In recent years we have seen the end of the Cold War symbolized by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the relative decline of the American economic hegemony, the strengthening of the regionalistic trend as reflected in the on-going integration of the European Community and the formation of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), and various ethnic and religious conflicts in former Yugoslavia, parts of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. These systemic changes challenge us to re-examine existing theories and current practices of international political economy in order to see how international cooperation can be facilitated and promoted hereafter.
Most articles in this volume directly or indirectly discuss the major debate between neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists, suggesting that we will somehow have to go beyond this current bebate, or at least maintain a balance between these two perspectives as we have much to learn from each of them. It is important to realize that whether or not nations seek absolute gains or relative gains may depend on the issue areas, the circumstances and the decision-makers concerned.
Charles W. Kegley, Jr., suggests that the dominant realist framework for international affairs may have become inadequate to account for current realities. This may or may not be true, but systemic transformations call for paradigm shifts. It is worthwhile for us to accept this challenge, and this volume will hopefully make a little contribution in the right direction.

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the structure of conflict and cooperation in international political economy theoretically.
In international politics, we have witnessed the debate between realism and idealism ever since the beginning of the discipline: realism focuses on the conflictual aspects of interstate relations; and idealism assumes the basic harmony of interests among nations. A similar contrast between realism and idealism can also be seen in international political economy.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the “traditional” interdependence theory which was based on the assumption that the basic relations among states are harmonious in nature a la the Ricardian theory of comparative advantages had been developed and elaborated. And, it was contrasted against the classical theory of international politics which was based on the conflictual nature in interstate relations. However, in the 1980s, what is called the theory of strategic trade policy was “invented” which reveals at least theoretically partial zero-sum aspects in international trade relations. And that theory seemed to have accelerated the conflictual nature of international economic relations. Furthermore, since the late 1980s, the reise of the relative gain hypothesis has radically shifted the theories of international political economy still further into the realist side of the spectrum. However, those theories which are based on cooperative aspects of international economic relations and which advocate multilateralism and intenational regimes have been still influnetial. And, the international economic relations in the real world exhibit both cooperative and conflictual behavior. Politics of international economic relations is indeed a mixed motive game and thus we have to develop a theory which includes both conflict and cooperation and which is able to guide us to control conflicts more effectively and to advance international cooperation so that the global, as well as national, economic welfare is to be enhanced.

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In recent years there has been a vigorous debate about the problem of conflict and cooperation under international anarchy. This debate has involved two of the most influential approaches to international relations theory, i. e., neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. The problem of absolute and relative gains divides these two approaches. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it summarizes the debate and argues that both of the two approaches are incomplete as a theory of conflict and cooperation under anarchy. Second, it attempts to outline a new approach to the problem of interstate cooperation that overcomes the shortcomings of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism.
Scholars in the realist tradition have long argued that anarchy inhibits cooperation among states. Since the beginning of the last decade, neoliberal institutionalists have challenged this realist assessment of the possibilities for international cooperation. Assuming that states are “rational egoists” who seek to maximize their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains of others, neoliberals claim to accept the realist view that anarchy makes cooperation among states difficult. According to their view, states under anarchy find it hard to work together because agreements cannot be centrally enforced (compliance problem or cheating problem). They argue, however, that international institutions can reduce the attractiveness of cheating and thus are able to promote cooperation.
Recently, neorealists have replied that there is a fundamental flaw with this neoliberal challenge to realism. Their argument goes as follows: Neoliberal institutionalists can see only one of the two major difficulties associated with cooperation among states, because they misinterpret core elements of realist theory and assume that states are rational egoists. For realists, anarchy means that states fear not just being cheated but also being dominated or even destroyed by others. As a result, realists do not believe that anarchy causes states to be rational egoists, but instead to be “defensive positionalists” whose fundamental goal is to achieve and maintain relative capabilities sufficient to remain secure in the self-help context of international anarchy. In turn, realists argue that a state will decline to join a cooperative arrangement if it believes that gaps in gains will substantially favor partners (relative gains problem). Realists therefore maintain that states must solve both the compliance and relative gains problems to achieve cooperation. Neoliberals, however, cannot take the relative gains problem into consideration, because they assume that states do not care about relative gains. Thus, neorealists conclude that neoliberal institutionalism cannot be applied to international politics where states seek relative gains rather than absolute gains.
This paper argues that both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are incomplete as a theory of conflict and cooperation under anarchy. Although neorealism correctly points out both of the two inhibitory effects of anarchy on the willingness of states to work together, it can say little, if any, to the question of how these problems can be solved in order to achieve cooperation. In the neorealist world, it seems that systemic constraints are so overwhelming that human creativity is totally incompetent against it. Here lies the merit of neoliberal institutionalism. It tries to show how human creativity can alleviate systemic constraints. However, as was mentioned above, its assumption about state preferences is seriously inappropriate.
Thus, this paper argues that a new approach to the problem of cooperation under anarchy must be devised. The new approach has to meet the following two requirements. First, it must be able to take both the compliance and relative gains problems into consideration. Second, it must be able to show how these problems can be solved.

