国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
1995 巻 , 110 号
選択された号の論文の17件中1~17を表示しています
  • 梶田 孝道
    1995 年 1995 巻 110 号 p. 1-22,L5
    発行日: 1995/10/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The rights of foreigners, including their right to vote in local elections, are expanding in the European Union as the integration of Europe not only allows people to freely travel across the borders in the region but also has brought about the new legal concept of European citizenship.
    Western Europe, however, has experienced an inflow and settlement of Asian and African immigrants and faces a serious problem concerning their social, economic and political rights. The purpose of this article is to explain the current status of the right of foreigners to vote in local elections in Western Europe and to generalize over the issue by comparing Western European countries with each other.
    The current status of suffrage of foreigners in local elections in Western Europe will be briefly discussed. The countries which have granted foreigners the right to vote in local elections include Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands. The remains of colonialism can be seen in the United Kingdom's approach to the issue, because the country has vested citizenship and suffrage to people from the Commonwealth of Nations. Ireland has also granted foreigners the right to vote, while the country decides whether it grants foreigners suffrage based on the historical relations between the United Kingdom and the countries the foreigners are from. The suffrage of foreigners has not yet been granted in France and Germany which have attracted many foreign workers, of whom Asian and African immigrants and Muslims account for a large percentage, although the issue has aroused much controversy in the two countries. These examples clearly indicate that the situations surrounding each country affect its approach to the issue of the right of foreigners to vote in a subtle way.
    We will next examine a group of factors which enable countries to grant foreigners the right to vote and a group of factors which prevent them from doing so. The former group of factors includes the history of granting foreigners suffrage in a certain region, such as North Europe, a close relation between the former colonies and suzerains, the diplomatic policy of the country concerned (e. g. Sweden), free trade and the openness of the country. The latter group includes the ideology of a strong nation state (e. g. France), strong nationality (e. g. Germany), the ratio of foreigners to total population, a large cultural and religious distance between society which foreigners come from and society which accepts them (e. g. France and Germany) and the existence of a strong anti-foreigner movement.
    Next, the logic behind granting the suffrage to foreigners and the logic against it will be discussed, and based on this discussion, the reasons why some countries have granted foreigners the right to vote and why others have not will be examined. The experiences in Western Europe could offer many suggestions to Japan which is facing the problem of whether to grant foreigners the right to vote in local elections. The problem of the suffrage of foreigners tends to be discussed at the level of norms, and there is little discussion on the matter from a positive point of view, such as how foreigners will be granted the right to vote and how heavy their turnout will be. Japan will be able to learn many things from experiences of Western Europe concerning this problem.
  • 若松 邦弘
    1995 年 1995 巻 110 号 p. 23-38,L6
    発行日: 1995/10/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper deals with the development of British ‘race relations policy’ and its present status in terms of the commitment of central government. Race relations policy, which is defined as public initiatives aiming at the integration of immigrants and their descendants into British society, has been encouraged mainly at local government level. Though there have been some attempts to eliminate racial discrimination by legislation, central government's initiatives have been to support the actions of local authorities. Within the mutual autonomy between central and local government, race relations policy has, at the local level, established an independent policy area which has objectives and principles of its own. In the case of central government departments, the Home Office is supposed to play the central role in race relations; its actions on this issue have been mainly from a law and order perspective and little attempt has been made to coordinate policy between departments. Generally speaking, race relations have received a low priority in the policy agenda of central government. Central government maintains a non-committal posture on race relations and has delegated initiatives as much as possible to local authorities.
    This explains why most academic research has focussed its attention on local authorities' initiatives so far. However the influence of central government on race relations has been increasing recently. Since the mid 1980s, against a background of restrictions in government expenditure, such measures as deregulation and transfer of social service operations to the private sector or public agencies have gradually curtailed local authorities' functions. Increasing central intervention in local authorities has influenced local policy. This is also the case with race relations. Central government has come to have more impact on overall public initiatives on race relations. Local authorities' initiatives have been subject to great alteration in the mid 1990s. In this paper reference is made to three concrete measures by central government, that is, the Race Relations Acts, Section 11 grants and inner city policy. Central government's stance on race relations revealed therein is analysed.
