国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
1988 巻, 88 号
選択された号の論文の15件中1~15を表示しています
  • 現代アフリカの政治と国際関係
    小田 英郎
    1988 年 1988 巻 88 号 p. 1-8,L5
    発行日: 1988/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The aim of this brief note is to introduce the ten articles included in this special issue on Africa, its politics and international relations. These articles express fair and balanced views regarding African problems within the context of international politics. It is my intention, however, in this introduction to discuss briefly four basic problems which are facing Africa at present.
    First; the problem of nation-building. There are more than fifty independent countries in Africa today but, with very few exceptions, all of them are new states that have achieved independence less than thirty years ago. Moreover, almost all of these states lack the basic ingredients of a ‘nation-state’ and owe their existence mainly to former colonial powers that drew international borders in the continent. We can even argue that ‘colonial self-determination’ rather than ‘national self-determination’ was the deciding factor behind the independence of many African states in their present form. In spite of the fact that nation-building is the top priority in Africa today, the record of the majority of African governments in this area is far from convincing and many countries are still suffering from communal conflict and national disintegration.
    Second; the problem of political instability and autocratic rule. Torn up by problems of ethnic conflict and national disintegration, African governments tend to look for conformity through autocratic rule. However, this heavy-handed form of government is usually accompanied by social dissatisfaction and political instability. The proliferation of coups d'état, military regimes and one-party systems and the violent nature that power transition usually takes in Africa are clear indications that political instability and autocratic rule are but the two sides of the same coin.
    Third; the problem of southern Africa. In the Republic of South Africa the abhorrent system of apartheid is in continuous and rapid decline. In 1983, the South African government adopted a new constitution under which Coloureds and Indians were given, for the first time, the right to vote for their own separate parliament. The anti-apartheid movement continued to grow both inside and outside the country, and by 1986 the government of P. W. Botha was cornered and found itself forced to announce some concessions regarding sharing of power with the black majority. Under these circumstances, steps taken by anti-apartheid organizations such as the ANC and UDF and moderate black movements like the Inkatha Movement continue to attract international attention.
    Fourth; the problem of non-alignment and Pax-Africana. Keeping the flame of Pax-Africa burning is the joint responsibility of all African states. However, in the détente era, this task is made even harder because of rivalries among super powers. But, the fact that more than half the membership of the non-aligned movement is in Africa may provide yet another means for the preservation of the Pax-Africana spirit. With the backing of the non-aligned countries in other parts of the world African countries may be in a better position to preserve their independence.
  • 現代アフリカの政治と国際関係
    林 晃史
    1988 年 1988 巻 88 号 p. 9-26,L6
    発行日: 1988/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Inkatha was revived by Gatsha Buthelezi as a Zulu cultural liberation movement in the early 1970s, but after the adoption of its constitution in 1975, it aimed to become a liberation organization against apartheid for all the African people. Gatsha Buthelezi, the President of Inkatha, is also the Prime Minister of the KwaZulu Homeland. At present Inkatha is the biggest liberation organization in South Africa.
    The purpose of this article is to clarify the character and role of Inkatha as a movement among the many African liberation organizations in South Africa. In section I I discuss the relationship between G. Buthelezi and the Zulu Royal Family, his political career and analyse Inkatha's 1975 constitution, its organization and the relationship between Inkatha and the KwaZulu administrative system. In section II I deal with Inkatha supporters at the township level and the reasons for a rapid increase in membership, as referred to by Lawrence Schlemmer, John Kane-Beerman, John Brewer and Roger Southall. Section III follows the development of the Inkatha movement, KwaZulu and the South African Black Alliance since 1970 and focuses on the Buthelezi Commission and the Natal/KwaZulu plan. Section IV compares Inkatha with the other political organizations (ANC, UDF, Black Consciousness Movement, National Party, PFP and labour union) and analyzes the percentage of support for each organization, depending on research by Mark Orkin.
