国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
1991 巻, 98 号
選択された号の論文の11件中1~11を表示しています
  • ラテンアメリカ-1980年代の国際関係と政治-
    松下 洋
    1991 年 1991 巻 98 号 p. 1-7,L5
    発行日: 1991/10/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The 1980s were ‘the lost decade’ for Latin America from the economic point of view, because almost all of the Latin American countries in this period suffered from not only the serious debt crisis but also the worst stagflation in their history characterized by hyper-inflation and very low economic growth. The average per capita income of the region dropped 9.6% between 1981 and 1990. However, politically it was a profitable decade, since many countries in this region experienced a kind of “democratic revolution”, putting an end to the military regimes which had been predominant in the 70s. This political change has had multiple effects upon Latin American society in general including the intellectual world. One example was the decline of guerrilla forces in many countries, which reduced concomitantly the importance of the “revolutionary” paradigms in the intellectual world such as the dependency theory elaborated by André Gunder Frank and other types of Marxism. In particular, the decline of dependency theory had an effect of weakening the nationalism of the left wing based on its anti-imperialistic discourse.
    The democratization also lessened the value of the theory of corporatism which had stressed the authoritarian and non-democratic tradition in this region. In short, the economic and political changes which occurred in the 80s in Latin America have put in doubt many paradigms prevailing in previous decades. Another important change can be also seen in Inter-American relations as a consequence of the weakening of Latin American nationalism on one hand and the decline of United States hegemony in the region on the other.
    All these changes have posed a series of new questions to us: e. g. how can we explain the coincidence of the economic crisis with the democratization in the region? how should we evaluate the capacity of the civilian governments to cope with the severe economic problems that even the authoritarian military governments had been unable to resolve? and what will be the future of Inte-American relations, taking into account the declining hegemony of the United States and the increasing internationalism in Latin America? Although not all the articles in this issue try to answer these questions, many are directly or indirectly related to them. It is the editor's hope that this number will stimulate further studies on these topics and others concerning Latin America and the Third World in the 1980s.
  • ラテンアメリカ-1980年代の国際関係と政治-
    大串 和雄
    1991 年 1991 巻 98 号 p. 8-22,L6
    発行日: 1991/10/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article reconsiders the nature of the National Security Doctrine (DSN) which was enunciated by the “new type” of military regimes of South America in the 1970s. The central purpose of the article is to shed light on the relationship among 1) the national security interests of the military; 2) the interests of the military in development and/or social reform; and 3) the politicization of the military, paying special attention to the cases of Chile, Argentina, Peru and Brazil.
    In the first section, the DSN is defined and its characteristics examined. The author distinguishes three types of the military's interest in development and/or reform: a) development and/or reform for their own sake; b) development and/or reform to strengthen the external defense; c) development and/or reform to prevent the threat to internal security.
    The second section analyzes the evolution of the DSN in this century. The author maintains that the DSN is an amalgam of various components and that its evolution is best understood when the changes in each component are considered. Based on this methodological proposal, the author traces the development of the DSN. Regarding the connection between external security and socioeconomic development and/or reform, the military became aware of it before World War II. With respect to the relationship between internal security and socioeconomic development and reform, it was not until the late 1950s that this link was fully understood and incorporated in the DSN as part of its professional tenets, although anticommunism existed in the military since the first decades of this century and some military precursors stressed this connection. From the late 1950s on most military officers accepted socioeconomic development and/or reform as a means necessary to prevent a revolution. However, they did not consider a revolution to be a legitimate demonstration of the suffering people but to be a movement of the masses instigated by “International Communism.”
    In light of the foregoing discussion, the third section reviews Alfred Stepan's thesis of “New Professionalism” and some historians' critiques of that thesis. These historians argue that the Brazilian military's interest in socioeconomic development and the maintenance of public order was already present well before World War II. The author stresses that, in general, these two areas of interest were not seen by the military officers to have a causal relationship; and that the role played by the armed forces in internal security was usually not regarded as proper to their profession. Moreover, the military's proclivity to intervene in politics before World War II was not a result of their concern for internal security. At the end of the article, the author criticizes some aspects of Alfred Stepan's original thesis.
  • ラテンアメリカ-1980年代の国際関係と政治-
    高橋 均
    1991 年 1991 巻 98 号 p. 23-43,L7
    発行日: 1991/10/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Many authors have characterized the Reagan-Bush Latin American policy as an attempt to restore U. S. hegemony there, heretofore in decline. The aim of the present paper is to propose an alternative view: it applied the same policy orientation as the prior administrations to a different, much more turbulent, context. This orientation may well be named “retrenchment”, which was inaugurated during the Nixon-Kissinger years as “low profile”, and continued by the Carter administration.
    The essence of retrenchment policy is to modify the U. S. commitment to the Inter-American system as built in the 1930s and to adjust it to the post-Vietnam situations. The system, with the isolationist tinge of the 1930s, was obsolete from the outset for the postwar U. S. hegemony, thereafter committed also to worldwide strategic and economic policy objectives. The incongruence between the global and hemispheric goals was most apparent in two aspects of the system: (1) the U. S. commitment to the no-intervention principle in the Americas, inclusive of the vulnerable Caribbean Basin; (2) the authoritative multilateral approach, in which the United States demands explicit support from all the Latin American countries for every U. S. unilateral action in the hemisphere.
