The Korean war has been almost exhaustively studied as an important part of the escalation process of the cold war. The historical significance of the Korean war is not however limited only to this point. The Korean armitice negotiation was one of the first cases of East-West talks, which have led the world to detente and ultimately to the end of the cold war. Thus the Korean war should be noted as an important beginning of the descalation process of the cold war as well.
Based on this historical understanding, the paper describes how the Korean armistice negotiations started. The author believes that three conditions are indispensable for the start of the peace talks in general. First, a stable war situation is necessary, because, only through military deadlock, could both sides realize the difficulty of a military solution. Second, an agreement on the negotiation agenda should be achieved. Third, there should be an influential mediator.
From July 1950 through July 1951, the governments of India and Britain continued their mediation efforts. But their peace proposals, both the simultaneous solution plan of China and Korean problems and the demilitarized zone plan, could not work out any UN-communist agreement, mainly because the military situations were too fluid and too tempting for military unification to have any meaningful negotiation. The limited influence of the mediators did not help the situation either. In addition the efforts on the part of the United Nations in early 1951 also hardly bore any fruit.
Only after the military situation became stable and the commencement of powerful Soviet involvement on mediation efforts, could China and the United States agree to begin the peace talks. Last, but not least, the fear of World War III indiscriminately brought both the mediators and the war parties together to manage the crisis.

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This article examines Britain's European Defence Policy between the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, and the Brussels North Atlantic Council in December 1950.
After the outbreak of war, the United States demanded greater European defence efforts, and proposed the utilization of the untapped reserve of German manpower. According to Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series II, Volume II, & Volume III, Western defence for Britain was both to maintain the status of World Power and to promote the Atlantic community.
In a series of New York conferences (September), Britain abandoned their proposal of the German police forcc, and they agreed to the US proposal of the ‘one-package’ deal in principle becaus of the Atlantic consolidation. At the meeting of the North Atlantic Defence Committee in Washington (October), they agreed to the recommendation on Medium Term Plan. On the other hand, France, who opposed German rearmament, proposed the Plaven Plan on 24 October. This plan aimed to create a European army under a supranational body, and to merge military units including German units. Britain would not participate in a European army, but she would not object to its formation. Because, Britain didn't want to become too closely involved in such schemes but, at the same time, she didn't wish to appear too hostile to any European initiative on the subject in the case this might result in the loss of her influence in Western Europe.
Bevin suggested a new British initiative, the concept of an Atlantic Confederate Force, against the Pleven Plan. It was a broader and grander concept than a European army, and more closely integrated than a NATO army. But the Brussels North Atlantic Council approved the Spofford plan. This plan aimed to introduce provisional arrangement for the utilization of German effectives, pending a final decision on a permanent framework for a German contribution, whereby the US project for a European integrated force would be put into operation. And in the Brussels conference, it was also agreed both for the setting up of the integrated NATO defence force and for the appointment of General Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander.
Britain pursued the leadership of Europe in the framework of the Atlantic community. This was attained by herself becoming more committed to Western European defence, and thus encouraging the US to maintain her close interest in Europe. But there was the possibility of turning Britain into a European power as a means of protecting her Atlantic concept of defence.

