To commemorate the 100th issue of International Relations, the editorial board decided to compile a special volume on the Cold War and After: Japanese Perspectives.
The 14 articles contained in this volume are for the sake of convenience divided into three groups: theory, history and prospects. The article by Yoshinobu Yamamoto gives an overview of the evolutions of international relations theories during the past four decades which, he argues, can be related to the historical developments of international relations in the real world. Since the latter were to an important degree shaped by the Cold War, a dominant paradigm altered from time to time, reflecting the sequence of events in the East-West relations. After tracing the paradigmatic development from the intitial stage of realist domination through the rise of various versions of liberalism during the 1970's to the resurgence of neo-realism in the more recent times, Yamamoto forsees the coming of an age of liberalist-led integration of international theories following the end of the Cold War.
This basically sanguine prospect shown by Yamamoto is in line with one of the major theses dealt with by various writers who contributed to this volume. Influenced by John Gaddis' book The Long Peace, they are concerned with the reasons for the continuation of peace between the two superpowers during the Cold War era. Without necessarily denying the idea that such systemic and objective factors as bipolarity and nuclear deterrence were conducive to the long peace, some of the writers for this volume rather emphasized the learning capacity of the policy-makers of the both superpowers as an explanatory factor (Anami, Umemoto and Ishii). To some if not all, the long peace in the Cold War era was part of the longer trend in international relations, i. e. the trend towards no war among the major powers. The lessons of the two World Wars in the 20th century brought about attitudinal change regardiag the issue of war and peace, signs of which were discernible even in the behaviours of the Soviet and American leaders despite their Cold War rhetoric. Democracy is not necessarily regarded as a prerequisite for international peace. In fact, examining the thought of George Kennan on the problems of democracy, one of the contributors (Terachi) casts doubts on the thesis that democracy is by nature conducive to international peace.
If one takes a narrow definition of the Cold War with a focus on Soviet-American relations or East-West relations in Europe, the long peace thesis seems largely acceptable, although his or her explanation may differ from the one offered in the above. A more fundamental objection will be raised, however, by those who adhere to the idea that the ‘hot wars’ outside Europe were the essential ingredient of the Cold War. In fact this was the central theme of The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, a volume edited by Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye fifteen years ago. Wit-nessed two hot wars in Korea and Indochina during their life time, many contemporary Japanese (and probably other Asian) historians would choose this broader definition of the Cold War. This thesis is worth remebering, although, apart from a brief reference by Ishii, it was not fully discussed in the present volume. This is so particularly because the relative weight of the Cold War in the entire history of the post WW II era differs from one region to another. Hece the difference in the impact of the end of the Cold War upon the regional international affairs in the years to come, which is the topic of the the third section of the present volume.
Koizumi (who deals with the present and future in the latter half of her article) and Ueta are concered with post-Cold War Europe, whereas all others are either with Asia/Pacific (Sakanaka, Kurata, Tamaki, Hara and Purrington) or with more broad themes (Oizumi and Takehiko Yamamoto).

