The ratification of the December 1965 Japan-South Korea Treaty established formal diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Seoul. In terms of diplomatic negotiation process, on the one hand, it did nothing more than confirm the relationship between Japan and the Korean Peninsula which was already in existence following the Korean War; on the orther hand, it also announced the birth of a new international system among three countries, Japan-US-South Korea. The conclusion of the Japan-South Korea treaty itself, was Japan's first diplomatic initiative since the end of war and the first act of Japan-US burden-sharing. However, it didn't deny the existence of another government in the Korean Peninsula i. e. North Korea nor did it put constraints on future relations with it. The Japanese leaders clearly limited the treaty's scope of application to the southern half of the Peninsula; subsequent relations with North Korea would be entrusted to the international situation in the future.
From that point of view, the 1972 U. S. detente with the Soviet Union and China, and the opening of the North-South Dialogue, brought a new perspective to Japan's relations with the Korean Peninsula. In fact, after Kissinger's July, 1971 China visit, in response to North Korea's invitation, Japanese-North Korean exchanges in the fields of sports, culture, and economy, rapidly developed. Furthermore, not only journalists, but also ruling and opposition Diet members began to visit to Pyongyang and hold discussions with Kim Il Sung. The Japanese government also clarified its policy on enlarging exchanges in nonpolitical fields. However, the North Korean side demanded establishing official diplomatic relations with Japan, which in essence, signified breaking relations with South Korea. In other words, North Korea would accept “coexistence with Japan” but would not permit “coexistence with South Korea.” With North Korea's announcement of suspending the North-South Dialogue, Japanese-North Korean relations took a turn to the worst.
However, with the start of the Roh Tae Woo administration, when South Korea announced abandoning its policy of isolation with North Korea, in July of 1988, an atmosphere of improved relations prevailed once again. Interestingly enough, this time, it was the Japanese side that demanded contact between the two governments. Also, both countries did not, nor do they, seek the establishment of diplomatic relations in the near future. The North Korea side fears setting the spark to the issue of cross-recongnition if it were to establish diplomatic relations with Japan. Nor does the Japanese side believe cross-recongnition is possible. In other words, Tokyo-Pyongyang relations cannot go beyond the level of Moscow-Seoul relations. It is possible however, that after “squaring up” issues from the “unfortunate past, ” “limited coexistence” short of diplomatic recongnition, would comprise no more than cooperative economic relations. The resilience of this relationship i. e. Japan and North Korea, will be tested by whether or not it will be able to withstand the Tokyo-Seoul-Pyongyang “game of diplomacy” with all its complexity.

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1990 will be the 45th anniversary of the North-South division of the Korean Peninsula. Since that division, the international environment surrounding this Peninsula and the relations between the United States and the two Koreas underwent a number of big changes. However, Americans always put the greatest emphasis on the “maintenance of security and stability in the Peninsula” in its policies towards the Peninsula. Washington devoted tremendous effort to preventing not only the recurrence of a war but also any North-South conflicts that might escalate into a war. On this premise, the United States constantly showed much interest in the political growth and economic development of the Republic of Korea (ROK). Although an attitude that can be regarded as “domestic interference” sometimes became conspicuous, Washington tried to get the chances to promote the “democratization” of ROK. The United States also contributed to the economic growth of ROK, as the largest donor of economic aid initially and as the greatest trading partner in recent years. It indirectly encouraged relational improvement between the North and South to pave the way for détente on the Korean Peninsula and, mainly from this point of view, paid a certain degree of attention to the improvement of its own relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).
The new Bush Administration started in the United States in 1989, but it should be taken for granted that no major changes will occur in the above basic policies towards Korea.
American concern about the internal politics of ROK is of course likely to continue, however, they will see more difficulties to exert strong influence on the South Korean government. The extent to which Washington's pressures will have an effect on ROK will be sharply declining in the years to come. The role that the United States played in the ROK's political change in June, 1987 was not so slight as one can neglect, yet its practical effect was still limited considerably. The “political maturity” of South Korea backed by economic growth has changed the “weak constitution” that was very sensitive to the influence of the United States. Washington appears to be welcoming this political development brought about by the remarkable economic growth of South Korea, however, it will continue to express its serious concerns about the democratization and human rights protection in ROK.
Since an atmosphere in which ROK is regarded as a “second Japan” is increasing in the economic sphere, Americans are expected to give hard pressures to South Korea continuously in asking for the opening of local markets or the correction of disequilibrium. It is almost certain that the United States will also urge South Korea to share more security burdens, based on an “appropriate evaluation” of the South's national power. At the entry of the 1990s, Washington will probably set forth an idea that only the ROK forces are sufficient for deterrence against North Korea and accordingly the withdrawal of US ground forces in South Korea would come to the fore again as a concrete political theme. At the same time an argument that ROK should play a more positive role in the security of Northeast Asia as “a member of the West” would strengthen on the part of the United States.
These economic and security demands on South Korea not only premise the stability and economic growth of the South but also necessitate the presevation of security and stability of the Korean Peninsula. From this viewpoint, too, the United States finds a significant interest in that the détente on the Korean Peninsula can be promoted by a progress of North-South relations. Therefore, Washington wishes more strongly than ever that ROK is going to take a “generous attitude” towards DPRK. On the other hand, it is unavoidable that Washington will basically