  • 大島 美穂
    1995 年 1995 巻 110 号 p. 39-54,L7
    発行日: 1995/10/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this paper 1 consider the process and meanings by which the Nordic countries, in face of their identity crisis, inclined toward Baltic Sea cooperation as a new framework of regional cooperation.
    After the Cold War, paradoxically the Nordic countries seemed to lose their superiority in Europe, because it became clear that their stability and unity, whose characteristics are a lower tension area with no nuclear weapons and no foreign troops, and a welfare society, was dependent on the fact that they kept their distance from East-West confrontation. In today's Europe, distance from Central Europe and the EU means away from the centre of Europe's new dynamism, and the Nordic countries changed into the periphery. In this threat to their existence the Nordic countries tried to seek another way of regional cooperation and committed themselves to Baltic Sea cooperation.
    Apart from self-containment Nordic cooperation, Baltic Sea cooperation because of its location, is not only open to East-West relations, but also can contribute to smooth relations between “the developed West” and “the developing East”.
    Besides the emergence of sub-regional cooperation, such as Baltic Sea cooperation, has something to do with the changes of the qualitative and territorial meanings of security in Europe. The qualitative change is from the old security that meant only military affairs in a limited sense. This has lost meaning and instead means security in a broad sense, including refugee and minority problems, societal insecurity, and ecological problems. Thus security is related to the whole of society, so called human security. Baltic Sea cooperation based on Nordic multiple cooperation, that is in the social, legal, cultural and communication fields, can cope with security in a broad sense, and bring security to the region.
    On the other hand, as the Treaty of Maastricht shows, the EU has moved into common diplomacy and security policies which nation-states previously monopolized, and the meanings of state and territory are being eroded by the EU. The rearrangements of the EU's role and each nation's role gives new significance to sub-regional cooperation. particulary Baltic Sea cooperation, between East and West.
    In these senses, even though Baltic Sea cooperation is a very young and small attempt, it can be an important sub-regional approach to European security, as the nation-state system enters a new stage.
  • マクレー ケネス・D, 加藤 普章
    1995 年 1995 巻 110 号 p. 55-69,L8
    発行日: 1995/10/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper explores the impact and the possible future impact of recent major changes in the international order on the stability of selected states and regions. As a specific case study, the focus is on language policies as developed by the European Community.
    The paper begins with an overview of language policies and practices of the Community from its origins in the 1950s down to the 1990s, tracing the effects of expansion from six of fifteen member states and from four to eleven official languages. This period saw a gradual informal separation of working languages and official languages in EC, and language questions became politically sensitive from several different standpoints. Reunification of Germany in 1989-90 reinforced the claims of German to obtain equality with French and English as a working language, and this claim was formally recognized in September 1993 by a Commission announcement that English, French, and German are the languages of documents intended for internal use. This historical overview also traces efforts to improve the situation of Europe's “lesser used” minority or regional languages during this period, especially through the elaboration of a European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages under the Council of Europe.
    A second part of the paper looks ahead towards the prospective expansion of the European Community northward and eastward, discussing the possible consequences for EC language policy if the countries of Central Europe become members in the near or middle future. The most probable result of such an expansion would be an enlarged and rather different Community organized on a three-tier language system, with more exlicit differentiation between working languages, official languages, and “lesser used” minority or regional languages.
  • 坂井 一成
    1995 年 1995 巻 110 号 p. 70-84,L9
    発行日: 1995/10/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In Europe, the nation-state is relativized through the concept of ethnicity, at the infranational level, and through the development of European integration, at the supranational level. This article analyses the dynamics of identities between the French nation-state and an ethnoregion, the nation-state and Europe as a supranation.