    This article concludes that Inkatha is (1) a non-violent movement, (2) insisting on a negotiated settlement, (3) supporting a free enterprise economic system, and (4) working against economic sanctions Inkatha is mostly supported by Zulu people in KwaZulu and the movement's major weakness is its failure to get the support of non-Zulu people.
  • 現代アフリカの政治と国際関係
    堀江 浩一郎
    1988 年 1988 巻 88 号 p. 27-46,L7
    発行日: 1988/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    “What makes the UDF tick”. This is a primary question which the author poses in the article. To answer the question, the present article touches on various aspects of the United Democratic Front which constitutes a major component of anti-apantheid movement in South Africa: 1. A driving force behind the formation of the Front. 2. Philosophy of the movement and structure on which it is based, 3. A Brief history of the movement in phases.
    Firstly, three factors are identified which precipitated the formation of the UDF. 1) Reform initiative of P. W. Botha, 2) ANC's move in the underground to recruit cadres for subversion, 3) Emergence of the democratic organizations in the Community.
    Secondly, two factors are identified to give an account of the UDF resilience against the state action, 1) Popularity of the Front in the community. The Front inherits spirit of Defiance Campaign of the 1950's (struggle for the political rights and social welfare of Blacks) and is an outcome of that Campaign, the Freedom Charter (determined commitment for non-racial, democratic and undivided South Africa). 2) Structure of the Front. Front is represented primarily by community organizations of various nature (education, civic, church, constituency-based, etc). The Front's detained leaders have been replaced by younger and more militant activists. On the other hand, national leadership gave an inspiration and national direction to the mass struggle in the community.
    Thirdly, the record of the UDF movement since its inception is divided into four historical phases.
    1) The formation and national campaign (mid 1983-mid 1984). The Front strove to get across its message that an introduction of Tricameral system is yet another “divide and rule” strategy of the state against the oppressed masses.
    2) The Community campaign and uprising (late 1984-mid 1985). The Front affiliates in the community led mass actions such as various forms of boycotts and stayaways to protest against the state apartheid measures and police action in the community.
    3) Peoples' power: its emergence and set-back (late 1985-mid 1986). The Front affiliates inched towards cementing the democratic structure to fill a vacuum left by the collapsing Black local anthority. Its set-back became apparent, however, when the state military might moved in to overwhelm poor organizational infrastructure of peoples' power.
    4) Under the Emergency regulations: struggle for survival (late 1986-present time). The Front became increasingly and severely fragmented and contained against the state and vigilantes actions. The National leadership of the Front led the way to break the impasse. Its effort culminated in mobilizing campaigns, inter alia, against White community inside and outside South Africa.
    The article ends with a quotation from Mandela's speech, “No Easy walk to Freedom”.
  • 現代アフリカの政治と国際関係
    青木 一能
    1988 年 1988 巻 88 号 p. 47-68,L8
    発行日: 1988/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The situation in Namibia presents itself to the unitiated as one of confusion. The World Court and the United Nations have characterized South Africa's occupation as illegal, but until recently, South Africa has maintained an everincreasing military force and has also mounted attacks on neighboring Angola from Namibian bases. International negotiations and local meetings have been convened and broken off with bewildering frequency. The South West African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO), which is recognized by the U. N. as a representative of the people of Namibia, has been waging a political and military struggle for independence while participating in negotiations as part of this struggle. In the late 1970s, under pressure from the international community, both South Africa and SWAPO agreed to a Western-formulated plan to bring Namibia to independence, but South Africa's withdrawal of its agreement again plunged the situation into uncertainty.
    The achievement of independence has been complicated by very deep and fundamental differences among all those immediately concerned about Namibia: the Namibians themselves, and particularly SWAPO; South Africa, which through its military might and police-state tactics has occupied the Territory in defiance of international law; the United Nations, which is the legal administrator of the Territory but which has been unable to eject South Africa; the Angolan Government, which is the chief supporter for SWAPO; the Great Powers, and particularly the Contact Group, whose economic, strategic, and political interests extend to Southern Africa; and the OAU, and particularly the Front-line States.
