This issue of International Relations features the international history of the 1960s and 70s.
These two decades may be characterized as the period in which the Cold War structure underwent a gradual and yet steady transformation, and it could also be argued that this period prepared for the final collapse of this structure.
In discussing this “transformation, ” we need to discern the continuing elements and changing elements in these decades. Hence constancy and change. First, what did not change? My answers are as follows: (1) throughout the Cold War period the United States had pursued a “containment” policy toward the Soviet Union. Even the “detente” of the early 1970s meant for the United States one form of containment; (2) the Soviet Union never abandoned, throughout the decades, the principle of “class struggle” in international politics. In Leonid Brezhnev's mind, “detente” never meant giving up support for “wars of national liberation”; (3) and yet, the United States and the Soviet Union were very careful not to get into a direct military confrontation, and the United States took extra care not to intervene in the Soviet “sphere of control” in Eastern Europe, as evidenced in its attitude toward the erection of the “Berlin Wall” or the Soviet invasion into Czechoslovakia.
What changed, then? (1) There were gradual, discernible changes taking place in Europe in the 1960s and 70s, in the form of economic and cultural exchanges or “independent” diplomacy or economic policy of certain East European countries; (2) while some degree of stability was established in Europe, the theater of the Cold War moved to the Third World where “proxy wars” were often fought, sometimes involving China too. It is extremely difficult, however, to explain how these changes contributed, if at all, to the disintegration of the Cold War structure; (3) during the period the power of the two “superpowers” declined relatively, thus creating the “diffusion of power” inworld politics.

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The article deals with the impact of the Vietnam War on the major trends of international relations in the mid-1960s as well as the influence of interactions among the major countries on the war. Charles de Gaulle of France, in his attempt to pursue a more independent policy, played a sigificant role in setting in motion those forces that promoted polycentrism in the Western world. France's recognition of China in January 1964 as well as its efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s was part of de Gaulle's desire to play a more assertive and important role in world politics. The Vietnam war provided him with a unique opportunity to achieve such a goal by acting as a mediator between the United States and the Communist countries. However, France's mediating role was increasingly regarded by Washington policy makers as an obstacle to the U. S. objectives in Vietnam and the free world. Thus de Gaulle's assertion of more independence within the free world. France was not alone in criticizing the expansion of U. S. war efforts as the other Western allies did not consider Vietnam as crucial to their national interests. In this sense, the war contributed to further decentralization within the Western world.
Communist China played the role in the Communist world that France did in the Western world. China's challenge to the Soviet leadership in the international Communist movement contributed to the decentralization of power in the structure of world politics. The Vietnam war contributed to such a trend as the war exacerbated the rivalry between Moscow and Peking. The U. S. escalation of the war ran counter to Washington's expectations as both China and the Soviet Union intensified their assistance to Hanoi but it also wided the conflict between the two communist countries because both of them wanted to increase their influence on Hanoi in their increasingly bitter struggle for leadership in the international Communist movement at the expense of the other. The intensification of the Sino-Soviet conflict put Norht Vietnam's leadership in a very difficult position as they needed their material and political support in winning the war against the United States and South Vietnam. The way out of the difficulty was to maintain an equidistance from Moscow and Peking. Thus the war, the Sino-Soviet conflict, and the subsequent polarization of the Communist world are all closely interrelated.
The war in Vietnam and the U. S. escalation of the war efforts also contributed to ‘freezing’ the U. S. -Soviet detente that had been explored by Nikita Krushchev after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. It was ironic for the United States that, on the one hand, the escalation of the war left no choice for Moscow and Peking but to increase their support to Hanoi and made the U. S. war efforts increasingly costly but, on the other hand, it aggravated the Sino-Soviet conflict to the point where by late 1966 both China and the Soviet Union began to look upon each other as more threatening than the United States. Even though China and the United States considered each other as the major enemy and the U. S. -Soviet relations remained frozen as long as the Vietnam War continued, there emerged signs by late 1966 that began to move Moscow and Peking toward improving relations with Washington. It was the ongoing Vietnam war that kept Moscow and Peking from moving away from assistance to Hanoi as well as from improving relations between Washington, on the one hand, and Peking and Moscow, on the other, throughout the 1960s. The war also contributed to the erosion of the Cold War bipolar structure.

