Nuclear deterrence, the foundation of peace since the end of the Second World War, has now entered into a period of transition. As US-Soviet strategic nuclear forces reached “essential equivalence, ” the strategy of Assured Destruction began to be questioned. Doubts about the efficacy of this strategy produced the concept of a limited nuclear war strategy, as can be seen in the search for flexible options and the advocacy of “discriminate deterrence, ” and of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which emphasizes strategic defense. The US and the Soviet Union both continue their arms race, both in terms of quantity and quality. Yet, in December 1988, the two superpowers signed the treaty to abolish Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF). Furthermore, the US and the Soviet Union continue to negotiate to reduce their strategic forces by half. Both countries have place a brake on increasing their nuclear forces, and it is possible that they will be able to go a step further and reduce these arsenals. Arms control policy has also entered a period of transition.
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was seen as a rational strategy in the 1960s. However, since the early 1970s, those responsible for US security policy began to entertain doubts regarding MAD. Moreover, the increase in Soviet military activism in the Third World only increased American suspicion. In 1974, the US Secretary for Defense, James Schlesinger, began to revise the MAD strategy, and since then, both the Carter and Reagan Administrations have subscribed to a “countervailing strategy, ” and have undertaken the modernization of American strategic nuclear forces.
The Soviet Union, even after it achieved parity with the US, continued to increase its nuclear forces. However, based on General-Secretary Gorbachev's “reasonable sufficiency” concept, the Soviet are moving away from an “offense-oriented” strategy and toward a “defense-oriented” strategy. It would appear also that the Soviets are moving away from their strategy of fighting and winning a nuclear war.
If the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction can no longer be relied upon, what type of strategy will break the stalemate of nuclear deterrence? President Reagan has proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). However, many people have expressed their doubts about the technology, the cost, and the military strategy of SDI. Furthermore, confusion on Western strategy exists within the alliance. The Treaty to abolish INF has both surprised and confused the countries of NATO, which have relied on nuclear deterrence throughout the postwar period. Arguments exist in Europe for the modernization of nuclear forces as well as for the denuclearization of Europe, and the debate is very confused.
Arguments about the future of nuclear strategy can be divided into three views. First, there is the view that a strategy based on MAD will be unavoidable in this century, and therefore we should return to MAD. The second view argues that MAD, based upon the murder of masses of people, is immoral, and therefore we should pursue and promote the SDI. And, a third view sees deterrence based on nuclear weapons as dangerous, and advocates a departure from nuclear deterrence. It is unclear which direction the US and the Soviet Union will choose in addressing strategic issues.
What we need is deterrence against war. In the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that we will find an effective method of maintaining the peace other than nuclear deterrence. But, we need stable deterrence. The Western countries need to find a balance between an effective strategy and arms control. It is irresponsible to simply reduce nuclear forces without paying attention to strategic concerns. However, excessively increasing nuclear forces only provoke the other side, and it is destabilizing. What we need to do now is to construct a new conception of deterrence stability.

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The INF elimination Treaty signed by Reagan and Gorbachev on December 8, 1987 is a clear success in securing Soviet agreement to the NATO's arms control goals, such as the global zero of ‘deep cut’ and the intrusive verification measure of ‘on-site inspection, ’ which the SALT Treaties markedly failed to achieve in the 1970's. However, this Treaty has generated a good deal of confusion and unease in the West. The imbalance of conventional forces in Europe, which favors the Soviet Union, could become more dangerous if the West's nuclear deterrent is weakened. Radical nuclear arms reductions could be harmful to Western security.
This article aims to clarify the central thesis of whether arms control can be compatible with nuclear deterrence and Western security. It is a thesis that even the most thoughtful arms control theorists have so far failed to analyze in the postwar period.
First, any degree of denuclearization of Europe not tied to a redress of the Soviet conventional/chemical superiority will not make Europe safe for conventional/chemical warfare. At the same time, to implement the INF Treaty is to lose the only means of making a “Eurostrategic nuclear war (theater limited nuclear war in Europe), ” which could leave the USSR open to attack, but would give sanctuary to the USA, and which might dissuade most effectively the Soviet Union's decision of waging war upon NATO.
