国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
1993 巻, 104 号
選択された号の論文の15件中1~15を表示しています
  • CISの行方
    木村 汎
    1993 年 1993 巻 104 号 p. 1-15,L5
    発行日: 1993/10/10
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The disintegration of the Soviet Union was inevitable, since those three elements which had served to integrate the approximately 120 nationalities into one artificial entity, i. e., the U. S. S. R., had recently severely weakened its cementing functions. These were the threat from outside, the Communist ideology, and the organs which had supervised the enforcement of that ideology, i. e., the CPSU, KGB, and the Soviet armed forces. The first two cements had for long reduced its centripetal functions, and the third ones lost it through their badly organized August 1991 abortive coup attempt. When the Soviet Union collapsed, three choices existed: its reorganization into a loose form of federation, for example, the Union of Federation advocated by Gorbachev; the complete interdependence of the 12 republics; and the formation of the CIS. The main reasons why the 11 former republics chose the CIS option seems to be the following: (1) the 11 former republics found themselves unable to become economically independent for the time being, at least in the period right after the demise of the USSR, partly due to the heresy they inherited, namely economic reliance upon each other, which was the result of the Stalin's skillful application of the “socialist principle of divided labor.” (2) Even if these republics had decided to become completely independent, the chances were that they would not have been recognized as independent states, and hence nor admitted to such international organizations as the UN, IMF, CECS, by the U. S. and other important Western countries, which were greatly concerned with the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other undesirable consequences of the breakup of the USSR. (3) These former republics needed some sort of a mechanism or forum through which they could solve those mounting problems and issues which were left over with the sudden disintegration of the U. S. S. R.
    What is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)? No one so far seems to have provided a definitive, satisfactory, clear answer to this question. It is understandable for the following three reasons. (1) The CIS is not necessarily a concept with a positive substantive content but rather a counter concept against the USSR, the Center and its personal embodiment, Gorbachev. (2) The leaders of the CIS participating member states hurriedly decided to build the CIS, without having any agreed-upon concept of that institution. (3) They interpret differently the CIS scheme, according to their own ideas and even wishful thinkings.
    As indicated above, the CIS thus contains, from the very beginning, the seeds of disagreements and even its own disintegration. Particularly, the following three constitute such a centrifugal element: (1) the sudden disappearance of the common enemy (the USSR, the center, Gorbachev), against which each constituent republic used to unite in the past; (2) different understanding or interpretation of the CIS scheme among CIS member states; (3) existence of potential and even actual seeds of contradictions, disagreements and cinflicts among CIS states with regard to their territorial boundaries, mother language tongue policies, and concern over the rise of Russian hegemonism.
    What will be the CIS's future? Three scenarios are likely to take place. The first is what one may call “Yugoslavianization, ” i. e., the disintegration of the CIS and the starting of the civil war between and within some CIS member states. This dreadful scenario has in part begun. The second is what one may call “block building”, i. e., CIS member states build close ties, mostly economic, with neighboring countries within and without the CIS. The third is an effort to reorganize the CIS in a more tight or loose fashion. One may conclude that a combination of all these three scenarios are simultaneously occurring now.
  • CISの行方
    上野 俊彦
    1993 年 1993 巻 104 号 p. 16-34,L6
    発行日: 1993/10/10
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Soviet Communist Party was deemed an illegal organization and had its property confiscated by a series of decrees and resolutions which were issued immediately after the ‘August Coup’ ended in failure. The Soviet Communist Party was not able to protest against these measures and was compelled to dissolve.
    It is indeed strange that the Soviet Communist Party, which had nearly twenty million members and had firmly ruled the whole of Soviet society, crumbled to pieces as the result of mere legislation. However, we can understand this dissolution when we remember that the Soviet Communist Party lacked strong unity and ‘iron discipline’ and had lost its influence with the people prior to the coup. The dissolution of the Soviet Communist Party was not a result of legal measures stemming from the coup attempt but was a consequence of its weakening through the period of perestroika.
    This process was also the process of the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself as a multinational state. It was the Soviet Communist Party that performed the functions of integrating this multinational state which consisted of various nations with many languages, religions and historical and cultural traditions. In other words the dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted from the dissolution of the Soviet Communist Party.
    The dissolution of the Soviet Communist Party was a complicated process. The analysis of this process needs multi-faced and complex approaches. Three years ago the author analyzed institutional and demographic changes in the Soviet Communist Party in the period of perestroika. The present article, as a sequel to the former paper, is especially devoted to an analysis of statistics and surveys of seceders from the party as well as analysis of public opinion on the party's prestige.
