Japan's ODA (Official Development Assistance) has increased rapidly over the past ten years, yet political analysis of the impact of Japan's ODA on the international system has not kept pace. Nonetheless, we are beginning to see various arguments emerge concerning Japan's ODA, and this article will explore some of the recent arguments on the role and influence of Japan's ODA to clarify the parameters of the current debate. There are roughly two theoretical perspectives from which to analyze the influence of economic assistance; (1) the “liberal” perspective which regards ODA as an international public good, (2) the “realist” perspective which regards ODA as a means to pursue national interest. Furthermore, we can characterize the objectives of economic assistance into two general categories; (1) political motivations and (2) economic motivations.
According to this categorization, this article will analyze how the Japanese government has rationalized its aid policy by surveying both the “Diplomatic Blue Book, ” (published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the “White Paper on Economic Cooperation, ” (published by MITI) over the thirty years since 1958. A categorization of the changes in aid rationales is presented in Table 1 and 2 and Chart 1. In general, over the past three decades, we find that Japan's aid rationales shift from a national interest orientation to an emphasis on Japan's international responsibility, and shift from being motivated by promarily economic interests to wider political interests.
In fact, the increase in Japan's overseas aid has not only made an international contribution, but has also increased Japan's economic and political influence over the recipients. If we look at the Japan's decision-making on ODA, however, we find that there are few cases in which the Japanese government has employed ODA as a tool for political leverage or as a positive sanction. Japan gains what Klaus Knorr defines as “non-power influence” (Knorr,
Power of Nations), by fostering a more interdependent relationship with the developing countries through its ODA. Instead, the Japanese government has promoted the untying of its aid and co-financing with international organization such as the World Bank in order to contribute more to the international common interests.
What then motivates Japanese ODA policy? In analyzing Japan's aid to the Phillipines, which has increased markedly since 1986, some policy makers (e. g. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) have give weight to political cooperation with the United States in their support for increasing aid to that country. Other policy makers, however, (e. g. MITI and business circle) have stressed Japan's own economic interests in the Philippines. Many analysts of the Philippine case stress the importance of “external pressure” on Japan's ODA policy-making. But the influence of “external pressre” in Japan's aid decision-making may not be a major factor because Japan's iterests frequently overlap with the interests of the Western allies (especially the United States).
To date, the debate on both the implications of and the motivations for Japan's ODA policy has, for the most part, been shaped by the “liberal” and “realist” conceptions of state behavior. Concrete case studies now need to be done to test these general assumptions made in these arguments.
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