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The Chinese Communist view of the world was a fabric woven by horizontal contradictions (contradiction among powerful states) and vertical ones (contradiction between imperialism and the oppressed nations). In this texture, the latter was conceived to be the function of the former. As early as in the late 1930s, Mao Zedong expressed his deep concern that accommodation between the imperialist states would have a disastrous effect on the national liberation movement of the underdeveloped world. In the 1960s, as they witnessed deepening U. S. -Soviet “collision, ” the Chinese leaders were impelled to defend the national liberation struggle of the Third World, as in the previous decades, which was seen to be menaced by the detente of great powers.
In the beginning of 1960s, however, the Chinese Communists were puzzled over whether to regard the East-West confrontation as meaningless to the current world owing to Khrushchev's rigorous quest for “peaceful coexistence” with the United States. The discussion continued until 1964, when an eclectic view came to the fore. This view of the world-the theory of “intermediate zone”-still had room for horizontal contradiction.
With the end of strategic “debate” hold in 1965, the theory of “intermediate zone” was replaced by the picture of “great upheaval.” In the Chinese eyes, East-West conflict vanished from the world scene and the national liberation movement of Asia, Africa, and Latin America was seriously threatend by the collaboration of superpowers. But this picture, emphasizing a situation of rapid and disorderly change on the whole world, had little strategic implication. Meanwhile, China had gained atomic bombs but lost allies in the “South” as well as in the “East”. As a result, Communist China could only rely on the “international class struggle” of “the world people.” The official assertion that China had become “the center of world revolution” was nothing but the acknowledgment of their growing sense of isolation from the rest of the world.
With the deepening of isolation, they came to be deprived of the susceptibility to discriminate between enemies. The contradiction between imperialism and revisionism was not a matter of concern. The new “Far Eastern Munich” criticized by the Chinese in 1966 symbolized the Soviet revisioism that came close to the category of imperialism.
After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia of August 1968, followed closely by the boder clashes of 1969, the major threat-or principal contradiction-facing China was now with the Soviet Union, providing a tactical rationale for accommodation with the United States. Yet, ironically, Sino-American rapprochement helped to reinforce the world situation in which national liberation movement in the Third World was the dependent variable of the relations among great powers. And the problem remained that the Chinese Communist self-defined role in world politics was incongruous with the world view which they described.

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In this article an attempt is made to analyze how the Brezhnev government coped with the Prague Spring, by focusing on the following three points; military pressure on Czechoslovakia, Dubcek's ability to control the situation, bilateral and multilateral negotiations among socialist bloc countries.
CPCz April plenum adopted the Action Program as the guideline to reform socialism in Czechoslovakia. Although CPSU April plenum gave an indirect warning that such an activity might be dangerous, the Soviet Politburo sent a letter of “good will” to Dubcek's government as a conciliatory measure. In May, WTO contries, with the exception of Rumania and Czechoslovakia, discussed the situation in Czechoslovakia and agreed on military exercises there as a temporary measure. After Kosygin's and Grechko's visits, Czechoslovakia also gave its consent to such military exercises in June. Although CPCz May plenum promised not to radicalize the reform, a dicision was reached to hold an Extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress on September 9.
Reacting to the Prague Spring, the Soviet leadership sought negotiations with the USA and FRG. Czechoslovakia also showed an interest in the relations with FRG. As a result of these attempts, Ulbricht attacked the very possibility of such exchanges with FRG and the situation in Czechoslovakia had not changed. Then Brezhnev proposed bilateral talks with the Dubcek government in the middle of June, but Dubcek rejected the offer. This rejection influenced Brezhnev's perception of Dubcek as a leader whose policy was not in line with the orthodox communist tradition.
