国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
1991 巻, 96 号
選択された号の論文の17件中1~17を表示しています
  • 1920年代欧州の国際関係
    濱口 學
    1991 年 1991 巻 96 号 p. 1-4,L5
    発行日: 1991/03/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Studies by Japanese scholars on European international relations in the 1920's has not been particularly advanced, except for some special issues such as the Briand-Kellogg Pact, when compared with work on the 1930's and on the origin of the Second World War. Our bulletin has already published three issues (1959, 1966, 1982) on European international relations, but these have contained very few articles on the 1920's. We have regreted the lack of attention on structural aspect of European international system-building in the 1920's and its important stability.
    The conditions of preservation, autonomy and influences of newborn small nations like Hungary, Lithuania and Czechoslovakia were analysed by Terao, Shima and Hayashi, from the viewpoint of the relations within the structure of the classical nation-state Versailles system.
    In European international relations, the ideology which was built into international relations after 1917 and led eventually to the Cold War was reinforced by the gap between the increasing economic functions and the decreasing military functions of the European international system and reinforced by the Dawes plan (under-structure) and Locarno treaties (superstructure) in the 1920's. The articles of Ishida and Kleinschmidt analyse the role of ideology in the interaction between Weimar Germany and its environment.
    Two articles by Shinonaga and Kamei on France and Great Britain which organized the central international system through Dawes and Locarno present opposing arguments against commonly hold view on the French ability to manage the European economic system and the British understanding on the structure and characteristics of European international relations in the 1920's.
    Disturbing factors against system-building in the 1920's will be found in the description of polish diplomatic policy by Matsukawa.
  • 1920年代欧州の国際関係
    寺尾 信昭
    1991 年 1991 巻 96 号 p. 5-20,L6
    発行日: 1991/03/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    After the victory of the counterrevolution the Horthy regime condemned Budapest as the center of the upheaval, and blamed Jewry for the lost areas of the country by the Treaty of Trianon. It conversely found the national identity in rural stability. The discords between the capital and the country side were sharply deepened by the gap of the land socialization policy for food supply to towns and the demand of land distribution in villages during the period of the revolutions.
    This article, therefore, analyzing the agricultural programs of the Social Democratic Party and the Smallholders' Party, who had represented the well-to-do farmers through the three agrarian reforms under the People's Republic, the Soviet Republic, and the Horthy regime, examines the absence of a class alliance between the industrial workers and the peasantry, conflicts in interests between the different elements (the farm hands and the landless peasants working for 120 days a year) of the socialized farms, and the opposition between the agricultural experts and workers, or between the young Jewish officials from Budapest and the native villagers. Anti-Semitism of the interwar period was connected with these circumstances.
  • 1920年代欧州の国際関係
    志摩 園子
    1991 年 1991 巻 96 号 p. 21-34,L6
    発行日: 1991/03/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The regions, Vidzeme, Kurzeme and Latgale, where the Latvian have been living for centuries, were under the control of the Russian Empire, when the Russian Revolution occurred in March, 1917. In Latvia the disorder of the Revolution resulted in the establishment of many political groups, organizations and parties. It was on 18th November in 1918 that Latvian Independence was proclaimed, although the Latvians had not even considered the idea of an independent state concretely before the Revolytion.
    After the March Revolution, the influence of the Latvian Bolsheviks became very popular in the whole of Latvia, in particular in Vidzeme, because Kurzeme had already been occupied by German troops and the other regions, where the Latvians lived, were faced with an increasing threat of German occupation. Though the Latvian Bolsheviks had insisted on Latvian territorial autonomy after the March Revolution and had won an overwhelming victory (ca. 72%) by the elections of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, they worked for self-determination after this election because of the Bolsheviks'defeat in the whole of Russia. In spite of the Latvian Bolsheviks'influence in Latvia, the anti-Bolshevbist groups could form the Latvian Provisional Government in November, 1918. They would have taken advantage of the interactions of Latvian groups.
    The main issue for the Latvian Provisional Government was to attain recognition as an independent state. Its efforts to get recognition involved the following three points. These characteristics of its foreign policy would influence the development of the Latvian Republic between the two wars. First, the Latvian Provisional Government oriented itself to depend on Britain consistently. Second, it availed itself of German power, though it had desired to exclude German influence in Latvia. Third, it reoriented its foreign policy according to the international situation from insisting on only self-determination to insisting on anti-Bolshevism, in addition to the threat that Germany would cooperate with the white Russians.
    These characteristics make clear that economy and security were very important for a small state, such as Latvia. While ecomomic relations with Latvia were necessary also for Britain and Germany, its location between Germany and Russia forced the security problems into Latvian affairs.