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Moscow's foreign policy has been undergoing a substantial change since Gorbachev's coming to power, with their policy toward the Korean Peninsula being no exception. In a sense its policy in this region can serve as a kind of touchstone to check the true character of the “New Thinking” diplomacy under Gorbachev.
There are two significant changes in the USSR's foreign policy strategy which exert an important influence on its policy line toward the Korean Peninsula. Firstly; Moscow's policy towards its Socialist allies, namely that of “do whatever you like if it serves the cause of Socialism.” Secondly; the Kremlin's policy in the Third World; one based upon the sober assumption that the future of Socialism looks extremely dark in this area. “Honesty coupled with modesty” and “realism not idealism” make up the main elements of the USSR's diplomacy.
Since 1984 Soviet-North Korean relations have seemed strengthened, especially in the security and defense fields. But, it now turns out that this apparent upgrading of the relationship is limited to military cooperation. The overall trend in the relationship still remains almost unchanged.
On the contrary, Moscow's rapprochement with South Korea is of greater importance. New developments instigated in 1988 in the relations between South Korea and the USSR and other Socialist countries are genuinely important. Now the USSR recognizes that there are complementary ties with NIEs.
Recent circumstantial evidence shows that the Kremlin's traditional negative stance on the “cross recognition” of the two Koreas is not categorical. This now depends upon factors such as the further warming-up of East-West relations and Sino-Soviet relations, the gap in economic power between North Korea and the South.

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This essay reviews the Chinese foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula in the 80s from the view point of a Chinese scholar.
The situation around the Korean Peninsula now is at an important and historical turning point. After 80s, the relationship between North and South Korea is to improve to some extent. In the dialogues newly started in the 80s, the North and South leaders have tried to take their advantage over the opponent, and have changed their policies toward each other. These policy changes are appreciated as the efforts to relieve the tension in the Korean Peninsula. These changes were caused by two factors. The one is international situations, which are detente between the U. S. and Soviet, the normalization of Sino-Soviet relation, the good relations maintained between the U. S. -China and Japan-China, and the probability of improvement of the Japan-Soviet relation, etc. These are international factors. The other is internal affairs, which are the equality of South and North Korean gross national powers, economic developments both in the North and South, and internal problems still to be solved in both, etc. These are internal factors that would promote an improvement of the political situation around the Korean Peninsula. These changes will likely affect the situation around the Korean Peninsula.
The situation around the Korean Peninsula has a dual character. On the one hand, peace and stability are being maintained in the Peninsula, and on the other, there are many factors to instabilize the situation. At the same time, it is a present trend that the Korean problems have become those of Koreanization, whereas adjacent big countries still keep strong influences upon the Korean problem. This dual character will eventually affect the future situations around the Korean Peninsula.
The basic stance of China's foreign policy toward the Korean Peninsula is to maintain the peaceful and stable situation of this area, and this will be the benefits to the North and South Korea and to China as well. China is one of the powerful agents to promote to improve the situation and to maintain peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula. And China will surely pay her efforts for the purpose to the extent of not interfaring the Korean internal affairs.