Military maneuvers which started from June 20 were strongly opposed by the Czechoslovak people and the famous “Two Thousand Words” was published in Prague. This statement proved to be a turning point and the Brezhnev Politburo changed their policies in three main aspects. 1. The Soviets stopped the negotiations with the FRG concerning the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 2. They postponed the end of the military maneuvers. 3. They replaced the bilateral meeting with Dubcek by the multilateral meeting in Warsaw.
In the Warsaw meeting, Gomulka, Ulbricht and Zhivkov, who had attacked the Prague Spring from March, once again heavily criticised Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev also showed strong doubt in Dubchek's leadership and decided to secretly seek a puppet government. After the meeting, Soviet and Czechoslovakia had bilateral talks at Cierna nad Tisou and later a multilateral conference at Bratislava. No decisive and concrete agreements were reached, but at the time of the Bratislava conference, a letter to ask “brotherly aid” was sent to Brezhnev. The political negotiations were over. It depended on Dubcek's leadership whether to take resolute measures or not. Soviet leaders had gone on the summer vacation.
Even in the middle of August, the situation in Czechoslovakia had hardly changed, and Chervonenko reported it to Brezhnev at Yalta. Ulbrichit and Shelest, who had strongly opposed the Prague Spring, also conveyed the same information.
At last the Soviet Politburo gathered on August 16 in Moscow and decided on a military intervention in Czechoslovakia. There were some indications that Western countries were not likely to react too strongly if such an intervention did take place.
In conclusion, it may be said that military intervention did not only result in the consolidation of the Soviet bloc and promoted the creation of the basis of the detente at that time, but also deprived the socialist countries of the reform impetus beyond the Prague Spring for twenty years.

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The post-1989 recasting of the focus of the Ostpolitik of the Brandt governments from global concerns for detente, the promotion of peace and the maintenance of the status quo to local concerns for “nation-building” in Germany has posed important questions about the genuine objectives by which the decision-makers were guided during the formative phase of Ostpolitik from 1969 to 1972, and about the sources available at present as the means to answer these questions. Despite the fact that primary internal sources on the period are not yet accessible, a few principle remarks appear to be possible on the interconnection between Ostpolitik on the one side, and, on the other, concurring policies, such as integration policy, security policy and the set of issues concerning the relations between the two then existing German states.
With regard to integration policy, it is evident that the formative phases of Ostpolitik appeared simultaneously with the first severe crisis of the institutions representing European integration. The Brandt governments did little to ease or to overcome the crisis, despite verbal commitments that they would continue to strengthen the European institutions. But such declarations only had the function of anchoring Ostpolitik into integration policy, thereby making Ostpolitik acceptable to Germany's western neighbors. In this respect, Brandt revised the hierarchy of goals which had governed West German foreign policy since the time of the inception of the Federal Republic of Germany [FRG]. This meant that, while the Adenauer governments (1949-1963) had given priority to the western integration of the FRG, the Brandt governments took western integration to be the lever which was to help launching Ostpolitik and keeping it moving.
As for security policy, the Brandt governments went out of their way to declare that they would continue to underwrite the principles informing the Atlantic Community and that they would fulfill the obligations towards NATO. Brandt even argued the view that Ostpolitik in itself was a contribution to the goals assigned to NATO and that, in this capacity, Ostpolitik could not possibly obviate NATO strategies. As the peace nobel laureate for 1971, Brandt sollicited much international support for Ostpolitik, turning down criticisms that Ostpolitik could loosen the ties holding the Atlantic Community together. However, in the long run, Ostpolitik ushered in a potential to weaken the Atlantic alliance because the West German government established its own capacity to negotiate agreements with governments in East Central Europe, a capacity that was to become crucial within the process of the merging of the two German states after 1989.