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The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the Cold War and the IR theories, particularly those developed in the United States, and to try to obtain some perspective into the future development of IR theories in the post-Cold War era.
The developments of, and fluctuations in, the Cold War have had determining impacts on the evolution of the IR theories in the United States. In the 1950s and 1960s when the Cold War had be reining the international political arena, the realist theories had been dominating, even though such liberal theories as political/economic integration and political development theories were advanced with a limited geographical application. However, in the late 1960s and in the early 1970s, due to the structural changes in international politics, the realist was seriously challenged and interdependence and dependency theories have been presented as contending paragigms: the former assumes the possible cooperation among nations and focuses its attention upon not only non-state actors but also such global issues as environment and energy as well as economic interdependence; the latter conceives international relations as a hierarchical structure (the core/periphery relations) due to the world capitalist system. In this era, therefore, the different paradigms of international relations have competed strongly each other, criticizing the others' basic principles and assumptions.
But, as the new Cold War was emerging in the late 1970s, the realist has once again become influential and now is called the neo-realist school. Throughout the 1980s, interdependence theories become ever more state-centric so that they have come close to the neo-realist perspective, while the dependency/world system models have incorporated the hypotheses of upward mobility, rather than perpetuation, of the periphery and of the hegemonic stability so that they have become not so challenging not only to the interdependence theories but also to the neo-realist perspecitve.
The ending of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have shaken the neo-realist synthesis. In the international security area, for example, the balance of power has shifted from the adversarial version to the associative one and the collective security/peace-keeping mechanisms have been given a serious consideration, the first time after World War Two. And, while new theories have been sought to explain the international politics in an ever integrated world economy, such global issues as environment have once again become one of the top research priorities.
After the Second World War, the American international political science has gone through four great debates, once every decade: (1) the realist-idealist debate in the late 1940s and in the early 1950s; (2) the behavioralist-traditionalist debate in the 1960s; (3) the realist-globalist debate in the 1970s; and (4) the post-modern debate in the 1980s. The content of the great debates has alternated between the substance ((1) and (3) above) and methodology ((2) and (4)). Thus, in the 1990s, we must expect another great debate concerning the substance of international relations.

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The major thesis of this article is that the year 1955 marked a watershed in the history of the Cold War, in a sense that by then a fundamental, qualitative change had taken place, and that it set the tone for the future Cold War.
By 1955, not only the “easing of tension” but also several changes in the nature of the East-West contest had become discernible. These changes were: (1) relative stability in Europe—the major battleground in the Cold War and also, to a much lesser extent, though, in Asia; (2) a growing awareness on the part of the leaders in Washington, London, and Moscow of the massive destructiveness of a nuclear conflagration, which had made them extremely cautious in their behavior, especially in Europe; and therefore, (3) the super-power rivalry shifting from the major battleground in Europe to the risk-free “Third World”, hence the globalization of the Cold War. Accordingly, the Cold War hereafter took on more of the characteristic of economic and psychological warfare and covert operations.
The above-mentioned changes resulted from: (1) the congealment of the two “security spheres” in Europe, and, to a lesser extent, on a global scale; (2) the emergence of thermonuclear weapons, making actual war unbearably costly and difficult.
This article basically supports the bipolar stability theory, and yet it contends that bipolarity alone would not guarantee stability, and stresses the “soft, ” human, and psychological aspect of the leadership on both sides.

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During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union confronted each other as arch enemies and yet avoided direct military engagements. According to some analysts, the development of nuclear weapons did much to arouse, intensify, and/or perpetuate the hostility between the two. It is commonsensical, moreover, that the growth of nuclear stockpile dramatically increased the danger that the U. S. -Soviet confrontation might someday result in a global conflagration.
On the other hand, nuclear forces contributed to the absence of hot war between the superpowers. Among other things, their accumulation of nuclear arms may well have strengthened the stability of the international system by reinforcing its bipolar structure. The presence of nuclear weapons doubtless induced the leaders in Washington and Moscow to act with the utmost caution in crisis situations, thereby allowing for “rules of the game” and even “security regimes” to evolve.
Divergence of opinion on whether the development of nuclear weapons has transformed the nature of world politics has underlain the debates about the utility of nuclear threats in superpower crises that recurred in the heyday of the Cold War. The “nuclear revolution” thesis asserts that the inevitability of mutual devastation has made any attempt to fight and win a nuclear war totally irrational. Its proponents either minimize the significance of nuclear threats or attribute their effects to the “balance of resolve” between the U. S. and Soviet leaders. Those opposed to the “nuclear revolution” thesis deny the inevitability of annihilation and contend that victory in nuclear conflict can rationally be pursued. In their view, the effects of nuclear threats derive from the “balance of [nuclear] power.”
The disagreements on the nature of nuclear world have also affected the disputes over certain criteria for peacetime nuclear policy. Developed mostly in the latter half of the Cold War period, those criteria include the enhancement of “strategic stability, ” the maintenance of “extended deterrence, ” the control of “vertical” proliferation, and the prevention of “horizontal” proliferation. In particular, challenges to the orthodox interpretation of “strategic stability” and to the main features of strategic arms control in the 1970s and 1980s highlighted the absence of consensus on the validity of the “nuclear revolution” thesis.

