国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
1996 巻, 112 号
選択された号の論文の20件中1~20を表示しています
  • 改革・開放以後の中国
    小島 朋之
    1996 年 1996 巻 112 号 p. 1-15,L5
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Many evidences show that the transitional period toward the post-Deng Xiaoping era has already taken place in spite of no offical news on his disappearance. The question on how the transitional period will be developed in a near future remains in question, however. There are many different possible scenarios for the transitional period. The one extreme scenario is a steady, undisturbed transition under Jiang Zemin's collective leadership. The other is a scenario of domestic chaos or disruption aggravated by his fragile leadership unable to resolve economic difficulties and social malcontent.
    On the one hand, the former scenario appears to be supported by following observations in China's domestic political economic and social aspects; the official statement to declare the completion of leadership succession from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin, the remarkable success in economic policies of reforms and opening up to the outside world for 17 years, and the strengthened foundation of social stability through economic well-off.
    On the other hand, however, Jiang does not seem to have yet established charisma monopolizing authority and power over the country to the extent that Deng Xiaoping has been able to define everything including truth by “the Doctrine of Comrade Deng Xioaping on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”. Any alternative system requiring no charisma has not yet been found in order to maintain integrity of Chinese state and nation. Debts of the “bubble” economy seem quite difficult for China to clear off in a short run, though having good prospects of economic development in a middle and long run. Social stability might be disturbed by growing disparties not only between cities and rural villages, eastern coasts and central-western inlands, and Han Chinese and ethnic minorities, but also within themselves, even if economic well-off could come true as a whole. A complicated mixture of these unstable variables in political, economic and social aspects seems to increase the possibility of the latter scenario.
    It is difficult to deny that either of these two extreme scenarios turns out to be reality, and yet it is most likely that reality in the transitional period will be somewhere in between these two scenarios. Although what kind of transition toward the post-Deng era will take place is China's own question, this must have great impacts on stability and development of Asian region including Japan. Along with Japan, China is by now one of only two regional majorpowers in both political and economic contexts. The regions' future in a middle or long run might be swayed by whether China will become a “responsible superpower” contributing to the region's stability and development, or a “hegemonic superpower” with strengthened military forces striving for her rule over the region. For Japan and Asia, the worst scenario in Chinese future will be a nation in disruption or a hegemonic superpower with heavy armaments. Effective responses should be made to such worst scenarios, and full efforts to cooperate with China should be made to maintain China's stable development in the period of transition toward the post-Deng era as well as good relations between Japan and China.
    In this context, it is one of the most urgent tasks at this moment to make a careful estimate on the post-Deng transition period as correct as possible. Such estimate must be made through comprehensive analysis of situations in China for 17 years after policies of reforms and opening up to the outside world.
  • 改革・開放以後の中国
    高原 明生
    1996 年 1996 巻 112 号 p. 16-32,L6
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Since the late nineteenth century, there has been a new element in China's central-local relations. Pushed to on the verge of disintegration by the imperialist forces, central-local relations then became important not only in terms of maintaining peace and order within the empire, but also in terms of strengthening national integration and state capacity.
    When Chinese merchants started to lose the upper hand in the ‘war of commerce’ with Western merchants, offices were established in central and local governments for the designing and implementing of industrial policy. This signalled China's transformation into a developmental state, and at the same time brought in a new source of central-local conflict, that is the conflict over who would administer and control industry. It also strengthened traditional conflicts over fiscal and personnel matters. The centre designed and proposed ‘separate tax systems’ which suited fiscal centralisation, while the localities did the same with a view to strengthening fiscal decentralisation. The basic pattern of central-local conflicts has remained more or less the same since then.
    After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the tug-of-war between the centre and the localities was fought under new conditions. They included the penetration of the Communist Party's system into the localities and society, the paramount authority of Mao Zedong, and the introduction of the socialist planning system. Forces that promoted centralisaiton centred on those institutions which may be called ‘the centre of the centre’, such as the Party Centre, the State Council, and the State Planning Commission. In the bureaucratic conflict between vertical departmental systems (tiaotiao) and horizontal local bodies (kuaikuai), ‘the centre of the centre’ tended to side with the former which had their ‘headquarters’, that is the ministries, on ‘the periphery of the centre’ and were easier to control than the localities.
