国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
1988 巻 , 89 号
選択された号の論文の16件中1~16を表示しています
  • 佐々木 雄太
    1988 年 1988 巻 89 号 p. 1-6,L5
    発行日: 1988/10/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Half a century has passed since the beginning of the Second World War in Europe. In the 1980's, historians both in Europe and in Japan began to concern themselves with the review and reappraisal of the studies on the Second World War up to now. At the same time, the steady flow of governmental documents released to the public, as well as the recent discovery of materials relating to the resistance movements, resulted in the publication of new positive historical works on the war and post-war period.
    In most of these recent analysis, the following trends can be observed. Firstly, historians have tried to reconsider the meaning of the Second World War and post-war settlements in the light of their present standpoints. For example, while recognizing the reality of a Europe reduced by the Second World War to a minor role between two hegemonic powers, some European historians, however, tried to define a positive legacy to the war. As regard Japan and Asia, the relation between Japan's “war-aims” and a decolonized Asia, as well as that between the U. S. occupation policy and the ensuing Japanese economic growth were the object of many debates.
    Another recent trend which can be observed lies in the growing tendency to research both the nature of the Second World War and the process of post-war settlements as objectively as possible, without relying exclusively on the preconceived notion of an “anti-fascist war” and a “cold war”.
    The Second World War is said to have been an “anti-fascist war” by the Allied Nations. The idea of “anti-fascism” included many different war-aims for many different actors in the war. Therefore, it is important to recognize that this gigantic war was the sum of many separate wars fought with specific war-aims. The three great Allied powers each fought the war with their own views of the post-war world order, and as these started to contradict one another, the “Grand Alliance” got to be called “the Strange Alliance”. Small states and resistance movements also had their own ideas of the regional or national political orders which would be built after the war. But in most cases the ideas held by the small states and the resistance movements eventually clashed with those of the great powers, and were suppressed in the process of establishing the post-war world order.
    It would, therefore, be very rewarding to examine these separate wars with their specific war-aims, which, needless to say, involved dozens of small nations in the context of their own historical background. As a result of such research, we should be able to deepen our understanding of both the nature of the Second World War and the fundamental characteristics of the post-war world order.
    The purpose of this volume is to analyze various aspects relating to the ending of the Second World War, as well as the preconditions for a new world order. Contributors proceeded with their work taking the following points into account: (1) To examine the various wars along with the respective war-aims, and consider the meaning of the war for each of the actors (or states). (2) To consider the relation between the present position of these actors and both the nature of the Second World War and the post-war settlements. (3) To keep in mind the interrelationship between people's lives and the conduct of the war.
  • 斎藤 治子
    1988 年 1988 巻 89 号 p. 7-23,L6
    発行日: 1988/10/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The study of Greek anti-fascist movements during the Second World War has developed since the 1970s. The Colonels' dictatorship dissolved in 1974 and the Greek Communist Party (KKE), outlawed by the dictatorship, was then legalised. Books and articles written by KKE members who had took part in the anti-fascist movement have been published.
    The anti-fascist movement in Greece had two aims; national liberation and democratization. In 1936 Prime Minister Metaxas secured the assent of King George II to the suspension of the democratic articles in the Constitution and parliament was adjourned without delay. Metaxas outlawed the KKE, introduced censorship and dealt badly with anti-monarchists. He organized the National Youth Organization on totalitarian lines. This quasi-fascism, however, was not popular among the Greeks because of their traditional individualism. Metaxas, who monopolised seven portfolios in the government, had a less massive party than Hitler had.
    On 28 October 1940 the Italian ambassador handed to Metaxas the ultimatum claiming some important areas in Greek territory, but the latter said “No (0 χ ι in Greek)”. He appealed to the people for fierce resistance against the Italian forces invading across the Albanian-Greek frontier. His rejection of the ultimatum and the appeal set fire to the patriotism of the Greeks. For the first time he succeeded in the unification of the nation. Rank and file, young and old, who opposed the Metaxas' dictatorship (4 August Regime), in the front and the rear fought against the invaders. Soon they liberated the occupied territory, and counter-attacked across the border and occupied the Greek-inhabited southern area in Albania which Greek nationalists had long aspired to. The victory has temporarily identified the people with the dictatorship.
