In 1989, socialism in East Europe collapsed and the Socialist Bloc, which had existed for forty years, fell to pieces driven by development of PERESTROIKA.
Before the decline of the Socialist Bloc, Sino-Soviet relations had been examined through the following approaches;
(1) The approach from Socialist internationalism. The ideal relationship between socialist countries was not only the main issue of Sino-Soviet antagonism but also the critical question after the Czechoslovakia-affair.
(2) Sino-Soviet relations concerned with such problems as War, Peace and national liberation movements in the nuclear age. US-Soviet control over nuclear weapons and world affairs caused the repelling of, China and the Third World.
(3) Analysis of Sino-Soviet relations in the context of strategic conditions, especially in the triangularity of US, USSR and China. China, which was inferior to the two super-powers, was a pivot of the power game between US and USSR.
(4) Analysis of Sino-Soviet relations as a pure bilateral relationship.
(5) Analysis of the impact which Sino-Soviet relations gave on the domestic policy of both countries. It was an essential moment to Chinese socialism, as the anti-Soviet Cultural Revolution typically showed.
(6) Besides, we have an approach of comparative study of both countries. Sino-Soviet ideological antagonism reflects the differences of both approaches to socialism.
By the fundamental change of Socialist World in 1989-90, now we are forced to have a new point of views.
Firstly, the question why they could not attain socialist internationalism leads us to the problem of “Socialism and Nation-states”. The Russian Revolution sought after internationalism as a universal value, casting away the idea of “Nation-states”. But during the Stalin era the Soviet Union was compelled to select socialism in one country. “Etatism” came up to bean an inviolable principle both in foreign and domestic politics. That tendency was accelerated by the Asian socialist countries which were aming to build nation-states. So, we have a paradox that socialist countries are more nationalistic than capitalist countrics.
Secondly, observing US-USSR-China trilateral relation, we can say as follows; There were gaps between the real state of China and the image of China which two super-powers and China herself held. It was these image gaps that intensified the Sino-Soviet antagonism. In 1970s when US made approach to China and tried to unite anti-Soviet front, she regarded China as a “candidate super-power”. So China, which was misled by the delusive self-image of being a super-power, fell into the power game of US-USSR rivalry.

抄録全体を表示

Based on the ideas of cognitive balance developed mainly by F. Heider, R. P. Abelson and others, a framework to represent a relationship characterized by amity and enmity is presented; essential points of this framework include (1) your enemy's enemy is your friend, (2) if A has both friendly and hostile relations with B, A and B have “ambivalent” relations, and (3) if there are no “ambivalent” relationship within a system of actors, this system is “balanced”. This framework then is applied to a triangular relationship among three actors and eight possible types of trialgular relationships are derived.
To derve possible directions of transition among these eight types, two assumptions and four transition rules are introduced. The assumptions are:
(1) three actors differ in their influence; and (2) A weaker actor is more sensitive to imbalance in the system. The four rules are: (1) changes of relationship take place sequentially, i. e., one at a time; (2) actors change their relationships to make the system “balanced”; (3) in an unbalanced system, the relationship between the two weakest actors tends to change; and (4) among the four balanced systems, three can change to become unbalanced (for the precise rule, see the text.)
With these four rules, possible directions of transitions among these eight types are derived; this derivation represents a theory to explain how a triangular relationship might possibly evolve (Table 9). To examine the validity of this theory, an analysis of the history of U. S. -U. S. S. R. -China triangular relationships in the postwar period is made (Table 10). Except for the deterioration of U. S. -U. S. S. R. relations in 1960 after the U-2 inicident, the isolation of the Soviet Union in the late 1970s, and the deterioration of Sino-American relations immediately after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, the theory explains the historical transitions in the triangle very well.