  • 1920年代欧州の国際関係
    松川 克彦
    1991 年 1991 巻 96 号 p. 35-50,L7
    発行日: 1991/03/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Poland's struggle to build up her independence after the Armistice, had a strong influence on her own foreign policy making process during the interwar period.
    This struggle was against the common aim of Soviet Russia and Germany to undermine the existence of Poland, as set up under the Versailles Treaty. The armed strife on the east and west borders of Poland was closely interconnected. There was direct Russo-German military and economic co-operation which also extended to Lithuania. As the latter also had territorial differences with Poland, Lithuania chose to act, as an intermediary between Soviet Russia and Germany which had no common borders.
    Czechoslovakia played a similar role to Lithuania on the Polish southern border. Czechoslovakia kept good relations with Russia and Ukraine which was offered a base to prepare an anti-Polish campaign over East Galicia. Thus if Poland were to antagonize Lithuania and Czechoslovakia, it would upset Russo-German co-operation.
    Poland tried to establish closer relations with Latvia and Estonia to diminish Lithuanian influence as well as maintaining good relations with Hungary and Rumania in opposition to Czechoslovakia. Although all of these countries were created after the world war and were in a similar situation, they were unable to form a common front against the growing menaces from east and west. The struggle between Poland on one side and Lithuania and Czechoslovakia on the other, continued through the interwar period.
    In addition, Poland was offended by the Entente, especially by the U. K. which not only refused to help Poland during her war with Soviet Russia but also compelled Poland to accept harsh Russian ceasefire terms. Britain wished to conclude a commercial agreement with Russia to be followed by British recognition of the state of Russia. For this reason, Britain tried to stop the war between Poland and Soviet Russia and to confine Poland's border to the so-called Curzon Line, which was the predecessor of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line. As France gradually leaned towards the British view point, Poland lost confidence in both countries.
    Lastly, this international situation widened the differences between the two main Polish political groups. Pilsudski, a leader of one of the groups, wanted to make Poland independent of foreign influence and regarded himself as the successor to traditional Polish patriots such as Mickiewicz and Kosciuszko. The leader of the second group, Dmowski, wanted to establish good relations with the U. K., France, Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia in order to confront the German menace.
    When Dmowski's foreign policy, which was grounded on the Polish-French Alliance, lost credibility through lack of French support and the effects of the Geneva and Locarno conferences, which seriously threatened Polish security, Pilsudski took the emergency step of a coup d'état in May 1926. He had decisive influence on military and foreign affairs and his aims were pursued by the “colonel group” after his death.
  • 1920年代欧州の国際関係
    石田 勇治
    1991 年 1991 巻 96 号 p. 51-68,L9
    発行日: 1991/03/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The election of an avowed monarchist, seventy-seven-years old Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg as the president of the Weimar Republic in April 1925 symbolizes the remarkable continuity in political attitude of the Germans from the time of empire to the republic. Many of them were uncritically attached to the old “Kaiserreich”.
    In spite of the total defeat and the revolution 1918-19 the aims and roles of imperial German policy in the outbreak of the World War had not yet been clarified. Every government during the Weimar period blocked full disclosure of the empire's war aims and engaged in a political cover up.
    It was the Independent Socialist Kurt Eisner, head of the revolutionary government in Munich, who released special reports in November 1918 showing the responsibility of the German Empire for the beginning of the World War. Eisner wished to discredit the old regime and persisted in purging the representatives of the “Kaiserreich”.
    Threatened by Eisner's revelation the foreign ministry insisted that such a free debate about the war guilt question would make the peace negotiations unfavorable to Germany. The new foreign minister Urlich Graf von Brockdorff-Rantzau decided to take the lead and refute any charges that Germany had made preparations for the war in 1914 and was responsible for it. He was determined to exonerate the imperial German policy.
    After the acceptance of the Versailles Treaty in June 1919 the foreign ministry planned an antiwar-guilt campaign. With the purpose of revising the treaty the foreign ministry mobilized the Germans beyond all classes and parties and lead a national movement (“Volksbewegung”) against the Allies' verdict on Germany's war guilt. A War Guilt Section (“Schuldreferat”) was established in the ministry which should direct research and discussion about this question at home and abroad in favour of German foreign policy.
    The purpose of this paper is firstly to describe how the war guilt question was dealt with in the German foreign ministry at the first stage of the Weimar Republic. It will show the process how the antiwar-guilt campaign was formed and developed.
    The second purpose is to analyze the meaning of this campaign for the Weimar political culture. Its influence on the radical-right thoughts and movements such as Nazism will be also discussed.