Second, the INF Treaty serves to decouple the U. S. strategic deterrent from Europe's defense, and creates phychologically an atmosphere among the American people to support the withdrawal of the American troops from Europe. Third, it would become the first step on the ‘slippery slope’ to the denuclearization of Europe, which will lead to neutralization of Europe. This is one of the ultimate goals pursued by the Soviets. Movement towards denuclearization also undermines the important principle of sharing the nuclear burden and risks within Alliance.
It is not unreasonable to conclude that the theoretical deficiency of arms control concepts, combined with related and false militico-strategic concepts, necessarily contradicts the end of national security and contributes to a worsening of the existing security situation. There are several reasons and causes.
The marked false strategic doctrine formulates a nuclear deterrence rationale to prevent an all-out or accidental nuclear war with the Soviet Union, divorcing from its original and right objectives to deter the Soviets from starting to invade with any type of weapons. Another deficiency is derived from the official U. S. persistence in believing in the erroneous theory of ‘nuclear equilibrium at a lower level, ’ which decreases proportionally the gross amount of destruction by the projected nuclear weapons and therefore the credibility of nuclear deterrence. The U. S. has not awakened to the danger caused by a radical cut of their own ‘nuclear deterrent’ in pursuit of a weakening of the Soviet ‘nuclear counter-deterrent’.
Especially, the U. S. does not recognize the geographical advantage of the central location in the Eurasian Continent which offers the Soviet state absolute safety and permits a multiplicity of applied pressures around the periphery. That is to say, the only retaliatory way to resist the unchangeable desire of the heartland power for the achievement of hegemony is to sustain a robust and superior nuclear capability, because only nuclear weapons can definitely give decisively destructive damages to the central or valuable part of the Soviet mainland.

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This essay reviews the renewed strategic debate, with a particular focusing on the issue of deterrence failure. If nuclear deterrence should fail, how will it fail and why? In other words, what are the obstacles to a successful deterrence strategy? It is theoretically impossible to prove or falsify the success of deterrence strategy as long as no aggressive action is taken by an adversary. Only when an aggressive action is taken do we know that the strategy is not working.
Based on the various case studies conducted by Alexander L. George, John D. Steinbruner, Robert Jervis, and Richard Ned Lebow, part one of this paper discusses why and how deterrence failed in the past. The historical cases include the 1914 European crisis, the US-Japanese crisis prior to Pearl Harbor in 1941, and the Middle East conflict in 1973. Special attention is paid to the perceptual and psychological factors in the challenger's decision-making process. The evidence suggests that a deterrence strategy may be ineffective, risky, or, at worst, counter-productive under certain conditions. To avoid the tragedy of deterrence failure in the nuclear era, it is essential to maintain crisis stability so that no party has an incentive to launch a pre-emptive attack. Furthermore, it is argued that a strategy of deterrence must be supplemented by crisis prevention measures.
The second part of this paper examines why some strategists believe that strategic stability is undermined. We trace the arguments of Fred Charles Iklé, Colin Gray, and others with critical eyes. We also compare the key logic of the strategies with concept of Mutual Assured Destruction and of Limited Nuclear Options.
The last part of this essay examines which strategic concepts are valid for stable deterrence, and which concepts are invalid. Finally, we discuss the possibility of reassuring an adversary through the creation of “security regimes, ” as suggested by as Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Alexander L. George.

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U. S. nuclear strategy has evolved considerably in the last four decades. This progress has occurred mainly in targeting doctrine. The number of targets in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) has grown with the expansion of U. S. nuclear stockpiles, and U. S. attack options have increased accordingly. Efforts have been directed toward increasing the number of limited nuclear responses, to achieving the required operational flexibility. The objective has been to maintain deterrence and explore the possibility of controlling escalation should deterrence fail. These developments are a natural progression of military strategy and technology, and should be evaluated as such.
However, these improvements in targeting doctrine are limited. An inherent deficiency is the lack of defense against nuclear attack. One can only guess whether the U. S. deterrent posture is sufficient to counter the Soviet nuclear threat. In an actual nuclear confrontation between the two superpowers, it is by no means certain that nuclear war will begin with a limited attack. Even if that were the case, it would be difficult to control escalation, given the damage to strategic command and control networks. Therefore, one must not exaggerate what has been achieved in U. S. nuclear strategy. Nuclear relations between the superpowers are as dangerous as ever.
