It is said that Japan did not approach her enemies to end the hostilities until the last stage of the Pacific War. But she tried repeatedly to negotiate a cease-fire between herself and Nationalist China (Chungking) during the war. What made Japan consider a separate peace only with China? How did she intend to make peace with China? This paper aims to analyze the objectives of Japan's approach to China and to make clear the circumstances of her peace efforts toward Chungking.
At first Japan contemplated making peace with China as a part of the plan to weaken the will of the United States to continue the war. As the tide of war turned unfavorably to her, Japan wanted to move her troops stationed in China to the other fronts by making a cease-fire with Chungking. In the last stage of the war, some of the Japanese leaders hoped that China would act as an intermediary between Japan and the United Nations to obtain less severe peace terms than unconditional surrender.
Japan, however, did not negotiate directly with China. The approaches in the early stage of the war were limited to gathering intelligence about Chinese tendency to make peace. Japanese were afraid that they would betray their weakness if they made overtures to China. Japan relied on the Wang Ching-wei Government (Nanking) to make contact with Chungking. Nanking government leaders, especially Chou Fo-hai, opened and maintained various routes of contact with Chungking through liaison agents. But they used the routes as a means to pursue their own purposes other than making peace overtures.
Japan did not regard China as a full-fledged member of the United Nations. So she expected that she would be able to exploit the differences between Chungking and its allies and to make a separate peace with it. But China would not show any attitude to accept Japan's overtures. Japan had few resources or means to induce China to consider making a separate peace.

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Dr. Friedrich Wilhelm Hack is famous for his attempt at peacemaking between Japan and the United States in Switzerland at the end of the Second World War. But he cut a figure not only as a peace-maker, but also as a Key player in Japanese-German naval relations in the 1930's. The aim of this article is to reconstruct the life of Friedrich Hack as for as possible and thereby to shed light on the not well known role of the Imperial Japanese Navy in Japan's policy toward Germany between the two World Wars.
Dr. Hack, who was taken POW by the Japanese at the siege of Tsingtao in 1914, became a weapons broker after the First World War and became influential in Japanese-German aero-naval relations, because the Japanese Navy was interested in acquiring German advanced technology, for example U-Boat and war planes, while Germany maintained the level of weapon-technology that was prohibited by Versailles Treaties by selling them to Japan.
After the Nazi seizure of power Hack's activity expanded into the sphere of foreign policy. His influence upon Japan absorbed the attention of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the chief of the intelligence department of the German armed forces, and Joachim v. Ribbentrop who intended to bring about better relations with Japan. So Hack played the role as the initiator of “Anti Comintern Pact”. But his success brought conflicts with the Nazi Party and others in “National Socialistic Polycracy” and resulted in his arrest.
Through the help of the Japanese Navy, Hack could live the life of an exile in Switzerland after the outbreak of the Second World War and served as an informant for the Japanese Navy. This activity of Hack led to the peace-mediation between the Japaneses Navy and the U. S. Office of Strategic Services.
Friedrich Hack symbolizes a aspect of Japanese-German naval relations in the 1930's and the early 1940's.

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Among wartime leaders in Japan, no one was more aware that the issue of World War II centered on decolonization than Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru (April 1943-April 1945). As Ambassador to China (January 1942-April 1943), Shigemitsu had become the strong supporter of Japan's “New Deal for China” to approve the Wang Ching-wei regime's voluntary self-independence and freedom. When he became Foreign Minister, Shigemitsu continued to promote “independence, freedom, and mutual equality” towards Asian occupied area as the main principles of Japan's “New Deal for Greater East Asia”. This set of “New Deal” policy could provide a “basic maneuver” for peace proposals towards the Allied Powers. In othe words, if Japan changed its war aims in accordance with those of Great Britain and the United States, there would be no more reason for Japan to keep fighting with China, the United States and Great Britain. At the opening of the Greater East Asian Conference in November 1943, Shigemitsu and the bureaucrats of the Foreign Ministry used the Greater East Asian Declaration as an opportunity to redefine Japan's war aims and to appeal to the Allied Powers with their basic peace maneuver. From the viewpoint of Shigemitsu, however, “New Deal” policy including the Greater East Asian Declaration was as much for domestic as for foreign use, to give the Japanese people a clearer conception of war aims, and to reform the militarism which had caused Japan to fall into military colonialism towards Asia. When he was aware that it was impossible to use the “New Deal” policy for domestic reform to exclude military colonialism from Japan, he insisted that the Japanese Government should accept “unconditional surrender” on their own initiative for the attainment of the same purpose.