    In France, there are several peripheral regions where ethnoregionalism is active; Alsace is selected as a case study. Alsatian political identity has been quite integrated in the French nation, the Alsatians, for some decades after the Liberation, preventing themselves from being considered as a political companion of Germany that had produced the Nazis. But people in Alsace have a strong attachment to their cultural or ethnic particularity based on language and they hold Alsatian identity in high regard; Alsatian ethnoregionalism is vigorous, and it is an important factor which relativizes the framework of the French nation-state at the infranational level.
    Alsatian regionalism has developed beyond its borders and it cooperates economically and culturally with the German and Swiss regions which are next to Alsace. The Regio, for example, is an transnational cooperation along the Rhine, where we must not ignose the cultural and traditional background of a territorial solidarity based on German culture and language. The European Union subsidizes interregional cooperation like the Regio, although, in this case, Switzerland has not yet entered the Union; we can see the situation that (ethno) regions have not needed to depend on nation-states absolutely in days of European integration.
    We must not ignore the reaction of French nationalism against the emergence of ethnoregionalism and deepening integration of Europe. The Council of Europe, which, in the realm of human rights or cultural rights, has played a main role in European international organizations, adopted in 1992 the “European Charter of Regional or Minority Languages”, but France has not yet signed it. And at the election of the European Parliament in 1994, many French voted for anti-Maastricht parties like “L' Autre Europe” (The Other Europe) for fear that France should lose its sovereignty and national character. These cases demonstrate a rise of French nationalism. French people nowadays have their identity as French and at the same time as European; these two coexist. In case of the Alsatians, they have an Alsatian identity in addition to the two; they have three identities, which are conflicting in one case and complementary in other.
    The nation-state is relativized by infranational ethnoregionalism and supranational integration of Europe, but at the same time, nationalism tries to reinforce its nation protecting the national identity; we can find both conflict and coexistence, in the correlation between nationalism and the other two. Ethnoregionalism and supranational integration are needed, in a sense, so that a nation-state might survive.
  • 一條 都子
    1995 年 1995 巻 110 号 p. 85-98,L10
    発行日: 1995/10/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper aims to explore the ever challenging theme of the future of the nation-state in relation to European integration, based on theories of nationalism and national identity. The paper looks closely at contemporary Scottish nationalism, and tries to find some material on this issue by examining the role of ‘Europe’ in the recent rise of Scottish nationalism.
    Based on interviews with Scottish elites, which the author has been carrying out since the Summer of 1993, three points are made. First, ‘Europe’ is important for the promotion of the cause of independence because the European Union is regarded as a guarantor of Scottish independence. Secondly, ‘Europe’ is important because it can promise the Scots an alternative to the British Empire in which they are expected to realise their talent and skill, and thus revitalise the Scottish nation. Finally, because at present ‘Europe’ can only be defined according to civic values, it is a symbol of liberal aspiration of Scottish elites who see the Scottish nation as being civic, not ethnic. In each case, ‘Europe’ has a positive role to play in promoting Scottish nationalism. These views, however, do not suggest the emergence of a European super-state with a European identity transcending existing national identities. This is basically in line with sociologists' view on this matter.
    Although the creation of a European super-state is very remote, the findings do not preclude the possibility of the emergence of some kind of ‘European consciousness’. Here, British identity has emerged as a possible model for such a sense of belonging. It is argued that British identity has never been a national identity by which is meant loyalty and a sense of belonging to the group called ‘nation’. But it is a kind of supra-national identity which has brought four nations of the United Kingdom together under the Crown, the Empire and Protestantism. With its civic values, ‘Europe’ may be able to produce such a loose form of identity. At the same time, the recent fever in rediscovering old Scottish ties with Europe among Scottish historians can be interpreted as an attempt to discover and rewrite common experiences of Europeans in a way in which it may serve as a basis on which a European nation is formed.
  • 阿部 汎克
    1995 年 1995 巻 110 号 p. 99-113,L11
    発行日: 1995/10/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    One of Switzerland's four national languages and three official languages—Italian—is loosing its leverage and another national language—Raeto-romansh—appears to be doomed, mainly due to economic reasons. The result will be a change in linguistic pluralism in Switzerland from a four-language system to a two (German, French) and a half (Italian)-language system.