There was a wide gap in the 1960s between employment policy and declaratory policy. In recent years this gap has narrowed. Moreover, the terms of reference have shifted from ‘deterrence only’ to ‘war-fighting’. This evolution has caused some concern in the West as to the direction of U. S. nuclear strategy. In reality, the change is more in presentation than in substance. It is true that the Reagan administration's reference to ‘war-fighting capability for a protracted nuclear war’ has an ominous connotation. But this resulted from the conceptual change in deterrence logic against the Soviet Union. Deterrence remains the cornerstone of U. S. nuclear strategy.
The Western strategic community is divided over the U. S. nuclear dilemma. The ‘deterrence school’ tends to downplay the military role of nuclear weapons and argues for deep cuts through arms control negotiations. The ‘war-fighting school’ attacks ‘deterrence school’ thinking as irrelevant in view of Soviet strategic thinking and stresses the need for strategic defense.
At present it is unrealistic and unwise to attempt to eliminate all strategic nuclear weapons. It is also too early to assume the feasibility of ballistic missile defense. There is no panacea for the present U. S. nuclear dilemma. For the forsee-able future, U. S. nuclear strategy will continue along on the same path as it has in the last decade: refining targeting doctrine while analyzing how the Soviets calculate risk and respond. Presently there is no alternative.

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Opinions vary as to whether the Soviet Union has accepted the concept of deterrence in formulating its national security policy. In the author's opinion, the Soviet Union may have in the past rejected deterrence theory as developed in the United States, but it has not only accepted the classical meaning of deterrence as defined by George and Smoke, but also such a concept has until recently become the foundation of its military policy. This article attempts to trace the evolution of Soviet deterrence policy since World War II.
During the post-war Stalin period (1945-1953), Soviet deterrence policy was determined by two factors: belief in the inevitability of war and strategic inferiority. Stalin believed that the United States would start a war against the Soviet Union by launching a surprise nuclear attack, and that such a war could be prevented only by raising the cost that the US would have to pay in such an eventuality. Stalin thus took three specific measures to deter such war: he developed Soviet nuclear weapons, took an offensive strategy against Western Europe with the superior Soviet conventional forces, and strengthened strategic defense.
The second period was a transitional period, in which Stalin's military doctrine was attacked from two directions. First, the theory of the inevitability of war was rejected by the political leadership. The rejection of this Marxist cannon was first proposed by Malenkov, but later taken up by Khrushchev. The long process of decimation of the Marxist approach to war had thus begun. Nevertheless, Khrushchev attempted to salvage Marxist orthodoxy by insisting on the Soviet quest for military superiority as the guarantee of peace and on belief in victory in nuclear war. Secondly, Stalinist military doctrine was attacked by military theorists who began to assess positively the role of a surprise attack with the use of nuclear weapons at the beginning of war.
The crack created in Stalinist military doctrine in the transitional period led to the nuclear revolution in the third period (1959 to 1966/67). Nuclear weapons were recognized as the most decisive weapons in modern warfare, while the Strategic Rocket Force was created. During this period, however, Soviet deterrence policy moved in the opposite direction of that of the US, in a direction that emphasized deterrence through damage limitation by adopting a first-strike counterforce strategy.
The Soviet recognition of the possibility of limited war around 1966/67 had a profound impact on the evolution of Soviet strategy. For the first time there emerged a possibility of sparing the Soviet homeland from a US attack even in case of a world war. This led to the idea of keeping its strategic weapons as strategic reserves to be used as second-strike retaliatory weapons. Also, this contributed to lowering the importance of strategic defence, leading to the Soviet acceptance of ABM ban. These factors set the stage for arms control with the US. At the same time, however, Soviet NATO strategy began to move in a more offensive direction. This time, Soviet strategy envisaged destruction of NATO theater nuclear weapons by conventional means, while leaving its own theater nuclear weapons as reserves in case NATO decided to go nuclear.
In the last half of the 1970s, the Soviet leadership moved to accept mutual deterrence by removing the two pillars of Khrushchev's military doctrine: the quest for military superiority and the belief in victory in nuclear war. Yet, the notion that the correlation of forces was inexorably moving in favor of the Soviet Union led the Soviet Union to overemphasize the military factor in its foreign policy and to pursue an activist policy in the Third World, whereby contributing to the perception of a Soviet threat among its adversaries.
