This is the first issue of International Relations that focuses on studies of arms stransfers. This volume will mainly examine current trends of research on arms transfers in Japan.
In recent years, international arms transfers have reflected the structural change in the post-cold war international system. The interactions among various actors become more complex and opaque. The attributes of these interactions can be classified into the following three different forms of arms transfers phenomena.
The first is a divergent dynamics which mostly occurs in the Third World. The divergent phenomenon includes a rapid spread of sophisticated weapon systems, a multiplication of new indigenous weapon producers as well as arms suppliers, and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and relted high tecnologies.
A second attribute of the interaction tends to prevent sensitive military technologies from diffusion. Convergent interaction is developing in the industrialized nations, which must regulate proliferation of WMD, Nuclear Weapons, and Ballistic Missiles to the Third World. This concentrated direction will formulate an export control regime at the global level.
A third type of interaction is the globalization of multilateral collaboration in industrial activities. The implications of the interdependence in arms productions can be considered to evolve into the transnationalization or multinationalization of arms transfers issue.
The concept of arms transfers is controversial and vague, but should be discussed. Whether to interpret the outline of it in a narrow or broad sense, it will bring the different approaches for analysis, or distinct conclusions may arise from multiple interpretations. The concept also can be used in dual theoretical contexts. First, it is used as a high politics issue area, thus it implies political, security and foreign policy issues. Second, it is possible to describe it as a more practical low politics issue area, with increasing arms trade or arms sales since early 1970s.
Finally, the social functions of arms transfers must be argued. The discussion of this question inevitably involves certain value or normative judgements. It will have dual functions, namely positive eufunctions and negative dysfunctions.

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The Coordinating Committee for Export Controls to Communist Countries which was established in 1949 was finally dissolved on March 31, 1994 as a result of the end of the Cold War. The U. S. Government and other allies have made nonproliferation a high priority in ther security and foreign policy since the mid -1980's. They will strengthen their export control efforts in terms of non-proliferation.
As is well known, the relations between export control and arms control regimes are the two sides of one coin; the Nuclear Suppliers' Group is a back side of the NPT regime, and the Australia Group is an another side of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Converntions. In this article, the structural linkage between arms control and export control regimes after the Cold War will be examined from the view-point of strategic interactions within both regimes.
It goes without saying that in an export control regime suppliers control has been a main focus of policy. In the 45 years history of COCOM, there have been many controversies among the member countries, over whether the export curb should be more stringent or not. The U. S. governments have adopted a maximalist approach vis-a-vis the European allies and Japan which have consistently pursued minimalist approaches. Secondly, it will be examined whether and how such a conflictual relationship among the allies has been reiterated in the non-proliferation export control regimes.
Such new regime-takers as Russia and China have, actively or not, taken steps to join to the complicated global networks of arms and export control mechanisms. Finally, it will be considered how the coordination and cooperation between former proscribed enemies and the western allies will be possible in the framework of the global export control system.

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This paper examines impacts of current defense conversion efforts in the U. S. on world arms export market. Since U. S. share in the world arms export market has been increasing after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is essential to understand how U. S. defense industry is reacting to the new environment in order to predict a future trend of the arms export market.
In the first section, motives of the U. S. government behind arms transfer are examined and it is found out that economic rather than political factors are gaining importance especially after 1980s. Then survival strategies of U. S. defense companies, they are 1) conversion, 2) shrinking in size and 3) exporting arms, are presented to provide a framework for the analysis of this paper.
In the second section, the defense conversion in the post-Cold War environment is analyzed by comparing it with the situation after the World War II. It is found that defense conversion in traditional sense, that is developing business into a commercial sector, is unlikely to be materialized because of 1) difficulty of defense companies in producing competitive commercial products due to the peculiar regulatory environment and corporate practices that were developed during the Cold War period, 2) non-existence of pent-up demand, that contributed to the successful defense conversion after the World War II and 3) Worsening financial conditions of defense companies and their negative attitudes toward the conversion.
In the third section, it is discussed that contraction of defense industry is a necessary first step toward reducing export pressure of arms. However, even after the industry contraction, the export pressure is likely to continue because cost of developing and manufacturing arms has been steadily increasing. Unless this trend is corrected, defense companies would continue to be pressed to export arms in order to reduce unit cost of their products. Then concept of commercial and military integration is explained as a means to reduce the export pressure. The commercial and military intergration in research and development, manufacturing process and part supply has potential to ameliorate inefficiency of the defense sector. Here, the aspect of the intgegration in reducing the export pressure is discussed in detail.
In the last section, it is concluded that both the defense industry contraction and commercial and military integration are necessary steps toward reducing economic pressure for arms exports. The Clinton administration's initiative on defense sector reform is evaluated as a right move toward this new direction. However, there is a danger that until the new system is established, the export pressure of arms would increase due to the severe competition among world defense companies leading to proliferation of arms and military technologies in the developing countries.