    The statistics for party members show that a reduction of the number of party members had begun in 1989 and that the largest reduction of party members in the history of the Soviet Communist Party outside wartime occurred in 1990 (especially in the period after the XXVIII Party Congress in July, 1990). The surveys of party members' views of their own party make clear that they also had great anxiety about their future in light of the changes in their political lives. The surveys of public opinion prove that the authority and prestige of the Soviet Communist Party among the people had declined before the coup.
    The XXVIII Party Congress introduced a ‘federation system’ for party structure and as a result the First Secretary of each republic's Communist Party gained Politburo membership. However, this structural reform was not able to prevent the Soviet Communist Party from spliting up.
  • CISの行方
    皆川 修吾
    1993 年 1993 巻 104 号 p. 35-49,L7
    発行日: 1993/10/10
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper attempts to find out how the clientelist groups work and what part they play in the process of political institutionalization. First, the paradigm of institutionalization process is tentatively presented in the paper. The paper then locates the political culture in the process of institutionalization. Clientelist behaviour which has been said to be a part of political culture was a key to understanding Soviet politics. Therefore, clientelism associated with Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's leadership was comparatively examined. In conclusion, whether the clientelism is functional or dysfunctional to the political system of transitional period was discussed.
    A patron-client relationship is an alliance between two persons of unequal status, power or resources, each of whom finds it useful to have as an ally someone superior or inferior to himself.
    Under the Soviet regime, clientelist operations were accommodated, if not ideologically, by peculiar institutional set-ups. It was indeed an important aspect of systemic adjusting mechanism in Soviet policy processes.
    Power politics among contending clientelist groups are in appearance more marked during the transitional period than during Soviet period. That may be so. The paper proves that clientelist politics which are by nature dependable variables, require solid institutional back-ups. Without it, the clientelist groups cannot assert themselves as self-perpetuating elites. It is the latter who can exert a decisive influence upon the course of the Russian political system. One has to admit, however, that the emergence of such an elite cannot be expected unless these groups can pride themselves on the destiny of their own country.
  • CISの行方
    森下 敏男
    1993 年 1993 巻 104 号 p. 50-65,L8
    発行日: 1993/10/10
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    1. The Liquidation of Socialist Constitutions
    By the time the Soviet Union disintegrated at the end of 1991, the constitutions of both the Soviet Union and the Republic of Russia had lost their socialist characteristics, due to the numerous revisions which had been made to them since 1988. At this time, the ideals and systems which had been negated under the socialist constitutions were revived, such as the rule of law, the separation of powers, parliamentarism, constitutional review, and the independence of the judiciary. The concept of human rights, which had also been negated under the socialist constitutions, was also revived, and the Soviet Union and the Republic of Russia each issued a declaration of human rights in 1991, which permitted the freedom of certain economic rights, such as the right to private property and the right to choose one's occupation, which had not been permitted previously. These declarations of human rights also expanded various civil liberties, the right to a trial and other rights which had previously been severely restricted.
    Some vestiges of the socialist constitutions still remain, however. The People's Congress is still the supreme authority in the land, standing aloof from the legislative, executive and judicial branches. The actual enforcement of the declarations of human rights also still presents many problems. In addition, although the right to own private property has been admitted, the privatization of nationally owned corporations has made only partial progress. The concept of private ownership of land is still incomplete, free transactions of land are still restricted, and the introduction of private ownership of land has also made only limited progress. Generally speaking, the old socialist system is still very much in existence, with respect to private property rights.
    2. The Debate on the New Constitution
    Proposals for a new constitution can broadly be divided into three types, each of which corresponds with the three political currents which can be identified in Russia today: the liberals, the middle-of-the-roaders, and the conservatives. The proposed constitution of the president, which is supported by the liberals, has a strong classical liberal character. The proposal of the parliament, which is close to the ideals of the middle-of-the-roaders, reflects the ideals of a social welfare state, and has a social democratic character. The proposal of the communists, which reflects the views of the conservatives, calls for the continuation of the ideals of socialism.
    The main issue in the debate on the establishment of a new consitution is the relation between the legislative and executive powers. It is generally explained that the president's proposal calls for a presidential republic, while the parliament's proposal calls for a parliamentary republic, and the communist's proposal calls for a soviet republic. The chances that the communist's proposal will be accepted are nil; hence the problem is one of the relation between the president and the parliament. This reflects exactly the current political conflict in Russia.