    In April 1941 the Germans attacked Greece assisting the Italians and in two weeks occupied Athens. King and the government (Metaxas had died in January but “4 August Regime” succeeded) withdrew to Crete, which the Germans occupied in May, and then to Egypt. They established a government-in-exile in London at first, then in Cairo. In the Axis-occupied Greece a puppet government was established, headed by the ex-commander of the Greek Army.
    Resistance groups were formed during the occupation. They were led by outlawed KKE members or democratic civilians or republicans. The general secretary of KKE had been imprisoned and the party had been divided. The underground and imprisoned cadres decided to unify the party and to organize the nation-wide resistance movement in order to struggle for national liberation and independence. The struggle was also aimed at the abolition of the “4 August Regime”.
    In September 1941 the National Liberation Front (EAM) was founded on the initiative of KKE. EAM consisting of four political parties that declared their common struggle against the occupants. Its slogans were national liberation and people's democracy (laocratia).
    The main object of the article is the analysis of the interrelation between national liberation and social evolution in Greece.
  • 大島 美穂
    1988 年 1988 巻 89 号 p. 24-41,L7
    発行日: 1988/10/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to examine the foreign policies of the Norwegian government-in-exile, paying attention to its post-war planning.
    Studies on the Second World War tend to emphasize only one of its aspects, that is to say, the war of Democracy versus Fascism. It is true that the Allied countries cooperated to defeat the Axis, but at the same time they had conflicts, and different needs and plans. The three Big Powers often had talks on their war tactics and post-war problems from the global point of view and determined the main issues. While the Small Powers, whose main concern was the liberation and reconstruction of their own lands, sometimes found their requests rejected. Here power politics manifested itself.
    In that sense the Norwegian government-in-exile had distinctive features. In the early days of the Second World War, the Norwegian government suddenly committed itself to Great Britain and the United States, and announced the ‘Atlantic Policy’, which was a post-war plan to renounce their traditional neutrality and suggest North Atlantic defence cooperation.
    That became the leading idea in the post-war plans of the other London-Governments, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Poland, and was favoured by the British Foreign Ministry. The direct motivation behind this policy was to prevent a future repetition of the catastrophe of the Second World War, but in addition to it the Norwegian government in London sought protection and support from Great Britain so strongly that she needed to prove her loyalty.
    However throughout the war, and particularly during the last eight months Norway had to subordinate her regional interests to the global considerations of the Great Powers. In spite of her efforts, neither Great Britain nor the United States gave any effective military support to Norway, and Norway exposed herself alone to the Russian demand for the session of Bear Island and the establishiment of a Soviet-Norwegian condominium for the rest of the Svalbard archipelago. It led the Norwegian government to the conclusion that Norway, being situated in the periphery, could expect no all-out political support from any of the Allied Great Powers. Subsequently the Norwegian government-in-exile re-oriented her foreign policies toward Sweden and the Soviet Union. Military cooperation with Sweden was not realized because of the delay of the Great Powers' approval, but it was the Soviet forces that did a major service to the liberation of North Norway.
    Here one can find the origin of the ‘bridgebuilding policy’, which means to balance between ‘East’ and ‘West’ by conducting a wise and unprovocative foreign policy in order to ward off dangers to her security primarily, and hopefully to lead to world peace. The hard experiences of the Second World War taught the Norwegian government-in-exile to come in practical contacts with both Powers and seek friendly relationships with them. This policy is not traditional neutrality, but something which we could call ‘practical neutrality’.
  • 筒井 洋一
    1988 年 1988 巻 89 号 p. 42-56,L8
    発行日: 1988/10/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to analyze the characteristics of the “Antifa”, a unique type of labor movement in Germany at the end of the World War II. The KGF in Bremen was one of the most influential Antifas. In contrast to other European countries at that time and to Germany at the end of the World War I, Germay after World War II was not liberated by the people themselves, but by the Allied Powers: most of the Germans were very passive and in the state of political apathy. In such circumstances, the KGF members were rare exceptions, and devoted themselves to the denazification of all the social sectors, the material reconstructions of daily life and the unification of the labor parties.
    It is true that the KGF arose from the labor movement and spread through it, but finally it went beyond the traditional labor movement: it came to have its own decision and action apart from the labor parties in organizing the members, and it also made much of the so-called “basic democracy”, which means the decentralized and direct democracy in the lower branch of the organizations.