    Decentralisation was strongly promoted by a charismatic leader, Mao Zedong, with a unique developmental strategy. Since Mao did not always enjoy dictatorial power, at times he needed to aggregate local interests in his attempts to take the initiative in policy making. From the viewpoint of the localities, they used Mao's authority and power in the tug-of-war with the centre. Thus, in Mao's days, swings in policy between centralisation and decentralisation coincided with the swings in politics between ‘right’ and ‘left’.
    Since the late 1970s when reform and opening-up policies were introduced, the new elements in the game have been marketisation and decentralisation of economic power to the enterprises. Overall, localities have succeeded in enhancing their power in this period. First, the reformers at the centre needed the localities' support in winning the power struggle and policy debate with the planners. Second, localities responded and adapted themselves swiftly to marketisation. Based on the reality that many enterprises lacked the capacity to compete in a market, the local authorities actively took part in economic activities in a way that can be called entrepreneurial localism.
    The new motor for centralisation existed in the attempt to strengthen macroeconomic control over a marketised economy through fiscal and monetary policies. In 1993, the financialists at ‘the centre of the centre’, who clustered around institutions such as the Ministry of Finance and the People's Bank, succeeded in persuading the localities to bring in the ‘separate tax system’ from 1994. The tug-of-war with the localities over the implementation and amendment of this system should continue. However, its introduction signalled the advent of a new era in central-local relations, in which financialistic centralism and entrepreneurial
  • 改革・開放以後の中国
    唐 亮
    1996 年 1996 巻 112 号 p. 33-47,L8
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In 1986, Chinese premier leader Deng xiao-ping demanded his comrades of political bureau to promote a political reform campaign. He told them, that “without political reform, the economic reform will not be sustainable”. “the key point of our political reform is to regulate relations between communist party and govermmental and economical organizations for the better management of state affairs and economical matters”.
    According to Deng's instruction, the 13th Congress of CCP passed a plan of political reform. The plan included three main measures. First, it aimed to remove Party Group (tangzhu) from bureaucratic organizations, until then Party Group had wide range of powers to make decision on important matters related to the bureaucracy, and to appoint cadres. Second, it sought to desolve party's apparatus. As the representatives of Party Committe in specific areaes, party's apparatus used to appoint senior cadres, take initiative in policy-making, regulate relations among bureaucratic organizations. Third, The plan made it clear that Party Committe of enterprise would no longer play any leading role on production and management.
    This was Deng's second endeaver of regulating relations between the party and govermmental and economical organizations. These efforts had achieved some progress. CCP's excessively centralized powers had become more restricted; govermmental and economical organizations gained much more discretions as well as responsibilities in dealing with their respective matters. As a result of promoting China as a law-governed country, the party's interferrence with adaministrative and economical matteres reduced.
    But, Deng's political reform is conservative and limited. He persistently sought to maintain the CCP's leadership. When students made democratic demandes in spring of 1989, he refused and decided to postpone his political reform for the sake of CCP. As a result, Party-State is still the characteristic of political system in China. Among three cricial phases of the Chinese democratization, Deng's reform opened the way to establishing market economy, separating the party from govermment, but not yet to domocratization.
  • 改革・開放以後の中国
    浅野 亮
    1996 年 1996 巻 112 号 p. 48-62,L9
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper analyzes the changing role of PLA (People's Liberation Army), police, legal organs, and other related organizations after the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee held in December 1978.
    Some analysts on Chinese affairs observed that de-politicization, professionlization, and institutionalization were the major characteristics of modernization in the military, police and legal fields, which has been promoted by Deng Xiaoping after the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CC. Some radical reformers such as Yan Jiaqi insisted to increase the autonomy of these organizations through separating the communist party from these organizations.
