I. Uniqueness of the Postwar Peace. II. The Nomos of the earth-Geopolitics of MAD (i) Bipolar System (ii) Geostrategic Approach to MAD (iii) Informal Rules of Game and Norms of Behavior. III. The Nomos of the Outer Space (i) Sanctuarization of the Space (ii) Ambiguity of the Space Weapons (iii) Issues of ABM Treaty in the Legal Context of SDI. This essay aims to examine the impact of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) on the Nomos of the outer space through revealing the secret of durability of the postwar peace. In calling for a defense that would render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete, ” President Reagan's goal of a perfect area defense stirred the interest of the public who have long sought a moral alternative to deterrence based on the mutual assured destruction (MAD). Yet MAD is not a strategy capable of being changed by political will or strategic considerations; it is rather “existential” condition, not unlike the condition of the market mechanism, resulted by the inevitable consequence of the super-powers having the assured capabilities of mutual destruction, closely connected with the asymmetric geopolitical positon. This condition has created the mutual vulnerability of civilized urban centers, because of the strategic reality resulted from the development of the ICBM and the so-called “reconnaissance revolution.” The detonation of even as few as five or ten Soviet warheads on U. S. cities would cause unparalleld destruction. It might be called the law of “impossibility of area defense”. This unique combination of the bipolar system and the condition of the MAD has successfully drawed a clear distinction between a zone of sanctuarity (a zone of predictability on which mutual interest in common rules based on reciprocal sanction) and a zone of danger (a zone of unpredictabily) in the periphery of the world. They have no choice, in this condition, but to play the game of influence by means of “nuclear cheque” on the security of the nuclear arsenals. Whereas we live in “neither war nor peace, ” we are afraid of a radical discontinuity by turning a zone of predictablity into a zone of danger. The concept of a zone of danger-currently highlighted by the issue of the SDI in outer space-also signals the arrival of an era of opportunity on the formation of the Nomos of the space. Any consideration of a militarization of outer space should not neglect the distinction of two different directions: the sanctuarization of the space (turning into a zone of predictability) through the passive uses such as reconnaissance and communications, in sharp contrast with the militarization of the space by turning into a zone of danger through the development of the ABM and ASAT technology, despite of the ambiguity of space weapons. In all probablity, super-power rivalry in strategic defense will lead to an increased Soviet-American arms race by the exchange of the offensive and defensive in a vicious circle. This is the reason why the development of SDI might be quite different from the Manhattan and the Apollo projects, which involves no less than unlocking nature's secrets; a struggle of man against nature. In contrast, the success of the stratigic defense depends on the reactions or the counter-measureas taken by the Soviet side, as the Fletcher panel project has suggested. Moreover, the SDI poses a real threat to the Outer Space Treaty, not to mention to the ABM treaty which is most significant arms-control agreement of the postwar period. Both treaties should provide us the legal framework (the Nomos), as a fundamental constitution, of the outer space. Such “passive” military uses as the satellites for reconnaissance, surveillance, early warning, and communications are compatible with a doctrine of peaceful purposes and deterrence. Yet the ballistic missile defence (BMD)
This is a memoir-typed essay rather than a monogragh which discusses the Japan-U. S. security system. The first chapter tittled the total reassessment of postwar security problem focuses on the process in which how the ‘security’ problem in Japan---one of the most important political issues during the ‘postwar’ period---has become an almost uncontrovertial issue among Japanese people in the 1980's. Taking a general view of the process, I think that the ‘final liquidation of the postwar period’ can be referred to, in a sense, as the ‘final liquidation of the postwar security problem’ in Japan. And I wonder what kind of factors have brought about the ‘final liquidation?’ The question over the revision of the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty in 1960 is discussed in the chapter two. As I was in the U. S. in 1960, when political uproar caused by this question occurred in Japan, I found it extremely difficult to understand the true state of the things because of lack of information on it. I especially got confused to see the fact that the target of the political movement in Japan had quickly changed, in a certain point of time, from ‘anti-Security Treaty’ to ‘anti-Kishi administration’ or ‘a defense of democratic parliamentary politics.’ It can be said in the final analysis that Japanese nationalism which had been tangibly or intangibly accumlated since occupation years flared up into such a chaotic movement with no clear-cut political goal on the occasion of the revision of the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty in 1960. In the chapters three and four, I focused on the question of ‘free ride’ of Japan, and the question of reciprocality between the both countries in our Security Treaty. Controversies over the Japan's free ride regarding her peace and security were heavily discussed in the U. S. for ten odd years after the last half of 1960s. Certainly some people in Japan still have a deep-rooted view which goes along with the free rider's line of thought, however, my interpretation is that Japan and the U. S. are maintaining reciprocality in the security system, playing different type of roles each other. I find that not a few people in Japan tend to discuss the security problem existing between the two nations, without a clear understanding of its precise structure in this reciprocal mechanism. Therefore, I clarifies its basic structure in this chapter. In the chapter five, I insert my dialogue with Mr. Hiroharu Seki which originally appeared in the ‘Shokun’ managine January 1970 issue. It goes without saying that Mr. Seki maintained that the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty had to be abolished, and that I was an advocate for the treaty. I would be appreciated if the debate make you realize how the countroversies over security of Japan were going at that time. Finally I make a brief review, in the chapter six, as to how the policies of the Opposition parties regarding security of Japan have changed. The reason why controversies over the security problem have virtually faded away in Japan is due to the fact that the anti-Security Treaty forces have changed their basic stance with regard to security and that we have come to have a wider and solid acceptance of the Treaty and the Self-Defense Forces among the Japanese people. Since the establishment of the ‘Guidelines’ for Japan-U. S. defense cooperation in 1978, our security system has stepped into a new stage with a particular and concrete cooperative relationship between the two countries from the stage of general and abstract cooperation.
When a country's international competitiveness in the world market and the country's industrial and economic superiority becomes apparent, the country is required to make appropriate policy changes for the sake of its own economy and the world economy. If no suitable policy change is made, the balance of the world economy will be destroyed and this will ultimately be a severe blow to the economy of the country in question. However, historically, such a policy is apt to be overcomed by events. Japan's slowness in changing its policy in recent years represents one such case. Japan now enjoys by far the biggest current account surplus by international standards and this is a serious threat to the world economy. In order to remove the threat, many demands have been made of the country. Yet, Japan has not been quick in responding to such demands. The country has actively initiated a series of economic measures: early implementation of the market-opening action program, promotion of domestic demands, and coordinated intervention to correct the overvalued dollar. These were in respond to the announcement by US President Ronald Reagan's New Trade Policy and the meeting of Finance Ministers from five industrialized countries in September 1985. These measures should have been put into practice much earlier. The United States in the 1920s is one historical example of failure in initiating a similar and necessary policy change when its economic advantage was assured in the world market. In those days the US was the largest and strongest economy in the world but it raised its tariff barriers and ignored the intensification of grave difficulties which the world economy was facing after the First World War. It must be pointed out that this mistake on the part of the United States obviously contributed to the Depression. Professor Walt W. Rostow, the well-known US economic historian, referred to this bitter mistake in a lecture in Tsukuba City, Japan, early last year. He said: “The difficulty at the turning point which Japan is now experiencing resembles well one which the United States met after World War I.” He pointed out how important it is for Japan, a newly-rising economic power, to get rid of its previous image and practices and to play a leading role in the world economy and meet its inescapable responsibilities. Clearly, Japan is required to play an active role in the development of the world economy. It is the Free World's second largest economy and now has the same role North American and European countries perform in the world economy. It should not simply respond passively to the movements of the world economy. In this sense, as Professor Rostow pointed out, Japan is now at a major turning point. And, as mentioned earlier, the most urgent matter now is for Japan to reduce its large current account surplus. Various types of imbalances and many serious problems in the world economy can partly be attributed to Japan's surplus. The country must do its best to expand domestic demand, open its markets, reform its economic structure and seriously pursue a global solution through coordinated multi-lateral management of the world economy in cooperation with the United States, the EC and other countries in the world. No valuable time must be lost and we must be very cautious about the rise of economic nationalism. The purpose of this article is to inquire from these perspectives and in the light of the British experience in the 19th century and the American experience in the 1920s, the problem of policy changes which are required of an industrially and economically strong country such as Japan. This article will also criticize Japanese economic policy in the 1970-80s when the American postwar economic hegemony gradually declined.