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The aim of this article is to explain the time-lag between two Jewish mass emigrations from Iraq and Egypt in the domestic and regional contexts of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in the 1950s.
The Jewish mass emigration from Iraq, on the one hand, suddenly began in consequence of the enactment in 1950 of the law depriving any Iraqi Jew who, of his own freen will and choice, desires to leave Iraq for good of his nationality. On the other hand, the majority of Jews of Egypt, who remained after the Palestine War of 1948, emigrated from Egypt after the Suez War of 1956.
Both Iraq and Egypt dispatched their armies to Palestine after British retreat from the mandate, while Israel declared the new Jewish state of Palestine in May, 1948.
Iraq and Egypt reacted differently to the repercussion of the 1948 War. Iraq suffered from serious economic difficulties after World War Two, which led to domestic political unrest. The Palestine War provided the Iraqi government with good opportunities to turn the general public's eyes to the Palestine question. After the War, Nûrî al-Sa'îd, the most influential politician in Iraq and advocator of the federation of the ‘Fertile Crescent’, utilized the Palestine cause in order to maintain his legitimacy in unstable domestic politics. Nûrî's parochial policy toward Palestine made it more difficult for Iraqi Jews to live in peace. Finally, about twelve hundred thousand Iraqi Jews were forced to emigrate from Iraq to Israel in 1950 and 1951. The oldest Jewish community in the world disappeared.
In contrast to Iraq, Egypt did not implement any special policy against Jews of Egypt after the 1948 War. Two-thirds of Jewish population in Egypt did not hold Egyptian nationality. They immigrated to Egypt after the British occupation in 1882. They continued to be foreigners until the nationalization of foreign companies in Egypt after the Suez War. No Egyptian government followed discriminatory policies to the Jews even after the Free Officers' Revolution in 1952. On the contrary, the Officers pursued peace with Israel through secret negotiations after the Armistice Agreements according to recently published researches, which are based upon newly available British, American and Israeli official documents, on Egyptian-Israeli relations.
The American policy of the Eisenhower administration influenced both Arab regional politics and secret peace negotiations between Arab states and Israel. The U. S. administration tried to attain a resolution between Egypt and Israel so as to secure a regional cooperation of the Arab states in the south of the ‘Northern Tier’ upon a concept of the containment of Communism.
Nûrî, the Iraqi premier, pursued his old concept of the federation of the‘ Fertile Crescent’ in the framework of the Baghdad Pact under British patronage. British also intended to maintain Imperial hegemony over Middle East through the Baghdad Pact, while Americans considered the Pact as a grand strategy against Communism. This contradiction produced American-British inconsistency in terms of their interests in the area. This situation reflected upon Egyptian-Iraqi confrontatins concerning participation in the Pact and also upon peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel.
Israel felt isolated in the above-mentioned regional circumstances. Israel expected the U. S. administration would agree with the supply of armaments. But U.S. were reluctant to supply their arms against Arab interests in their area strategy. Israel, therefore, sought other sources and turned her endeavors to reach an agreement with France.
Egypt also sought her arms from the Eastern Bloc, which led U. S. change their Arab policy of supporting Egypt, and finally to the outbreak of the Suez War. After the war, ‘Abd al-Nâsir declared that enemies’ companies would be nationalized. He also deported British and French nationals includin

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Views on the Eisenhower Administration's foreign policy have dramatically changed in a decade. In the field of the Sino-American relationship, many scholars explored voluminous materials and revealed that Eisenhower-Dulles's China policy was, contrary to our common understanding, not so obstinate or stubborn. Such scholars are now called the Eisenhower revisionists.
The Eisenhower revisionists indicate various facts which exemplify the administration's flexibility on its China policy. Their remarks can be summarized into two points: despite the Korean War or the Taiwan Strait Crisis, Dulles continued to pursue the Sino-Soviet split: Dulles also tried to work out the “Two China” formula and even conceived of Beijing's entrance into the United Nations. However, the Eisenhower revisionists do not succeed in explaining why the U. S. -Chinese relationship was not improved during this period, which is the major problem of their arguments.
The revisionists tend to regard the Sino-Soviet split as premise of the Sino-American accommodation, which seems somewhat naive. If the Sino-American relationship was a dependent variable of the U. S. -Soviet relations, the Sino-Soviet split may cause the Sino-American rapprochement, but this was not true. The relationship between the Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-American accommodation is not so self explanatory as the revisionists' assumption. Therefore, we cannot conclude that Dulles had a flexible policy on China, because he had a sophisticated view on the Sino-Soviet relations.
The other problem is that Dulles might consider some sort of the “Two China” formula, but he never thought of this scheme as a means of negotiation. His basic China policy remained to keep the maximum pressure on China in order to change its course. Once he said, “the U. S. could possibly recognize Communist China at some future time, but as long as Communist China is so bitterly hostile to us, we do not want to enhance its prestige”. Even if he had such a novel idea as the “Two China” policy in mind, the circumstances did not allow him to carry it out.
After the Geneva Conference of 1954, China enhanced its position in international society, especially in Asia. In this situation, the United States feared not only the expansion of communism but also the spreading of anti-Western sentiment in Asia. The U. S. thought China could strengthen this feeling through its anti-impelialist rhetoric. China became a regional threat to the U. S., which was, to some extent, independent of the Soviet or the communist threat. This was one of the main reasons why the U. S. -Cheinese relationship remained hostile, while detente between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. was in progress.