Brezhnev's policy invited a backlash from the West. Particularly, the US decision to deploy INF in Europe and to launch SDI threatened what the Soviets had gained in the pr

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U. S. extended nuclear deterrence is understood to mean that the U. S. is committed to use nuclear weapons, and escalate to the strategic level if necessary, in the event of a major Soviet conventional and/or nuclear attack on its allies in Western Europe and the Far East. Extended nuclear deterrence continues to pose some of the most vexing problems of modern strategic policy. America's policy of extending nuclear deterrence to its allies can often conflict with the requirements of strategic stability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. U. S. extended deterrent objectives might make the U. S. more prone to develop destabilizing counterforce damage-limiting capabilities for its central strategic nuclear forces in order to enhance the credibility of its overseas commitments. This policy would run counter to the concept of stability of U. S. -Soviet mutual deterrence.
U. S. extended nuclear deterrence for Western Europe has one dominant aspect: the U. S. reserves the right to employ its NATO-based nuclear weapons early and first, and escalate to the strategic level if necessary, in the event of a major Soviet conventional attack on its West European allies. This posture has long been deemed essential since NATO's conventional strength has rarely seemed adequate to deter a full-scale Soviet conventional attack or to defend Western Europe effectively once war began. Because of this, in Europe, the conventional, U. S. non-strategic nuclear, and U. S. strategic nuclear coupling is a prominent component of NATO strategy and is regarded as cardinal to the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence.
In sharp contrast to Western Europe, the function of conventional and nuclear coupling is not as relevant to the viability of the extension of the U. S. nuclear umbrella to Japan. This is because the status of conventional forces in Northeast Asia, naval and air forces confronting the U. S. S. R. in particular, has not been so adverse for the U. S. and Japan. Accordingly, the U. S. does not need to rely heavily on nuclear weapons to defend Japan. For this reason, U. S. extended nuclear deterrence to Japan has been, in essence, a U. S. retaliatory nuclear deterrent against a Soviet nuclear first use against Japan. Deterrence rests with the fear that the U. S. would use its nuclear weapons to respond to a Soviet nuclear threat or attack on Japan, which would risk escalation to a strategic nuclear exchange.
A two-track policy is necessary for the maintenance of credible U. S. extended nuclear deterrence. One track is to implement measures to prevent an outbreak of nuclear war between the U. S. and the Soviet Union. The other track is to strengthen the ties between the U. S. and its allies in order to prevent the Soviets from misunderstanding the American nuclear commitment.
For the first track, there are two broad policy dimensions: 1) the pursuit of a balanced policy between the maintenance of a credible U. S. nuclear deterrent power and stable U. S. -Soviet mutual deterrence, and 2) the maintenance of the regional conventional military balance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. An important policy orientation for the first policy dimension should be a balanced deterrence, not simply deterrence by existential nuclear threat or by increased prompt counterforce. threats. The latter should complement the former, up to the point short of destabilizing the U. S. -Soviet mutual deterrence. For the second dimension, we must first recognize that if the Soviet Union employs its conventional forces against major U. S. allies under the condition of U. S. -Soviet mutual vulnerability, it is likely to be only when a quick conventional victory or fait accompli seems possible. Thus, it is crucial for U. S. allies, with the assistance of the United States, to maintain at least not too unfavorable immediate and short-term regional conventional military balance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union that would prevent the Soviets from perceiving

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The nuclear umbrella of the United States has provided to Japan 1) deterrence against nuclear attack and 2) deterrence against non-nuclear attack by the Soviet Union since 1945. The question now arises whether the umbrella is still as effective against non-nuclear attack as in the past, mainly because the Soviets have achieved parity with the U. S. in strategic nuclear forces.
The system of nuclear umbrella includes 1) the U. S. nuclear forces, 2) conventional forces of the allies (protege of the U. S. nuclear umbrella) and 3) the reliable interdependance between the U. S. and the allies.
The nuclear umbrella of the U. S. has been extended to Western Europe and the Far East, including Japan, South Korea and the Philippines since the U. S. forces have been stationed in these three countries.
Observing the post-INF era after 1991, the situation of Far East is basically different from that of Western Europe as far as the credibility of nuclear umbrella is concerned. That is mainly because there has been no INF deployed on the ground of the Far East countries. We have no urgent task in the Far East countries like in NATO which now faces in compensating the abolishing INF system with modernization of battle ground nuclear weapons.
