The Single European Act fell far short of Parliament's aspirations as expressed in the draft Treaty on European Union. The SEA, however, has produced a “1992 boom” not only among Europeans but also among people outside Europe including the Japanese. The success of M. Delors lies in the fact that the SEA set the target date for the completion of the internal market. He has also utilized the momentum to extend integration to other sectors such as economic and monetary policy and social policy. But even M. Delors can not legislate the law of the EC. The key element in the progress of integration is in the changes of mood in the Council, especially owes much to French. Although M. Mitterrand has not given up “the Luxembourg Compromise”, he is taking initiative to push the Commission's proposals not only for the sake of French but also for people of Europe. In spite of strong opposition from Mrs. Thatcher, the recent dramatic developments in the Eastern Europe are expected to add more weight on the roles of the EC and further progress towards a more unified Europe. This article aims to shed more light on how the SEA was formed and then tries to clarify between what was written in the SEA and its political implications in the course of its implementation. Furthermore, it attempts to evaluate the current institutional reforms by the SEA in the context of European Union, originally envisaged in the preamble of the Rome Treaty as an ever closer union among the people of Europe. Lastly, it tries to forecast the prospect of future developments of the EC and Europe as a whole.
The Single European Act (SEA) has great impact on European integration. With regard to EC decision-making, the SEA involves two main reforms. On the one hand, it has reformed the Council's decision-making mechanism; it replaced unanimity by majority voting in a number of articles in the EEC Treaty. On the other hand, it has enhanced the European Parliament (EP) with introducing the co-opetation procedure into the EC decision-making process. This article examines the today's EC decision-making process prescribed in the SEA. Firstly, it outlines the EC decision-making process and the circumstances of implementing the co-operation procedure. Secondly, it analyzes the meanings and problems of the SEA. There are two main decision-making mechanisms in the EC; the consulting procedure and the co-operation procedure. The latter is the new decision-making mechanism. It has, in general, worked satisfactorily. Up to the end of 1988, some 50 proposals adopted under this procedure. Many EC institutions, especially the EP, the Council and the Commission, has been affected by the SEA. By means of the two-reading system under the co-operation procedure, the EP has tried to use its power to enhance its influence on the EC decision-making process. In a number of the articles of the EEC treaty, the Council can adopt the Commission's proposal by qualified majority. This has made the EC descision-making effective. To make a success of the SEA, the Commission has been given its own specific task. Especially, it is the duty of the Commission to keep the balance of the EC'interests and the national interests of the Member States. Finally, some problems of the SEA should be pointed out. Firstly, under EC law, the procedure applicable to the adoption of a particular item of legislation depends on the actual legal basis on which legislation has been drafted. Since the co-operation procedure is applicable to a small number of the provisions of the EEC treaty, many disagreements, among the Commission, the EP and the Council, have arised as regards the choice of the legal basis for proposed legislation. Secondly, in the Council second reading, if the Council should fail to find a majority to accept the Commission's proposal or unanimity to amend it within the three-month period, the decision could be blocked. Theoretically, this “non-decision” is a great problem in the EC decision-making process. Thirdly, the transfer of powers from Member States to the EC raises the question of how the EC can be made more democratically accountable. It is one of the most important problems facing the EC. It is true that the co-operation procedure is complicated. For that reason, the co-operation of the Commission, the Council and the EP is the key point of EC decision-making.
