The nuclear umbrella of the United States has provided to Japan 1) deterrence against nuclear attack and 2) deterrence against non-nuclear attack by the Soviet Union since 1945. The question now arises whether the umbrella is still as effective against non-nuclear attack as in the past, mainly because the Soviets have achieved parity with the U. S. in strategic nuclear forces.
The system of nuclear umbrella includes 1) the U. S. nuclear forces, 2) conventional forces of the allies (protege of the U. S. nuclear umbrella) and 3) the reliable interdependance between the U. S. and the allies.
The nuclear umbrella of the U. S. has been extended to Western Europe and the Far East, including Japan, South Korea and the Philippines since the U. S. forces have been stationed in these three countries.
Observing the post-INF era after 1991, the situation of Far East is basically different from that of Western Europe as far as the credibility of nuclear umbrella is concerned. That is mainly because there has been no INF deployed on the ground of the Far East countries. We have no urgent task in the Far East countries like in NATO which now faces in compensating the abolishing INF system with modernization of battle ground nuclear weapons.
What we face in the Far East countries are 1) to cope with the constant build-up of the Soviet forces in Asia-Pacific Ocean area in both theatre nuclear forces and conventional forces and 2) to cope with the Soviet proposal to inspect all SLCMs (not only nuclear SLCMs but also conventional SLCMs) in the current U. S. -Soviet disarmament negotiation, which affects the U. S. nuclear policy (“Not Affirm, Not Deny” of the nuclear presence) and the non-nuclear policy of Japan and other Asian countries—a problem of the reliable interdependance.
To discuss the U. S. nuclear umbrella and Japan's role to keep deterrence effective in the future, we can use two scenarios.
One is a near-future scenario, in which we see an appropriate mix of nuclear forces and non-nuclear forces like in NATO to keep nuclear umbrella effective as a deterrence. What is neccessary in this scenario are:
a. Keeping the U. S. nuclear umbrella effective—mainly to deter the Soviet nuclear attack,
b. Ensuring and strengthening of the Japan's conventional forces—mainly to deter the Soviet conventional attack,
c. Strengthening Japan's defense sharing-1, 000 miles sea lane defense and air defense on the ocean,
d. Keeping the U. S. forces stationed in Japan safely,
e. Increasing Japan's ODA to the strategic countries, and
f. Reviewing Japan's Three Non-nuclear principles where neccessary—to accept the U. S. ships and aircrafts with nuclear weapons entering Japanese water and airport and to allow prior consultation on the deployment of the U. S. nuclear weapons in case of neccessity with the U. S.
The other scenario is for the 21st Century, in which we see more emphasis on high technology conventional weapons than nuclear weapons as a deterrence. In the 21st Century, we will see the still constant “relative decline” of the U. S. power and the still remarkable uprise of Japan's economic power. What is neccessary in this scenario are:
a. Still keeping the U. S. nuclear umbrella effective, but the role is relatively dimishing,
b. Enlarging dramatically Japan's role as mentioned above in b., c. d. and e.,
c. Seeing the motives of Japan's three non-nuclear principles diminishing as the role of nuclear weapons is diminishing, but we must allow consultation on such subject as the introduction of the long-range conventional high technology weapons on Japanese territory, where neccessary, and
d. Growing neccessity of development and deployment of the conventional high technology weapons as a deterrence.
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