With respect to the relations between the two German states (as long as they continued to exist), Ostpolitik represented the final part of a major shift in policy orientations characteristic of the Social Democratic Party. During the early postwar years, the Social Democrats had been the largest politically active group to operate on the assumption that the traditional “nation-state” as manifested in the “German Empire” continued to exist as a veritable institutional entity demanding practical step towards “reunification”. Brandt began to ease communications between the two German states and enacted this policy while in the Chancellor's office. He thus came to narrow down the scope of “reunification” to the establishment of stronger ties between the two then existing German states.

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This article is an attempt to discuss the rise and fall of the linkage theory which is used as an instrument of foreign policy. Through the comparative studies of Dr. Kissinger's use of the linkage and Mr. Shultz's pragmatic approach, we will examine the success or failure of each method with regard to U. S. -Soviet relations.
Henry Kissinger used linkage in various areas of America's Soviet policy in the 1970s. Kissinger employed linkage at three stages, first for initiating detente, second for completing detente, and finally for maintaining detente. Although he was successful in the first two stages, he failed in the final stage where he tried to sustain detente through the delicate balance between incentives for Soviet restraint and penalties for its adventurism. He called these components the carrot and the stick. The carrot, in this case, was for example the expansion of economic ties and the stick was America's firm counter-action against Soviet adventurism. Despite his intentions, however, Kissinger could not use either the carrot or the stick due to opposition by Congress. With no incentive for improving relations with the U. S., and free from the fear of penalties, the Soviet Union soon again succumbed to the temptation of their traditional expansionism in the Third World.
Despite Soviet adventurism, detente continued to survive into the late 70s under President Carter, but linkage as an istrument of sustaining detente was not utilized by his administration.
The linkage theory enjoyed a renewal with the Reagan administration as a result of the bitter experiences of Soviet expansionism, especially in Afganistan and Poland. “There is nothing substantive to talk about, unitil the U. S. S. R. begins to demonstrate its willingness to behave like a responsible power.” This was the view of then Secretary of State Alexander Haig. But when Haig was replaced by George Shultz, linkage was also replaced by a more pragmatic approach. Shultz tried to seek better relations with Moscow through individual issues rather than attempting to manipulate the complex linkage strategy.
Thus, under Shultz's initiative, America's Soviet policy made a turn towards a more practical direction. Even if the dramatic improvement in U. S. -Soviet relations was greatly attributed to President Gorbachev, President Regan and his Secretary of State George Shultz must be given the credit along with Gorbachev.
In sum, Kissinger's strategy did not work well because it was difficult to implement in the U. S. political system. As Joseph Nye pointed out it relied on fine tuning where fine tuning is difficult to manage. On the contrary, Shultz was successful because his pragmatism was more compatible with the U. S. political system.

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The Association of South-East Asian Nations, known as ASEAN for short, came into being in the midst of the second Indochina war, a reflection of the Cold War of the 1960s in Asia on the one hand, and a struggle for national liberation on the part of the indigenous populations on the other. The five member states of ASEAN, ideologically non-socialist with basically capitalist economies, were also essentially attempting to build new nations, not unlike their counterparts in the adjacent Indochina peninsula, namely, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
ASEAN was a product of the Vietnam war, not in the sense that the South-East Asia Treaty Organization was born in the mid-1950s, but that the member states had no alternative but to choose their strategies for survival and nation building, avoiding directly getting involved in the military conflicts with neighbouring countries and with each other. Thus Thailand and the Philippines joined with the United States in its anti-communism crusades in Indochina, more as a part of their survival strategies than from their ideological orientation, anticipating that the latter would provide them with a security shield and necessary resources for their nation building. Accordingly, as the balance of power in the region began to change, and as the U. S. intervention in the war waned, the America's two regional allies sought to re-orient their relationship vis-a-vis the Americans.