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The aim of this article is to construct the new theoretical paradigm of international politics —“neo-realism synthesis”— in the post cold war era.
This study uses the method of synthesis and harmony of three existing theoretical paradigms of international politics: realism and neo-realism, institutionalism and neo-institutionalism, structuralism and neo-structuralism, in four dimensions of the rise and fall of a hegemonic power in international systems.
First dimension, in the period of a developing hegemonic power, is the model of “realism-structuralism”.
Second dimension, in the period of a flourishing hegemonic power, is the model of “realism-structuralism-institutionalism”.
Third dimension, in the period of weakening hegemonic power, is the model of “realism-institutionalism”.
Fourth dimension, in the period of transition of a hegemonic power, is the model of “institutionalism-structuralism”.
The comprehensive rearrangement of these arguments serves to systematize the three modern macro international political theories; to examine the significance of this new paradigm as a normative theory of international order; and, to aggregate a feedback study of issues, between theoretical analyses and empirical research, that await a solution.

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The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the decline of American economic hegemony since the late 1960s have given us cause to carefully reconsider Kenneth N. Waltz's Theory of International Politics, which have been subject to broad interpretation and severe criticism by manty scholars. However, thus far, only a few attempts have been made to shed light upon the relationship between several theoretical points of Waltz's theory.
The major purpose of this paper is to investigate this international political theory; to categorize it according to a scientific methodology, a systematic-structural analysis, and a stable bipolar system, and then to explain the connections among them.
The main points of Waltz's theory are as follows: (1) The principle of state action is self-help in an anarchic society as the absence of government. (2) States are functionally undifferentiated and have to perform similar tasks, however, the capabilities of their performance are varied greatly among them. (3) State power is a combination of the economic, military, and other capabilities, which cannot be sectored and separately weighed. (4) The structure of international system is defined as a configuration of power or the distribution of capabilities. (5) The international structure acts as a constraining and disposing force on state action. (6) State action is rational within a range of the structural imperative. (7) In a bipolar system it is much easier to reduce the uncertainty and complexity of state action. (8) Interdependence during the Cold War has been low at the international systems level because of the lack of economic penetration between the East and the West. (9) The reductive approach and the analysis of foreign policy should be excluded from systems theory. (10) Moreover, Waltz seeks to incorporate four scientific methodologies into his theory: (a) the hypothetical-deductive approach; (b) the definition of theory, structure, and relation as an explanatory power, a constraining force, and a positional picture respectively; (c) the effective and selective use of the economic theory of free and oligopolistic competition; (d) Emile Durkheim's depiction of mechanical societies.
These considerations in themselves, however, are preliminary to a further question, that is, how to reconstruct the relationship between the state and the international system. Both neorealists like Waltz and neoliberal institutionalists like Robert O. Keohane offer the key to understanding this new relationship.
The point I wish to emphasize is that the relationship between the structure of the international system and state action is similar to codetermined irreducibility. This approach called structuration theory in sociololgy requires us to lay the foundation for a theory of state action as well as to conceptualize the characteristics of systems structure.
Finally, I will put forth a number of proposals in order to meet these two requirements.

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This article reviews the major arguments regarding the security dilemma in international politics, focusing on its origins, the debates on the cause of the First World War, and nuclear strategic thinking. Special attention will also be paid to the relevance of the security dilemma concept to the emerging issues in the post Cold War era: namely, the problem relating to expanding NATO's membership to Eastern European countries, ethnic conflicts, and the international economic rivalry between the United States and Japan. Although the end of the Cold War appears to reduce the influence of the security dilemma in the Russo-American relations, this article suggests that the security dilemma continues to exist as long as we live in an international system in which no one can take measures to strengthen one's own security without making others feel less secure.