    At first, the United States continued to uphold the system in the original shape, the Kennedy administration reinvigorating it with the “Alliace for Progress” initiative. The relative decline of U. S. power capabilities, however, compelled the Nixon administration to modify the system in the aspect (2) above mentioned, and the modification process was completed under the Carter administraion. The Reagan-Bush interventions in the Caribbean Basin in the critical years since 1979 can be characterized as further steps in the same modifying process of the system, this time in the aspect (1). Though different contexts light up different facets, the retrenchment policy has continued with the same goal: to maintain the hemispheric hegemony by streamlining the hemispheric system.
  • ラテンアメリカ-1980年代の国際関係と政治-
    遅野井 茂雄
    1991 年 1991 巻 98 号 p. 44-61,L8
    発行日: 1991/10/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    By innovative initiatives for foreign debt policy, economic recovery, and improvement of the life of the nation's poor people, the García governmnet raised high expectations within Peru and drew much attention from the financial world. After the first years' success, however, the governmnet was faced with economic difficulties, such as the fall of foreign reserves along with gradual international isolation and a fiscal deficit, before it finally collapsed through hyper-inflation, unprecedented economic deterioration, and political chaos.
    The author attributes García's failure to the ideological ambiguities inherent to populism, the political climate within which García's Apra Party gained power for the first time after its foundation sixty years earlier, economic mismanagement, radically confrontational and internally consumed foreign debt policies, and basically to his peculiar leadership which once mobilised popular support and managed to build national consensus on the nation's economic recovery, but in an entrenched situation, led to a fatal policy of nationalization of the banking system.
  • ラテンアメリカ-1980年代の国際関係と政治-
    田中 高
    1991 年 1991 巻 98 号 p. 62-78,L8
    発行日: 1991/10/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Since the civil war broke out in 1979 El Salvador has experienced many structual changes. Using reformist measures such as agrarian reform, nationalization of banks and foreign trade, three consecutive governments have. with the assistance of the U. S. government, worked hard for the democratization of the country during the past ten years. This was particularly true for the PDC (Christian Democratic Party) government. The party's leader and the well-known social democrat José Napoleón Duarte (JND) struggled hard to implement these reformist policies. However, the PDC lost public support, and ultimately the presidency, to the more conservative ARENA (The Nationalist Republican Alliance) party in 1989.
    This paper analyzes the 5-year experience of the PDC government, focusing on the results of agrarian reform and the nationalization of banks. This report also deals with the limits and failure of the Duarte's peace efforts which JND started as his own initiative. Finally, through this analysis the author concludes that the present ARENA government does not enjoy absolute support from the public. If the current economic reactivation programme fails, the Salvadorans will shift support from ARENA to other political parties in the next elections, making the '90s a period of uncertainty for El Salvador.
  • ラテンアメリカ-1980年代の国際関係と政治-
    飯島 みどり
    1991 年 1991 巻 98 号 p. 79-96,L9
    発行日: 1991/10/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In December 1989 the President of the United States ordered his army to intervene in Panama for four reasons, one of which was to restore democracy in this small isthmian country.
    The author describes the evolution of Panamanian political parties with special emphasis on Omar Torrijos' regime (1968-81), and analyzes their limits as political forces to take the initiative in carrying out national projects. Moreover, during the so-called Panama crisis (1987-89), they have been sharply divided into two antagonistic standpoints in respect to the figure of Manuel Antonio Noriega, commander in chief of the Panamanian Defense Force, but not to anygrand schemes on Panama's future. Finally, the author points out that even after the forced change brought about by the United States, political parties in Panama are not yet ready to accomplish effective democratization.
  • ラテンアメリカ-1980年代の国際関係と政治-
    浅香 幸枝
    1991 年 1991 巻 98 号 p. 97-112,L10
    発行日: 1991/10/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    “Nationalism” and “Ethnicity” have returned as international issues, although they were once considered to have been replaced by modernization and globalization. In the case of Japan, there was the Dr. Fujimori boom in the mass media, stressing the birth of the Japanese-Peruvian President of Peru. Successful Mr. Fujimori was looked on as a Japanese citizen, not as a Peruvian. The Republic of Peru has gotten close to us beyond the Pacific Ocean. Our consensus is to take successful people into our group, and the tendency that mass communications are often preoccupied with, focuses on Japanese persons involved in aircraft accidents; this news represents the Japanese way of behavior. Can we Japanese people complete true globalization and not be isolated in international society? Can we go along with other citizens with different languages, values and life-styles?