It should be noted that while in Thailand there was a major domestic upheaval that ousted a long-standing military regime, almost at the same period in the Philippines a quasi-dictatorship emerged that abolished its traditional American-type democracy. The domestic factors in the both countries absolutely contributed to their foreign policy reorientations respectively. With regard to the relations with the United States, Thailand seemed to be more decisive and more independent, as the U. S. military personnel completely withdrew and all the U. S. military facilities inside the country were closed down. On the other hand, the Philippines' Marcos regime, strongly appearing to be independent of the former colonizer, finally accepted the continuing presence of the U. S. military facilities after the war in Vietnam ended.
The America's two allies, however, came to find their interests converged with other members of their regional grouping in standing together politically. Soon after the collapse of the non-socialist regimes in Indochina, ASEAN for the first time convened its summit meeting in February 1976, adopting the epoch-making “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia, ” which envisages the blueprint of peace and stability in the entire South-East Asia, based on their earlier, more idealistic demonstration of it: “Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality.”
The author concludes that the success in the 1976 summit meeting resulted in allaying to some extent the frustration and dilemmas shared by the Thai and Filipino elites in handling relations with the Americans after the Vietnam war. At the same time, the author implies that the peace and stability formula presented by the “Treaty of Amity” dose not allow the U. S. to engage in direct military intervention in the region any longer, but rather welcomes the moderate presence and role of the U. S. in the post-Vietnam South-East Asia.

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In early 1977, U. S. President Jimmy Carter announced that U. S. ground combat forces would be carefully withdrawn from South Korea within a few years. His decision, however, was soon faced with strong resistance from the military and Congress. Officially because of a new intelligence estimate on North Korea's military capability, in June 1979, President Carter postponed immplementing his withdrawal plan till after the next presidential election in which he was severely defeated by Ronald Reagan.
This failed attempt has been often regarded as a typical example of Carter's amateurish diplomacy. History tells us, however, that U. S. defense commitment towards South Korea has frequently fluctuated between the two extremes of intervention and withdrawal. This fluctuation seems to result from a dilemma in U. S. defense commitment towards South Korea: the United States has to provide enough credibility to maintain a favorable military balance in Northeast Asia without being too deeply involved in the defense of South Korea, which is not necessarily of vital interest for the United States.
It is far from an easy task for Washington to escape from this dilemma. First of all, it is extremely hard to evaluate the strategic value of the Korean Peninsula in the context of U. S. global, regional and local strategies. Secondly, given the relatively decreasing U. S. economic capability and the diversified public opinion on foreign policy, a domestic consensus on a desirable degree of U. S. defense commitment towards South Korea cannot be easily obtained. Thirdly, regardless of changes in international and domestic situations, due to their vested interest in maintaining the U. S. presence in South Korea, the Army and the State Department bureaucracies tend to be opposed to reducing the defense commitment.
After briefly reviewing the history of U. S. defense commitment towards South Korea, this paper intends to analyze how the Carter Administration tried to overcome the dilemma in U. S. defense commitment toward South Korea but was unsuccessful through the examination of the policy process of its withdrawal plan with available written materials and interviews with key participants.

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The Third World nations are often the target of intervention. Especially during the cold war period, but not limited to then, the United States intervened in the internal affairs of those nations, claiming to protect its national interest. What constitutes American national interest which should be protected by intervening in other nations, however, remains dubious at best.
Aiding the Angolan civil war was among such intervention policies, but was exercised over two different time periods: failing détente in the 1970s and emerging new cold war in the 1980s. This article examines what factors were given priority in each of the decision makings, and points out the problems.
The first covert aid was a typical cold-war intervention, although delayed in time. Wherever the Soviet Union expands into, the United States should also get in and stand tall. In the decision making process on covert aid to FNLA and UNITA among the limited circle, consideration for Angolan interests was missing. Moreover, covert manipulation gave an open invitation for South African intervention, which complicated the southern African situation.
The legacy of such covert aid remained even through the Carter administration. While the political landscape of the Angolan civil war shifted from U. S. -Soviet rivalry to struggle among African nations over Apartheid, the United States entered the new round of intervention with old mind set.