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The catalyst for improvement in recent North Korea (NK)-Soviet relations was the Soviet's acknowledgement of the Kim Jong Il successor regime, and its de facto recognition of NK's independence after Brezhnev's death. NK's assessment of “perestroika” has strong diplomatic implications, which reflects the closer relationship between the two countries. Perestroika is highly appraised on parts in accord with “juche (self-reliance)” ideology and course stressed by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. However, the NK leaders have clearly shown that, they will independently choose the reforms to be introduced. In this aspect, NK's reforms may be called selective reforms or openness based on “self-reliance.”
Namely, political structural reform or, “glasnost, ” a major part of “perestroika” is not in consistence with their own base for legitimacy. Therefore, it is necessary for them to prevent the influences of those reforms from penetrating the domestic arena. From the lessons of the past, the leaders feel a need to prevent the development of a domestic political power based on Soviet theories which would challenge the Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il regime. It becomes more imperative, especially, at the present moment when the effectiveness of the Kim Jong Il successor regime is being tested.
Therefore, as a preventive against the impact of “perestroika” a new ideology called “social-political organism” theory has been created as a legitimation for the successive regime. In this theory, it is said that the supreme leader, the party, and the poeple comprise one social organic body, and the supreme leader guarantees eternal “social-political organism” to its members. A socialist society have been redefined not only as collective possession of manufacturing means, but also as a society in which a “social-political organism” is created. Furthermore, this is a strong expression of NK nationalism, with the purpose of the recovering the superiority of socialism vis-a-vis capitalism.
Accordingly, in ideological terms, it could be said that the Soviet “perestroika”, political structural reform in particular, is being criticized as revisionism. However, it must be stressed that this ideology, at the present, is only domestically-oriented, and does not comprise a direct criticism toward the Soviet Union. As long as autonomy is respected between NK and the Soviet Union, a sense of incompatibility in each other's course or regime would not develop into open criticism as in the past. But the very fact that these mutual differences exist, sets the limits on NK-Soviet relations.

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Germination of South Korea's ‘Nordpolitik’ was first evidenced by Park's declaration on June 23rd 1973 of ‘Special Statement on the Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification.’ The main political background of the declaration could be attributed to the friction in the U. S. -R. O. K. relationship symbolized by Nixon's gradual reduction plan of U. S. forces in South Korea.
South Korea's positive posture towards the North-South dialogue and its appeasement to the communist nations emerged as a result of South Korea's insecurity. In this process, the South Korean government enlarged the concept of the ‘non-hostile communist nations’ to include the P. R. C. and U. S. S. R., which was accompanied by growing tolerance of North Korea's participation in the debate of the Korean question and its affiliation in the United Nations.
As a consequence, South Korea was not able to adhere to the U. N. resolution 195-[III] any longer owing to the growing international status of North Korea and the realization of the P. R. C.'s representation in the United Nations. Therefore, Park's declaration was coupled with the apeasement towards the P. R. C. and U. S. S. R. by renouoncing its assertion as the sole legitimate government in the Korean Peninsula.
Around the time of Park's declaration, South Korean government, which left out of the aegis of the U. N., shared in part some of the U. S. S. R.'s view regarding the settlement of the Korean question. On the one hand, unofficial contact between South Korea and U. S. S. R. would be one of the aspect of ‘Asian Collective Security System’ offered by Brezhnev.
On the other side, at that time, P. R. C. began to give vent to the inability to achieve political rapproachment to R. O. K., since the P. R. C.'s recognition of ‘The Two Koreas’ formula, would be related to ‘The Two Chinas’ formula.
The subtle relationship R. O. K.'s relationship with P. R. C. and U. S. S. R. in the early 70s could be said as the archetype of the South Korea's ‘Nordpolitik’,

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In August 1945, the Korean Peninsula came under the partitional occupation by the U. S. and Soviet armies at the 38th pararell. However, Korea was not doomed to a fate of perpetual division as a result of partitional occupation itself, but rather, as a result of the postwar U. S. -Soviet confrontation. The U. S. postwar plan for Korea was to place it under an international trusteeship for a certain period at the time from its national liberation until the time of national independence. Although the U. S. needed to take prudent policies towards the Soviet Union in a situation where the northern half of Korea was occupied by the Soviet Union, the policies that the U. S. actually took in relation to the other critical problems were quite the contrary.
The Council of Foreign Ministers (London, September-October 1945), was broken off due to disagreements between the U. S. and the Soviet Union. During the conference, the Western nations and the Soviet Union recognized it impossible to adjust their mutual interests under the name of the Allies. This marked abandoning the ‘principle’ among the Allies. Immediately after the conference, Soviet foreign policies became uncompromizing, exerting notable influence on its occupation policies towards North Korea, as an example.
The only legitimate measures the U. S. could take was to promote a trusteeship plan. This, however, might have given the Soviet Union the opportunity not only to ‘Sovietize’ North Korea but also to place the whole of Korea under Soviet influence.
The Conference of Foreign Ministers (Moscow, December 1945) adopted with minor changes the Soviet proposal that Korea should be placed under an international trusteeship for a period of five years among the U. S., the Soviet Union, China and Great Britain. The distinctive feature of the Soviet proposal was that it entrusted the design of trusteeship to the U. S. and the Soviet Union, and actually excluded China and Great Britain. This marked recognizing ‘reality’.
The U. S. -Soviet Joint Commission, based upon the agreement at Moscow, started in March 1946, but failed at the outset due to the fact that the Soviet Union adhered to a policy excluding the prominent nationalists in South Korea, who opposed the agreement, from participating in the provisional government. The Soviet Union, judging this impossible, made a bold move to communize North Korea by hindering the implementation of the trusteeship. Although the U. S., which proposed the partitional occupation of Korea, made certain efforts to dissolve the division, the U. S. -Soviet relationship was not in a situation where the U. S. could demand the Soviet Union to diminish its influence on Korea any further.
The division of Korea could not help but be perpetualized when the Moscow agreement based upon the compromise between the U. S. and the Soviet Union could no longer be implemented.