    In revealing international cooperation among the Nikkei (Japanese origin) people as “evolved Japanese”, this article shows historical milestones of how Japanese people living in Japan become mankind. “Ethnicity” (considered to accelerate the segmentation) is reviewed through this case study. The Pan American Nikkei conventions began in 1981, while retaining their own specific identity, they have been able to promote various international cooperative ventures. This investigation analyzes first hand materials: minutes of 5 conventions, pamphlets, invitation letters, local Nikkei newspapers, interviews, and other sources of information gathered from the headquarters of the Pan American Nikkei Association.
    I would like to reflect on the many beneficial outcomes of this joint venture—the Pan American Nikkei Association.
  • ラテンアメリカ-1980年代の国際関係と政治-
    乗 浩子
    1991 年 1991 巻 98 号 p. 113-128,L11
    発行日: 1991/10/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to study the role of oil diplomacy of Venezuela in 1960s and 1970s and to examine its implications for the international economic order.
    OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) was founded in 1960 by the leadership and philosophy of Pérez Alfonzo, minister of petroleum in the Betancourt administration, with strong support from Abdullah Tariki (Saudi representative). Prior to 1960, many Venezuelans had been conscious of their dependent and vulnerable pattern of development. From the conservationist and policy alternative stance, Pérez Alfonzo stressed that oil had a high intrinsic value not necessarily reflected in market prices. Therefore it was seen as necessary to assure satisfactory prices and controlled production of oil. For those purposes it is indispensable to place the petroleum industry under government control and to establish a public cartel made up of producing governments.
    In the 1960s the philosophy and policies of Pérez Alfonzo were not fully understood by other OPEC members and Venezuela found itself competing with lower price of Middle Eastern oil even in the South American markets. However in the 1970s most OPEC countries were rapidly becoming more knowledgeable and specially after the Fourth Arab-Israeli War sophisticated in petroleum policies. Though Venezuela, traditional oil supplier to the US market, did not participate in the Arab oil embargo, US government applied the “OPEC Amendment” to the 1974 Trade Act to exclude Venezuela from trade preferences.
    OPEC was the most effective creation by the third world countries to protect their natural resources. OPEC members acquired economic sovereignty and contributed to the making of a new international economic order, which also produced south-south problems.
  • ラテンアメリカ-1980年代の国際関係と政治-
    阿南 東也
    1991 年 1991 巻 98 号 p. 129-144,L12
    発行日: 1991/10/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Graham T. Allison, the author of Essence of Decision, once described the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 as “a seminal event”. In fact, numerous analytical studies of the crisis have already been written. Moreover, new information which has recently become available sheds new light on the conventional understanding of the crisis, making the event even more attractive to students of international politics and foreign policy. This article is a review of the new information that has recently arisen regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis. In addition, an analysis is made on what kind of influence this new information might have on the development of foreign policy theory.
    The largest pillar of this recent revision to the Guban Crisis is the three review conferences, which have been held since 1987. The first was the Hawk's Cay (Florida) Conference, held in March 1987, in which former Excomm members and scholars on international politics got together and recapitulated and re-analyzed the decision-making process in the Kennedy administration during the crisis. The second was the Cambridge Conference, which was held in October 1987, the 25th anniversary of the crisis. At this conference, three Soviets (Mikoyan, Burlatsky, Shakhnazarov) made testimonies on what was happening in Khrushchev's inner circle. The third one was held in Moscow in February 1989. The course of events in the Kremlin was clarified even more at this conference by first-hand accounts made by Andrei Gromyko and Anatoli Dobrynin, among others.
    In addition, newly declassified documents, as well as newly published memoirs by those involved in the crisis, both from the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R., include some startling revelations.
    The new information from the American side includes: President John F. Kennedy acutually planned secretly that he would offer a public trade between Soviet missiles in Cuba and U. S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey at the final stage of the crisis (“Rusk revelation”); Robert Kennedy, who had been thought as “the leader of the doves, ” initially insisted on a naval invasion of Cuba; the decision-making process was in fact not so systematic as scholars have analyzed, with the policy makers heavily burdened with psychological stress; etc. Now that the new information is available and we know that there is a diverse possibility in interpreting the decision-makers' motivations for their stances, we have to construct and make use of a more dynamic decision-making model, not a static one like the Bureaucratic Politics model, in order to explain what was really happening in the Oval Office during the thirteen days.
    On the other hand, the new revelations from the Soviet side include: Khrushchev's real motivation for deploying missiles in Cuba was to prevent a possible American invasion; Khrushchev got angry at Kennedy's announcement of quarantine and nearly ordered the running of the blockade; Khrushchev also suffered from the heavy pressure of being on the brink of a nuclear war and finally decided to withdraw the missiles from Cuba; 20 nuclear warheads had already arrived, and 40, 000 troops had been sent to Cuba; etc. Although the new revelations from the Soviet side are highly welcome since they fill blank spots in history, we need more information, not only oral testimony but also archival materials, to ascertain the hard facts in the Kremlin during “the Caribbean Crisis.”
  • 藤本 博
    1991 年 1991 巻 98 号 p. 145-150
    発行日: 1991/10/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 松下 洋
    1991 年 1991 巻 98 号 p. 155
    発行日: 1991/10/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
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