    At the same time, a rapid expansion of dialect (Swiss-German) in the German-language zone is leading to the decline of standard German in universities, churches and other institutions. While this phenomenon could be interpreted as cultural self-assertion by the people of this region, it hampers verbal communication with other language zones because few people want to learn a dialect that is used only in a small area.
    The result is that more and more people are learning English, which is starting to become a sort of lingua franca.
    These linguistic trends are of great importance, given Swiss identity based on segmented pluralism. They suggest the collapse of the balance between cultural segments, which could threaten the very identity and cohesiveness of this federal nation.
    The danger, particularly if Switzerland is to participate in the European Union in the near future, is that each language zone may become less culturally independent from the surrounding countries that use the same language, strengthening the centrifugal effect from outside.
    To prevent such a possibility, the federal government has proposed the revision of article 116 of the Federal Constitution, which stipulates the national and official languages. Under the revision, Romansh would become an official language in dealings between the canton of Graubünden and the federal government. The revision would also try to protect the threatened Italian and Romansh languages, and to promote deeper comprehension between the language zones.
    This paper analyzes these developments and examines the possible changes of national identity in this federal and consociational state.
  • 三竹 直哉
    1995 年 1995 巻 110 号 p. 114-127,L12
    発行日: 1995/10/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In May 1993, Belgium has formally become a federal state with the fourth revision of its Constitution on the state reform, which started in 1970 in order to solve the persistent conflicts between Dutch and French language groups.
    In this article, the six main features of the reform of 1993 will be briefly reviewed, and their significance will be evaluated. The article also examines attitudes of the Belgian citizens on the state reform as well as their identification with the country.
    The revision of the Belgian constitution in 1993 includes many important changes in the political institutions in the country.
    1) Belgium is now formally referred to as a federal state in the article 1 of the new constitution.
    2) The Senate was reformed so as to fit better with the function of the federal state, and it now represents the federal entities in addition to the electorate.
    3) Regions now have their own assemblies which are composed of directly elected deputies.
    4) The ‘constitutive autonomy’ of the three of the six federal entities has been introduced, thus paving the way for significant means for them to decide by themselves on the operation of their respective government structure.
    5) The competences of the federal government will be limited to diplomacy, monetary policy, defence, judiciary, policing, social security, and the repayment of public debt. The residual competences are to be transferred to the federal entities.
    6) The province of Brabant, which includes Brussels and covers both Dutch and French language regions, is divided into two povinces.
    Two things have to be pointed out. 1) The non-territorial character of the Belgian federalization process since 1970 has now receded substantially, making way for the territorial principle. 2) This revision clearly reflects the weakening centripetal forces on the part of the Belgian state, and their restoration was not attempted in the latest reform.
    The 1993 reform of the Belgian state has not succeeded in solving or containing the language conflict in the country. Survey data show that Belgian citizens are largely in favor of the restrengthening of the Belgian state. However, on specific issues, such as the federalization of social security and the voting right of the francophones residing in the Dutch language district in the suburbs of Brussels, opinions of the population in the Dutch-speaking part and French-speaking part show marked differences, thus indicating the difficulty of avoiding further quarrels between the language groups.
    The territorial principle which has become dominant with the last reform is likely to cause further problems as well, especially around Brussels and Fourons area where dynamic movement of people are present and/or the two language groups live in the same area, and thus the territorial demarcation according to language groups is difficult to realize.
  • 鈴木 昭一
    1995 年 1995 巻 110 号 p. 128-142,L13
    発行日: 1995/10/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The process of nation-state building in Spain, from the beginning of the nineteenth century to Franco's authoritarian regime (1939-75), was sunk into disorder and confusion which was manifested in four civil wars and numerous military revolts. Moreover, during forty three years of this century, Spain had been under dictatorship. One of the principal reasons that nation-state building was not successful in Spain is the absence of a national identity and history resulting from its multilingual and multicultural character. The peripheral regionalisms against the state raised first in Catalonia and next in the Basque country at the end of last century were influential in this respect.