The Completion of the Internal Market will provide an increase in growth and competitiveness for European economies. However as the White Paper commented, there may be risks that, by increasing the possibilities for human, material and financial servises to move without obstacle to the areas of greatest economic advantage, existing discrepancies between regions could be exacerbated and therefore the objective of convergence jeopardized (point. 21). This paper focuses on the regional dimension which must taken into account in the process of completing the Internal Market. I will try to argue the diversity of regional policy making, policy implementation, and administrative links between the European Communities and the Member State. The following questions are asked: What was the nature of regional policies implemented by Member States? How is the European regional policy made and implemented? Has supranational integration within the Community reinforced or weakened the power of national governments, and local governments within Member States? National governments have for many years operated their own regional policies. But the gaps are even bigger when viewed at the Community level. National regional policies conducted in isolation and sometimes in competition with each other are both more costly and less effective. So the European Communities have an important part to play in reducing regional disparities. The Council of Ministers adopted on 18 March 1975, Regulation No. 274/75 setting up the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The ERDF regulation was revised in 1979, and again in 1984, these reforms of the ERDF are likely to give the European Commission a greater say in project choice. In almost every Member States, there are recent moves to decentralize administration to local government level. National governments tend to share responsibility for the administration of regional policies with local governments. This pattern is identified in the institutional setting of Federal-Länder relations in West Germany. It can be shown that similar institutional conditions are producing similar decision making and policy implementation patterns of the Community regional policy. The regional policy of the European communities involves problems of distribution.
“1992” is now a hot catchphrase in the European scene. With materialization of about 280 EC laws, the European Community will be firmly intergrated. This move naturally affects the energy sector in the EC. The energy supply systems in the member states are quite different from one another. As for the “Big four”, the supply situations are varying. The UK has the North sea oil. West Germany is producing 75 million tons of coal annually. France has 50 nuclear power stations producing one fourth of the total EC electricity outputs. Italy suffers from few natural resources. Due to this diversity, They have long conflicted in national interests. Because of this, the EC's common energy policy has been referred sarcastically to be as “ l'arl esienne de Bizet” by Frenchmen in the energy sector. That is to say, she (the energy policy) is important and everyone talks of her, but No one has seen her in reality. But in parallel with that move toward “1992”, even in these energy sectors new moves are seen. In the energy sector, especially in the sectors of electricity and natural gas, new initiatives are being taken by the European Commission. In the EC this is being tackled in the form of draft council directives based on article 100A which was newly introduced by the Single European Act. The main points of these legislative measures are to make the transit of electricity and natural gas by grids or pipelines assured within the EC based on the idea of “common carrier”. As for electricity, France supports this measure, since she has excessive production of electricity by nuclear power and expects to export to West Germany. Portugal is also a supporter of this move with another reason. With this legislation Portugal can nullify the Spanish unwillingness to her transit based on national sovereignty. As for natural gas, because of the objections from Holland and its firms which are vital for gas trade in the EC, the draft is not likely to pass. One more important point mentioned is that opening up of the “compartmentalized” markets in electricity and gas are inherently contradictory to fixing the “Energy Objective”, one of the main pillars of the energy strategy by the Commission in the EC. In the decision making process to materialize the internal energy market, the role of the European Parliament is becoming increasingly important, where the “Rainbow Group, ” a supranational environment oriented party, is gaining powers. This article covers the recent moves in the energy sector in the wake of the moves towards 1992 and analyses what sort of problems the EC will have in creating the internal energy market as a whole through intensive study of political factors such as the EP, the Council, the Commission, member states and the relevant industries in the EC.
There have been three contexts in the protection of fundamental rights at the EC level. One concerns the relationship with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In this context, the EC Commission proposed that the EC should accede to the ECHR, which means that the rights contained in it are treated as the list of fundamental rights of the EC. This idea was supported by the EP, the ESC and the Council of Europe, but was rejected by the EC Council in spite of the intiatives of the Dutch Presidency. Therefore, this idea lost political impetus. Another stems from the EP's attempts to reform the EC's institutionl framework leading up to the draft European Union Treaty, which stipulates that within a period of five years, ‘the Union shall adopt its own declaration on fundamental rights’ (Art. 4.3). Though this draft was not adopted, the EP took action under that provision. The result is the adoption of “the Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms” by a vast majority on 12 April 1989, which contains not only civil and political rights but also social and economic rights. Yet this declaration is nothing but a unilateral resolution of the EP. The other context concerns the social dimension of the internal market. The EC Commission is convinced that 1992 will succeed only if both sides of industry are involved in it and that efforts must be made to prevent distortions of competition from leading to forms of social dumping. Therefore, the EC Commission proposed the EC Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, which was adopted by all the member states except Britain in the Strasbourg Summit on 9 December 1989 as “the Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers”. This Charter is a “Solemn Declaration” which is not itself legally binding. It is to be implemented according to the action programme by the EC Commission. Considering the EC's long-term developments after 1992, it is essential, as a source of political legitimacy, that a list of fundamental rights should be adopted at the EC level. In that case, two scenarios exist. One is the re-launching of the idea of the EC's accession to the ECHR. The other is the adoption of fundamental rights in proportion to increased powers of the EC at an intergovernmental conference in the future, possibly in the form of a “Solemn Declaration” by the heads of the governments. These are not incompatible with each other. It is possible that they will happen on the same occasion.