    However, The Tiananmen Incident in June 4, 1989 revealed the limitations of de-politicization of these organizations both in theoretical and practical terms. As far as Deng tried to maintain the stable “authoritarian political system” in order to promote the modernaizaion of China, he needed the tight control of the military, police, and other closely related orgazanions through the channel of CPC (Communist Party in China). Thus, Deng again consolidaited the party's contorl over these organizations while he simaltaneouly promoted the professionalization and institutionalization of them. Separation of the two different functions, the maintenance of military security and the maintenance of public security has also been stagnated.
    The insitutitionalization had not been fully achieved mainly because Deng wanted to control these organizations, particularly PLA, exclusively by himself, without intervention of other powerful and potentially competitive leaders. The incomplete insitutionalization of the military, police, and legal organizations indicates that China is still on the way from the personal dictatorship towards the authoritarianic polity.
    In the dynamic change of China's politics and society, the military, police, and legal organs have difficulty in finding a new role and indentity.
  • 改革・開放以後の中国
    阿部 純一
    1996 年 1996 巻 112 号 p. 63-83,L10
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The aim of this paper is to analyze the interrelation of Chinese foreign policy and military strategy, in order to clarify the characteristics of Chinese national security perception. Through this process, we can find several factors inherent in Chinese national security perception which would generate so-called “China Threat” thesis in East Asian countries.
    Under Deng Xiaoping's rule since 1978, China has started the reform and open-up policy for its economic construction, and has seeked for economically prosperous and militarily strong China. For this purpose, China set up the independent diplomacy in 1982 to realize peaceful international envilonment necessary for its economic development and equidistant relations with superpowers. That is to say, China abandoned its long-kept policy of so-called “main enemy” thesis which put either or both the United States or/and the Soviet Union as a main enemy. Under these circumstances China has started its military modernization program.
    In 1985 China declared one million force reduction, which marked the virtual start of its military modernization aiming at restructuring military power matching for limited wars under modern conditions. This military modernization reflectrd the strategic conversion in China; the old thesis of the inevitability of next world war was abandoned. Deng stated that such kind of war could be avoidable because of the nuclear stalemate between the superpowers and the growth of peace oriented power among people in the world. But Deng's military modernization program has been in fact seeking for strengthening both conventional forces and nuclear arsenal, putting special stress on building up naval power.
    As for diplomacy, based on Deng's judgement on war, China has added the word “peace” in its independent diplomacy since 1985. This diplomatic development was to prepare for China to join rising economic circle in East Asian countries. For this purpose, China adopted the strategy of economic development in coastal area in 1987. At the same period, there appeared the concept of “total national power” in Chinese journalism and described international politics as the struggle to enhance total national power. This concept indicates China's belief in power politics, and it actually promoted China for asserting maritime sovereignty over its territorial waters, especially the South China Sea where believed to have abundant natural resources, but in complicated condition over the possession of islands with Southeast Asian countries.
    In the spring of 1988, after the small scale sea battle with the Vietnamese navy in the Spratly area in the South China Sea, China successfully started the effective control over several islands there. In the fall of the year, China officially proposed to set up the “New International Political and Economic Order” based on the Chinese invented “five principles of peaceful coexistence.” This new Chinese proposal was the development of its independent peace diplomacy, but with the exaggeration of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, this proposal put more stress on national sovereignty as the supreme right in traditional nation-state system.
    1989 was an extraordinary year for China. In May, after the thirty years' confrontation, China attained the rapprochement with the Soviet Union. But soon after that, there occured the “Tiananmen Incident” which forced China into international isolation because of the military oppression against student movement for democracy. Against Western countries' economic sanctions, China made a counterattack to them blaming that they tried so-called “Peaceful Evolution” to China, but it never gave up its reform and open-up policy.
    Since the beginning of 1990's, China has made efforts to set up good relations with Southeast Asian countries and joined
  • 改革・開放以後の中国
    宇田川 光弘
    1996 年 1996 巻 112 号 p. 84-101,L12
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This essay is intended to examine how human rights issues, which are concerned with the rights of the individuals, became to play some part in international relations, the arena whereby states are generally regarded as the main actors. The relation between China and the U. S is considered, because China was not on the agenda of human rights concerns in the 1970's in the U. S., but it became an important issue in the 1990's. This change seems to indicate the changing nature of international society.
