or even modernization policy itself, has to be severely constrained by existing international relations, the relationship of interdependence. (4) What China is most seriously concerned with, after thirty years of policy fluctuation, is the “exploitation” caused by technological dependence on developed countries and the danger to national security caused by reliance on a single specific country (“leaning to one side”). Therefore, China is likely to try to pluralize the international relations of technology and to choose the paths which will precipitate the transition from imitation to creation of technology.
An important and conspicuous characteristic of postwar developments in the United States is a marked and steady increase in military expenditures, which has led to the emergence of the ‘national security state.’ In the wake of these developments the ‘military-industrial complex’ has grown powerful enough to perpetuate the political and social structures justifying huge military spending of 231 billion dollars in fiscal year 1984. It has also attained immense economic benefits from these expenditures. The ‘military-industrial complex’ and its supporters have developed a unique national security ideology which is characterized by an emphasis on the primacy of the national security of the United States and the subsequent stress on the crucial importance of military science and technology. They have argued that U. S. national security is best promoted by securing superiority in military technology. Their military doctrine is based upon deterrence which they argue is maintained by possessing superior military power, nuclear and conventional. They have further developed the argument that the military-oriented research and development (R & D) would produce various technological innovations that will spill over into the civilian market. It is argued and demonstrated in this paper, however, that the above points of view can hardly be substantiated in the light of the serious negative consequences for which the activities of the ‘military-industrial complex’ are largely responsible. Contrary to the expectations of ‘military-industrial complex’ and its supporters, not only has U. S. national security declined steadily in the postwar years, but technological spin-off effects benefitting the civilian economy have been marginal. Rather, such military-oriented technological developments have led to overdevelopment or ‘baroque’ technologies which in turn have made the application of military technology in the civilian market increasingly difficult. If spinoffs are wanted, this paper argues, there are better public policies and institutions available to achieve such objectives. Therefore, the author agrees with Herbert York's prophetic observations made during the 1963 public testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “Ever since shortly after World War II, the military power of the United States has been steadily increasing; over the same period the national security of the United States has been rapidly and inexorably decreasing…It is my view that the problem posed to both sides by this dilemma of steadily increasing military power and steadily decreasing national security has no technical solution. If we continue to look for solutions in the area of military science and technology only, the result will be a steady and inexorable worsening of the situation.” In addition, the author suggests that the huge military spending and the emphasis on military R & D by the federal government will distort technological development in the United States and steadily erode the economy.
Nuclear disarmament negotiations began with “the Baruch Plan” of June 14, 1946. The Baruch Plan was the first proposal for the international control of atomic energy presented by the United States to the United Nations. It was evaluated as an epochal proposal that the United States, then the only nuclear weapon state, publicly expressed her intention to abandon its monopoly on nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the “strictness” of that plan—namely, its provisions of “punishment against violators” and “restriction of the veto power” in the United Nations—brought about rejection by the Soviet Union. As a result, the first negotiations for nuclear disarmament were completely upset. But that failure provided an important suggestion regarding those factors which decide disarmament negotiations and international relations after World War II. And we cannot forget the great contributions of atomic scientists to ideas on the international control of atomic energy. This article re-examines the process of establishing the first plan for international control of nuclear energy focussing on the viewpoints of atomic scientists. David E. Lilienthal and his group, including J. Robert Oppenheimer, drew up a plan for the international control of atomic energy in March, 1946. “The Acheson-Lilienthal Report”, as it was usually known, was a draft plan of the Baruch Plan. But these two plans contain important differences in their contents. The Acheson-Lilienthal Report, which was based on Oppenheimer's ideas, proposed setting up an international organization which should possess all the fissionable materials and should control all nuclear activities. This organization was envisioned to be the center for research and development in this field. The Baruch Plan, which laid the foundations of United States atomic policy, partially followed the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, but it emphasized inspection and sanctions against violations. Namely, the Baruch Plan demanded enforceable punishment of violators rather than cooperation in atomic energy development. It is well known that the emphasis of punishment and problems relating to the veto in the United Nations became obstacles in gaining Soviet approval of the plan. Disarmament negotiations to follow inherited this kind of disharmony. For example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, which aims to prevent the appearance of any new nuclear powers, supports the dominant positions of the nuclear big powers rather than protects the benefits of non-nuclear states. The political character of the treaty meant severe antagonisms between the nuclear and non-nuclear powers. If we try to find the beginning of such deadlock in disarmament negotiations, we must re-examine the Baruch Plan. And if we compare that plan with the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, more significant facts will be found. One is the ideas of Oppenheimer, who represents both scientists and politiciants. And the other is the paradoxical meaning that his ideas exerted no influence on decision making, which provides a case study to consider the close relationship between scientists and nuclear policy.