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze arms exports in the Soviet Union and Russia in the transitional period. Needless to say, the Soviet Union was the largest arms exporter in the world. Its share in the world was 52 percent in 1979. The special feature of the Soviet arms exports was that it was done from the view of point of communist ideology and strategy rather than economy. That's why the middle and near east, China, North Korea were the most important countries in exporting arms.
At the end of the Gorbachev era, exporting arms to many of these countries was prohibited by UN resolutions or bilateral agreements. The Soviet Union lost many arms importers and naturally, the amount of arms exports was drastically decreased.
After the collapse of the USSR, intensive arguments arose about arms exports in the new Russia. Many disputants demanded to increase arms exports to finance conversion of military industry to civilian use and to reconstruct the economy. They thought that the western countries aimed at taking traditional Soviet (Russian) arms markets away.
In the latter half of 1992, Russia began to export arms actively.
This time economic profit is the main purpose. In many places they compete with western countries, particularly with the United States. There are some cases of friction between the US and Russia about arms exports. Since the arms market became small after the end of the cold war, this kind of incident will increase in the near future.

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In many developing countries, the arms industry is the most advanced sector of all industries, and that has raised the technical level and productivity of civil industries. For those reasons, many countries in the Third World have developed arms industries. Now, India, Korea and Sountheast Asian countries are expanding their arms industries.
Recently, China has emerged as a major arms exporter to the Third World. In the time of Mao Zedong, China exported small weapons to socialist countries and revolutionary forces by its “friendly price.” But after Deng Xiaoping's reforms, national interest took precedence over ideology, and china began to export large and expensive weapons. For example, China exported tactical ballistic missiles to Syria and Pakistan, and China exported nuclear reactors to Algeria. In 1985, China exported fifty medium-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia for two billion dollars. Saudi Arabia is an anti-communist and fundamental Islamic country.
In 1980's, the objective of arms export was to earn foreignn currency for the “Four Modernizations” Programme. China also sold weapons to both Iran and Iraq. At that time they fought a long war of attrition.
Chinese weapons are competitive in the world arms market. They are basically copies of Soviet weapons of 1950's and 60's. China insists that Chinese weapons are cheap, tough and easy to handle. But complicated weapons, such as tanks and fighters, are said to have many defects. Nevertheless, for developing countries, cheap Chinese weapons are very attractive.
Chinese weapons cannot fight against the high-tech weapons of the advanced countries. But Chinese weapons can fight well against the old weapons of the developing countries. Above all, developing countries can import Chinese weapons in a short period of time. In many advanced countries, arms exports are strictly controlled by the government. Technical procedure of arms exporting has to take lengthy steps, and sometimes it takes a few years. But in China, there is no congress or mass media which can check the Communist Party. For those countries, that may cause political or economic frictions with the advanced countries, China is a convenient country, or the only choice to deal with. Chinese low price weapons, which are easy to import, lower the threshold of war.
China influences the devloping countries not by economic aid but by arms export. Looking back over the Cold War era, one of the most powerful resources of the superpowers was their superior military capability which enabled them to control the world arms market. China's national strategy is to be the hegemon in East Asia and to have influence over the world. China's active arms export strengthens the Chinese influence upon the Third World, and advances its national strategy.