    Consequently, it had to face the Military Governments (MG), the German civil administrations and the labor parties. MG and the administrations shared an interest to oppress the KGF, to delay the denazification and to reconstruct the traditional conservative administrations in the pre-Nazis era. At the beginning, the labor parties in Bremen kept step with each other to strengthen the KGF. Unlike most of the rank and file, however, many local leaders were obviously persuaded to pledge loyalty to the national leaders: to K. Schumacher in SPD, to W. Ulbricht in KPD. Their strategies tried to damage the unification policy by the KGF. Members of the split socialist groups criticized furiously this tendency and stood by the KGF. Those who would not agree with SPD nor KPD were too small in number to become the third group.
    Besides those obstacles inside and outside of the labor movement, the KGF essentially had inner organizational weaknesses. In regard to its member structure, most were recruited from labor movement veterans, not so many from nonpartisans. More importantly, they had no more intentions to make long-range strategy, after having failed to gain unification. Finally they dissolved the KGF by themselves in early 1946. In mid-1940s and 1950s, the labor movement was almost involved in Cold War, neglecting the original ideas of the Antifa. However, we find its analogous type of movement in mid-1960s, when the “new social movement” appeared.
  • 木戸 衛一
    1988 年 1988 巻 89 号 p. 57-72,L9
    発行日: 1988/10/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The post-war order in central Europe started with the transfer of German population, as well as with the division of Germany into four occupation zones and the de facto delimitation of the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's eastern frontier. In the Federal Republic of Germany (BRD), where the “German problem” is still hotly discussed, transferees are called “expellees”, while they are called “resettlers” in the German Democratic Republic (DDR). Mainly because of difficulty in obtaining historical materials there are few academic achievements concerning the problem of the transferees in the Soviet Zone (SBZ), which this article deals with.
    Nazi Germany utilized German ethnic groups for her “living space” policy. On June 23, 1939, she concluded an agreement for population removal with fascist Italy. After the attack on Poland, Hitler advocated “a new order of ethnographic relations”, and Germany made such agreements with Estonia, Latvia, the Soviet Union and others. About one million Germans immigrated, 70% of them into the incorporated and integrated Ex-Polish areas, whose native population would become illiterate helots by the “Germanizing” policy.
    It was Beneš, President of the Czechoslovak government in Exile in London, who proposed the removal of German minorities (Sudeten Germans). This proposal was accepted by the governments of the anti-Hitler coalition by the summer of 1943. But at the conferences during World War II the Big Three could come to no agreement about a transfer plan. Meantime the westward exodus of German inhabitants had already begun. The Potsdam Agreement accepted as a fait accompli Germany's eastern frontiers and the transfer of German populations.
    By February/March 1944, 825, 000 Germans had been evacuated from Berlin and northwest cities into the territories east of the rivers Order and Neisse. In January, 1945, the Red Army broke the German eastern front, and several times as many Germans fled westwards as eastwards. According to statistics of 1946, 215, 000 were lost as war casualties and 313, 000 went missing.
    The Potsdam Agreement requested Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary “meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending the examination by the Governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the Control Council”. But this request wasn't necessarily effective. On November 20, 1945, the Control Council in Berlin made a plan for scheduled movements of German populations from December 1945 to July 1946. Germans from Poland would be accepted into Soviet (2, 000, 000) and British (1, 500, 000) zones. Those from other countries would be transfered to Soviet (750, 000 from Czechoslovakia), US (1, 750, 000 from Czechoslovakia, 500, 000 from Hungary) and French (150, 000 from Austria) zones. The French government wouldn't undertake any addtional categories of transfer.
    As more than 10 million people rushed into three-quarters of the territories of the Weimar Republic, the post-war German population (1946) showed a 10% increase over the pre-war (1939) one (+20% in the US Zone, +14% in the SBZ, +13% in the British Zone, -4% in the French Zone, -27% in Berlin). In the impoverished conditions after the war it was very difficult to take care of transferees (in matters of hygiene, food, housing) and to integrate them into the new society.
    In October 1946 760, 000 Displaced Persons still lived in the western zones of occupation, while 5, 991, 000 former prisoners of war and slave-workers had been released. Some of the DPs, above all from Poland and the Baltic Republics, refused repatriation for political and other reasons.