The United States intervened again using covert aid to UNITA, but this time such covert policy was publicly mentioned by the President and others. This is so-called overt-covert action. While promoting the public approval of this policy, the administration denied the opportunity for Congress to openly discuss the policy content of Angolan intervention.
Deprived of the proper Congressional function to terminate the wrong policy, covert aid to UNITA continued to flow, thus dragging out the process of peace agreement, and the subsequent establishment of the national government. Although elections were finally conducted, UNITA, which enjoyed the distorted image of national popularity, could not accept its loss and refused to go along with the terms of the agreement. A new round of civil war was thus launched.
American covert aid first avoided the opportunity for a national government by turning the Angolan civil war into an East-West confrontation. The second intervention did not help strengthen the basis for democratic government among the Angolan population either, but rather helped Savimbi's individual aspiration at the cost of the nation at large. American Angolan policy may have been a lost cause from the beginning but covert action cannot be the method to promote constructive foreign policy. For its decision making by-passes the democratic system at home and thus fails to enjoy a lasting support, while the hidden aid is subject to manipulation which fails to convey a clear message to the recipient nation.

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The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was proposed by the USSR in order to gain a formal recognition of the post-war territorial and political status quo in Europe. The Final Act of the CSCE in 1975 set forth principles for guiding relations between participating states and set up areas of cooperation for the common security in Europe. The most innovative and controversial area of the Final Act was the third ‘basket’-agreement on the cooperation in human contacts and free flow of information. The participating states agreed on detailed regulations on the human contacts such as the following-regulations to enable members of families to visit or reunite, to enable citizens of different states to marry. In the area of information, regulations were adopted on such matters as working conditions for journalists and transboundary radio broadcasts. Although the Eastern states were not interested in international regulations of these issues, they had to accept them in exchange for agreements on other political and econmic issues.
The CSCE acquired its own momentum and provided a framework of multilateral cooperation in these fields. This was a remarkable development as there was virtually no regional framework for cooperation in these fields. Yet the often diametrically opposed opinions of the East and the West made the finding of solutions extremely difficult. The Eastern states were not interested in the free flow of individuals and information, since for the socialist regimes it was vitally important to have these fields under tight state control. The Western states aimed at opening the ‘iron curtain’ through establishing common norms and principles of cooperation in these fields.
The Belgrade follow-up meetings of the CSCE (1977-78) could not reach any further agreement, but the beginning of multilateral discussion in the framework of the CSCE gradually made issues such as human contacts and the free flow of information legitimate CSCE agenda. The second follow-up meeting in Madrid (1980-83) made some development in further agreements. When the CSCE opened its third follow-up meeting in Vienna (1986-89) the USSR had changed its policy and ceased to coordinate the opinions of its allies in these fields. The Eastern states made compromises on the prohibition of radio jamming, freedom of movement, and the introduction of a permanent supervisory mechanism for the CSCE ‘human dimension’ (the human rights pricinciple of the baket I and humanitarian issues of basket III).
The Vienna follow-up meeting was a turning point of the CSCE process. The Eastern states ceased to act as a united group and prior to the revolutions of East European states in 1989 conflict between socialist countries took the place of the East-West conflict. The CSCE process contributed to the collapse of the Soviet bloc and hence to the end of the East-West conflict.

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No unilateral US policy has caused as fundamental a shift in the international political economy as the so-called “Nixon Shocks” of August 15, 1971. By forcibly suspending the US dollar's convertibility to gold and imposing a 10% import surtax on all dutiable goods, the Nixon regime destroyed the Bretton Woods international monetary system, and precipitated strain with its allies. Washington's largest and second largest trading partners were especially damaged, and took steps to counteract the Shocks. The outcomes of Ottawa's and Tokyo's policies, however, were divergent: in the end, Canada achieved diplomatically more than Japan without making any apparent concessions. Specifically, the Japanese acquiesced in its “textile wrangle” with the US, and unwillingly accepted a larger-than-expected up-valuation of the yen against the dollar. The Canadians, on the other hand, succeeded in lifting the surtax with the lucrative Canada-US Autopact intact.