  • 1920年代欧州の国際関係
    クラインシュミット ハラルド, 仙石 学
    1991 年 1991 巻 96 号 p. 69-84,L10
    発行日: 1991/03/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The article seeks to demonstrate the wide range influence of the principles of cultural nation-building in Weimar Germany. Cultural nation-building is understood as a set of administrative measures designed to build a ‘nation’ in Germany, held to be ‘split and torn’ by class struggles and pressures from abroad, by means of the cultural traditions as manifested in classical literature and art. These principles were laid down in the Weimar Constitution of 1919 (dealt with in section 2); and they were supported by the professional organizations of lower middle class artisans (section 3), the Social Democrat based popular education movement (section 4), and various intellectuals (section 5).
    Hence, while it has always been known that nation-building was an issue argued for by the right, it becomes clear that the issue received wide support also in the center and the moderate left. Therefore, the conclusion seems safe that the isolationist tendencies in Weimar Germany (as forming the basis for Nation Socialism) resulted from a general current in political life.
  • 1920年代欧州の国際関係
    林 忠行
    1991 年 1991 巻 96 号 p. 85-98,L10
    発行日: 1991/03/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Czechoslovak foreign policy, led by Dr. Edvard Beneš during the interwar period, is characterized as “Western Oriented”. However, its policy toward Soviet Russia is crucial to understanding its diplomacy as a whole. This article aims to describe Czechoslovak policy toward Soviet Russia, 1920-1922, in the context of its relations with Western Powers, East Central European countries, and domestic politics.
    While Beneš advocated the idea of collective security and the League of Nations, he admitted the existence of power politics. After World War I, Czechoslovakia endeavoured to promote friendship with the victorious Western Powers, and to maintain freedom of diplomatic action in East Central Europe Though Beneš's diplomacy was less affected by domestic politics, he had to preserve a delicate balance between the left and right wings in his contacts with Soviet Russia.
    Negotiations between Czechoslovak and Soviet Governments started at the beginning of 1920. They agreed to exchange unofficial commercial missions in the summer of 1921. In August, 1920, Czechoslovakia proclaimed neutrality toward the Soviet-Polish war and began to create the Little Entente against French wishes to organize East Central Europe in cooperation with Poland and Hungary. Beneš's initiatives were appreciated by Soviet Russia and accelerated negotiations.
    At the end of 1921, negotiations on the commercial treaty between Czechoslovakia and Soviet Russia became deadlocked. The Soviet government demanded a neutral clause and recognition as the only representative of Russia in the treaty, which Beneš refused. He observed that the Soviet system was in transition and adovocated “economic intervention” in Russia through the commercial relations. Soviet diplomats criticized this policy of Beneš toward Russia.
    Beneš assumed the role of intermediary between France and Great Britain to clear the way for the Genoa Conference of April, 1922. In Genoa, Beneš tried to realize his economic intervention policy toward Russia as a compromise between France and Great Britain. After the conclusion of the Rapallo treaty, which made the agreement between France and Great Britain impossible, Beneš turned to the alternative of a separate agreement with the Soviet government. During the course of the Genoa Conference, he agreed with Chicherin, the People's Commissar for Foreion Affairs, on the provisional commercial treaties with Russia and the Ukraine, including a neutrality clause and recognition of single representation. With this treaty, Czechoslovakia recognized the Soviet Government de facto. However, Czechoslovakia could not recognize it de jure until 1934 because Beneš could not overcome opposition in the coalition cabinets and among the members of the Little Entente.
  • 1920年代欧州の国際関係
    篠永 宣孝
    1991 年 1991 巻 96 号 p. 99-123,L12
    発行日: 1991/03/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Before World War I, France was lacking in competitive manufactured goods and hardly possessed favorable factors in international rivalry. Her only trump card to play was the enormous capital (banking capital) collected systematically by banking branch networks spread all over the country. Making good use of this “financial arms”, the big banks in Paris led by the banques d'affaires invested not only in foreign loans but also in companies in overseas markets. In this economic expansion of France, they often formed respectively a “group” (considered as a phenomenal form of financial capital) —a mass of various satellite companies organized by a core enterprise, mainly by the banques d'affaires—, combining banking capital with industrial capital. We can enumerate such groups formed before 1914 as Paribas=Société Générale group and Schneider=Union Parisienne group in Russia, Banque Ottomane=Régie Générale (Vitali) group in Turkey, Banque de l'Indochine group in Asia, etc.