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At the beginning of 1945 American forces landed in the Philippines and Manila fell. As the war situation grew still more desperate, Konoe Fumimaro attended the court on February 14 for the first time in over three years and presented a long memorial to the Throne. In this memorial Konoe adomitted that defeat was inevitable but reasoned that defeat itself did not necessarily mean the end of the national polity, as the real threat was a communist revolution which could occur as a result of defeat. Therefore Konoe concluded that Japan should seek to terminate the war as immediately as possible.
Until now studies about this memorial have focused mainly on his fear against the danger of a communist revolution. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to reexamine his aim in this memorial.
Not only Konoe but also the Jushin, Hiranuma, Kido, and Wakatsuki, had strongly expressed the same view. It is natural that the ruling class has such feeling, and Konoe, who was a prince, has been frightened by the fear of a communist revolution from his youth.
Konoe also stressed that the Manchurian Incident and Sino-Japanese War and their expansion into the Pacific War were skillfully plotted by one group within the army which have long time aimed at a communist revolution. But Konoe was strongly influenced by Ueda Shunkichi, Yosida Shigeru, and other some adherents of Kodoha, who had helped draft this memorial to begin to hold this conspiracy. Moreover this idea has been developed and intensified by his strong anger toward the army, which regarded his detachment as negativism and watched him with deep suspicion, the Sorge Incident, and his political motive to attempt a Kodoha revival.
More noteworthy is Konoe's grasp of the international scene. On the one hand he pointed out that the Soviet Union was pushing revolution not only in Europe but also in East Asia. On the other hand he observed that America and Britain had not yet decided over forcing Japan to abolish the national polity. Through obtaining much accurate information from the Department of Foreign Affairs and other channels, he was somewhat optimistic about American opinion. Amongst his contacts, Ogata Shoji, chief of the second section of the Investigation Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs, played a most important role by talking and submitting the memorandum to Konoe about the international situation.
In particular Konoe was very sensitive to the trend about Japan in America and knew well that there were some influential persons like Joseph Grew and Hugh Byas, who understood the position of Konoe and Japan. He concluded that Japan must terminate the war immediately by negotiating with America in order to avoid a communist revolution and to preseve the national polity.
Four months later Konoe agreed to go to the Soviet Union as special envoy by the Emperor's entreaty. Though he personally distrusted the Soviet Union, he had one secret plan to negotiate directly with America using this chance. But his plan was not realized, as the Soviet Union did not accept the Konoe mission.

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When did the Japanese begin to regard the United Nations as the ideal organization? Most of Japanese intellectuals must have advocated the construction of the “Greater East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere.” When and why did the switch from the regionalism to internationalism occur? This article's purpose is to answer these questions, focusing on the Japanese intellectuals' perception of the postwar international organization in the Pacific War.
In 1942, the Association of International Law in Japan established four committees in order to serve their country by pursuing and constructing the Greater East Asian International Law. It made a plan to issue the Greater East Asian International Law Series.
The first volume of this series was written by YASUI Kaoru, who was an associate professor of international law at Tokyo University. He introduced the idea of the national socialist international law initiated by Carl Schmitt to Japan. He expressly wrote in this book that he could select neither liberal international law, nor Marxist international law, nor national socialist international law as his own position. But he was purged from Tokyo University in 1948. Why? Because he never denied establishing the Greater East Asian International Law. After the Pacific War he became a Marxist student of international law, and he played an active part in the movement to prohibit the atomic and hydrogen bombs.
One of the faculty members to oppose Yasui's promotion to a professor in 1943 was YOKOTA Kisaburo, who was the head professor of international law at Tokyo University. Both Yokota and Yasui were followers of TACHI Sakutaro, but Yokota considered that Yasui was unprincipled and went with the current of the times. Yokota studied the non-belligerency phenomena in World War II, dissimilar to belligerency or neutrality on the international law. He never converted from liberalism to militarism, though he criticized the United Nations for attacking Japanese hospital ships and merchant ships. And he paid attention to the international organization plan discussed among the United Nations at the Dumberton Oaks Conference before the surrender.
He foresaw that the United Nations would be the name of the new international organization, and he temporarily translated the word of the United Nations with “Kokusai Rengo, ” which meant not Allied Powers but the international union of states, as if it were an ideal organization. This free translation might only be in imitation of the precedent that the League of Nations had been translated into the term “Kokusai Renmei” which implicated the international league in Japanese, but it was fixed as the formal translation in postwar Japan. It has given the United Nations the image of the ideal international organization for the Japanese.