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The end of the Cold War has enabled us to re-examine the nature of the world politics of the past four decades.
Recently, a school of historians cogently argued that the Cold War was a period of a “long peace”, not so much an era of hegemonic rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, but instead cooperation, or at least peaceful competition, between both superpowers for power and influence in the world. This thesis has influenced theoretical developments in the studies of international politics, as more scholars began to emphasize the cooperative aspects in U. S. -Soviet relations. This is a review article of works which attempt to place U. S. -Soviet cooperative relations in a theoretical framework.
First, a review is made of works which try to apply the “international regimes” theory to an analysis of U. S. -Soviet relations, in other words, examine aspects of U. S. -Soviet relations as an international security regime. Works by such scholars as Robert Jervis, Dan Caldwell, Alexander L. George et al, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Graham T. Allison et al, are examined. This school raises new challenges to the earlier literature of international regimes through its principal focus on “high-politics” issues instead of “low politics” issues. In addition, this school examines not only systemic variables but also some domestic influence on regime change. The school increasingly treats U. S. -Soviet relations not as an overall security regime but as a “mosaic of regimes” divided into several issue areas. The literature, more recently, has addressed U. S. -Soviet cooperative measures to prevent and manage direct and indirect conflict between the two states, which means that such studies can be fruitfully developed within the context of international crisis management studies in the future.
Secondly, another review is made of works which pay attention to “reciprocity” in U. S. -Soviet behavioral patterns. Reciprocity is defined here as a form of action that is contingent on an others' behavior. Works done by William J. Dixon, Michael D. McGinnis & John T. Williams, Joshua S. Goldstein & John R. Freeman, Sheen Rajmaira & Michael D. Ward, Steve Weber, are reviewed. These studies are mostly quantitative-empirical studies which utilize event data, with special references to U. S. -Soviet arms races. But because such studies focus more on stability and reciprocal interaction, they differ from earlier “Richardsonian” arms race studies. Although these studies on U. S. -Soviet reciprocity are limited by their treatment of actors as unitary and rational, they can be converged into “U. S. -Soviet relations as an international regime” literature when reciprocity is regarded as one of the “norms” in the U. S. -Soviet security regime.

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George F. Kennan is known as the father of “containment” and as one of the architects of “cold war.” At the same time he has been a well-known critic of postwar American foreign policy. Most studies on him have focused on the meaning of “containment” and his role in the making of postwar policy. But this tends to neglect one major theme which runs through most of Kennan's writings, i. e. —the question of democracy and foreign policy. Kennan, like de Tocqueville, had grave doubts about democracy's capability in conducting diplomacy. This paper analyzes Kennan's views on the problems of democracy in making foreign policy and tries to shed some new light on the study of democracy and postwar U. S. foreign policy.
Kennan's views closely follow de Tocqueville's views on democracy's capability in conducting diplomacy. Partly relying on Hamilton's and Madison's thinking on democracy, Kennan argues that democracy is little capable of having fixed, long-term “objectives” in foreign policy. It is incapable of keeping secrets. Power is dispersed in democracy and foreign policy is always under the influence of the changing moods and feelings of public opinion and Congress. Congress presents problems because its members are susceptible to the pressures of various minority groups and lobbies. They utilize foreign policy process for their own domestic political purposes. Public opinion is “erratic and subjective.” It is all the more unreliable because it is easily influenced by the commercial mass media and the advertising industry. Kennan criticizes the moralistic-legalistic tendencies of U. S. foreign policy because American democratic institutions and values are not necessarily applicable to the international scene and exportable to other areas of the world. The U. S. should be modest in judging the goodness of other governments and promoting democracy in other countries as a universal aim of U. S. policy. For Kennan, democracy has not yet passed its test and America should secure its internal health first and present itself as an example.
Kennan's analysis of democracy's deficiencies in making foreign policy has its own defects. Still, his criticism prompts us to reconsider the place of democratic values in foreign policy—what constitutes “democratic” foreign policy and to what extent postwar U. S. foreign policy has reflected “democratic values”?