“Security theory” and “strategic theory” are profoundly related. However, deep research on Japan on historical evolution processes have never been conducted in the framework of the above-mentioned relations between security and strategy. The author has tried to explicate the meaning of “security” values within the framework of origins of the state, particularly based on Tilly's theory of state origins. The author has tried to answer three questions which he has himself raised. The three question are: (1) What kind of pattern Japan's search for security took over the past 120 years from the Meiji Restoration to SDI? (2) What kinds of profound changes and transformations of security theory and its environment were produced over time as a result of the rapid development of military science and technology? (3) What is imminent and necessary for the peace and security of Japan in the present stage of the development of the Asia and Pacific? In describing the historical pattern of security policy of Japan from the Meiji Restoration to the defeat of Japan in the Pacific War, the author focuses on the so-called “worst case learning networks” produced by the Westphalian International System and analyzes the learning process of Japanese leaders who participated in these networks. However, in his description of the post-World War II period, the author has rather tried to focus on the revolutionary dimensions of the characteristics of war as influenced especially by the development of the atomic bomb, and also on the relationship of traditional security values to these revolutionaly aspects of military science and technology. The author furthermore analyzes the security values of Japan in the age of Star Wars and the development of SDI research within the entirely new paradigm of computer science. The author's emphasis on the relationship among MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction), NUTS (Nuclear Utilization Strategy) and DEAD (Destruction Entrusted Automatic Devices) is the notable in the sense that the author also raises the necessity of a new “Global Take-Off” by means of “alternative marginal developments” within a “Global Survival Machine” making optimal use of the globalization of Japanese economy.
Ethnic conflicts are often regarded as dysfunctional, especially among Western scholars, for the national integration and the economic and social development of a country. Their theories are based on the myth of a ‘nation-state’, a concept which assumes that a state should be integrated into a ‘nation, ’ and a ‘nation’, and in this sense an ethnic group as well, should acquire their own territory, and become a state. In other words, conflicts inevitably arise between ethnic groups within a state boundary and a nation as a whole, and the solution would be either the central government enforcing the national identity or a secession. In a multi-ethnic developing country like India, however, ethnic conflicts can be, and sometimes are, functional. They often play an important role in mobilizing otherwise indifferent social groups and enable them to articulate and aggregate their interests. If no solution can be found within the framework of parliamentary democracy, the conflict escalates into a violent one. However, when the whole political system learns the cost of the conflict, efforts are made to find a solution usually by giving more autonomy to a local unit such as a state. Thus the democratic process is restored. In this way, new social groups now participate in the actual political process. The political development in India is a constant process whereby different kinds of demands are accommodated into the political system and a larger number of people participate in the political process. The Punjab problem illustrates this process.
Ishibashi Tanzan, the Finance Minister under the first Yoshida cabinet (May 22, 1946 to May 24, 1947) was purged on May 16, 1947, in accordance with category G of Appendix “A” of SCAPIN-550, dated January 4, 1946. Ishibashi's purge was clearly unreasonable. As president and editor-in-chief of the Oriental Economist, Ishibashi had been firmly in opposition to the Manchurian Incident (1931), the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), The Triple Alliance (1940), and the Pacific War (1941-45). He was well known as one of the few liberalists opposing the totalitarian government in those days. That is why Colonel Kramer, who became the first chief of the Economic & Scientific Section (ESS) of GHQ and had been a reader of the Oriental Economist even during the war, asked for Ishibashi's cooperation from September to December, 1945. This article aims to clarify the factors and process of Ishibashi's purge as GHQ's attempt to silence him and to squelch his economic enlargement policies in favor of their own economic retrenchment policies. There were three purge actions on Ishibashi. The first purge movement was requested by the Soviet representatives at the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) conference; GHQ disagreed. The second occasion arose when Ishibashi and ESS came into extreme conflict over the Extraordinary Tax Legislation issue, but General MacArthur denied his purge for fear that the Yoshida cabinet would fall. And finally, the situation that led to the purge of Ishibashi was the clash on the cost problems of the Occupation that occurred between Ishibashi and GHQ. Moreover, the Government Section (GS) viewed Ishibashi as a dangerous man for offering such stout resistance to GHQ. GS had to purge him not as a politician, but as an journalist because there was no clause on resistance to the Allied Powers as a justification in SCAPIN-550. Prime Minister Yoshida assumed an indifferent attitude because Ishibashi was becoming powerful in the Liberal Party.