What we face in the Far East countries are 1) to cope with the constant build-up of the Soviet forces in Asia-Pacific Ocean area in both theatre nuclear forces and conventional forces and 2) to cope with the Soviet proposal to inspect all SLCMs (not only nuclear SLCMs but also conventional SLCMs) in the current U. S. -Soviet disarmament negotiation, which affects the U. S. nuclear policy (“Not Affirm, Not Deny” of the nuclear presence) and the non-nuclear policy of Japan and other Asian countries—a problem of the reliable interdependance.
To discuss the U. S. nuclear umbrella and Japan's role to keep deterrence effective in the future, we can use two scenarios.
One is a near-future scenario, in which we see an appropriate mix of nuclear forces and non-nuclear forces like in NATO to keep nuclear umbrella effective as a deterrence. What is neccessary in this scenario are:
a. Keeping the U. S. nuclear umbrella effective—mainly to deter the Soviet nuclear attack,
b. Ensuring and strengthening of the Japan's conventional forces—mainly to deter the Soviet conventional attack,
c. Strengthening Japan's defense sharing-1, 000 miles sea lane defense and air defense on the ocean,
d. Keeping the U. S. forces stationed in Japan safely,
e. Increasing Japan's ODA to the strategic countries, and
f. Reviewing Japan's Three Non-nuclear principles where neccessary—to accept the U. S. ships and aircrafts with nuclear weapons entering Japanese water and airport and to allow prior consultation on the deployment of the U. S. nuclear weapons in case of neccessity with the U. S.
The other scenario is for the 21st Century, in which we see more emphasis on high technology conventional weapons than nuclear weapons as a deterrence. In the 21st Century, we will see the still constant “relative decline” of the U. S. power and the still remarkable uprise of Japan's economic power. What is neccessary in this scenario are:
a. Still keeping the U. S. nuclear umbrella effective, but the role is relatively dimishing,
b. Enlarging dramatically Japan's role as mentioned above in b., c. d. and e.,
c. Seeing the motives of Japan's three non-nuclear principles diminishing as the role of nuclear weapons is diminishing, but we must allow consultation on such subject as the introduction of the long-range conventional high technology weapons on Japanese territory, where neccessary, and
d. Growing neccessity of development and deployment of the conventional high technology weapons as a deterrence.

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This paper focuses on the interaction between US-Soviet bilateral negotiations on nuclear testing and multilateral consultation of the Conference on Disarmament on the comprehensive test ban from 1986 to 1988. It aims at clarifying the possibilities and limitations of the multilateral disarmament forum.
A comprehensive test ban is one of the central issues of arms control and disarmament, and has been under discussion since the 1950's. A comprehensive test ban is said to be an effective measure to prevent vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. As nuclear testing is inseparable from the global strategy of every country possessing nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test ban is a highly controversial issue as well. Although a comprehensive test ban has a “general or indirect” effect on the arms race, many non-nuclear states have made it their goal.
The Conference on Disarmament, a “single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, ” and its predecessors have examined a comprehensive test ban. In the 1982 and 1983 sessions, they established an Ad Hoc Committee, a subsidiary body, but substantial negotiations for a draft treaty have not yet begun, although negotiations on the convention for a chemical weapons ban is already in progress. The Conference on Disarmament is the best organ to negotiate the treaty of a comprehensive test ban because its expertise on verification. The Conference on Disarmament has studied the technical problems of verification, especially by establishing the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events since in 1976. Also, the conference is best able to address the multi-lateral aspects of compliance with a test ban.
The existing treaties on nuclear testing, such as the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the US-USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, were drafted through trilateral or bilateral negotiations. From 1977 to 1980, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union negotiated a comprehensive test ban, but they failed to come to an agreement mainly because of discord on verification.
Since November 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union have opened “full-scale, stage-by-stage” negotiations on nuclear testing. In the first step of these negotiations, the two sides are pursuing effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the TTBT and the PNET. The object of the second step is “intermediate limitations on nuclear testing, ” which would lead to “the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing.” In August and September 1988, the two sides conducted Joint Verification Experiments at each other's test sites in order to develop effective verification measures.