    In this article, the author aims to investigate the internal integration of Spain after 1975 through the strategy and movement of the Catalan regionalist party CiU (Convergència i Unió) founded in 1978. During 1980's the CiU did not persist in the framework of nation-state and developed its diplomatic actions as if Catalonia were a state. By contrast, the Socialist Party, which came to power in 1982, repeatedly issued warning to the CiU emphasizing the importance of the existing nation-state system. The latter half of the 1980's marked the climax of the antagonism between the CiU and the Socialist Party.
    The general election of 1993, in which the Socialist Party lost its majority, changed the situation completely. To stay in power, ultimately, the Socialist Party had to be supported by two regionalist parties, the CiU and the PNV (Basque Nationalist Party). As a result, both parties used this opportunity to cast votes for their aims. After the general election, the Socialist Party began to negotiate with them to make a blueprint of the new internal intgration of Spain.
    Though it is too early to make predictions about the future of the nation-state in Spain, its significance must be diminished as long as the CiU, associating with the PNV, continues to keep gaining votes.
  • 大庭 千恵子
    1995 年 1995 巻 110 号 p. 143-154,L14
    発行日: 1995/10/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The aim of this paper is to describe the present situation of the group of citizens designated by the term of “Macedonian-Muslims” in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
    The term “Muslim”, in Yugoslav usage, has dual meaning, designating both religious confession and ethnic affiliation. In 1969, the Yugoslav government finally recognized a Muslim nation, which included the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovia. The former Yogoslav Republic of Macedonia, however, officially resisted the expansion of the concept of a Muslim nation beyond the area of Bosnia Sanzak. Macedonian-speaking citizens of Slavic descent would be considered Macedonians even if they were of the Islamic faith, since the newly created Macedonian nation was struggling against Bulgarian or Greek claims and for national recognition.
    Although about forty thousand citizens of the Macedonian Republic described themselves as belonging to the Muslim nation in the census in 1981, in the latest 1994 census the number has decreased to fifteen thousand. One of the reasons was that the Macedonian leadership had encouraged Macedonian-speaking Muslims to raise their consciousness of its membership in the “Macedonian mother-nation”. Muslim ethnologist Nijazi Limanoski, one of the representatives of the Republic association “Cultural and Scientific Manifestations of Macedonian-Muslims” founded in 1979, insisted that they would be considered as “Islamized Macedonian”, not as “Macedonian Muslims”.
    An identification of Macedonian-Muslims is difficult, however. Current problems originate among the diverse groups of Muslims themselves, especially in claims for education in mother-tongue. The Muslim community of Macedonian Republic comprises Macedonian-Muslims, Albanians, and Turks. In recent years, representatives of the Turkish community in the western part of the Republic have been trying to get official permission for opening Turkish classes in primary schools. These efforts were met with a negative answer, arguing that as they were Macedonian-Muslims they had hence to study in Macedonian.
    This brief overview of the present situation has not sought to draw conclusions. The objective here has been to present one complex aspect of the Muslim national identity that is politically sensitive.
  • 西脇 文昭
    1995 年 1995 巻 110 号 p. 155-174,L15
    発行日: 1995/10/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to analyze and clarify the characteristics of U. S. strategy in the post-cold war era. It is based on the following three U. S. government strategic reports: (1) Discriminate Deterrence: Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, January 1988, (2) Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, January 1993, (3) Report on the Bottom-up Review, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, October 1993.
    Discriminate Deterrence provided the basic concept of changing the Soviet containment strategy of the cold war era to a new one emphasizing preparing for a wider range of contingencies in the new era. The Regional Defense Strategy disclosed the new Regional Defense Strategy, which represented a shift from a focus on a global threat to one on challenges in critical regions. The Bottom-up Review put forward a strategy for “winning two major regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously”. These new U. S. post cold-war strategies are not necessarily desirable for Japan by two reasons.