    So, this paper aims to summarize the political development of the Namibian issue and clarify the interaction of actors concerned about Namibia. This paper consists of four chapters: firstly, an overall survey of the Namibian issue as prologue; secondly, the way in which Namibia became a matter of international concern from the mandate to the 1960s; thirdly, the political development after the fall of the Caetano government in Portugal; and fourthly, the situation in the 1980s and the interaction of actors concerned about Namibia.
  • 現代アフリカの政治と国際関係
    井上 一明
    1988 年 1988 巻 88 号 p. 69-85,L9
    発行日: 1988/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article describes and analyzes the nation-building and national integraton in Zimbabwe from 1981 to 1984. Generally speaking, nation-building and national integration are the most important and urgent ploblems in the third world. Especially in Africa, the government has to overcome tribalism, sectionalism, regionalism and so on, resulting from lack of national conciousness and national identity. Needless to say, the government of Zimbabwe is no exception to this rule.
    There was a lot of tasks which ZANU (PF) government had to face, in the process of nation-building and national integration. They had suppress the dissident activities. So the Security Forces were brought into this area and the people's militia was formed in every county. They were able to achieve their mission in some regions of Midlands and Mashonaland West Provinces, but failed to do so in Matabeleland. But it might be said that the people's militia helped to accelerate the patriotism among people.
    As for ZANU (PF), the most important task was the creation of the party organs. This was started on a full scale in 1981. They created village committees/cells, branches, districts and provinces as organizational unit, and executives were established at each levels. As a rule, this task was completed in some provinces where ZANU (PF) had won the majority of seats in the 1980 general election. But it was difficult for the party to organize the people and create the organs in Matabeleland because of dissident activities. It might be said that the party could not integrate Matabeleland into the process of nation-building and national integration. Some problems occurred in the process of restructuring the party. There were some problems between the party and local government organs. For example, executive district councillors agreed to unseat their chairman who was accused of putting party interests before those of council in some districts. The indiscipline of party leadership, or its corruption was another problem. One of provincial executives and his cooffenders were suspended. The Second National Congress was the most dramatic event for the party in this period. This congress was historic in more than one way. Because it was in this congress that the orientation of nation-building was decided, and many other important resolutions were adopted. For example, the so-called Zimbabwe Socialism policy was declared, which means adoption of socialism based on Marxist-Leninist principles but taking into account the special historical, cultural and social experiences of Zimbabwe. To bring about a one-party state was also decided. But we must note that according to the resolution, this should be realized in accordance with the law and the constitution, Another important point is that the political bureau was set up. The functions of bureau were to superintend, supervise and administer all Government ministries. Thus the party established the framework of its rule over the government.
  • 現代アフリカの政治と国際関係
    小島 さくら
    1988 年 1988 巻 88 号 p. 86-106,L10
    発行日: 1988/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The main purpose of this paper is twofold: first to trace the development of the African trade union movement in colonial Kenya, and second in the light of the important contribution of Asian immigrants (who originated in both India and Pakistan) to the development of African trade unionism, to point out the political role that the Asian immigrants played, albeit indirectly, in the African liberation movement. Although the economic function of Asians is well-known, my intention in this paper is to examine the political role of the Asians, focusing on the trade union movement. The trade union movement became political especially during the period between the Second World War and the first half of the 1950s, when multi-racial or Afro-Asian cooperation could be seen not only in the movement but also in the broader anti-colonial struggle.