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The end of the Cold War implies the end of the two blocs in which the hegemons affected the behavior of non-hegemonic countries. In the post-Cold War period, there is no hegemonic country which can provide collective goods by herself. Nations which, during that period, did not take much responsiblitity, now have to assume greater costs in the international arena. Today, the capabilities of nations are distributed more equally and interdependence is more symmetrical. In this situation, two distinct phenomena emerge which did not present themselves in the Cold War period: (1) nations make use of established international institutions to reduce the necessary costs of state actions, and (2) domestic political institutions affect international issue-areas.
First, concerning international institutions, two variables can be determined by judging how actors (states) deal with the international “anarchical” system. Institutions as dependent variables connote the place around which “actor expectations converge” in Stephen D. Krasner's definition of international regimes. If actors seek common goals and interests, institutions can be created. But, once such institutions are formed, they have autonomous functions at least partially free from state interests. Institutions as independent variables imply that they affect actor expectations in reducing transaction costs and providing information channels.
Second, concerning domestic institutions, two similar variables can be discussed by analyzing relations between institutions and state policies. They are sometimes regarded in the international arena as trade barriers which prevent international cooperation. Domestic institutions as dependent variables imply that policies which pursue international economic competitiveness are accumulated to form a peculiar domestic structure.
By combining both variables of the two institutions, four types of international cooperation can be assumed. First, “ad hoc cooperation.” a genuinely new international agreement with no constraints of international or domestic institutions. Second, “cooperation for adjustment, ” the interaction between international institutions as independent variables and domestic ones as dependent variables. Here, the external economic policies of each nation are adjusted toward international institutions. Third, “incremental cooperation, ” the interaction between international institutions as dependent variables and domestic institutions as independent variables. This implies that even if international negotiations reach some agreement, the implementation of the agreements can be worked out little by little because of the incremental change of the internal political structure. Fourth, “pseudo-cooperation, ” the interaction between both institutions as independent variables. Here, although negotiations are carried out through international institutions, peculiar domestic institutions pose obstacles to genuine agreements.

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Robert D. Putman suggests that the politics of many international negotiations can be captured within the context of a two-level game. Level I is the bargaining phase between the negotiators, leading to a tentative agreement, and Level II is the ratification phase within each domestic constituency. The requirement that any Level I agreement must, in the end, be ratified at Level II imposes a crucial theoretical link between the two levels.
The important concept of the two-level games model is a “win-set”, defined as the set of potential agreements that would be ratified by domestic constituencies. Three sets of factors are especially important as determinants of win-set size: Level II preferences and coalition; Level II institutions; Level I negotiator's strategies.
This article is an attempt to examine the utility of the two-evel games approach through Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations between the United States and the European Community as a case study. The unsure win-set in the EC was largely responsible for the breakdown of the December 1990 negotiating conference in Brussels, scheduled to finalize a new GATT agreement by the accepted deadline of December 31, 1990. As EC's CAP reform had not realized at the time, the relationship between EC offers for the reduction of agricultural subsidies and CAP reform were not sure. At the end of 1992, however, the expansion of each win-set made possible the agricultural agreement between the U. S. and EC (the 1992 Blair House agreement). Both negotiators from the U. S. and the EC demonstrated an understanding of the others' interests and concessions in realizing the CAP reform in the EC. In 1993, the EC decided that “renegotiation” with the U. S. would lead to ratification in the EC since France had been pressing for changes of the Blair House agreement. Finally, a new farm agreement was realized by concessions from each side. Especially, the EC persuaded France by providing the possibility of taking “financial” measures as side-payments, if the GATT agreement. entailed supplementary restraints for the reformed CAP.
Putnam's two-level games “model” is an outgrowth of his analysis of the Seven-Power Summits. Consequently, we must pay attention to several points to apply his model to agricultural problems. Firstly, although the reform of the GATT rules about agri-trade needs to include the reform of domestic agricultural policy, these policy processes seem to be autonomous. Secondly, negotiators who participate in Level I are not monolithic. And finally, the sense of a game is so intense that Putnam's model is apt to disregard the philosophical differences about agriculture. However, if we use this model, while regarding such issue characteristics, it will be convenient. Sufficiently useful.