    No matter where their final destination was, most of the refugees and transferees flowed into the SBZ at first. Therefore the SBZ, a sparsely populated agricultural area for the most part, showed social confusion with rapid population increase
  • 小野田 求
    1988 年 1988 巻 89 号 p. 73-89,L11
    発行日: 1988/10/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to examine the independence movements of the Korean people against Japanese colonialism during World War II in order to find out the fundamental cause of the division of Korea into two states after the war. They are analyzed in the following two ways: Firstly, to examine the idea of each independence movement and to make clear whatpolitical character the movement aimed to attribute to the independent state after the war. For this purpose, it is necessary to analyze the platforms, leaders and members of the independence movements. Secondly, to examine their means and ways to realize their ideas. For this purpose, it is necessary to analyze their struggles within the borders of Korea and their relations with each other as well as with international anti-fascist movements.
    The five independence movement bodies can be divided into two groups according to their ideas. One group includes the bodies which aimed at establishing a people's democracy. They are Choson Konguk Tongmaen (Korean Independence League), Choguk Kwang Bokhoe (Korean Fatherland Restoration Association) and Hwabuk Choson Tongnip Tongmaeng (North Korean Independence League). The other group includes the bodies which aimed at establishing an anti-communist state. They are Taehan Minguk Imsi Chongbu (Korean Provisional Government) and Chae Mi Hanjok Yonhap Wiwonhoe (United Committee of the Koreans in America).
    At the end of World War II, there was a fair chance of establishing a people's democracy based chiefly on the Choguk Kwang Bokhoe among these bodies, while it was hardly possible for an anti-communist state to be established. Therefore, a people's democracy should have emerged in Korea after the war, only if self-determination of the Korean people was recognized.
    During the war, the Korean people carried out the independence movement against Japan in cooperation with the international anti-fascist forces, including the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The former aimed at an anti-communist state in Korea, but the latter helped to establish a people's democracy there while trying to maintain her hegemony as a big power. Therefore, there occured a possibility that the question of Korean people's independence might be turned into an international issue and the self-determination of the Korean people violated.
    Consequently, the fundamental cause of the division of Korea into two states after World War II was the violation of the right of self-determination of the Korean people mainly by the United States of American and to some degree by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
  • 小沼 新
    1988 年 1988 巻 89 号 p. 90-108,L13
    発行日: 1988/10/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The ordinary phase of World War II ended in Asia with the triumph of the Allies over Japan. Among many countries in Asia, the triumph of Vietnam was unique. Its reasons are the following.
    (1) Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were French colonies and French rule was very severe.
    (2) Vietnam was occupied by France and Japan from the invasion of the Japanese army in the winter of 1940 to the coup on March 3, 1945. It was a so called “double occupation”.
    (3) After that coup, Japan gave independence to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Of course, they were puppet governments of Japan. But it is true that the French role disappeared.
    (4) The resistance groups against the double occupation had made a united front under the Viet-Minh (Vietnamese Independence League). A famous leader of this independent movement was Ho Chi Minh who had established the Indochina Communist Party in 1930.
    (5) When Japan was defeated in August 1945, the Viet-Minh disarmed the Japanese army and seized political power. The Allies had not arrived in Vietnam yet.
    (6) The Allies especially France insisted that they had won, so France had a right to come back to Vietnam. But on the other hand, the Viet-Minh insisted on their triumph over Japan. Therefore they called the end of the World War II in Vietnam the “August Revolution”.
    The formation of order after the “August Revolution” was as complicated as the end of the war. The Viet-Minh regime asked the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Republic of China to recognize independence. But U. S. A. had forgotten Roosevelt's trusteeship plan of Indochina at that time. DeGaulle proclaimed the French were returning to Indochina. W. Churchill did not recognize the Viet-Minh's independence at all. Chiang Kai-shek wanted to make a pro-Chinese government in north Vietnam. Y. Stalin was not much concerned with the status of Vietnam.
    On the one hand Ho Chi Minh's government (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) attempted to construct the new state, on the other it opposed reaggression of the French army with negotiations, because Ho Chi Minh expected generosity from the French government which was organized by his old friends. In the fall of 1946, clashes between the Viet-Minh army and the French army spread over the northern part of Vietnam. At the end of 1946, leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were determinded to fight with France again. The Indochina War broke out.