    The rapprochement between China and the U.S in the early 1970's was realized when the leaders of the two nations agreed that it was essential to recognise each other to achieve a stable international order. Kissinger, who was impressed by the diplomacy of Metternich and Castlereagh, considered that the differences among states were undeniable facts in a diverse world, and he concluded successful foreign policy should exclude ideological elements. Therefore, ideological differences between the two states were set aside at the time of the rapprochement. The leaders of both nations held the view which presupposes that the principal members of international society are states.
    But the Sino-American relationship has experienced a fundamental change after the normalization of the relations in 1979. China became active in the international community, particularly in the economic sphere, for Chinese leaders noticed that the rapid growth of their economy needed the aid of Western technology, export markets and financial capital. This change prepared the way for human rights in China to emerge as an important issue in the international sphere. Access to China has become much greater today and information on conditions of human rights are more readily available than in the past. An increased trade and investment promoted some American congressmen to reconsider the relationship, first by doubting the moral justification of trading with a violator of human rights and secondly by looking for an effective way to use economic power as an instrument to put pressure on Chinese officials for the improvement of human rights. By this stage the presupposition which dominated the minds of the leaders in the early 1970's has vanished. China is not only a member of the society of states, but it is becoming an essential part in the international community.
    The dominant view in the present America is that human rights issue should be separated from trading policy, because it is widely held that the Chinese government would not improve the human rights conditions as the result of American pressure. But it should be noted that such view expects that the U. S. contributes to the growth of the middle class in China through trade, which would be essential to the coming democratic society.
    In conclusion, most Americans, whether ‘human rights first’ or ‘trade first’, would like to see democracy to foster in China in the end. In this sense, Kissinger and the Chinese leaders, who claim that an ideological factor does not matter in foreign relations, are hard to find real friends in the U. S..
  • 改革・開放以後の中国
    谷垣 真理子
    1996 年 1996 巻 112 号 p. 102-122,L14
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper examines the politics of Hong Kong toward the 1997 reversion. I think it is worthwhile to conduct the research on Hong Kong from the political perspective. The difference in political systems between Hong Kong and China remains big even after China's Open Door Policy. On the other hand, in the 1990's, the previous characteristics of socialistic economy have disappeared in the transformation of the economic system.
    The first part of this paper argues that the Hong Kong government has been paying attention to accomodate the opinions or demands from the people. In the post-war period the demands of people had increased in the process of industrialisation. The political system of administrative accomodation has become inefficient in the late 1960's and late 1970's, which could be seen from the increase of urban protests and industrial strikes. In order to respond this system failure, the Hong Kong government carried out administrative reforms.
    The second part of this paper describes the result of a telephone poll conducted by the author. The poll was designed to find out the political consciousness of people in Hong Kong. The basic question is whether people in Hong Kong support democratization since early 1980's. Although their main concern was the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong, the poll showed the people's preference toward democratisation.
    In sum, the people's commitment to the Hong Kong's politics beyond 1997 seems to increase. In order to fulfill the function of “one country, two systems”, it will be important to accomodate the public opinion efficiently.
  • 改革・開放以後の中国
    松田 康博
    1996 年 1996 巻 112 号 p. 123-138,L15
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to analyze from a historical viewpoint, the characteristics of China's Taiwan Policy, and its decision-making primarily during the period 1979 to 1987, when the “peaceful unification” and “one country two systems” policies were formulated.
    After Deng Xiao-ping's revival and the normalization of relations between the United States and China, China changed its Taiwan Policy drastically.
    Firstly, China replaced its policy of “liberation” with the “peaceful unification” policy. During the “liberation” period, peaceful measures were the supplement to the use of force, but during the “peaceful unification” period, force became the supplement to peaceful measures.
    Secondly, the “peaceful unification” and “one country two systems” policies were formulated in tandem beside the formulation and implementation of economic reforms. Both were based on similar thoughts, such as “Limited War Theory, ” pragmatism, economy-first, and peaceful coexistence.