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This essay discusses the rise and fall of the arms industry in Latin America, which stepped into the limelight of international arms market as new “merchants of death” during the height of Middle East conflicts in the early 1980s, taking Brazil and Argentina as major examples. It consists of three sections: arms trade and production in Latin America: the formation and the characteristics of Latin American arms industry; and causes of the decline of arms industry in Brazil and Argentina.
In the early 1980s, Brazil became the fifth largest exporter of arms in the world and first in the Third World surpassing Israel. From the end of 1980s, however, arms industry in Latin America experiences a rapid decline. Today, Brazil is no longer included in the list of major exporters of arms.
For Latin American arms industry, the sharp drop in arms demand particularly in the Middle East meant the loss of their major market. Latin American producers, which was considered as “niche manufacturers” based on intermediate technology, has gradually lost competitiveness against the arms release of major suppliers after the end of Cold War. In this essay, the author also emphasizes the endogenous factors as a major cause of their decline.
Two important factors that contributed to the growth of Brazilian and Argentine arms industry were the long-term military regime and the industrial development policies under the “National Security and Development Doctrine” adhered to by the militaries.
In Brazil and Argentina the influential power of the military has declined to the point where we can refer to it as the “end of militarism.” While democratization in those countries removed the military from the first line of politics, military spending was drastically curtailed as a result of the shrinking budget, and the continuing liberalization of the economy is now shaking the basis of domestic production of arms.
The collaboration among the members of the Organization of American States (OAS) to maintain democratic governments as well as efforts such as Mercosur (the Common Market in the Southern Cone) to unify the regional economies has reduced the hostility among countries in Latin America. Even the developments of nuclear weapons, which were the stronghold of nationalistic hard-liners in the militaries, have been restrained as Brazil and Argentina recently ratified The Tlatelolco Treaty (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America).
Arms industry in Latin America has now entered an era of survival in which only firms who can increase sales to the private sector can survive. Thus the movement of arms from the region will most likely be liminted in the future.

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Japan is one of the largest arms importers in the world. On the other hand, it severely restricts the export of weapons. Namely, the Japanese Government carries out the most extraordinary policy that it bans the export of any kinds of weapons abroad, while Japan has developed and produced highly sophisticated weapons for the Self Defence Forces and also it has extremely high capability in terms of military technology.
It was in April 1967 that the principles on arms export were incorporated into national policy by former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato for the first time. It was called the three principles on arms exports, by which Japan refrained from the export of weapons to such countries as (1) communist nations, (2) countries on which were imposed arms embargoes by the UN resolutions and (3) parties to international conflicts or nations which were likely to become parties. Several years later, the Japanese Government revised the principles by enlarging the areas to which they were applied. Namely, in February 1976 the Cabinet lead by former Prime Minister Takeo Miki announced the unified government guideline that Japan refrained from exporting any weapons to every area in the world. Also, at the same time, the Cabinet defined weapons prohibited from exporting under the guideline as one which was used directly for battle by military forces. Thus the Japanese Government shaped the strict policy on arms exports.
In January 1981, however, the scandal that gun barrels had been smuggled to South Korea by some company was brought to the public. It was called the Hotta Steel Scandal. As a result of it, the effectiveness of the policy on arms export came into question. In March 1981, both Houses of the Diet adopted the resolution on the ban on arms exports, which requested the Government to respond to the acts whcih had violated the principles with strictness and discretion, and also required it to take effective measures to improve the condition. Accordingly, the policy of the Japanese Government on the arms export was substantially reinforced.
At the end of June 1981, the United States requested Japan to start the mutual exchange of arms technology between the two countries. At that time, it had been understood in the Japanese Government that the arms on which the principles were applied included every arms technology except widely used ones whcih were applicable for both military and non-military use. The United Sates took notice of the excellent arms technology that Japan, especially Japanese private companies, had developed so far. The United States has dissatisfaction with the unfair transfer of arms technology between Japan and the United States, because Japanese companies and other entities were not permitted to export such technology to the United Stats by the policy of the Government, while the United States had provided arms technology for Japan through licenced production and other means. The request from the United States purported to make the flow of arms technology between the two countries both ways. Actually there was a great controversy in the Japanese Government on whether it was consistent with the established principles on arms exports to accept it. Thus the Japanese Government had much difficulty in responding to the request from the United States.
Through the discussion in the Japanese Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Agency were in favor for the request, and on the contrary, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was relucfant to accept it. Finally in January 1983, the Cabinet lead by former Prime Mimister Yasuhiro Nakasone determined to accept it and start the transfer of arms technology to the United States as a exception to the principles. In the process of discussion, a opinion that it is the obligation imposed on Japan under Japan-U. S. Security Treaty and other arrangements between the two countries for Japan to provide arms technology for the