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This paper aims to elucidate how the Eisenhower Administration responded to the China Differential issue with an extensive use of recently declassified materials. In September 1952 the China Committee (CHINCOM) was established to coordinate the trade embargo against Communist China. From its beginning trade controls against Communist China had been considerably more comprehensive than those applied against the USSR and Eastern Europe. The gap between them substantially increased in August 1954 when the COCOM countries agreed to a major reduction in trade control against the USSR and Eastern Europe. This gap was called the “China Differential.”
After the Geneva summit in July 1955, CHINCOM participating countries including Britain, France, and Japan started to ask the United States to either reduce the CHINCOM controls or eliminate the China Differential. Against their mounting pressures, the United States government managed to forestall a showdown with other participating countries of CHINCOM by postponing the Consultative Group meeting. However, President Eisenhower did not display his strong leadership in solving the China Differential issue and instead he left the handling of that issue in the hands of bureacrats. Because of both Ike's lack of presidential leadership and conflicting views among concerned agencies of the U. S. government, the Economic Defense Advisory Committee(EDAC), a sub-organization of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, often faced serious difficulties in reaching a bureaucratic consensus over the issue of reducing the China differential in the process of reviewing both the economic defense policy and the U. S. negotiating position. Bureacrats were reluctant to make extensive concessions to the CHINCOM participating countries' demands of reducing the diffrential. The bureaucratic reviewings always resulted in only minor concessions. Such reluctant postures of the United States government increased frustations among CHINCOM participating countries. When the mulitlateral negotiation began at the Paris meeting of CHINCOM in May 1957, the U. S. government found herself to be isolated. What the Eisenhower Administration finally obtained after their two-year struggle to maintain the multilateral trade embargo control against Communist China was the United Kingdom's decision to eliminate the China Differential on 27 May.

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The world in the 1950s witnessed the growth of peaceful coexistence, which was basically brought about by the drastic changes in the Soviet diplomatic postures. The two superpowers' accomodation, however, did not last for a long time. The Cold War tensions mounted once again soon, following the Soviets' launching of the first man-made satellite into space, the East-West collison over the status of Berlin, the successful revolution in Cuba, and the shooting down of an American reconnaissance plane in Soviet territory.
During this short period of coexistence, the United States tried to use the given breathing spell for rebuilding the Western alliance. While relying upon the threat of massive retaliation to deter overt attacks by the Russians and the Chinese, the Eisenhower Administration sought a more efficient and less costly strategy of containment, the key to which was the collective security system to allow American allies to respond in local conflicts, as shown in the case of Indochina in 1954.
Fortifying the global American alliance network, with the greater emphasis in Asia and the Pacific regions, would be possible through bilateral security treaties with South Korea and Taiwan, multilateral arrangements in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and inclusion of West Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty. All these efforts were aimed at not only military but political and economic integration of America's allies, and the linkage of each integrated areas under American auspices, to secure maximum economic prosperity and political stability of the Free World. Expanding trade and investment, as well as American aid, were primary means for neutralizing the Soviet diplomatic offensive in the developing areas.
Secretary Dulles' firm belief in collective security and in economic integration, and his grave doubts as to the idea of national sovereignty, were also shared by President Eisenhower, and hence constituted the backbone of their New Look strategy. Yet they could find little sympathy among American allies toward their endeavor for an integrated and strengthened alliance. Nor was there any sufficient common understanding as to the Communist menace. America's allies were increasingly hostile to excessive pressures from the United States, and the Americans were irritatd by their allies' reluctance in cooperating with them in meeting challenges posed by the Soviet and the Chinese Communists.