The General Agreement recognizes, in Article XXIV: 4, the value of closer integration of national economies through voluntary agreements of freer trade between two or more countries. Such groupings may take the form of a customs union or a free-trade area (Article XXIV para. 8(a) and (b)). In both cases, customs duties and other barriers on substantially all trade between countries in the group are required to be removed. In either case, duties or other regulations of commurce after the formation of a cutoms union or a free-trade area should be, on the whole, no more restrictive than those which existed previously (Article XXIV: 5). The Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community was examined by an intersessional committee comprised of all contracting parties to the General Agreement in 1957-1958. Although the examination was quite comprehensive, no agreement was reached as to whether the Treaty was consistent with the General Agreement in particular Article XXIV. Thus, the Treaty came into effect as of 1 January 1958 without having any legal blessing from the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES. Since then the GATT, as a legal institution, has been obliged to accept the reality of the substantive power of the growing European Communities. The most recent enlargement took place in 1986. A Working Party was set up by the Council of the GATT in February 1986 and finished its work in October 1988. The EC consistently maintained that the task of the Working Party was to assess the impact of the enlargement in general terms, and that if barriers were not on the whole higher than those previously existing in the EC, then it should be considered as conforming with the General Agreement. The EC was also of the view that any individual cases where the negative incidence was demonstrated could be dealt with in Article XXIV: 6 negotiations. Other contracting parties, in particular those who have no bilateral agreements with the EC, argued that the Working Party had to examine the impact on particular trading partners as well as on all contracting parties, and that the requirements of Article XXIV: 5(a) could not be fulfilled without assessing the specific effects on individual contracting parties. They also insisted that Article XXIV: 6 could not solve all the bilateral concerns, for instance the problem of unbound duties. Products such as maize and sorghum were the symbolic items in the discussion. Although the EC has never formally acceded to the GATT, it acts as a legitimate contracting party to it representing its twelve Member States which are fully-fledged contracting parties. As a negotiator in GATT, the Community, or more specifically the Commission of the EC, has further gained the capacity of the political go-between of sometimes conflicting interests among the Member States, as well as the substantial representation vis-à-vis third parties. One can perhaps observe a tendency that the more pressure that comes from outside the Community, the more the Commission shall be needed to harmonize the conflicting interests among its Members reallocating the burden within themselves. Thus, the GATT as a multilateral legal institution and a negotiating forum provides the EC with a substantial interest in participating in it, and the active participation of the EC in the GATT System also strengthens the credibility of such a multilateral framework.