    Although socialism has crumbled, a stable, post-socialist social structure has yet to be established. The process of establishing a new constitution itself has developed into a power struggle. While the president has currently taken the lead in that struggle, it is predicted that revolutionary and violent changes regarding the process of establishing such a new constitution will occur. Even if a new constitution is established through compromise, however, it is likely to be of a transitional nature. A stable new constitution probably will not be created until the economic reforms currently being implemented take root, and until the socialist systems of private property rights are completely dismantled.
  • CISの行方
    永綱 憲悟
    1993 年 1993 巻 104 号 p. 66-81,L9
    発行日: 1993/10/10
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Russian Constitutional Court (hereafter the CC), born in October 1991, was expected to be the Third Power, or truly independent guardian of the Constitution, In January 1992 people were delighted with the CC's first verdict which declared the President's decree of making a security-internal ministry was unconstitutional.
    The CC's second verdict in November concluding the long communist party trial was a compromising one. The CC chairman Zorkin, explaining it, said, “the Russian President is right in large measure; however, we have to state that in equally large measure he is also not right.” Some inteligentsia said they had learned the civilised way of resolving a severe political conflict. Ordinary people, however, lost all interest in the Court. Next came the trial of the National Salvation Front (NSF), an alignment of communists and patriots. The president had ordered the NSF to dissolve. The CC's verdict of February in 1993 was simple; the Presidential decree was unconstitutional because there was no law permiting him to do so. This time some intelligentsia were worried because although the verdict seemed correct legally, it allowed the existence of an unsocial organisation.
    Zorkin, however, did not seem to share this worry. By this time, he had engaged himself actively in politics outside the Court. Believing that the unity of Russia was in jeopardy, he first tried to mediate between the Congress of the People's Deputies and the President. And then, he led the Court to make a decision of the virtual impeachment of the President. The Russian people, however, began criticizing Zorkin's involvement in politics. His political defeat was ascertained by the President's victory in the referendum of April 25 1993.
    Why did Zorkin's CC fail to come up to the people's early expectation? Firstly, the Constitution which should be the supreme guidance for the CC was a transitional one including lots of contradicting articles. Secondly, the CC could not stand aloof from politics because the judges had been elected by the Congress through negotiations among deputies' groups. Finally, there was the factor of Zorkin's personality. His perception of law was rather authoritative and his behavior outside court decreased the dignity of the CC. Here we see some appearance of Russian political culture.
    Relying mainly on Russian Newspapers and partly some official reports, this article have tried to analyze some peculiar aspects of the transitional period as well as of Russian political culture.
  • CISの行方
    菅野 哲夫
    1993 年 1993 巻 104 号 p. 82-98,L11
    発行日: 1993/10/10
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    On Dec. 8, 1991 the dissolution of the USSR was declared at the three power summit conference of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and Dec. 21, 1991 heralded the beginning of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which consists of eleven countries of the former Soviet Union. Their economy, which was structured in the communism era, was based on the vertical division of labor and therefore it was clear that the newly-borne republics could not exist by themselves without substantial assistance from the wealthier countries within the CIS.
    As a result, the CIS economy in 1992 showed stagnation and contraction. Compared with the previous year, industry output decreased by 18.2% and agricultural production also dropped 10%. In addition, foreign trade shrank dramatically by 25% in terms of the value of foreign currency.
    As for the inter-republican relationship, especially between Russia and the former Soviet republics, it can be sketched as follows:
    1. Concerning the supply of energy, Russia used to provide Belarus with 100% of its oil and gas requirements and Ukraine with 86% and 52% respectively of its oil and gas needs. But in 1992, Russia could not meet their demand and the supply was reduced significantly.
    2. Regarding the financial position, the Russian Central Bank reports that Russia's credit balance including settlements between banks in the former Soviet republics, interstate records and emissions amount to 2.31 trillion rubles. In fact, the corresponding account for the procurement of goods and services as of the end of 1992 shows credit from Russia's account stood at 1.29 trillion rubles.
    To fight inflation in order to protect the domestic market from neighboring countries, to cope with the shortage of the ruble cash and also to prepare for the introduction of own national currency “Hryvnia” as the symbol of its independence, Ukraine introduced a monetary unit on Jan. 10, 1992 which can be used repeatedly and issued coupons called “Karbovanets” to be circulated in parallel with the Russian ruble. In the case of Kyrgyztan, its own national currency “Som” was introduced on May 10, 1993 with the support of IMF and World Bank.
    CIS is currently an aggregate economic region where Russian financial support is much expected. But this situation is starting to normalize as the former Soviet republics recognize that Russia is not in such a strong position.