抄録全体を表示

There are many reasons for the Sino-Soviet Conflict. But, I think two factors are more important than others: first, difference in stages of economic development; second, difference in stages of perspectives on international relations related to stages of economic development.
1. From strategy-tactics approach to world order approach
In the first stage Soviet perspective on international relations is imperialism theory. This is strategy-tactics of world revolution. In the second stage its perspective grows to general crisis of capitalism theory. It is composed of the strategy-tactics approach and balance-of- power approach. Balance-of-power approach is based on inter-state relations. In the third stage Khrushchev gives priority to inter-state relations over strategy-tactics approach. But, inter-state relations theory contradicts with the strategy-tactics approach. To deter explosion of its contradiction Brezhnev separates these two elements and sets up double standars. But still the contradiction grows more and more. Therefore, to slove the contradiction Gorbachev gives up the theory of general crisis of capitalism and adopts the world order approach.
2. Four stages of Sino-Soviet relations
After the Peoples Republic of China was established, Sino-Soviet relations went through four stages. The stages are divided by above-mentioned two factors. The first stage is period of Sino-Soviet alliance from establishment of PRC 1949 to the Great Leap Forward policy in 1958. The second stage is the period of Sino-Soviet dispute from the GLF policy to Czech incident in 1968. The third stage is the period of Sino-Soviet conflict from Czech incident and Social-Imperialism theory to four modernizations policy in 1978. And the last stage is the period of Sino-Soviet reconciliation from four modernizations policy to perestroika. From now on since two factors behind Sino-Soviet conflict differences are smaller than before, relations between the Soviet Union and China will improve.

抄録全体を表示

During the battles of World War II, the United States planned for collective security by creating a new international organization with final responsibility to keep international order after victory in the war. On the other hand, the Soviet Union defeated Germany by its military power and annexed the Baltic States. At the same time the Soviet Union made East European counties, such as Poland, its satellite countries and tried to maintain security on its western borders. In short, the United States tried to keep security by establishing “organizations, ” while the Soviet Union searched for security through “space.”
This tendency of the Soviet Union to secure “space” outside of its borders, could be true also in the east. In the negotiation of the Sino-Soviet frendship treaty of alliance and mutual support in 1945, the Kuomintang Government of China was forced to accept most of the stipulations settled in the Yalta Conference. Those stipulations were promised in return for the participation in the war against Japan, without agreement of the Kuomintang Government. (They included the one to protect Soviet priority of interest in the Port of Dairen, or to grant the lease of Port Arthur as a navy base of the Soviet Union.)
This paper tries to focus on the process where by Chinese government aimed to recover Port Arthur and Dairen. At first, the Kuomintang Government tried to solve this problem of recovering Port Arthur and Dairen through diplimatic negotiations. In June 1947, China sent an inspecting party to Port Arthur and Dairen, but the Soviet Union was not sulficiently cooperative to permit full inspection. Subsequently, the Kuomintang Government was banished from the Continent of China without recovering Port Arthur and Dairen, and this task was taken over by the government of the People's Republic of China.
The government of the People's Republic of China was later able to recover rights and interests in its territory including Port Arthur and Dairen that was previously been obtained by the Soviet Union. As a result, the Soviet army began to withdraw from Dairen on February 24th, 1955 and completed its withdrawal on May 31st. Since then, the People's Republic of China has strictly refused to accept military installations of the Soviet Union on its territory.

抄録全体を表示

The purpose of this paper is to review the changing patterns of Chinese communist perception of the world during the 1950s, focusing on the rise and fall of the theory of intermediate zone. The theory was first articulated by chairman Mao Zedong in an interview with an American journalist Anna Louise Strong in August 1946. The intermediate zone means the vast area lying between the United States and the Soviet Union. The theory contended that not the East-West conflict but the conflict between the American imperialism and the oppressed people of the world formed the main contradiction in the present situation. This view was accompanied by a characteristic notion of international security. According to Mao, it was the bold struggle against imperialism that would promote “peace” among world great powers. Such a notion marked a contrast with the Soviet attitude which saw “The Great Alliance” as essential in securing world peace.
With the increasing pressure from Moscow to unify ideology within the socialist camp, the term “intermediate zone” vanished from the Chinese documents since late 1948. But the logic of the theory still influenced the perception of the Chinase leaders until 1952.
There were remarkable changes in the framework of Chinase world view after 1953. Firstly, the notion of peaceful coexistence was introduced into the Chinese policy papers. Secondly, the evaluation of neutralism was adjusted. Thirdly, the demarkation of the socialist camp was redefined. These changes altogether modified the previous notion of international security underlying the theory of intermediate zone. Namely, the idea that people's bold struggle against imperialism in the intermediate zone would reduce the probability of world war was replaced by the notion that consultation among the great powers was indispensable for promoting world peace. With this notion on international security, Chinese communist theory proceeded to the diplomacy of peaceful coexistence.
In 1958 the theory of intermediate zone was revived. While it emphasized the necessity of daring anti-imperialist struggle in the intermediate zone as it did in the late 1940s, it did not discard the idea that the coordinated effort between the communist nations and the Asian nationalist regimes was effective in eradicating the influence of American imperialism from Asia.
The revival of the theory of intermediate zone brought about a discrepancy with regard to the notion of peaceful coexistence between the Chinese and Russians. Although such a discrepancy was relative in character, it was destined to deepen by the transformation of the world system in the late 1950s.