  • 菅 英輝
    1988 年 1988 巻 89 号 p. 109-125,L14
    発行日: 1988/10/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is, first, to find out what are some of the major principles and ideas upon which America's postwar world order was intended to be built and relate them to the complicated and varied aspects of the Second World War. Next, an attempt has been made to analyse how such principles and ideas interacted with each other and defined policy choices in the U. S. postwar planning efforts to integrate Japan with the rest of Asia. Finally, an assessment is made as to what has happened to the efforts towards regional integration in its embryonic years as the result of the courses of action taken by the policymakers.
    Throughout the years in question U. S. policy-makers were preoccupied with “economic stability and orderly political process” so that the Soviet Union might not take advantage of “confusion and radicalism” derived from poverty, hunger and misery. Therefore, when the policymakers in Washington began to focus in 1948 on Japan rather than China as the driving force in economic recovery and stability in Asia, it was naturally determined that economic recovery should be made “the primary objective of U. S. policy in Japan.”
    The essential means to achieve such objectives was through promoting regional integration in Asia. The deteriorating situations of the civil war in China forced the Truman administration officials to seek an alternative as the key to Japan's recovery and self-sufficiency. Thus Southeast Asian countries emerged as vital links between Japan and the European metropolitan powers because these industrialized countries depended upon this area as the suppliers of food and raw materials and importers of finished products.
    The rise in strategic, economic and political importance of Southeast Asia coincided with the emerging perception of the U. S. policy-makers that the area had become “the target of the coordinated offensive clearly directed by the Kremlin”. Such a perception was reinforced by the success of the Chinese revolution in October 1949 and its impact felt throughout the Asian countries. The dollar gap question in 1949 interposed another serious challenge to economic recovery and political stability both in Asia and Europe. Therefore, such key policy-makers as Acheson and Nitze, also under Congressional pressure to cut down expenditures for economic assistance, tried to meet the economic and political crises through the playing up of the Soviet threat and the militarization of the containment policy.
    The militarization of containment shifted the U. S. efforts of regional integration in such a way that it paved the way for collective security arrangement culminating in ANZUS and SEATO, anti-Communist military alliances against the Soviet Union. Concurrently, their interest in building a loose regional social, economic and political association receded. Moreover, their resort to the military containment and the anti-Communist rhetoric led to a policy-making environment within the Washington bureaucracy where the balance of power considerations prevailed over the support for the Asian nationalist aspirations including self-determination and higher living standards through industrialization.
    From the very beginning, the policy-makers in Washington were aware of the enormous obstacles to promoting of regional integration in Asia. But one of the most important dilemmas was the revival of the neocolonial relationship between the metropolitan powers and the Southeast Asian countries. The delicate balance between Washington policy-makers' consideration for Asian nationalism and for the interests of the European metropolitan powers and Japan that had existed until late 1949 (NSC 48/1) shifted in favor of the latter as they opted for the military containment of the Soviet Union in Asia. This in turn resulted in the chronic underdevelopment of the Southeast Asian countries and necessitated the continued U. S. assistance and deepening m
  • 豊下 楢彦
    1988 年 1988 巻 89 号 p. 126-141,L15
    発行日: 1988/10/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    On July 1943, the British Government proposed to the American and Soviet Governments the “principles which would govern the conclusion of hostilities with the European members of the Axis.” Those principles were the joint system of occupation control and the equal position of the three Allied Governments. By this “memorandum of July 1st”, the British Government intended to prevent a Soviet separate armistice with Germany and Soviet exclusive control on the satellites of Germany.
    However, the first axis state to surrender was Italy in September. Then, at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference in October, the British Government proposed a new system on control machinery for the occupation of Italy, namely, the Allied Control Commission composed of Anglo-American representatives with exclusive authority to administer the occupation. There was only one Soviet representative with observer status and a merely advisory role. This exclusive occupation control system was generally called the “Italian Formula”.
    This Formula was applied next to Rumania. In this case, the Soviet representative had exclusive authority and Anglo-American representatives were only observers. The “Italian Formula” was also applied to Bulgaria and Hungary, and in the case of Germany it was applied to each separate zone. In the end, the Japanese occupation was also controled substantially with this Formula.