    Right after the Second World War African labourers began to be organized into trade unions, and the African trade union movement became active on a large scale. Until that time, the movement was mainly confined to Asian labourers. The main cause for the delay in African trade unionism can be explained as follows; although labour stabilization is a prerequisite for organizing unions, in the pre-war period so called ‘target worker’ or migrant labour prevailed. Most of those involved were semi-peasant and semi-labourer at the same time; it was difficult to organize them. But even before the Second World War, a few Asian trade union leaders tried to organize the African labourers, and to create multi-racial trade unions based on class-consciousness. This occurred in the Labour Trade Union of Kenya (established in 1934), which was under the leadership of Mkhan Singh in the latter half of the 1930s. It has been argued that the biggest impact of the LTUK upon African labourers was its popularization of the right to strike. The LTUK organized a two-month strike in the Nairobi building industry to enforce a 25% wage increase demand in 1937. The lesson of the successful 1937 strike, it is said, induced various organized strikes by African labourers in Nairobi and along the coast between 1937 and 1939. The Asian trade unions leaders were said to have contributed greatly to the development of African trade unions.
    Historically in Kenya, as elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, it was the colonial power that forcefully created the embryonic African wage labour. In Kenya colonial land policies, that put most of the productive land in the hands of European settlers, resulted in pushing out many African peasants who were forced to look for wage employment. Before the Second World War, African wage labour was demanded mainly in the white settler estate sector or plantation sector, and migrant type labour was predominant. But the forces of industrial development after the War made possible the move toward labour stabilization. The growth of industry was beginning to create a demand for skilled workers rather than for large numbers of unskilled ones. Labour stabilization was much more in the interest of large, highly capitlized foreign firms than it was for the settler enterprises. It is generally accepted that only in the 1960s did a breakthrough take place in the migrant cycle of low-wages, low-skill, and lack of stabilization. But the tendency toward labour stabilization had already begun during and after the Second World War.
    After the Second World War the African trade union movement developed on a large scale. There was a growing contradiction between postwar economic prosperity and the African low wage structure fixed by a racially discriminatory wage system. African workers became conscious of their deprived position. The wage system was still based on the living cost of a single adult male, despite the fact that labour stabilization was advancing. This was a driving force to develop a trade union movement. African dissatisfaction with the low wage system culminated in the biggest general
  • 現代アフリカの政治と国際関係
    佐々木 俊郎
    1988 年 1988 巻 88 号 p. 107-123,L11
    発行日: 1988/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Modern Nigeria was the creation of British ambitions and rivalries in West Africa. Nigeria still is inhabited by a large number of ethnic groups, ranging in population from a few thousands to many millions, speaking several hundred languages. The variety of customs, languages and social organizations can be classified into a number of linguistic groups, which gives a fairly good indication of their wider cultural affiliations. Geographically, Nigeria can be divided into three main blocs: North, West and East, and this corresponds with the main religious beliefs, that is Islam in the North, various types of animism in the West and Christianity in the East.
    South Nigeria (the East and the West combined) is rich in agricultural and natural resources, while Northern Nigeria, in spite of its vastness, is limited by a dry climate and overall poverty of its soil. The British amalgamation of 1914 provided a means by which the impoverished Northern Protectorate could share with the South the enormous revenue the latter acquires from custom receipts.
    The British found the system of indirect rule rather cheap. Furthermore, ruling through local princes was convenient and less fraught with Muslim fanaticism.
    A great variety of types of administration in Nigeria continued throughout the duration of the Cliford Constitution in spite of a policy of unification for Nigeria. Sir Arthur Richards' Constitution tried to express in a constitutional form the reality of Nigerian politics of divide and rule. Nationalists of every hue and color objected to the Richards' Constitution because it was imposed from above, without any consultation whatever. Sir John Macpherson's Constitution called for winning the good-will of all the Nigerians at the grass-roots level. Ironically, however, this period was dominated by the factionalism of nationalism and regionalization.