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The East European countries waged the Cold War as members of the Eastern block. But they also waged the Cold War against the Soviet Union. The Purpose of this paper is to analyze the beginning and end of this Cold War of East Europe from the viewpoint of the Soviet perception.
The Soviet rule over East Europe was the result of the Soviet threat perception, as well as the vacuume of power and Soviet capability to fill it up. In other words, the Soviets felt strong threat from the West and came to a conclusion that East Europe is a special and vital area for the Soviet national security through the experience over the Second World War. Then the end of this Cold War must be based upon the overcome of this perception by the new Russian leadership and the society. The paper will address to these processes.
As for the beginning of the Cold War of East Europe, we are going to pay attention to the period from August 1939 to June 1941, namely from the conclusion the Soviet-German Non-Agression Pact to the start of the Soviet-German War. This is because we think that these years got a decisive meaning for the formation of the Soviet security perception after WWII.
Then after fifty years, the time for change came with the Perestroika started by Gorbachev. The Soviet Union (then Russia) no longer has the capability to hold the East European nations as her protege nor alliance. Her threat perception is also being mitigated under the new post-Cold War situation in Europe. For all of this the paper will still give a suggestion for uncertainty over whether Russia has finally overcome her perception of vulneravility and of East Europe as her special zone.

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The symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall has brought a sweeping chage in the European security landscape. The dissolution of the Soviet Union itself followed the collapse of the Warsaw Pact Organization. After the breakdown of the Eastern organizations, the Western organs, NATO, WEU, and EC began to transform themselves and are trying to adapt a new security environment. Although NATO adopted its new strategy in November 1991 and is seeking new roles and identity, NATO will remain a “collective defense” organization in the forseeable future. A collective defense organ provides mutual assistance in case of external aggression, while a “collective security” institution such as the United Nations does not exclude a “potential enemy” among the participants and can therefore take enforcement measures against an aggressor in the organization.
The third type security forum, which is defined as a “cooperative security” structure, namely the CSCE, emerged from the East-West confrontation. The cooperative security structure covers any country and develops consultations and mutual confidence on a consensus basis. The new forum, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), consisting of NATO and mainly the former Warsaw Pact countries, is the second forum of the cooperative security structure.
This paper examines the two “cooperative security” forums in transition. After the Paris summit, the CSCE has been on its way to institutionalization, and has established its administrative secretariat in Prague, the Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, and the Office for Democratic Institution and Human Rights in Warsaw. The CSCE has elaborated its military confidence- and security-building measures, which are the basis of the cooperative security structure, and it adopted the fourth CSBM document in Vienna in March 1992. This “Vienna CSBM Document 1992” has opened the door to qualitative disarmament. After the crisis and civil war in Yugoslavia, the participants have tried to provide the CSCE with operational conflict prevention and crisis management mechanisms. The French proposal, a “CSCE Security Pact, ” is aiming at transforming the CSCE into a treaty based security organization, which eventually would lead the CSCE to a “collective security” organ. Germany and other countries submitted an idea, “the CSCE as a regional arrangement under the Chapter VIII of the United Nations.” Many countries, however, always attach importance to the flexibile structure of the CSCE and to its consensus-building decision making system.
NACC is a forum for “former enemies”. NACC was convened for the purpose of providing NATO with a new mission, and of encouraging former Warsaw Pact countries since NATO members are not ready to enlarge its membership and to extend security guarantee to Central and Eastern Europe. NACC's present task is to develop dialogue and cooperations, which are mainly limited to the NATO's military related expertise. Whether NACC will merge into the CSCE or not remains an open question.
The role and objectives of these cooperative security forums are to develop partnership through cooperation, and to stabilize the security in Europe after the cold war. Evolving Europe needs flexible cooperative security forums as long as the situation is in flux.