    After the war, preserving the strongest army in the Continent, the French government secured there the liberty of action for extension of her influence, in consequence of the Russian Revolution and the succeeding internal war, the defeat of Germany and the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; nevertheless, embarrassed by many problems such as security, reparation and war debts, reconstruction of the country, currency crisis, inflation, and financial difficulties, France didn't have so many means to avail herself of such an opportunity. In these conditions, the government willingly favored the overseas expansion attempted by the Schneider Company, the biggest arms-machine-iron-manufacturing enterprise in France (founded in 1836 by Schneider brothers). Buying up Skoda, the biggest arms-steel-manufacturing enterprise in Czechoslovakia, the Compagnie Minière et Métallurgique, etc. and creating in 1920 the Union Européenne Industrielle et Financière (financial holding company) in cooperating with the Union Parisienne, the second biggest banque d'affaires in France, the Schneider Company extended actively its business in Eastern and Central Europe and formed a gigantic group—in 1921 they controlled about 182 companies at home and abroad.
    As the example of Schneider suggests, accelerating the fusion between banking capital and industrial capital (producing financial capital), French companies, particularly banques d'affaires, pushed into East and Central European, Balkan, and French colonial markets and invested capitals in enterprises immediately after the Armistice. We therefore agree with the proposition of Bouvier=Girault=Thobie who, differing from Lenin and others, move the zenith of French imperialism into the interwar years.
  • 1920年代欧州の国際関係
    亀井 紘
    1991 年 1991 巻 96 号 p. 124-142,L13
    発行日: 1991/03/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In the inter-war period, as the successive governments of Great Britain recognized the break-up of unity of the Empire and failed to improve relations with the United States, they chose to construct an amicable partnership with Germany in order to protect its internal market from foreign threats and to partition a world market with Germany for its traditional export industries. This meant that Great Britain had decided to retreat into “a medium world” of Europe. The ultimate object of the foreign policy of Great Britain in the inter-war period was to prevent its status in the world from declining without the support of the Dominions. It was one of the most important motives of its “Appeasement policy”.
    The origins of such a policy were to be found in two affairs after the First World War. One was the international economic conference of European powers involving Germany and Russia held at Genoa and the other was the fall of Lloyd George's Coalition Government after the Chanak crisis in 1922. In this article, the policy of Great Britain during the Genoa Conference will be examined, and the latter will be analyzed in a forthcoming article.
    The late A. J. P. Taylor wrote that it was a myth that the Coalition Government advocated “a peace of revenge”. It was true that just after the armistice they also insisted that Germany should take the primary responsibity for the outbreak of the War. But by the beginning of 1920, they ceased to search for solving the problems of responsibility for war and began to construct a new international order. It is important that the world order for which Great Britain searched involved Germany and even the Soviet Union as formal participants not as defeated powers.
    The Supreme Council of Allied Powers was held at Cannes in January 1922. Its main aim was preparation for the forthcoming conference at Genoa. The intentions of Great Britain were expressed in the resolutions adopted on the first day of the Cannes Conference. They were as following: (1) Nations can claim no right to dictate to each other. (2) The property and the rights of foreign investers must be assured. (3) The sense of security should be re-established. (4) An adequate means of exchange, generally, financial and currency conditions must be available for sufficient security for trade. (5) All nations should undertake to refrain from hostile propaganda. (6) All countries should refrain from aggression against their neighbours.
    For Great Britain, especially for the head of the Coalition Government Lloyd George, the conference held at Genoa from 10 April to 19 May 1922 was the first opportunity to realize the peaceful world where trade was carried on reciprocally by adhering to the six Cannes resolutions. Great Britain formulated its economic policy unanimously to revive trade in Europe, and searched for political conditions to carry out the economic policy decided there.
    As examined in this article, a blueprint providing an economic framework for Europe was made successfully, but political problems could not be solved because of antagonism between France which pursued military security first, and Great Britain. The purpose of this article is to place the stress on the significance of the economic framework which was successfully constructed at Genoa under the leadership of Great Britain with the participation of Germany and the Soviet Union.
  • 石井 貫太郎
    1991 年 1991 巻 96 号 p. 143-164
    発行日: 1991/03/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 山内 康英
    1991 年 1991 巻 96 号 p. 165-181
    発行日: 1991/03/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 鈴木 茂
    1991 年 1991 巻 96 号 p. 182-186
    発行日: 1991/03/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 松村 正義
    1991 年 1991 巻 96 号 p. 186-190
    発行日: 1991/03/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 原 彬久
    1991 年 1991 巻 96 号 p. 190-195
    発行日: 1991/03/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 太田 正登
    1991 年 1991 巻 96 号 p. 195-199
    発行日: 1991/03/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 渡邊 啓貴
    1991 年 1991 巻 96 号 p. 200-207
    発行日: 1991/03/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 濱口 學
    1991 年 1991 巻 96 号 p. 208
    発行日: 1991/03/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
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