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The foreign policies of the Eisenhower administration represented American diplomacy at the height of the Cold War. From the perspctive of the post-cold war era, however, it is inappropriate to regard all of them as cold war policies, because some of them still have their own raison d'être, whereas others failed accompanied by the end of the Cold War. Moreover, Eisenhower diplomacy brought about such an ironic outcom that its cold war policies were rather straightforward toward the third world nations, where relations of communist movements with nationalist ones were ambiguous, while intervention into the Eastern European countries was cautiously avoided in spite of its provocative rhetoric of “roll back”. In order to investigate the reasons for this irony, it is necessary to distinguish various objectives or aspects of Eisenhower diplomacy and to identify their interrelationship. In this article, we break down such objectives and aspects as follows:
(1) Leadership style and its interaction with domestic politics or political moods.
(2) Eisenhower's public philosophy.
(3) Type of policy formation and decision-making.
(4) Strategies.
(5) World system-oriented policies.
The leadership style, such as the rethoric of anticommunist crusade, as Robert Dallek points out, greatly appealed to Americans of the 1950's, because they felt uneasy in the transitional period from individual ethics to organizational ones. Such strengthened popular anticommunism, in turn, constrained options of Eisenhower diplomacy. On the other hand, intentions to promote international economics as the world system did not work so strongly as to restrain the cold war policies in the cases of the third world countries. The type of the policy formation and decision-making was not so flexible, either, while it made the Eisenhower administration well-prepared for eventualities. As a result, cold war policies toward the third world nations were rather straightforward.
The primary goal of the Eisenhower administration, as Robert Griffith persuasively analyzes, directly derived from Eisenhower's public philosophy was to keep American economy healthy to prevent the United States from becoming a garrison state. One of the main reasons the Eisenhower administration adopted a notorious “massive retaliation” strategy was to reduce the military budget. However, the Soviet success in developing thermonuclear weapons caused Dulles to think of the inevitability of mutual deterrence. Thus, concerns of Eisenhower and Dulles with the outbreak of the third world war, according to John Lewis Gaddis, led to their sincere search for a plan to place nuclear weapons under the superintendence of the United Nations. Nonetheless, why did the Eisenhower administration fail to stop the nuclear arms race? This is still an important topic to be investigated.

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With the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan at San Francisco in 1951, the Amami Islands as well as the Ryukyu, Ogasawara, and some other islands were to remain in the control of the United States and thus to be separated from Japan. However, as early as 1953, the United States returned the Amami Islands to Japan. That action has often been explained as a means to compensate for the United States' retention of the Ryukyu Islands. Beyond that, the United States' action regarding the Amami Islands was developed in relation to the Soviet Union's control of the Northern Territories. This article intends to add a new explanation for the return of the Amami Islands, taking into account the relationship between the Japanese southern and northern territorial problems.
The Japanese desire for the return of the Amami, Ryukyu, and Ogasawara Islands was strong. The United States recognized that Japan's territorial frustration toward the United States could not be rectified until the United States returned all of those islands. The United States concluded that some consessions to Japan were necessary. But the United States also felt a serious concern about the potential confrontation with the communist powers in East Asia. With such considerations, the United States decided to return only the Amami Islands, while merely improving the administration of the Ryukyu Islands. The United States considered that that series of actions was the maximum possible concession at that time.
There is another aspect that should be emphasized. The United States was irritated that the Japanese felt any antipathy toward the United States for controlling the southern islands. Similarly, the Japanese also felt antipathy toward the Soviet Union for its occupation of the northern islands. The United States was afraid that the Soviet Union might forestall it by returning some of those islands. In that case, the Japanese frustration would then concentrate on the United States role with the southern islands. That scenario was one of the main reasons why the United States separated the strategically unimportant Amami Islands in the peace treaty and quickly returned them to Japan two years later. The above strategy was possibly brought by the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department of State, especially by Hugh Borton, who was a specialist on Japan. It is highly probable that the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, knew the strategy.
Ironically, even following the return of the Amami Islands, the Japanese frustration regarding the territorial problems turned toward the Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands rather than to the Northern Territories. It was not before the total territorial settlement between the United States and Japan that the Northern Territories problem became the Japanese main interest among its territorial problems.