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While the end of the Cold war has opened new vistas for easing tension in the West Pacific, it has made the post-World War II order fluid and brings with it the danger of destabilizing the West Pacific region. When considering the opportunities and risks brought on by the end of the East-West confrontation, it is now time to seek a structure for peace and security in the West Pacific.
The absence of an east-west, bipolar confrontation similar to the confrontation in Europe is the major geopolitical characteristic of the West Pacific. The region, however, has been caught up in the Sino-Russian border disputes and in the confrontation on the Korean Peninsula. In addition, the region is composed of countries with very different geographical characteristics, with the Russian Republic as a continental power, the United States and Japan as maritime powers, and the two Koreas as pninsular countries.
In addition, different stages of social and economic development between nations makes it difficult to build values similar to those in Europe. Alliances, friendships and animosities shift easily because of this. Since emerging colonial control, there are many nations without a long history of independence where nationalism is very strong.
Given the specific circumstance of the West Pacific, peace and stability in the international environment should be sought in the region. The following measures are necessary for such peace and stability to become a reality.
(1) The security system built around US alliances and treaties must be maintained.
(2) A wide range of cooperative relationships in economics and politics, among other areas, should be constructed between nations in the region as a foundation for regional security system.
(3) A political dialogue between nations in the region which includes the United States and the Russian Republic should be promoting for peace and security in the region.
(4) The encouragement of arms control is also crucial for stability in the international environment. In the West Pacific, the establishment of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) is an arms control policy possible in the near future.

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“The end of the Cold War” could be paraphrased as “the revolution to U. S. -Soviet Joint Action” in regards to their policies towards the Korean Peninsula, recalling that the tragedy of the national division of Korea was brought about by the failure of “U. S. -Soviet Joint Action”. This meant the so-called “Cross Contact” in a situation where the enmity between North and South Korea transcended that between the U. S. and Soviet Union. The new international environment eventually resulted in the establishment of diplomatic ties between South Korea and Soviet Union. Accordingly, the comprehensive security framework in Asia and Pacific advocated by Gorbachev was largely localized, for Roh Tae-woo's initiatives for Nordpolitik were accompanied by proposals for an international conference regionally defined within Northeast Asia.
Roh Tae-woo's address before the U. N. General Assembly in 1988 signified an attempt to improve the inter-Korean relations. Roh, in his address, proposed to adopt a “nonaggression declaration” within “the framework of mutual trust and security”. For the declaration to have the effect of a formal nonaggression pact, the proposed framework would have to be defined in concrete measures.
In spite of Seoul's new initiative, however, there can be no real hope for advancing inter-Korean relations as long as North Korea sticks to the Tripartite Talks within which the North regards the talks between Pyongyang-Washington as the prerequisites for progress in unification issues. The policy speech made by Kim Il-sung in May 1990 was highly significant in that Pyongyang dropped its insistence on the Tripartite Talks.
Moreover, North Korea unveiled a disarmament proposal incorporating a number of measures for mutual confidence building. North Korea's plan was principally concerned with taking direct actions on the adoption of a nonaggression declaration and on phasing large-scale military cutback. But confidence-building measures, as South Korea is aware, are not intended to bring about automatic military cutbacks.
Although efforts to improve inter-Korean relations resulted in the commencement of High-level Talks, disparities remain unsolved even after the adoption of the comprehensive North-South accord. The actual accord, for example, endorsed Seoul's position emphasizing the implementation of confidence-building measures on the one hand, and endorses Pyongyangs' insistance on reducing armaments on the other.
The North-South accord provides a case where the European experience should be applied, localized though it may be, in that the accord has comprehensive contents as seen in the CSCE. North and South Korean are supposed to seek for a sort of bargaining with the main agenda moving within the framework.