抄録全体を表示

The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the Soviet strategy of peaceful coexistence with the United States and Soviet policy related to China during the Khrushchevian period. Peaceful coexistence with the United States was a new strategy and not well received by the Chinese who were at this time a vital part of the socialist block countries.
Khrushchev presented the fundamental framework of his new strategy at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956. He did this without the benefit of any military theory primarily because the Soviet military posture was far inferior to that of American forces. Consequently, maintaining the unity of the Soviet block countries as well as upgrading the Soviet military became key points in the framework. It is important to note that Russia had been unable to maintain a strong sense of unity alone and depended on the joint effort with China to do so. As a direct result, the Russians had been obliged to grant certain concessions to the Chinese including assistance with economics as well as technical advancements in the area of development of missiles and nuclear weapons. At the same time Russia wanted to restrain Chinese concessions since they were afraid of Chinese deviation from the socialist camp.
In 1957 the primary fundamental framework changed. With military and scientific achievements, ICBMs and Sputnik, as well as the political strength of the fortieth anniversary of the Russian revolution and Moscow conference for background, Khrushchev introduced a new military theory giving priority to missiles and nuclear weapons rather than conventional ones. However, the military posture of the Soviet Union remained inferior to that of the United Sates since Khrushchev's new theory had yet to be backed by real Soviet missile and nuclear powers. Actually the new theory was political propaganda directed at the United States for the purpose of pursuing the peaceful coexistence policy.
Meanwhile Khrushchev turned his attention toward China; he concluded an agreement with respect to “new technology” with China in October 1957. He had two main reasons for this. First, the Soviet missile and nuclear powsers remained inferior to the American forces; and second, the Russian effort to maintain the unity of the socialist camp was unsuccessful without the Chinese. Support form the Chinese was especially needed after the disturbance in East Europe at this time.
Regardless of Khrushchev's political care, Mao tse-tung expressed his own strategy at the Moscow Conference in November 1957. His strategy was in direct opposition to that of Khrushchev; Mao tse-tung persuaded the socialists to confront the imperialists more radically.
Since the Moscow Conference, Khrushchev had been focusing his attention on accelerating the build up of the Soviet military strength while decreasing the Chinese role in his strategy.
The agreement concluded in October 1957 was broken by the Soviet Union in June 1959. Soviet forces were more confident at this time due to the new Strategic Rocket Forces estimated to be sufficiently capable of threatening the North American continent by the end of that year.
Khrushchev, armed with the Strategic Rocket Forces, introduced a new military theory into the primary framework of his strategy to the Supreme Soviet Ministry in January 1960. At this time his strategy was firmly established; however, he made no mention of China to the Ministry. Khrushchev clearly decided he no longer needed China to support his plan.

抄録全体を表示

The political turmoil in South Vietnam after the coup against Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963 presented both the United States and the Vietnam Workers' Party with hard choices, and led both sides to escalate the War.
This was a crucial moment for the Vietnamese Communists, both in regard to the South and in their relations with the Soviet Union and China. The Party wanted to take advantage of the chaotic situation in the South and seek a quick victory, while its leaders viewed the increasing Sino-Soviet split as a disadvantage to their own cause, since it prevented the formation of an international united front of the socialist camp to deter direct U. S. intervention in the Vietnam conflict.
While it believed it possible to contain the U. S. within its “specila war” efforts, the Party view was that Vietnam was a peripheral state of the socilaist camp and her role was to mediate the dispute between the two “centers” of the socialist camp. But when the Party was compelled to fight a total war with the U. S. in 1965, the Vietnamese Communists began to view the Vietnam conflict as becameing the “focal point” in the world-wide rivalry between the revolutionary forces and the anti-revolutionary forces. This implies that they began to shift their role from mediation to expoitation of the Sino-Soviet dispute trying to take the initiative in creating an international united front against the U. S. intervention in Vietnam and to gain more positive aid both from the USSR and China.
While the Sino-Soviet dispute impinged on the Vietnamese Communist war efforts and both the USSR and China were only reluctantly helpful, it was difficult for both of them to abandon the “holy revolutionary cause” of Vietnam since the two Communist giants disputed with each other over the subject of “champion of the world revolution” in the 1960s.