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The dichotomous approach to the political economy of development, which was especially prevalent in the context of the bipolar relations of the Cold War, no longer provides us with an adequate framework for finding solutions. Instead, a triangular or tripolar model may help overcome some of these difficulties.
It is argued that sustainable development needs to be conceptualized using a triangular schema, with liberal, social and environmental democracies at the poles. These three poles are associated with a three-level differentiation in terms of political spatiality, ranging from an inward-looking “closed nationalism” to “open nationalism” (internationalism) and “supranationalism” (globalism).
This schema will be used to examine Japan's ODA. In so doing, this article presents a descriptive overview of changes in the disaggregated dependent variable (volume and form, geographical distribution, sectoral allocation, and terms and conditions) of Japan's ODA.
The average ratio of bilateral ODA in total ODA volume dropped, when Japan increased its payments to the regional financial institutions. Since then the position has remained around 70 percent in the bilateral-multilateral dimension, but the relative predominance of yen loans in bilateral ODA was rapidly eroded by a constant increase in bilateral ODA grants. Thus, Japan's ODA activities moved from the less open nationalism to more open nationalism in the 1970s, although the shape of the triangle became more balanced when accompanied by a moving back to the strengthened bilateralism.
The changing inclination of the vector towards the pole of market-oriented economies differs across time and space. Loan-centrism remained relatively high in Asia. In the Middle East loans and grants were almost balanced in the early years, and loan-centrism quickly emerged and remained after the 1970s. By contrast, the share of grants for Africa gradually increased, although yen loans still shared almost half and again increased in the late 1980s. In this process, the shape of the triangle changed from that of an acute-angled one with a low grant element to resemble an isosceles triangle with relatively balanced grant and loan elements. The change in the direction of ecological sustainability has just begun and the majority of Japan's ODA program is still heavily targeted to capital-intensive projects.

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In the post-Cold War period, democratization in the former socialist countries and developing countries is seen not only as a domestic matter but also as one of the important issues for world politics.
This article first examines the reasons why developedd countries began to make various commitments to support democratization in former socialist countries and developing countries as one of their diplomatic agendas. It suggests: the recognition of democracy as a common goal for human beings, the acceptance of the “democratic peace” idea, and the perception that because of power relations, it is advantageous for developed countries to support or demand democratization in non-democratic countries.
Two theoretical problems regarding support for democratization are examined. The first is the legitimacy of international support for democratization vis-à-vis national sovereignty. The second is a problem of how to balance democracy with other common values, particularly economic development. This article examines developed countries' various approaches to the second problem such as the idea of political conditionality, economic sanction, the emphasis of “good governance” and the insistence of an “Asian way” of economic development.

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The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the relationship between the withdrawal of Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPVA) which was completed in 1958 and the establishment of Kim Il Sung's power base. When compared with the U. S. forces still stationed in South Korea, the CPVA withdrawal progressed smoothly upon Chinese-North Korean agreement. The CPVA withdrawal was implemented in two stage, in 1954-1955 and 1958, and suspended in 1956-1957. Why suspended in 1956-1957? According to the Chinese explanation, it was suspended upon Chinese-North Korean agreement with the shakeup within the socialist camp after the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress in the background. However, 1956 and 1957 was a period in which Kim Il Sung established his own power base by purgeing the Chinese and Soviet factions within North Korea. In 1956, China suspended the withdrawal of CPVA to pressure Kim Il Sung who trying to eliminate the Chinese faction within North Korea. However, Kim Il Sung has almost completed purging the main members of the Chinese faction by the end of 1957. In 1958, China who judged that the revival of the Chinese faction was difficult, completely withdrew the CPVA to maintain good relations with North Korea. Afterwards, Kim Il Sung continued his all-out purge of the Chinese faction and established his power base. Therefore, the establishment of Kim Il Sung's power base and the timing of the CPVA withdrawal was closely connected. Afterwards, North Korea and China maintained good relations, but it was a delicate relationship between Kim Il Sung and China in the beginning.