    First, all three strategic reports describe Japan as a future superpower and a rival of the U. S. signalling that the American people are going to be more realistic and cautious about looking to Japan as a ally. The Second is rooted in the new U. S. defense policy concept disclosed by the Bottom-up Review: “linkage between a sustained U. S. security commitment to allied countries and their trade policy, technology transfer, and participation in multinational security operations”.
    This linkage theory would put pressure on U. S. allies to compromise with the U. S. on economic and political issues. Under this linkage theory, if Japan is reluctant to compromise with the U. S. on trade issues, the Japan-U. S. security alliance, which is based on the 1960 security treaty, could be jeopardized by playing the U. S. “security card” against Japan. If Japan rejects a compromise with the U. S. on trade issues, the U. S. may see Japan as “arrogant, ” and latent American suspicion toward Japan may surface.
    On the other hand, if the U. S. continues to press Japan to compromise on trade issues by linking these with security commitments, Japan might begin to sense that the U. S. is using defense as a “Trojan horse” to sell American products. The linkage theory could, in this way, jeopardize the basis of the Japan-U. S. alliance itself.
  • 殷 燕軍
    1995 年 1995 巻 110 号 p. 175-188,L16
    発行日: 1995/10/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The letter to John F. Dulles from the Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru on December 24th, 1951 is an important document of Japan's policy towards China after World War II. It has been regarded as Dulles's composition by existing research. But, in historical documents of the government of Taiwan, this writer found that when Yoshida Letter was being drafted, the government played an important role, especially in stating the keywords in the letter: “be applicable in all territories which are now, or which may hereafter be under the control of Government of the Republic of China”. And this writer proved that the important decision that includes these keywords was made not by Dulles but by the government of Taiwan under unavoidable conditions as a result of prior consultation between the United States and Taiwan.
    During the period of conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty, the government of Taiwan gave up the rights to make claims for reparations for Taiwan in order that the United States would support to join the treaty. However, because of the opposition by Britain and the other countries, Taiwan was forbidden to join the treaty. By considering global strategy, and furthermore to isolate China who had been fighting in Korea, the United States required Japan to settle the dispute with Taiwan and conclude the Japan-Taiwan Treaty. At that time, the United States persuaded Taiwan to yield on the problem of the treaty so that it was not applicable to mainland China and to propose a detailed scheme of it.
    Although Taiwan was persistent with her sovereing power over mainland China for a while, she had to propose a detailed applicable scheme of the Japan-Taiwan Treaty to the United States because of the pressure from the United States and the necessity of early conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan. The United States, on the other hand, was required by Taiwan to show the evidence that Japan would positively conclude a peace treaty with Taiwan.
    The word of application in the draft of Yoshida Letter which was presented afterwards by Dulles during a talk between Dulles and Yashida came from the very scheme of the government of Taiwan. The Yoshida Letter can be regarded as a result of the prior agreement between the United States and the government of Taiwan and as evidence raised by the United States to Taiwan that Japan would really conclude a peace treaty with Taiwan. The procedure of the negotiation concerning the Japan-Taiwan Treaty has also proved that the word of application came from the government of Taiwan.
    This article base on positivism proves the relationship between Taiwan and Yoshida Letter, which was an important document in Japan's China policy. The elucidation that Taiwan had played an important role in the procedure to draft the Yoshida Letter has practical significance to understand Japan-China relations during the early period after World War II, the relationship between the procedure of the United States's policy planning towards Japan and the government of Taiwan and the triangular relations among China, Japan and the United States.
  • 都丸 潤子
    1995 年 1995 巻 110 号 p. 189-193
    発行日: 1995/10/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 大津留 厚
    1995 年 1995 巻 110 号 p. 193-195
    発行日: 1995/10/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 土佐 弘之
    1995 年 1995 巻 110 号 p. 195-198
    発行日: 1995/10/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 山本 吉宣
    1995 年 1995 巻 110 号 p. 198-200
    発行日: 1995/10/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 梶田 孝道
    1995 年 1995 巻 110 号 p. 205
    発行日: 1995/10/21
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
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