    Thirdly, Taiwan Policy began to include some consideration of the Nationalist government and the Taiwanese people. China appealed to Taiwan for the opening of “three direct communications” and the start of Cross-Strait talks with no precoditions. At the same time, China extended the object of the United Front. Some native Taiwanese businessmen were charmed by various business opportunities in mainland China which were carefully created by the Chinese authorities.
    Fourthly, interaction between China's Hong Kong policy and its Taiwan policy was strengthened. China originally planned to take over Taiwan first, however, as Taiwan ignored China's proposal, China could not help taking over Hong Kong first, and using it as a model case of “one country two systems” to let Taiwan see.
    Finally, China's diplomatic struggle against Taiwan was successful. The normalization of relations between the United States and China, and the Joint-Communique issued by both countries successfully isolated Taiwan.
    In conclusion, although China did not have enough power to take over Taiwan though the use of force, she began to offer proposals which seemed to be profitable or acceptable. Taiwan was forced to change its “Three No Policy” cue to China's “peaceful unification” tactics and the subsequent diplomatic struggle.
  • 栗栖 薫子
    1996 年 1996 巻 112 号 p. 139-157,L16
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Understanding international regimes raises a twofold problem: regimes may be studied not only as outcomes to be explained (dependent variables), but as social institutions which have distinctive impact on state behavior (intervening variables). This article takes up both kinds of questions by examining the case of the human rights and humanitarian area (the human dimension) of the CSCE from the Helsinki Declaration in 1975 to recent developments.
    First, in an attempt to demonstrate why the human dimension regime of the CSCE formed, endured, and changed, the basic causal variables to explain the regime development are applied. These include “political power” and “egoistic self-interest”, but the importance of such factors as learning, knowledge and ideas has been also stressed in the recent literature. Second, it will examine how the regime substantially affected the participating states in their cognition and behavior, or whether their policy changes were attributed to the international power structure or to the domestic factors specific to each country (non-regime).
    The human dimension of the CSCE can best be understood as an integral part of the CSCE's “comprehensive and compound” framework. It also includes the other two areas of security: military CBMs and environmental and economic cooperation. When a regime consists of several issue-areas, linkages between different issues often promote compromises among parties in the decision-making process and hence persistence of the regime. And by the term “comprehensive”, I refer to the CSCE's comprehensive concept of security which interrelates nonmilitary aspects of security (human rights etc.) with the traditional sense of security.
    The Helsinki Declaration set forth norms and rules for human rights and for the cooperation in the fields of human contacts and free flow of information. The USSR agreed to such norms mainly in exchange for a formal recognition of the territorial status quo in post war Europe. The case study concludes that the CSCE human dimension did not exist as a regime in the 1970s, in a sense it had no impact on the USSR and her allies in East Europe in their behavior (declaratory regime).
    The regime, however, came to matter gradually through the follow-up conferences at Madrid (1980-83) and Vienna (1986-89). Several factors can be pointed out to explain these changes. Tactical linkages between issues such as in the fields of military security and the human dimension contributed to maintain the balance of the conflicting interests of the East and West. But other factors began to gain more importance. (1) Social movements in the USSR and East European countries developed, claiming that their govenments should implement the norms and rules of the regime. They also acquired strong support from the transnational networks. It suggests that the CSCE human dimension was not merely a declaratory regime wihtout binding force towards states, but its norms and ideas could be directly accepted by social groups and individuals and possibly reinforced changes in their governments' behavior. (2) The “review of implementation” rule at the follow-up conferences to assess the participating states' performance in the human dimension made the Eastern states learn how neccesary it was to comply with the regime standards. Some changes in behavior of the Eastern states took place before the end of the Cold War, partly because of their domestic policy requirements, the factors independent of the regime. After the revolutions of the Eastern countries in 1989, the regime emerged with new tasks of how to promote democratization in the former communist countries and to prevent ethnic conflicts (regime change).
  • 三輪 芳明
    1996 年 1996 巻 112 号 p. 158-174,L17
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to to examine the prospects for Finnish security policy in the foreseeable future by following the arguments on security alternatives after the application of EC (EU) membership in March 1992.