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As the result of the World War II, the German government ceased to exist; Germany was occupied and governed directly by the occupation authorities of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union. The Japanese government continued to exist; Japan was occupied and indirectly controlled by SCAP/GHQ whose personnel were predominantly American. The occupation of Japan by the Allied Powers was in substance a unitary occupation by the United States.
The United States, as an occupying country, tried to associate the occupied Japan and Germany with the International Trade Organization (ITO) and/or the-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and thereby secure reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment for these occupied areas. Many countries, however, were opposed to such attempts on the grounds that the issue of most-favored-nation treatment should be dealt with in appropriate Allied control councils, and ultimately in a peace treaty.
Nevertheless, the United States efforts bore certain fruis with regard to Germany. In mid-1948, in connection with the Marshall aid agreements, West European countries granted most-favored-nation status to Western Germany in an exchange of notes with the United States. This success was followed, in September 1948, at the second Session of the Contracting Parties to GATT, by a multilateral arrangement outside GATT framework, whereby countries signatory to it agreed to grant most-favored-nation treatment to Western Germany on a reciprocal basis. West Germany was also invited to the Torquay tariff negotiations of GATT, and given an opportunity to accede to it. However, similar efforts by the United States with regard to Japan all failed. Why did these differences occur?
Whereas Japan regained sovereign status after the making and coming into effect of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Germany made no peace treaty. Germany was recreated as a divided country. The differences in the political climate in Asia and Europe, and consequently in the ways in which Japan and Germany regained independence seem to have affected their acquisition of most-favored-nation treatment and entry to GATT. West European support for West German accession to GATT was in line with the grand strategy of the West to create a West German State in a context of growing cold war tensions in Europe. West Germany was an integral part of Europe economically, politically, strategically for the West. In contrast, there was no corresponding support by the West European countries for Japanese accession to GATT. The issue of most-favored-nation treatment for Japan was then made an issue for the peace treaty; and no country except the United States supported most-favored-nation status for Japan in the process of peace-treaty making.

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This article discusses and analyzes changes in the international telecommunications regime which have given rise to a whole new set of expectations in the management of global communications, and also examines the political process that has led to the changes.
First, it argues that the expected patterns of international cooperation as embodied in this new regime have become both more global and liberal. They have become more global, because the boundaries between domestic and international telecommunications have all but disappeared, and as a result, international cooperation regarding telecommunication standards and regulations now concern the terms of user access to the digital public-switched telephone network known as “integrated services digital network” or ISDN. They have also become more liberal in the sense that telecommunication services can now be defined and provided independently of the network by end users as well as enhanced service providers. Combined together, these changes have transformed telecommunications into services which can be traded internationally for profits, hence the reason for close coordination between the International Telecommunication Union and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
It then attempts to explain these changes by developing a set of neo-functionalist hypotheses that emphasize the role of an epistemic community in governmental learning, a cognitive process whereby scientific experts and their consensual knowledge induce actors' preference change leading to progressive changes in international regimes. The study has found that indeed the creation of this new international telecommunications regime is attributable to the consensual knowledge on ISDN, created by the International Consultative Committee on Telegraph and Telephone (CCITT) of ITU, and also to a high degree of uncertainty regarding nations' economic futures, spurred by the technological convergence between computing and telecommunications.
More specifically, the discussion focuses on the governmental responses in the European Community, Japan, and the United States to the CCITT's proposal on ISDN. In Europe, the EC under Davignon's leadership has played a decisive role in promoting ISDN as a means of creating a common market for telecommunication services and equipment. Its primary aim has been to provide economies of scale to the European telecommunications equipment manufacturers as well as to provide more diverse and cost-efficient telecommunication services to Europe's major multinationals, lest Europe as a whole lose future information-based economic competition to Japan and the United States. Similarly, the concept of ISDN has been eagerly adopted by Japan's Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications as a necessary foundation for Japan's commercial success in the emerging gobal information economy. Compared to these two cases, however, the cognitive change in the United States has been more complex as well as more unpredictable. This is due to the fact that the political process in the United States, being extremely fragmented, has lacked a dominant player such as the European Commission or Japan's MPT. But, in the end, a policy coalition sharing a concern for the economic fortunes of the U. S. industry, led by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration of the Commerce Department, has succeeded in making both the U. S. Congress and the District Court for the District of columbia reconsider the role of common carriers in enhancing the country's international competitiveness.
Finally, it discusses the negotiation process that actually led to the successful conclusion of new International Telecommunications Regulations at the 1988 World Administrative Telephone and Telegraph Conference that laid the foundation for the emerging international cooperation in telecommunications, and concludes that governmental learning by advanced industrial countries was a necessary,

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