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The purpose of this paper is to describe clearly the Nippon Zaikai (Business Circles) 's role in the normalization of Japan-South Korean diplomatic relations during 1960-1965. In particular, I focused on the Kansai Zaikai which showed their zeal for this long-pending question. There have been few studies about this topic, but I believe this analysis will illustrate the Japanese non-governmental economic diplomacy towards South Korea after the World War II.
The Kansai Zaikai's strong interest in Korea was generated by the Kansai area's geographical proximity to Korea and the traditional trade ties linking the two. This led the Kansai Zaikai to play a major role in the rebirth of economic ties between Japan and South Korea. The large number of Koreans living in the Kansai area led to the formation of the Zainichi Kankoku Shokokai (Korean Chamber of Commerce in Japan). This group took a vested interest in restimulating both cultural and economic exchange between Japan and South Korea. The normalization of Japan-South Korean diplomatic relations was viewed by the Kansai Zaikai as means of revitalizing the Kansai economy in the aftermath of World War II.
When the Ikeda Cabinet appeared in 1960, Kansai Zaikai formed the Japan-Korea Economic Association with the Keizai Dantai Rengokai and Japanese Chamber of Commerce. The Korean Chamber of Commerce in Osaka also took part in this association and played an important role in linking the Japanese and South Korean economic circles.
Subsequently, Michisuke Sugi, ex-president of the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and one of the leaders of the Kansai Zaikai, was appointed as one of the chief-representatives in the Japan-South Korean talks held during 1961-64.
In conclusion, an evaluation of the Zaikai's Activities during 1960-1965 as follows:
(1) One of the most notable changes brought about by the Zaikai's efforts to normalize relations was the improvement in the Zaikai's image of South Korea.
(2) As a result of the Zaikai's efforts, the establishment of a direct channel between the Pak Cabinet and Japan was established.
(3) While the Kansai Zaikai took an interest in the reestablishment of economic and political ties because of its historically close ties with Korea, their interest in restoring economic activity to the Kansai area, and their pronounced rivalry of Tokyo sparked them into taking a leading role in the normalization efforts.

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The admission of South and North Korea to the United Nations is one of the unresolved issues around the Korean Peninsula. Although the issue has not been the major topic, it still maintains its meaning as the present and future topic while most of other issues have only historical meaning.
1. Application by South and North Korea in 1949 and 1951
In 1949, South and North Korea applied for the membership of the United Nations. Each of them asserted that it be the only legitimate government representing the interest of the whole Korean people.
The admission of North Korea was not even adopted as an agenda of the Security Council. The admission of South Korea, on the other hand, was rejected by the veto of the Soviet Union at the final stage.
2. Package Deal and the Admission of South and North Korea
Package deal was a kind of compromise between the Western and the Soviet blocks made by admitting the membership of allies of the Western and Soviet blocks all at once.
In the latter half of 1950s the issue of the admission of South and North Korea was dealt with in the context of the package deal. In 1955 the membership of South Korea failed to obtain support even from some of its allies since they feared that it might destroy the almost reached compromise of the admission of other sixteen States. On the contrary, the membership of South Korea was supported even by the Soviet Union in 1957 and, 1958 on the condition that the membership of North Korea also be admitted simultaneously.
3. Seven-Point Declaration for Peace and Unification on June 23, 1973, and the Admission of South and North Korea
On June 23, 1973, President Park made the Seven-Point Declaration for Peace and Unification and declared therein that South Korea would not object to its own admission to the United Nations together with North Korea provided that it would not cause hindrance to the unification of Korea. In response, however, North Korea made public its objection to the admission of the two Koreas in the Five-Point Program for National Reunification.
In June and September, 1975, South Korea urged the Secretary-General to take appropriate measures for its admission with its new policy mentioned above. The Security Council, however, did not adopt the application of South Korea even as its agenda. The Soviet Union obtained one third of the votes in the Security Council, which enabled the Soviet Union to reject the membership of South Korea without using its veto. It reflected the change in the power balance in the United Nations beginning in 1960s.
After 1975 the situation around the admission of South and North Korea does not seem to have changed.