抄録全体を表示

The first Asian-African conference was held at Bandung in 1955. It created an epoch moment in international political history after the second world war to the extent that it was the first manifestation by the Asian and African nations of their intention to solve their own problems in an Asian-African way, through solidarity.
However, in the years since the Bandung Conference, and particularly in the sixties, the political constellation and the interrelations among the Asian-African countries had changed very dramatically.
Chinese aggression toward India in 1962 had its impact among the Asian-African nations. The impact of this conflict was very large because these two major Asian countries had played an leading role at the Bandung Conference. Among the new emerging African nations existed unbridgeable divisions. There was the so-called Casablanca group, in which Ghana and Epypt played a dominant role, while another bloc constituted itself as the Monrovia group, with Nigeria as the leading nation.
Among others, the Sino-Soviet Conflict created farreaching consequences on the Asian African nations, dividing these states into two-blocs supporting either China (as, for instance, Indonesia), or Russia (as, for instance, India). One insisted on the anti-colonial struggle against the Western powers and advocated the second Asian-African conference. The other gave primacy to the general principles of non-aligument, peaceful coexistence and supported the second nonaligned conference. This antagonism dominated the foreign affairs of Asian and African countries and competed with each other for the priority between these two conferences in 1964-65. For example, Sukaruo emphasized that the primary aim of the Asian and African countries should be to eliminate the old estabilished order as represented by the forces of colonialism and imperialism. On the other, Nehru advocated world peace and peaceful coexistence among the nations irrespective of their social system.
Eventually, the second nonaligned conference was held at Cairo in 1964, but the second Asian-African conference was postponed indefinitely. In the course of this political process one thing became clear that the Asian-African solidarity was a mith and an empty dream. In this sence we cannot place too much emphasize on the impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the Asian-African foreign affairs in 1964-65. After their independence, Asian-African nations began to pursue their own national interests. These weak nations, econmically and politically, could not but be drawn into the Sino-Soviet conflict as well as the East-West conflict.

抄録全体を表示

When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he had no new policy in Asia. As for his policy towards China he basically continued Moscow's policy towards China which had been formulated by Brezhenev in Tashkent in 1982. In 1986, however, Gorbachev seems to have decided to prepare a new approach to the Asia-Pacific region. In the spring of 1987 fundamental change was introduced into Moscow's foreign policy. And this “conceptual revolution” was soon reflected in its policy in Asia, particulary towards China.
Since then Sino-Soviet rapprochement has been guided by the reform movement in both countries. Soviet attempts to put pressure on Hanoi in solving the Cambodian problem became successful in 1987 and 1988. In this way the biggest obstacle in the way of the Sino-Soviet normalization was reduced to just a problem for Peking.
In 1988 Moscow changed its policy towards Eastern Europe. The Brezhnev Doctrine was declared half-dead. Hence the solution of the problem of “hegemony” in the world of Socialism. In 1989 Gorbachev visited Peking and met Deng. Full normalization between the two countries was thus acomplished. But soon after this Deng suppressed the great movement calling for democratisation in a brutal way. After the clumping down the course of the Chinese reform movement was greatly changed and China has suffered from international isolation.
Gorbachev had two aims in his attempt to have Sino-Soviet relations normalized. The first aim was literally to normalize relations; reduction of tension on Sino-Soviet borders, promotion of trade between the two countries and so on. The second aim was to utilize Chinese economic influences in Asia in Moscow's entering the Asia-Pacific area. This aim, however, remains unsatisfied. Now the time has come when Moscow should formulate a genuinely new Asian policy based on Moscow's interests in Asia as a region of great promise.

抄録全体を表示