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In the 1990s, ASEAN moves to three major directions. Firstly, ASEAN manages to build the cooperative relations with the Indochinese countries in the framework of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Secondly, ASEAN searches wider dialogue with the Asian countries, China, South Korea, Taiwan, India and so on.
But, relations with Western countries, especially the Unites States, is mixture of rapprochement and estrangement. To clear this problem, ASEAN nations use “defence diplomacy.”
Thirdly, in the post Cambodian era, ASEAN needs new rallying points. ASEAN cooperation seems to be impeded by frictions among ASEAN countries caused by border dispute, immigration labor, new concepts of regional cooperation, and intra ASEAN military buildup.
Now, ASEAN seeks new role in the Asia-Pacific region, but ASEAN holds “utilitarian” approach to extra-ASEAN nations and intra-ASEAN relations. To build a new regional order initiated by ASEAN, it should reconstructed the basic concept of regional order, ZOPFAN.

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The U. S. -Japan Security Treaty as well as The Treaty of Peace with Japan were concluded in 1951 in San Francisco. It is wrong to think that The U. S. -Japan security system began with. the conclusion of that treaty, because we can not identify the security system with the security treaty.
The security system between the U. S. and Japan came into existence with the unconditional surrender of Japan and the occupation of Japan by the U. S. in 1945. We shall think of the U. S. -Japan security system as one started by the “substantial” coupling on the political and military level between both countries.
In this essay there are three parts. First, we will examine the historical factors, particularly the Emperor system and the cold war, giving rise to the security system. Second, we will consider the nature of the treaty as a smaller part of the security system. Especially we will study the “one-sided burden” of the U. S. to Japan and the mechanism of Japanese compensation in the treaty. Third, we will forcus on American expectations of a “strong Japan” and American fear of Japanese neutralization under the security system.
Following the collapse of the cold war, it is more necessary to examine closely the structure of the security system between the U. S. and Japan in the context of the cold war.

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The future of the Japan-U. S. security alliance, which during the Cold War formed the basis of Japanese security policy (and foreign policy) is examined. During the Cold War period, the alliance moderated competition between both countries, as each side had an incentive to compromise in order to maintain the alliance. The degree to which the presence of a mutual threat (the Soviet Union) was responsible for this is subject to debate. In light of the declining Soviet threat and the rise of Japanese power vis-a-vis the United States, revisionists on both sides of the Pacific charge that the alliance is no longer necessary (or cannot be maintained) and that conflict between the rising power, Japan, and the declining hegemon, the United States, is inevitable in the post Cold-War world.
The article argues that hegemonic conflict between both countries is not inevitable and indeed is unlikely. Instead, a global Nichibei partnership, centered around the alliance is most likely. Continued cooperation with the United States remains Japan's only viable security option in the post Cold-War world. Both Japan and the United States will continue to value the alliance. But in response to changes in the international structure, the nature of the alliance will undergo some changes: military roles of the alliance will remain important (although less important than during Cold War era), while other functions of the alliance will assume added importance in providing for the comprehensive security of both nations and regional stability. Because of the continuing value of the alliance, it will also remain the “basic political framework for cooperation” between Japan and the United States in both bilateral and international matters, thereby moderating conflict between both nations.
The main threat to the alliance will arise from inequities in current burdensharing and powersharing arrangements. As Japan plays an increasingly more visible and proactive role in the maintenance of international order (increased burdensharing), it is dissatisfied with decisionmaking arrangements in the international order from which it often has little input. Such resentment could lead to a backlash of anti-U. S. nationalism among the rising generation of Japanese leaders (a scenario that resembles the 1920s when Japanese resentment at not being fully accepted into the great power “club” of nations helped play the government, cast adrift following the termination of the Anglo-Japan alliance, into the hands of Japanese ultra-nationalists in the 1930s). This is the only scenario under which Japan would directly challenge the United States. Whether or not the Japan-U. S. partnership succeeds will therefore depend ultimately on U. S. willingness to allow Japan a greater voice in international affairs. The outcome will have a major impact on the nature of the international order in the 21st century.