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The purpose of this paper is to re-examine Henry L. Stimson's internationalism in the light of 20th century reform movements. Many scholars have written about his activities in the diplomatic field, but few have paid attention to his behavior as a party politician. Since the Progressive era through the New Deal, he had endeavored to make the Republican Party a bulwark of the federal government against class-based labor influences. He advocated that the national government should make policies on a basis of national interests, and that consistent national defence policies never be made under a class-oriented Democrat government. In this sense, his nationalism, which led him to internationalism, was based on the class issues which characterized early 20th century reform politics.
As soon as the Republican Party suffered a historical defeat in the 1936 election, he embarked on the reconstruction of GOP with the Republican National Committee, Chief Justice C. E. Hughes, and former President H. C. Hoover. He was opposed to socialistic aspects of the New Deal policies, and thus tried to make his party a core of anti-New Deal movements.
It's important to note Stimson had knowledge and experience about such activities. As a righthand man of Elihu Root, he worked the same job from 1912 through 1916 while progressive groups deserted from the GOP. With this crisis Stimson succeeded in helping deserters' return and created new supporters by strengthening the party's policy planning and propaganda sections. And in 1937 he recommended the GOP national committee to heed the lessons of 1912.
This strategy was accepted and went well until the 1938 midterm election. But after WW II broke out, Stimson was disappointed with the leadership of GOP. Party leaders planned to mobilize votes of anti-war groups to defeat the Democrat government. This isolationist campaign strategy reminded Stimson of his experiences in the 1920 presidential election. In this election he and Root strongly supported General Wood. But the GOP national committee and party leaders chose W. Harding because they thought isolationists' appeals for voters were as important to their party's victory as internationalists' and that Harding could get support from both.
In 1940, FDR gave frustrated Stimoson a chance. He apponited him War Secretary in order to get support from Republican internationalists. Stimson accepted his offer not because he accepted FDR's general policies, but because he wanted to control the war department as a “hostage.” He told Frank Knox that by doing so, Republican Party politicians could change the New Deal system from within the Democrat government.

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The establishement in June 1945 of the United Nations, which was conceived as a major international organization for general security of the post-World War II world, was pursued separately from peace conferences and other post-War settlements. It was the second attempt to design an international order based on the principle of collective security, but this time it sought to incorporate all the lessons learned from the earlier failure of the Versailles system of 1919.
This paper takes up the genesis of the United Nations as an example of an international effort with special attention to the role of major powers. First, it reviews the parallel efforts for war and peace by the “Big Three”-Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston S. Churchill and Joseph V. Stalin-and points out the nature of collaborative diplomacy which, despite different priorities, was only possible “before the Cold War.”
While stressing that the United Nations is as much a product of realistic calculation as the embodiment of idealistic principles, the paper then considers the prerequisites for post-War peace in general by using K. J. Holsti'study of past major peace efforts of 1648, 1713, 1815, 1919 and 1945 and appraises the current performance of the UN which has survived (with a blend of success and setbacks) the Cold War.
The study concludes that the role and responsibility of major powers (both the Permanent Five members and the ones formerly defeated but now enjoying inproved status) and their healthy “internationalism” have never diminished, though these are not necessarily the only factors, in managing international peace and security in the post-Cold War world.

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At the end of the Pacific War, there were more than 6 million Japanese (this figure includes not only military and naval personnel but olso civilians) scattered in overseas theaters; Korea, Manchuria, China, the Philippine islands, and the islands of the Western Pacific. At that moment, there was no one who dared imagine that Japanese nationals overseas could get back home safely and smoothly.
But in fact, 90 percent of them were repatriated by the end of 1949. In particular, 80 percent of the Japanese in former Japanese occupied territory in China, could return by May 1946.
This paper focuses on how the disarmament and repatriation policies for the Japanese overseas were made, and why they could be repatriated so quickly.
Who had the supreme responsibility to accomplish the disarmament of Japanese nationals and to provide for their repatriation? The Chinese National government troops under Chiang Kai-shek's rule could not carry out this mission. During the anti-Japanese War, the Nationalist government moved into the western regions, far from the coastal araes, so it took time for them to reach Japanese occupied territory.
Only the United States had the power and will to govern all the processes of repatriation. But at the same time, she had to solve other problems. First, she was supposed to maintain the pace of her own demobilization. There was strong pressure to bring Americans out of China. Second, she had to consider Manchurian problems. Generalissimo Chiang asked United States to transfer his army to the northern part of China, as quickly as possible, or the Soviet and Chinese Communist Party would have enterd into the vacuum.
In short, the repatriation of Japanese, demobilization of Americans, and transportation of Chinese were absolutely necessary for Washington. In order to carry out all these programs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff mapped out detailed plans for navigating large numbers of LST and Liberty vessels in December 1945.