    Under these circumstances, CIS countries are now moving to strengthen their economic relationships by concluding economic cooperation agreements on a bilateral basis. It seems that this will be a new step to strengthen the structure of CIS where member countries can be satisfied.
  • CISの行方
    中井 和夫
    1993 年 1993 巻 104 号 p. 99-116,L12
    発行日: 1993/10/10
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The agreement reached in Minsk on 7-8 December 1991 to create a Commonwealth of Independent States was signed by the leaders of three slavic countries. The agreement stated that, “the USSR as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality ceases its existence”. Ukrainian president Kravchuk stated that it had prevented the uncontrolled disintegration of the former Soviet Union, but “We cannot allow ourselves to be locked in the Commonwealth, we should go in search of wide ranging relations with other countries”, added he. Many Ukrainians regarded CIS more sceptically than president Kravchuk. According to an opinion poll conducted after signing of the Minsk accords, Ukrainians were the most pessimistic of the three founding states.
    Elected as the first president of Ukraine, Kravchuk shortly succeeded to establish an authoritarian regime. He introduced several new institutions which strengthened his presidential power. By shifting his position from “sovereign communist” to the “fighter for Ukrainian independent statehood” Kravchuk neutralized his former opponents. Also he recruited many key persons from opponents camp to the higher governmental posts. But Kravchuk's authoritarian regime lasted barely one year. New prime minister L. Kuchima challenged Kravchuk in power game and weakened Kravchuk's position last winter. Kravchuk's authoritarian regime was further weakened by the economic crises in Ukraine.
    Since Ukraine's ratification of its independence in December 1991, its quarrels with Russia grabbed international headlines. During the early months of 1992, Russo-Ukrainian relations reached so low an ebb that many observers felt the big possibility of the Ukraine's retreat from the CIS. However, an reapprochment has taken place. An agreement was reached between the two sides on many of the outstanding areas of conflict at the Dagomys summit meeting in June 1992 between president Yeltsin and Kravchuk. Although there are still many points of conflict between them, relations between them have become quite stable.
    From the begining Ukraine did not possess strong loyality to the CIS. Ukraine regarded CIS as an economic cooperative organization. Therefore, Ukraine was always against the CIS as a unit of political-military integration. If CIS would be strengthened as a political institution like the former Soviet Union, Ukraine would likely choose the alternative of “exit” from the CIS.
    Finally, what is the meaning and impact of the independence of Ukraine in the region? From the Baltic to the Black Sea, there are now six new independent states, including Ukraine. These western parts of the former Soviet Union can be called the “New Eastern Europe”. thrusts Central Europe (former Eastern Europe) to the west and at the same time pushes Russia to the east.
  • CISの行方
    宇山 智彦
    1993 年 1993 巻 104 号 p. 117-135,L13
    発行日: 1993/10/10
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Kazakhstan is known as one of the most stable republics in the former Soviet Union, but the possibility of growth of interethnic tension is by no means negligible in this multinational country. This paper aims to study the factors which determine interethnic (especially Kazakh-Russian) relations in Kazakhstan, by examining concrete events and controversies in recent years.
    Soon after perestroika began, in December, 1986, youths in Alma-Ata held a demonstration to protest against the nomination of Gennadii Kolbin to the post of the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. The demonstration itself was peaceful and not nationalistic, but soon tension emerged between demonstrators and officials, who refused to have a dialogue with them. The conflict assumed an ethnic character when the Party organised vigilante corps of Russian workers. The authorities severely suppressed the demonstration and described it as nationalist riots, all the more exacerbating the Kazakhs' sense of humiliation and the Russians' distrust of Kazakhs. After four years, the events were revalued by a special commission.
    In 1989-1990, when the republics of the Soviet Union were strengthening their self-assertion, Viktor Kozlov, Solzhenitsyn and other Russians argued that parts of Kazakhstan should be transferred to Russia. Immediately after the failed coup in August, 1991, Yeltsin also stated that Russia has a right to pose territoial claims, and caused strong protests in Kazakhstan. At almost the same time, Cossacks in northern and north-western Kazakhstan increased their activity, demanding annexation of their area to Russia, inviting Russian Cossacks to their festival, revitalizing their tradition as fighters.