Post-war Western Europe has been divided into two regional economic organisations of different types: the European Communities (EC) aiming for economic union with supranational institutions and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), only a free trade area without any supranational institutions. The relationship between those two bodies can be described as a cycle of tension and relaxation which have resulted from the enforcement of the EC integration and the fear of marginalisation of the EFTA side. Historically, the author classifies three periods according to the above mentioned cycle. In the first period (from 1956 to 1969), the establishment of the EEC had caused certain fear to non EEC member-states, which had been appeased by creating the EFTA but with a consequence of the divided western Europe. The second period begins from 1969 and ends by 1984. The relaunch of the EC integration after the Hague summit of 1969 and the enlargement of the EC that meant the reduction of the EFTA members, menaced again the remaining EFTA countries and the tension had been resolved by the free trade agreements concluded between the EC and the each EFTA countries, which have completly achieved only by 1984. The third period have begun from 1984 till now and they try to establish together the European Economic Space (EES) as declared at the Luxembourg first EC-EFTA ministerial meeting, to resolve the tension resulting from the fear of marginalisation of the EFTA countries facing to the EC's 1992 internal market programme. The EFTA countries' strategies have been to concentrate on maintaining the special relationship with the EC, pursuing it on both bilateral and multilateral bases not to join the EC. Nevertheless the creation of EES on a mutilateral basis have many difficulties: inequality of the two organisations, and irregularity of EFTA countries' policy priority. And the changing international political and economic structures complicate the problems. The author points out several new dimensions of the EC-EFTA relations and concludes that the most probable scenario in the foreseeable future would be the creation of the single market composed of 18 Western European countries in the framework of the EES and the possible development of “l'Europe à la géometrie variable” in other domains.
This article focuses on the relationship between the European Community (EC) and European development non-governmental organizations (development NGOs) active in the field of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. The term “development NGOs” covers here a heterogeneous group of more than 600 organizations in the EC countries. Cooperation betwen the European Community and the development NGOs dates from 1976, adding a new dimension to the EC's development policy. Its signification consists in a supranational support for transnational solidarity of European NGOs with the poorest sections of humankind in the Third World. This purpose was initially reflected in the establishment of a Community budget heading for the cofinancing of operational projects in developing countries. Since 1976, the Commission of the European Community (CEC) has provided financial support for the development projects carried out by NGOs of the Member States. The appropriation, which was set at 2.5 million ECU for 1976, has been subsequently increased gradually to reach 14 million ECU in 1980 and 46 million ECU in 1986. Between 1976 and 1985, the EC has contributed a total amount of 174.2 million ECU for 1, 913 projects. In the same period of 10 years, the total amount of joint investments by the CEC and development NGOs records about 431 million ECU, giving a multiplier effect of 2.5 times to the Community's own contribution. In addition, between 1978 and 1985, the CEC has confinanced 275 projects with 132 NGOs by a total sum of 11 million ECU in order to raise European public awareness of world development issues. In selecting projects for cofinancing, the CEC applies a series of criteria with regard in particular to the nature of the applicant organizations. The applicant organization is required to be autonomous and non-profitmaking, and to have effective support from the European general public. It must furthermore demonstrate personal commitment and experience and have a proven track record of development work in developing countries. These criteria, and indeed the whole body of rules governing CEC-NGOs cofinancing, are contained in the General Conditions for project confinancing. As regards project selection, various criteria are likewise applied, the most important of which is the need for genuine participation of the beneficiaries in all stages of the project, including planning. At the same time, the CEC has encouraged co-ordination and liaison among NGOs at the Community level, resulting in the growth of an institutionalized EC-NGOs network. The EC assistance to European NGOs has a specificity that, although its financial support is destined primarily for national NGOs, it also provide an impartial international forum for inter-NGO contact and joint action. This European experience is usetul for Japan as well, now a leading country in terms of ODA.