    The N. C. N. C. ceased to enjoy countrywide support and the tribal political parties, NPC in the North and Action Group in the West, began to play a dominant role in constitution making. In spite of the good intentions of Macpherson, his Constitution soon proved unworkable because of the secessionist threats. The Kano riots were the climax of these frictions. When Chief Awolowo in 1953 openly threatened that the Western Region would secede unless Lagos was given back to the West, Oliver Littleton, then Secretary for the Colonies told Awolowo the British government would use force to bring any region that rebelled against the Nigerian government back into the union. Under the Littleton Constitution there was no open violence until after independence, but the latent force of disunity remained.
    The role of tribal nationalism is explicitly shown in Frederick Forsyth's “The Making of an African Legend: The Biafra Story”.
  • 現代アフリカの政治と国際関係
    望月 克哉
    1988 年 1988 巻 88 号 p. 124-139,L12
    発行日: 1988/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Nigeria obtained formal independence in 1960. Since then it has been the most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa. Because of its multi-ethnic character Nigeria ceaselessly faced the causes of confrontation and split among dominant ethnic groups.
    Early in this century, Nigeria's two Regions (the Northern Nigeria and the Southern Nigeria) were amalgamated under the British colonial rule. However decades of British “indirect rule” made its national integration even more difficult. The division of Nigeria into three Regions dates back to 1939. After that, established Constitutions tried the devolution of policy-making power into Regional hands and instituted a system of advisory councils that would make policy recommendations at local levels. But it seems that each one of these efforts didn't succeed. Rather, movements for seeking new Regions were acceralated.
    The situation of Nigeria has not changed after 1960. The Only difference was that the inter-Regional conflict has been replaced by party struggle. In 1963, the Federal government decided to adopt the Republican system and started to implement its policy programmes. None of these programmes, however, was helpful in stabilizing the domestic political scene. For example, the population census gave rise to dispute among regional parties over its validity. Thus the confusion caused by the “census dispute” threw Nigeria into the Civil War.
    In spite of such domestic political changes, Nigerian foreign policy seemed to have been consistent throughout the post-independence era. The backbone of its coherence may be the idea of African unity which is embodied in the Charter of the OAU. That idea is called “Pan-Africanism”. It includes such diplomatic principles as anti-colonialism, self-reliance, territorial integration and so on. The present study tries to clarify such principles and to describe emphatic points of each administration in terms of diplomatic orientation and to discuss briefly the foreign policis of different Nigerian administrations since independence. Another objective of this study is to analyze the impact of domestic affairs on Nigerian foreign policies and its reflection on Nigeria's foreign relations.
    For these purposes the present study tries the periodization of Nigerian foreign policy first. Then a few characteristic issues will be selected and verified briefly. And lastly some comments on theoretical problems will be suggested.
  • 現代アフリカの政治と国際関係
    金子 絵美
    1988 年 1988 巻 88 号 p. 140-157,L13
    発行日: 1988/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to examine the attitudes of African states towards the two Congo conflicts between 1960 and 1965 from the point of view of the search for “Pax Africana”. “Pax Africana” is the idea that the peace of Africa is to be assured by the efforts of Africans themselves, and has been a basic idea in attitudes to African security at the continental level among African states since the period of decolonization. The Congo conflicts gave the newly independent African states two chances to realize this idea.
    In the first Congo conflict (1960-1963), Africa made use of the framework of the United Nations and almost succeeded in realizing a “Pax Africana”, even though they divided into three groups; the Brazzaville group, the Casablanca group and the neutral group, and opposed one another at least from time of the Congo central government's collapse until its reconstruction. They, especially the Casablanca and the neutral group, were able to oppose foreign intervention by any state and take the initiative in the UN Congo policy by maintaining an African position. They were also able to oppose the secession of Katanga from the Congo. They were ineffective only in the matter of the Congo central government's collapse. They were not able to resolve the problem and could only wait for a solution by the UN.