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This article examines the role of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) from its establishment to its incorporation into WEU in US-European relations and the process of European integration.
In 1976 the IEPG was set up by European NATO states and France. The IEPG's objectives which were defined by the Rome Resolution are to strengthen the European factor and the industrial and technological foundation for Western defense, by promoting the standarization, interoperability of equipment, and the efficient use of research, development and procurement resources. The IEPG is not formally a part of NATO. Nonetheless, close contacts exist between the IEPG and NATO.
In the 1980s, in the multilateral framework of the IEPG, the restructuring of European armaments production and procurement was promoted to increase the competitiveness of Europe's defence equipment industry. The IEPG, therefore, took initiatives which closely affected the European market for defence equipment. In fact, the European Commission refrained from intervening directly in the field of military equipment, because defence trade was excluded from Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome.
The Treaty on European Union, which ws agreed by the 12 EC member countries in Maastricht in December 1991, states that the Union can request ‘WEU, which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications’ (Article J 4.2). And in December 1992, defence ministers of the 13 IEPG countries agreed that the IEPG should be incorporated into the WEU to form a European armaments agency.
The WEU is expected to serve as a bridge between NATO and EU and strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance, particularly given the large-scale reductions in American troops stationed in Europe and concern that the lack of a European initiative for Western defence could further weaken the transatlantic security system. After the end of the Cold War, Europe needs the United States and the U. S. has an interest in a workable European defence cooperation. America's ambivalence towards European integration has existed since the late 1950s. On the one hand, Americans had some interest in a stronger Europe able to shoulder a considerable part of the Western security burden. On the other hand, they wanted this neither to harm US economic interests nor to undermine America's leadership in Western security and defence policies. However, in Western Europe ambivalence has also existed. Many Europeans have sought greater independence from the U. S. by creating its own security and defence mechanisms, while at the same time preserving US security guarantees.
In this situation, the IEPG has been integrated into WEU and the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) has taken over the European armaments issues from the IEPG. This group attempts to foster transparency and a reduction in defence trade barieers among members of the WEU and NATO states.

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With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the continuing need for East-West arms control negotiations has been called into question and now unprecedented attention is focused on nonproliferation problems. However, despite an emerging international consensus to put top priority on this issue, it is still very unclear about what a new threat is and what actions can be taken to prevent or even in some instances roll it back. Such uncertainties surrounding the problem seem to stem partly from the recent fundamental transformation of contents of the issue, which makes inadequate the traditional “nonproliferation” approach.
This article first points out that during the process toward the end of the Cold War, the NPT regime has aquired a new monentum, with South Africa, Zambia and Tanzania, France, China and other coountries becoming parties to it. Argentina and Brazil have also agreed explicitly to renounce the development of nuclear weapons and to establish a framework for implementation of fullscope IAEA safeguards. These new accessions to the nonproliferation regime can be understood at least partly in connection with domestic regime changes, including the end of the diplomatic and economic islation of each nation. Therefore the NPT's new momentum can be anlyzed as an integral part of the global “third wave” toward the neo-liberal market economy and democratization.
What is now perceived as a new nuclear threat is mainly posed by a few states left behind the current rapid politico-economic changes in a global scale stated above. Although Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Lybia, Syria, Algeria and others are ofen listed as states still harboring the desire to aquire nuclear weapons, it will be critical not to exaggerate the very risks in this new phase. On the other hand, they can not be left unquestioned. First, if they prove to be quite capable of developing nuclear weapons even under the NPT-IAEA verificaton system, the credibility of the regime's core will be seriously eroded. Furthermore, it may trigger new chain reactions of nuclear development races in some conflict-ridden regions. Finally, for an aggressive newly nuclear country, the potential payoffs on nuclear use would rightly be perceived to be high.
Dealing with the consequences of possible possession of nuclear weaponry in the newly nuclear countries, two problems will have to be tackled; first, how the traditional nonproliferation approach which concentrates almost exclusively on export controls can be adapted to the changed circumstance, where a basic capability needed for manufacturing a crude nuclear weapon has widely spread; second, what sort of an intenational force structure can and should be built to deter them from using nuclear weapons. Greater attention will also need to be paid to what to do if deterrence fails. This article will also refer to some problems accompanying current “counterproliferation” planning in the Clinton administration.