    In 1992, the first year of independence of Kazakhstan, there was a heated controversy about languages. Many Russians, worried about their future as a minority, demanded to make Russian, in addition to Kazakh, a state language, whereas many Kazakhs, indignant at the past colonial oppression and the decline of the Kazakhlanguage, maintained that Kazakh should remain the single state language. The new constitution, which was adopted in January, 1993, declared Kazakh the state language, and Russian the language of interethnic communication, as did the language law in 1989. There are differences of opinion on some themes, including language questions, between urban Kazakhs and rural-rooted Kazakhs, too.
    Thus, interethnic relations in Kazakhstan tend to become tense when the state stands at some turning point. With the adoption of the new constitution, the basic state structure was determined, but some important problems, including that of the autonomy of minorities and the characterisation of the country, remain unresolved. Success in keeping interethnic harmony will largely depend on whether the people of Kazakhstan, without distinction of nationality, can obtain “Kazakhstani” identity, based on the Kazakhs' nomadic open mentality and the will to make Kazakhstan a bridge between Asia and Europe.
  • CISの行方
    藤本 和貴夫
    1993 年 1993 巻 104 号 p. 136-150,L14
    発行日: 1993/10/10
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    After the collapse of the USSR one of the most serious problems with which the Russian Federation is faced is how to regulate its centrifugal force such as “Ural Republic” and “Republic of Primorye”. This article seeks to be a case study of “Primorye krai”.
    When there was a coup d'etat and the State Committee declared a state of emergency in August 1991, movements against the State Committee and the support of the President of Russian Federation Yeltsin were growing stronger in Primorye krai, being an administrative territorial unit of the Russian Federation. After August 1991, Chairman of Excutive Committee of Soviet V. Kuznetsov, an ex-vice-director of Institute of Academy of Sciences, was appointed as newly established Chief of local Administration by Yeltsin. It seemed that his position in regional politics may be improved, since his rival Golovidin, Chairman of the Soviet, former first secretary of the local communist party, was dismissed from his post because he did not organize the anti-State-Committee movement.
    But the oppsition groups were still in power in the Soviet and they criticized the Chief of Administration for his measures taken in 1992. The greater part of these criticisms concentrated on the failure of economic policies and the lack of competent government officials to deal with the situation. Finally on March 1993 the general meeting of the Soviet decided that the report of Kuznetsov was not perfect. A letter demanding Kuznetsov should be dismissed was sent to President Yeltsin and in May the proposal was agreed to. The President recommended Nazdrachenko, a director of a business enterprise, as the successor, which was accepted by the Soviet.
    The government of Kuznetsov in Primorye krai fell down after continuing for three years. The fact that many “academic governments” in Russia during the period, shows they had something in common with each other. The reasons for Kuznetsov were as follows:
    1) He failed to organize the experienced staff who worked efficiently in his government. 2) At first he was elected as Chairman of the Excutive Committee of the Soviet and the position was strongly influenced by the Soviet and its Chairman. But later he was appointed as Chief of Administration by the President, which changed his status. He became independent of the Soviet and its Chairmen. The relationship between the Chief of Administration and the Chairman of the Soviet was not legally clear-cut, which caused many kinds of troubles over power. 3) He tried too hard and rapidly to improve the economic situation by building up relationships with foreign countries. It turned out, however, that the international contacts led to the rapid increase in crime rate and political corruption, which provoked criticism from the opposition groups. Lastly, Kuznetsov, who was a leader “from Moscow”, did not have an enough footing to rule in his own “Krai”.
  • 小泉 直美
    1993 年 1993 巻 104 号 p. 151-167,L15
    発行日: 1993/10/10
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Russia as an inheritor of the Soviet Union had finished her initial efforts to determine the priorities of foreign policy by the spring of 1992. It was the near neighboring countries, that is, the former republics of the USSR to which the highest priority was given. The purpose of this paper is to follow the process of Russia's diplomacy toward these countries until the present, and to analyse the factors causing the changes observed in the process. The analysis of the factors will consist of the four parts; the three objective elements of national security, economic, and international ones and the last one processing those objective environmental elements, namely the decision-making processes. This analysis should help us to find the degree of stability of CIS in the near and mid-term future.
    In sum, Russia has recognized her ‘special status and role’ in the former Soviet Union and has gradually changed her policy toward the near neighboring countries from non-intervention to a more active one. However, analysis of the factors shows us more complicated changes behind this simple picture. This is presumably because of the conflicting attitudes of the two factions in the decision-making circle; the one to call for Russia's reform first, pursuing the maximum economic rationality in reform and foreigh policy (we call it hereafter the ‘Russia’ faction), and the other one persisting in maintaining a whole and undivided space of the former union from the polical, economic, mitilary and ideological reasons (we call it hereafter ‘Union’ faction).