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The domestic economic policy of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) immediately following the war was interventionist in character. It included emphasis on a planned economy, the nationalization of major industries, and cooperation between labor and industrialists at the expense of the interests of capital. As a consequence, it has been conventional practice to view the JPS's foreign economic policy as based on the principle of autarky. In actuality, however, it was much more open in nature, promoting both participation in the Bretton Woods Agreement and the introduction of foreign capital. The JSP reasoned that it would be necessary to pursue an interventionist domestic economic policy in order for Japan to obtain the economic power to enable competitiveness in an open international economic order.
Two historical origins of the JSP's postwar positive evaluation of an open international economic order can be delineated. First, the right wing of the JSP was supportive of an open international economic order from the time immediately following the formation of social democratic parties in the late 1920s. Second, the attitude of the left wing of the JSP, the ‘Labor-Farmer’ faction (Ronoha), changed over time from opposition to support of an open international economic order. Prior to the Second World War, the ‘Labor-Farmer’ faction had been critical of such an open order. However, at the time of Japan's defeat, upon reflecting on the international economic order created by Japan during the war, it came to approve of the open international economic order created by the United States of America.
At the time of the formation of the Socialist Party-led Katayama Cabinet in June 1947, the Japanese economy was autarkic out of necessity, and it was thought that this situation would continue for some time. It was in these circumstances that the major industrialists and the left of the capitalist parties, the Democratic Party, supported the economic policies of the JSP. Further, with economic recovery in mind, they cooperated with the JSP and its labor union base, the Japan General Federation of Labor (Sodomei), in order to prepare for entry into an open international economy. As a result, the Katayama Cabinet was a coalition centered on the JSP and Democratic Party and it placed much importance on the Council for Economic Reconstruction (Keizaifukkokaigi), an organization for the promotion of cooperation between workers and employers in which the major economic groups and labor unions participated, as a means of implementing interventionist domestic policies.
In August 1947 GHQ approved of the restoration of private trade in certain areas. The major industrialists and the Democratic Party, confronting this earlier than expected partial deregulation of exports, became more positive towards the rationalization of firms through such measures as the retrenchment of excess employees so as to improve international competitiveness. The industrialists were, however, unable to implement such rationalization programs because of the fact that, firstly, despite the above mentioned partial deregulation, the government still controlled an extremely large portion of trade, and secondly, that a socialist filled the post of Prime Minister.
From the end of 1947, the situation had improved so that the introduction of foreign capital, especially private foreign capital, was now considered possible, although respective party responses differed to this changed situation. The major industrialists and the Democratic Party, who were both highly supportive of the introduction of foreign capital, began anti-labor calls similar to the right of the capitalist parties, the Liberal Party, for a retrogressive revision of the labor law in order to better promote the interests of capital. Furthermore, they commenced a program of enterprise rationalization. The resignation of Katayama and the appointment of a Democrat,

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The Sino-Japanese war which ended in Japan's brilliant victory over China had various aspects, of which we have long been unaware. First of all, the war was fought between Japanese and Chinese armies, but actually it was a war armoured by Western weapons on both sides. The Japanese army had been trained under the German military system, and her navy also had been traditionally influenced by the British navy. The Chinese armament was also Western-made. That is to say, it was a war by proxy of Western powers, therefore it was an experiment of modern western weapons and all the world watched the course of events. Japan made most of what she learned from the Western military and obtained great success. Secondly, the aftermath of the war brought remarkably important consequences. As a result of victory, Japanese imperialism began to grow, and Japan became the symbol of the most civilized country in Asia, advancing into the rank of Western powers. On the other hand, China soon lapsed into chronic anarchy, inviting Western colonization. According to the Shimonoseki peace treaty, China was obliged to pay a heavy indemnity to Japan, and had to borrow from abroad. The sum of indemnity itself was 2 hundred million taels, but because of payment for the bond to Western countries, the total sum amounted to 6 hundred million teals, and China was actually reduced to bankruptcy; financially she lay in ruins. Such being the case, although the war meant remarkable success for Japan and led her to the rank of the civilized nations, for China it meant tragic disaster and China harboured deep resentment toward Japan, which we Japanese unfortunately were unaware. The war was the opening of the dark age for China, which terminated with the defeat of Japan in the Second World War in 1945.