    In this way the conflict was ended through the UN with results which were possibly satisfactory for Africa, and as regards security this experience never made African nations dependent on the UN either. It was the discontent with the UN's methods and the desire to control African security more directly by their own initiatives, that led to the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as the framework to realize “Pax Africana”.
    The second Congo conflict (1964-1965) was expected to be resolved within the framework of the OAU, but the OAU found itself unable to do so. It was totally incapable because the member states were divided again on how the OAU should cope with the conflict. It was not only unable to resolve the conflict peacefully, but it was also unable to exclude foreign powers from the conflict. Finally the OAU allowed the conflict to be resolved by force with the intervention of non-African states. This conflict showed the OAU's lack of ability to resolve such conflicts.
    The two conflicts examined in this paper showed different results, but rather than this difference we should pay attention to a common problem in the African states approach to the conflicts, that is, Africa's inability to resolve internal conflicts within the borders of any given state. The African states merely became divided on the problem in both cases and worsened it. This means that the African states had a vague desire for “Pax Africana”, but did not have any consensus as to the content. Only when the states have achieved this consensus can the dream of “Pax Africana” become a reality.
  • 現代アフリカの政治と国際関係
    奥野 保男
    1988 年 1988 巻 88 号 p. 158-171,L14
    発行日: 1988/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Non-Aligned Movement is a group based on the political ideas of Non-Alignment. The movement is not limited within the regional framework of Africa, but all African states except the white dominated Republic of South Africa are full members of this movement and they constitute more than half the total membership.
    That is to say, the main actors of Non-Aligned Movement are African States, and a number of its essential objectives are also African problems, such as apartheid, Namibia, external debt, desertification and drought, starvation and malnutrition, deforestation, refugees and displaced people. Thus, Africa is closely connected with the Non-Aligned Movement.
    From these viewpoints, this article is an attempt to describe international relations in Africa through the Non-Aligned Movement.
  • 現代アフリカの政治と国際関係
    川端 正久
    1988 年 1988 巻 88 号 p. 172-187,L15
    発行日: 1988/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Food aid is gererally the transfer from donor countries to recipient countries of food commodities on a grant basis or on highly concessional terms. Commodities shipped as food aid are divided into two main categories; cereals including wheat, rice and coarse grains, and non-cereals including dried skim milk, dairy products, vegetable oil and butter oil. Food aid represents a significant part of the total external assistance to developing countries, especially to African countries. FAO and WFP have been continuously monitoring food aid flows and development.
    Toward the end of 1983, as the drought-induced crisis in Africa intensified, secretary-General of the UN initiated a campaign to alert the international community of the iminent perils confronting the African continent, The various organizations of the UN system strengthened their emergency relief operations. The office of Emergency Operations in Africa (OEOA) was established to mobilize and co-ordinate international assistance to Africa in January 1985. The UN considered the critical social economic situation in Africa and coped with emergencies including food aid. Since 1986 food aid was overdelivered.
    Food aid has aroused criticism. Food aid is critized, firstly because it creates a budgetary dependence on food aid by generating local currency resources through open market sale, secondly it reduces incentives to agricultural producers. because of lower prices of aided food, thirdly it makes a custom of consumption of food which is rarely produced in Africa, fourthly it breaks traditional defence mechanism against drought and famine, fifthly it creates sometimes new gaps between the starving and the survivors, sixthly it is used strategically by the US administration.
    In conclusion, African countries must not depend on food aid, which often comes with many economic and political strings attached to it. African countries must now regard priority and self-reliance in food production and supply, that is, self-sufficiency in food as one of their central objectives.
  • 渡辺 正志
    1988 年 1988 巻 88 号 p. 188-192
    発行日: 1988/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 戸部 良一
    1988 年 1988 巻 88 号 p. 193-197
    発行日: 1988/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 小澤 治子
    1988 年 1988 巻 88 号 p. 197-202
    発行日: 1988/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 小田 英郎
    1988 年 1988 巻 88 号 p. 203
    発行日: 1988/05/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
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