    Let us examine each of the four factors. The first is national security. At first, the ‘Russia’ faction wanted to depend on the new European security system, but then Russia, especially the ‘Union’ faction, tried to establish a collective security system with Russia as a main pillar only to fail due to negative reactions from Ukraina, Moldova and Azerbaizhan. But the eruption of the nationality conflict and the danger of the stationed Russian troops and residents to be involved in the bloodshed incidents moved the Russian leadership to recognize its “special role” and to take concrete steps to maintain peace in the region, which has been accepted as appropriate, although sometimes reluctantly, by the other nations.
    In economic terms, the centripetal force of the CIS is also in action. The reasons for this are the drop of production caused by the disruption of the economic ties among highly interdependent former republics and the steep rise in energy prices, and uncontrollable inflation due to lack of consistency of monetary and budgetary policy among them. At the same, however, the ‘Russia’ faction assuming relatively a greater power after the political struggle in March 1993 and the referendum in April, began to pursue a policy of maximising economic rationality by establishing the Economic Union of only three Slavic nations, which is welcomed by the Western nations but could complicate the political scene in Russia as well as among CIS nations.
    The third factor is international, but this has played only a secondary role in changing Russia's policy. For paradoxically due to the end of the Cold War the superpower status of the United States has also eroded and the international organizations expected to play a major role in the post Cold War period have revealed their inability to deal effectively with local conflicts. The economic aid from the G7 has been still perceived as indispensable but Russia's total dependence on it appeared to everybody to be impossible and even humiliating. Therefore, the idea of the ‘Russia’ faction giving the highest priority to act in concert with the US and West Europe has lost its appeal and brought about bitter criticism against the Foreign Ministry.
    In this way the objective circumstances around the Russian leadership has made them
  • 邵 建国
    1993 年 1993 巻 104 号 p. 168-182,L17
    発行日: 1993/10/10
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The conflict which broke out in May 1928 between the Japanese Army, which was dispatched to Tsinan in Shantung province of China, and the Nationalist Armies of China which went north to overthrow Chang Tsuo-lin's (_??__??__??_) military clique is called the “Tsinan Incident.” After this incident the Japanese Army issued severe requirement terms on Chiang Kai-shek, the general of the Nationalist Armies of China, and urged him to accept these terms without any conditions and to conclude a military agreement. The Nationalist Goverment was determined to pursue a policy that would make as Many concessions with Japan as possible, for fear that marching on Peking (to unity the country) might be left unfinished halfway. In order to find out a way for compromise, General Chiang Kai-shek dispatched his delegate to Tokyo and tried direct negotiation with Prime Minister Tanaka. At first Prime Minister Tanaka showed signs of a compromise, but as the Japanese Army, especially the commander of the sixth division of Japanese Army on the spot in Tsinan, had been strongly opposing the relaxation of the requirement terms, the negotiations surrounding the conditions of the compromise reached a complete deadlock. On the other hand, in China the people's critical opinions of the failure in the diplomacy with Japan became more and more clamorous and Chiang Kai-shek was put in a difficult situation. Chiang Kai-shek began to assume a negative attitude to the compromise with Japan and advised Huang Fu (_??__??_), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was a Japanophile to resign. It was Wang Cheng-ting (_??__??__??_) that took the place of Huang Fu and who was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Wang pursued the policy of making Japan isolated by means of creating a better relationship with Britain and America, and he demonstrated to Chiang Kai-shek his advatageous judgement of the situation and explained to him that they should not make any concessions to Japan. Chiang Kai-shek, who judged that the terms required by the Japanese Army were still too strict, began to accept Wang's opinion and gave up the negotiation with the Japanese Army. On this account since June 1928 the negotiation concerning “Tsinan Incident” could not help left to the diplomacy authorities of the both countries.
    This thesis clarifies the expectations of both China and Japan in dealing with this case, especially the process by which the Nationalist Government led mainly by Chiang Kai-shek concluded the policies by referring chiefly to the books and resources published recently in Chinese.
  • 油井 大三郎
    1993 年 1993 巻 104 号 p. 183-186
    発行日: 1993/10/10
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 戸部 良一
    1993 年 1993 巻 104 号 p. 186-190
    発行日: 1993/10/10
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 安岡 昭男
    1993 年 1993 巻 104 号 p. 190-192
    発行日: 1993/10/10
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 木村 汎
    1993 年 1993 巻 104 号 p. 197
    発行日: 1993/10/10
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
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