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This paper examines what kind of political and social factors set the basic pattern of Fiji's ethnic relations between indigenous Fijians, local Europeans and Indian immigrants, under British rule. The paper also suggests common determinants of ethnicity in multi-ethnic societies of a tripartite structure composed of indigenous people, colonisers and labour immigrants, by comparing the Fijian case with the conditions in Hawaii and Malaya (Malaysia).
In Fiji, despite the lack of attention by scholars to the period before the 1960s, the re-organisation of the ‘native administration’ from 1943 to 1948 by the colonial government played the decisive role in intensifying ethnic divisions. The de facto architect of the re-organisation was a Fijian chiefly elite with British education, enjoying the confidence of the colonial government. Curbing the British officials' progressive intention to bring Fijians towards modern forms of self-government, he enforced a rather retrograde policy to keep Fijians within traditional village communities, away from the influence of other ethnic groups and urban Fijians. He managed to justify this isolation by emphasising the Indian threat to the Fijians.
This separatist scheme persisted through decolonisation and independence in 1970, despite criticism from the indigenising faction of European settlers, liberal urban Fijians, and some of the British officials who saw multi-racialism as a step towards stable self-government.
The comparison with Hawaii and Malaya points to the significance of the following factors in determining patterns of ethnic relations: numerical balance between ethnic groups, including 40% line of immigrant population as a crucial border; influence of the indigenising Europeans and people of mixed parentage (ex. Part-Europeans) as possible ethnic mediators; intra-ethnic leadership and legitimacy of the indigenous elites, as well as ‘inertia of the colonised mass’; colonical land-reservation policy and ‘sons-of-the-soil’ sentiment against immigrants; and war efforts as an allegiance test for immigrants.
This paper is an attempt to shed light on the effects of colonisation and decolonisation on the patterns of ethnic relations in such tripartite multi-ethnic societies as mentioned above, especially the relations between indigenous people and immigrants introduced by colonisers.

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The framework of “the Asian Pacific region” has appeared due to a regionalism which includes large areas of Asia and around the Pacific Ocean without a clear definition. Especially since APEC was organized in 1989, “the Asian Pacific region” has been drawing much public attention. On the other hand, some small regionalisms, which cover smaller areas, have been growing as well. These phenomena can be found in the emergence of some regional organizations such as ASEAN in Southeast Asia. SPF in South Pacific/Oceania. In other words, various regionalisms have been developing and coexisting in the Asian Pacific region.
Due to its breadth and political, economic, cultural and historical diversities, some argue that “the Asian and the Pacific” hardly make up a “region.” The Asian Pacific, however, can be dealt with as a framework even if it is not monolithic. Because it is regionalism and relations among units (actors) that make a geographical area a “region.” In addition, regionalisms are embodied in both inter-governmental and non-governmental regional organizations as well.
That many regional organizations have coexisted and often overlapped in the Asian Pacific suggests the Asian Pacific region form a “stratified” regional structure. In a “stratificational” Asian Pacific region, actors participate in various regionalisms at the same time.
This paper is an attempt to prove the existence of a phase of the “stratified” regional structure in the Asian Pacific caused by some overlapping regionalisms and how such a structure was formed. To avoid the tendency of observing the regional structure with general and previous images, the principle component analysis, one of statistical methods, is used. In concrete term, participation in a regional organization by official and private actors in the Asian Pacific is recognized that these actors take part in a regionalism. The data shows how actors from countries in the Asian Pacific took or take part in regional organizations in 1971, 1981, 1991. This paper clarifies that some regionalisms, South Asian regionalism, Southeast Asia regionalism, Pacific-rim regionalism and South Pacific regionalism coexist and overlap in the Asia Pacific in 1991. Furthermore, it describes the process of this stratified regional structure's formation. Such stratification derives from the inter-relation among units within the Asian Pacific region.

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