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In the early 1950s the United States concluded with various non-Communist countries Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements (MDAAs), which have constituted the very basis of Pax Americana. However, albeit their importance and voluminous amount of works on the Cold War, studies on the MDAAs are still at an initial stage.
Under the MDAAs, aid recipients promised in return for US military assistance their military cooperation such as the increase of indigenous military forces, transfer of raw and semi-processed materials to the United States, or export controls against countries which threaten their security.
Among them the role of the MDAAs on global anti-Communist export controls has been neglected due to scholars' focus on COCOM. The dual structure, i. e., COCOM on the upper level and the export-control network through the MDAAs on the lower level, gave a solid basis to the export controls even at the time of relaxation of COCOM controls.
Unique feature of the US-Japan MDAA under Article Nine [renunciation of war] of the Japanese Constitution is also a focus of this essay. Due to Article Nine the “economic interpretation” of military issues has prevailed in Japan, which gives a unique tinge to the US-Japan MDAA. Yet, the demise of the USSR makes such an economic interpretation no longer feasible.
So far Japanese analysis on security matters goes mostly to Article Nine and the US-Japan Security Treaties of 1951 and 1960. This essay insists that we should pay more attention to the MDAA network especially when military relations are drastically changing on a global scale today.

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On August 19, 1956, Secretary of State Dulles told Foreign Minister Shigemitsu that, should Japan recognize the full sovereignty of the Soviet Union over the Kuriles and South Sakhalin, it would be assumed that the United States will similarly be entitled to full sovereignty over the Ryukyus. Several days later, Dulles's statement was carried in the headlines of Japanese newspapers, shocking the public. The leaders were reminded that the options of Japan's course of action for the normalization negotiations with the Soviet Union were quite limited, if Japan were to keep the U. S. -Japanese relationship intact. This paper, using recently declassified American diplomatic documents, attempts to examine the reasons behind and the significance of Dulles's intervention at this point as the United States abandoned the initial posture to remain an “interested bystander.”
Dulles advised the Japanese leaders including Shigemitsu to take a cautious and tough approach. He did not want to see a normalization which would strengthen the Soviet position, or would encourage Japan to accommodate with Communist China. Moreover, the Japanese recognition of the Soviet claim over the territories in question would conflict with the American interpretation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. It could undermine the postwar basis of the U. S. -Japanese relationship. Furthermore, new evidence shows that Dulles had understood the American position in the Ryukyus to be based on the same rationale as that of the Soviet position in the Kuriles. It was the combination of the above that prompted Dulles to make the statement, and then advise Shigemitsu to insist on residual sovereignty of the Kuriles—the same status as the Ryukyus.
As Ambassador Shunichi Matsumoto later wrote, the rigid US position over the territorial issues was one of the main causes of the difficulty in the Soviet-Japanese peace negotiations. Dulles's statement was clearly a reflection of this US position. The statement also reflected a dilemma in the American policy toward Japan during this period: while the United States wanted to keep the Ryukyus bases intact, it needed to eventually return the islands for a closer alliance with Japan. The status of the islands had to be blurred. It seems that Dulles, who saw a parallel between the Kuriles and the Ryukyus, intervened to keep the status of the Kuriles blurred.