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New trends of the political science have come to be seen among younger students in the South Korea since the 1970s. Their studies focus on the interplay between politics and socioeconomic changes caused by the rapid industrialization. They use analytical frameworks, for example, dependency, bureaucratic-authoritarianism, corporatism, neo-Marxism. These are critical approaches. The purpose of this paper is to attempt a survey of whether the bureaucratic-authoritarian model is considered valid among South Korean researchers and to examine its relevance to the Yushin regime. This model was proposed by G. A. O'Donnell whose study of Argentine political economy was epoch-making and it has been applied by many students to the analysis of authoritarian developmentalist countries in Asia as well as Latin America.
The bureaucratic-authoritarian state can be analyzed from three points: the emergence, the dynamics of the class aliance, the corporatistic labor control. In South Korea, Sang Jin Han and Jang Jip Choi employ the O'Donnell's model, mainly, to analyze the Yusin regime of the 1970s. Their research can be examined from these three viewpoints.
(1) Han analyzed the emergence of the Yusin regime using the O'Donnell's model. Han identifies situations in 1970-71 with the crisis similar to, but not equal to, the mass praetorianism which introduces bureaucratic-authoritarian state. Choi refutes this argument and he discusses that the Yushin regime was the product of the overdeveloped state itself. In spite of such differences, both pays little attention to the linkage between internal and international politics.
(2) Han and Choi propose different views of the fluctuating middle class, relating to the dynamics of the class aliance in the Yusin regime and its breakdown. Han evaluates the political attitudes of the middle class favorablely, but Choi does not.
(3) Choi applies O'Donnell's corporatism model in analyzing the labor control of the Yusin regime. Choi concludes that the labor control of the Yusin regime was almost “the exclusionary subtype of the state corporatism.” Choi is not successful in escaping from the dichotomy of the O'Donnell's model comprised of “incorporating” and “excuding” state.
The bureaucratic-authoritarian model is not sufficiently relevant to analyze the interplay between politics and socioeconomic changes. We should at first explore the internal logic of the interplay in South Korea, without adopting regional parochialism and simplistic comparative approach.

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The coup backed by the CIA which toppled the Mussadiq's government in 1953 and the failure of the popular uprising led by Khumeini initiated and developed the anti-US feeling in Iran. This fact can be proved because Khumeini's “struggle” against “American imperialism” led to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the successive US hostage incident in Iran (November 1979-January 1981).
After the uprising in 1963, the U. S. government gradually got on closer terms with the Shah's regime. Such U. S. support for the corrupt and repressive government of the Shah had close connections with important American industries, such as munitions production, electric power generation and communication industry. In addition, the clash of interests and competition of these industries in Iran were carried out by bribes and a huge commission system. Furthermore, in 1977, about 70% of the national budget was spent on military affairs, so it was evident to many Iranians that the Iranian policies were determined by the interest of these American enterprises.
After the 1963 uprising was quelled, Khumeini formed strong attachments with the purpose of overthrowing the Shah's regime. He believed that the Shah was selling the spirit of Iran to the U. S. and propagating corruption, immorality and repression. In addition, Khumeini blamed the U. S. for making the Shah carry out the “White Revolution”, so it was responsible for the tragedy that occurred in that uprising. Khumeini also declared that the U. S. government compelled the “Puppet Shah” to give Americans extraterritorial rights. Up until the revolution in 1979, he had condemned the Shah and admired the people who were engaged in the anti-establishment movement, and he denounced the U. S. government for supporting the corrupt and repressive Shah's government. Thus, Khumeini and his followers became the background of anti-US ideology of the Iran-Islam government which has endured till the present.
This paper traces the formation and development of anti-American feeling in Iran. This anti-US feeling has formed the basis of diplomatic policies of the Iranian government since the revolution. Needless to say, Iranians have various feelings about the U. S. In fact, while freedom and democracy have been questioned in Iran since the revolution, some Iranians have discovered the merits of American democracy. This influence of democracy had penetrated the public as well as the private sector, because it is known that some Iranian government officials secretly negotiated with the U. S. government in the Iran-Contra incident. Furthermore, Rafsanjani's more realistic government might change its policies against the U. S.; however, it is certain that the Iranian government will follow Khumeini's line for the present. Needless to say, the U. S. learned a great lesson about its relations with the Third World from Iran-a lesson that should be remembered when dealing with these countries in the future.

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