The nuclear testing issue has been “the litmus test” for the two superpowers' “seriousness” about arms control and disarmament, and a comprehensive test ban has also been regarded as “the price that will have to be paid to assure continued adherence to the NPT.” As the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to pursue the long-range goal of a comprehensive test ban, this approach is expected to activate the multilateral forum, the Conference on Disarmament.

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The United States Constitution stipulates the division of authority among the three branches of government, but there remain some grey areas concerning foreign policy issues, including nuclear strategy. This article focuses on the recent dispute over ABM Treaty reinterpretation, which prompted both legislative and executive branches to consider what the proper role of Congress should be in the formulation of nuclear strategy.
The origin of the reinterpretation issue was the Reagan administration's policy on SDI rather than in the content of the treaty itself, which had been singularly interpretated for 13 years. The ABM Treaty prohibits testing, development and deployment of a sea-, air-based or mobile land-based ABM system. It also provides for further consultation by the both parties on future systems. The Reagan administration pledged to observe these restrictions as it launched the SDI program, but due to later political developments, SDI proponents, especially those in the Department of Defense, tried to push the program beyond these restrictions. The easiest way of doing so was to give a new interpretation to the treaty to loosen the restrictions, rather than amending or abrogating the treaty itself.
Congress, so far permissive. of the SDI program, was provoked by this move of the administration. The congressional reaction was made both on the constitutional and on policy ground—the former concerned with the Senate's authority to advise and consent to treaties, while the latter concerned the preference over accelerating SDI program. In the Senate, the debate was quite heated and Senator Sam Nunn led the criticism against Judge Abraham Sofar's justifications based on his own studies. He and Senator Carl Levin also introduced an amendment which used the congressional power of the purse to induce the administration's compromise, by holding the SDI budget as the hostage. The House was less concerned about the constitutional issue, but put a similar condition on the SDI budget. The dispute ended with congressional reassertion of its constitutional authority as well as of its evaluation of the principles of the ABM Treaty.
Moreover, through the debate over ABM Treaty reinterpretation, one notable view was brought forward with regard to the congressional role in foreign policy making, including nuclear strategy: Congress is given the authority to advise and consent to treaties and the authority over the budget. It should go further to positively inter-relate these two roles with a broader perspective. In that way, both the executive and legislative branches can create policies which better serve American interest.

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The year 1983 was called a “decisive year” by the Western European mass media. This was because, in that year, public opinion in Europe was split over the acceptance of U. S. Intermediate Nuclear Force missiles.
Antinuclear rallies that drew more than 100, 000 demonstrators in various parts of Europe created a phenomenon aptly named the “hot autumn”.
After five years, the peace movement in Europe has become tranquil. There are voices that oppose the decision of the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate all of their INF missiles.
What has brought about such a major change? Has Europe itself changed? This paper aims to explore the answers to these questions. It will discuss the controversies over nuclear weapons that occurred at the time in Great Britain, and the results of public opinion surveys that were conducted then in that country.
The paper focuses on the unilateral discussion to abolish nuclear forces, which constituted a major force in the debate of the “decisive year”. I have chosen to do so because I believe that therein lies the key to the understanding of Europe's nuclear umbrella mentality, and to some of the misinterpretations and errors that occurred at that time in evaluating the events of 1983.
The paper will not focus on the nuclear arguments of the left and the right wings, as they are obvious, but instead it will delve into how these arguments of the supporting bodies of the peace movement unfolded inside each organization, and how they were eventually appeased under their individual power structures.
These organizations are: 1) the CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament); 2) the Labour Party; and 3) the Anglican Church.
The paper is not merely a reevaluation of the incidents of the past 1983, as I believe they continue to affect the current minds of the British citizenry.
I will suggest that the controversies that developed within the CND and the Anglican Church will continue to demand attention.
The 1982 schism in the CND was considered to be owing to the activities of the Trotskyists. If so, have those militants disappeared suddenly after the “hot autumn”?
Were not these people—who are not professional Labourites, much less professional Tories, and who could perhaps best be called the non-politiques—the main creators of the “Geldof Phenomenon”, having sympathized with and supported the Band Aid and the Sports Aid of Bob Geldof, who stood up for the relief of the African refugees after the INF missiles were deployed in Europe?

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