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After the end of World War II, Korea and Japan needed two mores decades before they finally reached an agreement to reestablish a formal relationship. The Korean-Japanese negotiation is recorded as one of the longest and the toughest ones in postwar diplomatic history.
In addition, it can also be characterized as a trilateral rather than bilateral negotiation. The U. S. played a role of more than just a “mediator.” This paper attempts to describe and analyse the U. S. policy toward the negotiation process in the 1950's using recently declassified documents of the U. S. Government. In particular, the Decimal Files (694.95) of the State Department contain a lot of valuable reports, memoranda, and telegrams which show us what the U. S. thought and tried to do.
It has been a well-known fact that the U. S., as a part of its containment strategy in East Asia, exerted an overwhelming influence in making the two reluctant parties to sit at the same table and make compromises on various issues. However, a close examination of the related documents give us a somewhat different picture. The U. S., during most of the negotiation period, tried carefully not to be involved directly in the disputes. The terms such as “hands-off policy” or “non-intervention policy” were used to describe the U. S. position. What did this policy position actually mean? What factors can explain its formation, development and change? These are the questions this paper attempts to address and answer.
The mediation efforts of the U. S. in the 1950's can be divided into three phases. Phase I (1951-1953) corresponds to the Truman Administration. In 1951, after it became clear that the ROK would not be given the status of a signatory of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, GHQ/SCAP in Tokyo offered good offices for the initiation of the talks, which resulted in the preliminary conferences in October 1951.
However, despite of the repeated requests from Korea, and the initial positive reaction among the State Department officials, the U. S. finally decided against being involved officially in the actual negotiations, declaring the principle of “non-intervention” as its basic policy position. Two factors were behind this decision. First, GHQ/SCAP in Tokyo raised a strong opposition to a formal mediation by the U. S., stressing that the negotiations should be autonomous and bilateral ones. It was no doubt the reflection of the Japanese viewpoint. While Korea badly needed official participation (at least as an observer) of the U. S. as a means to buttress its weaker position, Japan wanted to deal with its smaller partner after the restoration of its full independence. Secondly, the issue of reparation and property claims, which emerged as a central point in dispute during the first round of talks, made the U. S. position furthermore negative. As a de facto party concerned, who had seized all Japanese assets in Korea and turned them over to the ROK, the U. S. had no other choice but to proclaim neutrality by dissociating itself from the issue.
With the coming of the Eisenhower Administration, the U. S. policy began to take a turn into active intervention (Phase II). The New Look strategy, based on the neccesity of “cheap” strategy, required reinforcement of its alliance systems as a means to reduce the defense burden of the U. S. In East Asia, rapprochement between Korea and Japan was given the highest priority. Application of high level pressure upon Rhee was followed by the first official mediation effort, after the Third Conference was wrecked by the “Kubota remarks” in 1953. When all these attemps were frustrated, Eisenhower tried a kind of “showdown” with Rhee during his visit to Washington in July 1954, which proved to be another disastrous failure. Confronted with obstinate and desperate resistance by Rhee, the U. S. was forced to retreat into the earlier policy of

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A series of conferences were held in Washington, D. C. in October 1953, between mission leader Hayato Ikeda, personal representative of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, and Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State with staff representatives of related departments. It has been regarded until now that the requirement from the United States to reinforce Japanese defense forces was alleviated and that the development of Japan's defense policy after World War II was extremely affected by these Ikeda-Robertson talks. However, this common view mainly came from Tokyo-Washington no mitsudan (Tokyo-Washington, D. C. Confidential Talks), published in 1956 by Kiichi Miyazawa, who attended the talks at that time. The purpose of this article is to restudy the contents and meaning of the Ikeda-Robertson talks based on primary sources.
Ikeda's five-year private plan of Japan's defense program, which he proposed at the conference in 1953, was different from the National Security Agency's plan at that time. On the other hand, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, since May 1953, had been planning the schedule for reinforcement of the Japanese defense forces. When the Ikeda-Robertson talks were held, the draft was under investigation at the Far East Command in Tokyo, and the Department of Defense had no intentions of negotiating concretely with the Ikeda mission. The defense plan proposed at the Talks by JCS was one which predated Dwight D. Eisenhower's rise to power, and was not officially admitted by JCS. While the mission stayed in Washington, D. C., JCS failed to propose a new plan. JCS officers furiously criticised Ikeda's plan at the Talks and never accepted it.
JCS did not modify the Japanese defense force goals after the Talks. However, in Japan, the defense forces planned by the National Security Agency were regarded as official and were proposed to the American Embassy in Tokyo and the Far East Command. Ikeda's plan had disappered completely. In fact, this draft was like an observation balloon for the Talks in Washington, D. C.
In conclusion, there was no proof that the Ikeda mission eliminated the U. S. pressure at the Talks. It was not until Eisenhower adopted a new policy toward Japan (NSC 5516/1), and the new structure called the “1955 system” was established in Japan, that the U. S. attitude toward Japanese defense forces began to change.

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