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International relations have become “normal” in a respect of power-politics after the end of the cold war, and it is thought that regional conflicts would increase far from the superpowers' intentions. What is the role of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security respecting sovereignty and collective responsibility of the member-states in such an era?
First of all, there exist three types of the UN functions. (1) The resolution of conflicts under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter (peace-making function). (2) Non-military and military sanctions against the parties under Chapter 7 (peace-enforcement function). (3) The management of conflicts without any legal basis under UN Charter (peace-keeping function). Secondly, function (2) seems to have become more important in the post-cold war because the Security Council can work as the Charter says as in the case of the Gulf Crisis. However, there is risk that the UN can be used as a tool of specific big-power and groups, and that international and national interests are apt to be confused. The character of regional conflicts has also changed. Thirdly, the importance of function (3), what is called the PKO, has increased. The PKO in the cold war, so to speak traditional-style PKO, has basic characteristics, such as, non-enforcement, neutrality, respect of sovereignty, internationality and exclusion of big-powers. Hammarskjöld called it “Chapter 6 and half”. It can be called “the management of conflicts”, but not “the resolution of conflicts”. The new-style PKO after the end of 1980's has been gradually diversified and seems to have some new tendencies, such as, the range of activities has expanded (combination between the management and resolution of conflicts) as in the case of Namibia and Cambodia. The fact that the PKO in Iraq was sent under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter informs us that the PKO may be used as a part of peace-enforcement (sanction) in the future by the will of the big-powers.
The UN's main function in the post-cold war era should be the PKO combining both the management and resolution of conflicts, but not as a part of peace-enforcement. The PKO may play the role to change the historical “war-system” to a “peace-system” in the future. Peace-making would be more important, useful and desirable than military peace-enforcement. But, the spirit of peace-enforcement itself, that is collective responsibility for international peace, should remain.

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The Cold War system, which has precipitated the fragmentation of post-war international political economy, seems to be under the final process of breakdown. Although this system functioned as mutually closed system in the first stage of the Cld War, both the West and the East has accumulated the cooperative achievements in terms of economic interactions on step by step basis, especially with the development of East-West detente in the 1970's.
Both super-powers have fought harsh arms race for about 40 years. In other words, they have continued to invest a large segment of their resources on military-related sectors for about half a century. As a result, the Soviet Union had failed to develop their national economy and had been finally bankrupted.
After the end of the Cold War, the process of fusion between East and West in the realm of international economic system has been drastically and dramatically accelerated. And after the demise of the Soviet Union, the political and economic influences of the reborn Federation of Russia has been seriously eroded. At present stage, therefore, it apears that the post-Cold War system of international political economy will be dominated and managed by the Group of Seven Directorate for the time being. The international community will be compelled to pay big costs for rebuilding more healthy and stable regimes of international political economy under the heavily loaded legacy of the Cold War.

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The objectives of this paper are to figure out what substantive issues and theoretical approaches are receiving scholars' attention in Japan and to present proposals to build a viable transnational community of students of international relations.
To avoid writers' personal conceptions of these problems, the following methods were used; first, a questionnaire was addressed to the members of the Japan Association of International Relations (JAIR) to bring together JAIR members' perceptions of the problems in 1988. The rate of return was about 27 percent; 329 out of about 1, 200 JAIR members answered the questionnaire. The results of the questionnaire were suggestive.
Second, to avoid a gap between perception and behavior, the academic works done by JAIR members were also examined to understand what substantive issues were actively studied and which theoretical approaches were frequently used in research. Third, a research team was organized to examine the result of the questionnaire and the characteristics of international studies made by JAIR members.
The result of this research was presented to the Third World Assembly of International Studies held in Williamsburg, Virginia, August 1988. This article is a Japanese version of a summary of the original paper.
The first section of this paper explains the objectives and methodology. The second section briefly reviews international studies of Japan before the 1980s. The third section figures out JAIR members' primary fields of research. The fourth section investigates JAIR members' perceptions of the important substantial issues and their works in regard with these issues.
The fifth and six sections are devoted to the examination of JAIR members' perceptions on theoreticl approaches, the theoretical characteristics of the works done by JAIR members, and major analytic weakness of research. The seventh section argues the principal users of scholarly research on international questions. The eighth section discusses the way in which Japanese scholars contribute to building a viable transnational community of scholars.

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