Twenty years have passed since European Political Co-operation (EPC) started. This article is concerned with the development of EPC from the Luxembourg Report (1970. 10. 27) to the Single European Act (SEA, 87. 7. 1). It analyses not only the various documents but also the activities of EPC. It may be said that the fundamental objects and character have not greatly changed. Even today, EPC is mainly managed by spirit of ‘pramatism’ on the basis of consensus of all the Member States which can act freely and voluntarily within the loose framework of EPC. EPC does not impose any legal obligation even after the enactment of SEA. SEA in spite of the word ‘single’, does not provide EPC with any link to the EC Treaties, because matters in the field of EPC are excluded from the competence of the European Court of Justice (see, art. 31). But, under this dual structure (often called ‘dichotomy’) between EPC and the EC, EPC has obtained some excellent results through its activites over the past twenty years by the tandem method. Owing to this method, practices of co-operation or co-relation have developed between them. Indeed, EPC has no instruments to implement the decisions taken within the framework. When the meetings of European Council of Foreign Minister want to take decisions including declarations and statements, it should be followed by the decisions made by the EC Commission and the EC Council, if necessary, through the consultation with the European Parliament. Such an interaction often happens also in the lower level, that is, between the Political Committee in EPC and COREPER in the EC. Nowadays in these cases, we can often see the decisions in the EC taken by applying article 113 or 224 of the EEC Treaty. And yet, so far as EPC matters are concerned, when the EC institutions take such decisions, prior consensus in EPC has become increasingly needed. Of cource, there are some difficulties to run the tandem system, because it usually demands compromise between the EC and EPC, and among the Member States. So EPC (or ‘tandem’) is a success, objection may be raised on the grounds that it cannot work with efficiency, mainly owing to the complex dual structure. In fact, it could not act rapidly when the United States of America asked the allied nations to impose some sanctions against Lybia in April 1986. The current system has certain limits. It largely depends on the conditions whether ‘tandem’ can succeed or not. Reviewing the history of EPC over its first ten years, William Wallace said as follows: Is the record of political co-operation really a success?… a great deal depends on how high or low expectations were pitched. Then, how further can EPC go towards a common foreign policy? It depends not on the system or the rules but on the political will of the Member States, and I believe it is not impossible to reach the final destination even by the current method, if they wish. People in Europe has never forgotten the objectives of the European Union or European Unity, as seen in many reports or suggestions on EPC. As in stated also in SEA (art. 30. 1): The High Contracting Parties…shall endeavour jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy.
The EC integration has apparently reached a new stage in terms of transnational political dynamics. The European Community has decided that it should constitute a single market by 1992. The Single European Act was a very important momentum to make the EC integration progress toward the new phase. The EC integration has put an end to the “Europessimism”, and to a dark age which the European Community has experienced particularly since the early 1970s. The expected completion of the internal market by 1992 suggests that the EC integration would make a remarkable progress in the transnational dynamics which is far beyond a mere common market. We can assume that the EC intergration is becomming an important process in changing the rules of the game in political diplomatic interaction among member countries. The real issue seems to be a gradual transformation of the dynamics in the nation-state system. Under the new historical context, we need examine in depth how the integrative processes in the European Community would affect the matter of international security and in what way the “European renaissance” could transform elites as well as peoples perceptions of the traditional national security. The national security issues have not been what the European Community has to deal with. However, the reality is most likely to be changed. According to the Single European Act (Title 111, 6(a)), “member countries are ready to coordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security”. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to attempt to demonstrate how the EC integration processes are related with the issues of international security for member countries. Firstly, we try to analyse how the international security environment has been changed since the middle of the 1980s. The eroison and ending of the Cold War between the two superpowers in the military sense has obviouly exerted substantial influences on the settings under which the European Community is placed. Secondly, we discuss why the game of “political cooperation” has emerged as an important rule in the foreign policy field in the EC. The “political cooperation” game has in fact worked to broaden the scope of the game on the international security. This new development is what many integration theorists have not expected in the dark age of 1970s. Added to this point, the new problem of “German unification” is now what member countries in the EC must consider as an emergent issue. The EC must find an agreeable solution for this problem, precisely because the international security issues are newly involved in the matter of “German unification”. Thirdly, we will argue how people tend to see the EC integration processes in terms of their expectations and assesments. What would it mean if peoples' judgements would be positive rather than negative on the integrative achivements? Finally, we try to show, though it is still a hypothesis, the change of perceptions on the part of the people in the European Community. The international seourity seems to be institutionalized in the arena of the European Community.