This paper concentrates on theoretically answering an important question of “why did Canada and Japan receive diverse bargaining outcomes?” For that purpose, the paper identifies the bureaucratic politics model, intervulnerability model, and complex interdependence model to examine its explanatory power for this ease.
The bureaucratic politics model created by G. Allison and M. Halperin, and refined by J. Rosati is a conceptual framework integrating Allison's 2nd and 3rd models. According to this model, the policy outcome of each actor in its response to Nixon's enforcement of his measures derives from the decision-making process reflecting (often irrational) “pulling and hauling” of major players or semi-automatic process based on existing Standard Operating Procedures. Invariably, the outcome is neatly explained if Japan produced the unfavorable decision-making process similar to the bureaucratic politics model whereas Canada did not.
The intervulnerability model was suggested by C. Doran. Going beyond the metaphor of “interdependenced”, he proposed that the Canada-US dyadic relations should be characterized by “intervulnerable” nature. Accordingly, what the US unilaterally did like the 1963 imposition of Interest Equalization Tax would be self-defeating because the interlocking nature of both economies would damage the US economy as well as the Canadian one. If this logic prevails, the surcharge and other unilateral economic measures to Canada can be lifted while Japan still suffers from them because of Japan's absence of intervulnerability with the US.
This paper denies the above two explanations of the divergent outcomes of two dyads, and revives the complex interdependence model envisaged by R. Keohane and J. Nye as a proper explanatory tool. The absence of hierarchy among issues is an important element in explaining the different results of negotiations. Within the Nixon cabinet, high politics of H. Kissinger, prevailed over low politics of economic diplomacy by J. Connally, thereby creating the room for maneuver for Canada. Why was this room for maneuver not utilized by Japan? Enter another condition of this model, multiple channels of contact. The emergence of de facto transgovernmental allies of Kissinger and A. Burns, played a decisive role in defending Canada's national interest. As a result, Canad-US multiple channels of contact fragmented the US decision-making process, while fewer channels between the allies across the Pacific did not do so. The result was the US acted as if it were a fragmented actor to Canada, but it was more unitary toward Japan. The paper concludes this is why the American preponderance of power vis-a-vis Japan resulted in better bargaining outcomes for the lamer power than in the case of the Canada-US dyad.

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According to the orthodox theorists of hegemonic stability, for example, Kindleberger, Gilpin and Krasner, a hegemon has to have enough power and power bases to stabilize the international systems. If the hegemonic power and power bases decline, the international systems will be unstable. In hegemonic declining ages, however, if there is asymmetric information for the hegemonic power between the hegemon and the nonhegemons, it is possible that the hegemon stabilizes the international systems. According to Alt, Calvert and Humes, one of conditions for it is that the hegemon has enough reputation for the hegemonic power.
We construct a model of hegemonic stability by a reputation game theory of asymmetric incomplete information and explain some conditions of stabilization of the international systems in hegemonic declining ages. Our model is different from Alt, Calvert and Humes' one in these points. First, we distinguish the hegemonic international regimes (rules of coordination) and the hegemonic power (structure to keep rules). Secondly, we introduce discount factors for future expected payoffs of the hegemon and the nonhegemons.
We can get some results different from Alt, Calvert and Humes. First, we can explain an important relation between the hegemonic power and the hegemonic international regimes. That is, the hegemonic regimes are not sufficient conditions in themselves for the nonhegemon's coordination and the hegemonic power is needed to keep it. And the hegemonic power is not a neccessary condition for the coordination. That is, even if in hegemonic declining ages, the international systems are stabilized if the hegemonic reputation of power is established enough. Secondly, by introducing discount factors, we can explain some conditions under which the nonhegemons coordinate to stabilize the international systems even if the hegemonic reputation of power is not established enough.

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