    As mentioned above, the “Italian Formula” was applied to all the Axis powers and under this Formula the United States and the Soviet Union carried out occupation policies. Their policies embodied “Unconditional Surrender” aimed at the reorganization of the entire state structure of the defeated Axis. Within the exclusive systems, this reorganization was basically exercised on the principles of the American and Soviet social systems. Thus, the exclusive occupation control systems prepared the division of the ex-Axis powers in Europe and Asia into American-Soviet spheres of interest and formed the basic structure of the Cold War.
  • 木村 昌人
    1988 年 1988 巻 89 号 p. 142-158,L16
    発行日: 1988/10/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this thesis is to describe Robert Dollar's views on Japan based on his memoirs and diary, and to present a different aspect of U. S. -Japan relations after the Russo-Japanese War.
    In 1888, Dollar settled in San Francisco and entered the foreign trade and lumber business. He eventually became known as one of the largest operators of ocean vessels in the North Pacific. Some of the companies which he founded include Dollar Steamship Co., Admiral Oriental Co., and Canadian Robert Dollar Co. He also developed his own diplomacy based on an interchange of personnel and commerce between various business worlds in the North Pacific. Not only American businessmen who worked out of the West Coast but also Japanese Foreign Ministry and big businessmen, such as Eiichi Shibusawa and Renpei Kondo, paid close attention to Dollar's activities.
    Dollar was convinced that strengthening the merchant marine was the most important way for the U. S. to increase its foreign trade. In his design, the North Pacific was to play a key role in helping to increase U. S. foreign trade.
    The following two points are important features of his view of Japan: The first point is that he placed Japan's position within the framework of a triangle which was defined by the U. S., Japan and China. Dollar thought, through his visit to Asia, that in the near future Sino-U. S. trade would increase rapidly and China would become the biggest trading partner of the U. S. in Asia. However Japan proved to be the U. S.'s largest partner in Asia. Consequently, Dollar became the driving force behind the expanding trade between these three nations.
    The second point is that he thought Japan would become a serious menace to the American merchant marine. The Japanese government and business leaders recognized the importance of marine transportation in the North Pacific from a very early stage. Therefore the Japanese government began subsidizing shipping and shipbuilding industries as early as 1896. Major Japanese shipping companies, such as Nippon Yusen Kaisha, opened new lines between Japan and the West Coast of the North American continent, utilizing large steamships on these lines. Subsequently, Japan was second in marine transportation in the North Pacific only to Great Britain. Dollar was worried that Japan's rapid increase in merchant marine would prove to be a serious threat to the U. S. shipping industry. Shortly thereafter, Japan's shipping industry surpassed Great Britain and grew to acquire a 60-70 percent share of the marine cargo shipped in the North Pacific.
    Such a study provides many interesting topics concerning Japan-West Coast Relations which need to be researched further.
  • 守屋 純
    1988 年 1988 巻 89 号 p. 159-174,L17
    発行日: 1988/10/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Japan held very sensitive relations with Germany and the Soviet Union during the Second World War. The Japanese concluded a military alliance with the Germans, and maintained neutrality with the Soviets. The Japanese aimed not only at the maintenance of neutrality with the Soviets but peace between the Germans and the Soviets.
    However, the Germans pursued their own ideological and racial aims on the war against the Soviet Union, so from these points of view, there were no possibilities of peace with the Soviets. Thus, there were great gaps between the Japanese and the Germans around the measures against the Soviet Union. Here is a problem how these gaps worked upon their war conduct in each nation. But, there have been few studies about this subject except some works based only on Japanese materials.
    Therefore, we would like to rearrange the negotiations and consider the meanings of the gaps between both countries with new materials.
    In this study, we would like to deal with the period from June 1941, the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union, to September 1943 when the Japanese failed to dispatch a special envoy to the Soviet Union.
  • 関根 仁日
    1988 年 1988 巻 89 号 p. 175-179
    発行日: 1988/10/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 臼杵 陽
    1988 年 1988 巻 89 号 p. 180-184
    発行日: 1988/10/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 岡本 哲明
    1988 年 1988 巻 89 号 p. 184-188
    発行日: 1988/10/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 朱 建栄
    1988 年 1988 巻 89 号 p. 189-193
    発行日: 1988/10/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 佐々木 雄太
    1988 年 1988 巻 89 号 p. 200
    発行日: 1988/10/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
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