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The concept of ideas or “an ideational approach” in the literature on foreign policy decision making has been extensively explored in recent years. In tandem with types of decision making, it is argued that ideas, defined as policy beliefs held by individuals, are likely to represent a new type, thereby enlarging the horizon of the conventional models of rational, organizational and bureaucratic decision making. Indeed, the works by Odell, Checkel, Goldstein and Keohane cogently suggest that ideas have an independent impact on the outcomes of foreign policy, and are often important determinants of government policy.
As a preoperational attempt, this article is to demonstrate how ideas can be applied to the process of Japanese foreign policy making by closely examining the case of the Fukuda Doctrine propounded by former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda in August 1977. The case study concludes that the promulgation of the doctrine can best be explained by ideas held by a policy team composed of foreign ministry officials. Having construed the doctrine as a somewhat novel departure from Japan's reactive foreign policy, it follows that policy change can be influenced by ideas simply because new ideas emerge as a result of changes in underlying conditions of existing ideas. It also suggests some research propositions: whether ideas are likely to be adopted is dependent on (1) the saliency of an idea held by “policy entrepreneurs” to the political leadership, (2) the effectiveness of “policy windows” a policy community has in order to get access to the leadership, and (3) the ability of the political leadership to empower the policy community during the process of policy making.

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Treáting the personality of the three diplomats Shigemitsu Mamoru, Sugimura Yôtaro and Shidehara Kijurô this article focuses on the mental structure of Shidehara diplomacy and the general diplomats' understanding of China before the Manchurian Incident at September 18, 1931.
Among these three diplomats, Sugihara, who acted as a permanent chief secretary at the secretariat of the League of Nations and as a chief of the department of political affairs, is considered to be internationally orientated. On the other hand, in connection with the Japanese-Chinese economic negotiations, Shigemitsu was mainly in charge of China affairs and a supporter of Foreign Minister Shidehara. For Sugimura, China was an important export market for Japanese products. That is the reason, why he understood the whole of China to be one territory and did not separate the centralvegions from Manchuria. He also kept cooperation with the Nationalist Government in mind and recognized China as a proper state.
In opposition to this opinion, Foreign Minister Shidehara distinguished between China proper as an export market for Japanese products and Manchuria as a sphere of influence. The unification of China by the Nationalist Government brought the differences between these three views of China into the open.
As a result of the unification of China by the Nationalist Government, the two diplomatic channels used by the Japanese-negotiations with the central government and negotiations with the local governments-lost their function. Therefore, Shidehara could not turn his diplomatic visions into a strategy. Further, Sugimura was isolated by the strategical turn of the League of Nations.
Against this bachground, the Manchurian Incident, treated as a plot by the Kantô-Army, changed the destiny of Shidehara, Shigemitsu and Sugimura. Shidehara lost his political power. Sugimura left Geneva as Japan seceded from the League of Nations. After that, his opinions underwent a change as he argued that China should create a bloc. Shigemitsu was wounded in the Shanghai Incident, which followed the Manchurian Incident, and went back to Japan, where he acted 1933 again as a diplomat. He did not alter his understanding of China and tried to carry on the economic relationship between Japan and China. But the political climate had changed and the former partners were not representatives of China any more. That is why Shigemitsu lost sight of China as a state and ended by confronting Britain.

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From the viewpoint of international political economy this paper investigates the influences of the transformation of international banking in 1980s, especially (1) the U. S. financial services revolution, (2) the rapid increase of the twin deficits as well as becoming a net debtor country of the U. S., and (3) the globalization of the international financial system upon the interrelation of American international banks and the nation-state, among others, the external power of the U. S.
Through financial deregulations the American banks have been so damaged that their international status has been appreciably degraded. The globalization of the international financial system has made it easier for the U. S. to finance its twin deficits so that the U. S. has much larger deficits and has made it harder for the developing countries to gain money sufficient for their development.
Notwithstanding, the external power of the U. S. does not seem to have weakened so much, probably because, according to Susan Strange, the U. S. has been having enormous “structural powers”. The author also tries to explain this situation with his own notion of “the power of the market”. Under this notion, any country with opened, stabilized domestic markets of goods, money and services rich in demand may be able to make use of these markets as a strong diplomatic lever.
In other words, the countries having such markets have strong external power and the U. S. is unquestionably the strongest in this point. Moreover, American government has been working hard in using this power of the market in order to help international banks. The case of the international capital adequacy agreement for the international banks through the Bank for International Settlements (B. I. S.) is introduced as a good example for the U. S. to have practically forced with its “power of the market” the other industialized states to accept the agreement.
Although American banks once played a big role in defending and preserving the key currency status of the U. S. dollar in the Eurocurrency markets, etc., they more often restricted and constrained American foreign policies in 1980s after the above-mentioned transformation of international banking.
In conclusion, strong banks are necessary for the U. S. to preserve its strong structural power, while the strong structural power of the U. S. is essential for American international banks to remain competitive in the long term.

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