    The end of the Cold War forced Finland to reconsider the premises of her neutral policy. The confrontation of two blocks, in which Finland found room to pursue neutral policy, ceased to exist, and the withdrawal of former Soviet's forces from East Eupopean countries increased the strategic importance of Nordic area Pondering these changes, Finland decided to apply for EC (EU) membership, and determined that the core of the neutral policy is military non-alignment and a credible, independent defence. As for the relationship of these policies to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of EU, Finland takes a interpretation that observer status of WEU is compatible with the amended neutrality, as WEU is a crisis management organization. The purpose of the applicastion was to ensure its security in a changed situation by participating actively in the formation of the new security order of Europe.
    Toward the application to EC membership, some advocates of EC membership began to insist on the necessity to establish an institutional relationship with NATO, some maintaineded even the possibility of joining it. These arguments on NATO membership calmed down in the autumn of 1993, when the positive attitudes of Russia toward NATO turned to negative. While the major concern of Russia has been directed to the East European countries, it was highly probable that any attempt to approach NATO would strain the relationship with Russia owing to the Finnish position as a neighbouring country of Russia as well as the increased strategic importance of Nordic area In November, the then president Mauno Koivisto, made it clear that Finland would continue to pursue the neutral policy as any imminent and concrete menace against Finland was foreseeable. What was important for Finnish security was, according to the president, indirect security obtained through EU membership.
    The main issue for the Finnish security policy in the foreseeable future is whether the amended neutrality functions in the changed situation or not. It depends on how the EU and Russia estimate this policy. From the viewpoint of stability of Nordic area this policy could be in the interest of both. For Russia, this is a much better alternative than of Finland seeks to join WEU, whose membership could lead to the membership of NATO. For the EU whose border has come to touch with Russia, to maintain the stability is a matter of essential interest. One way to make this policy function more effectively in a way to serve for the EU and Russia may be to search for a possibility to cooperate with Sweden, as she is also a new EU member state and pursues neutrarity. Through this cooperation, neutrarity could be incorporated in CFSP as an institutionaized element.
    Another main issue is the validity of the concept of indirect security in the longer term. In case imminent and concrete menace emerges, would the EU membership be enough to ensure security, or should Finland consider joining NATO? If the latter's case is not excluded, this concept remains to be a transitional one. This problem of NATO membership is, however, premature. It depends ultimately on the advantages gained by NATO membership. But the function of NATO in the new security order of Europe is still unclear, especially in the context of nucler deterrence. The essential points, when Finland considers membership, are the reliability of the nuclear deterrence and the repercussion to be caused by joining NATO; among other things, endangerment of the regional stability of Nordic area.
  • 黒野 耐
    1996 年 1996 巻 112 号 p. 175-188,L19
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The past studies of Japan's Imperial Defense Policy (IDP) of 1907 point out that the IDP contains a number of both theoretical and practical problems. They may be aptly summed up in the following outlines: (1) Did Japan's national strategy match its grand military strategy? (2) Was there proper coordination between army and naval strategies? (3) Did force requirements and availability match the strategy?
    In this article, the author argues that the most fundamental question at issue is sound coordination between national strategy and military strategy. He then tries to probe into the consensus-building process between the government and the military.
    By establishing the IDP Giichi Tanaka wanted to find strong justification for continued military expansion and the maintenance of a high level of military preparedness following the termination of the Russo-Japanese War. For that purpose, he needed to demonstrate the matching of national strategy and military strategy and to establish proper coordination between army and naval strategies.
    Prior to the establishment of the IDP, Meiji political leaders had launched a “northward” advance by changing their traditional national strategy of hokushu nanshin or “defend the north, advance to the south”. However, this did not mean that the government had given up the “southward advance” strategy, but it simply wanted to maintain a noncommittal attitude toward changing the fundamental national strategy.
    Under these circumstances, Meiji Japan's postwar military leaders took the initiative for expended interpretation and laid down the fundamentals of the nanboku heishin national strategy or “concurrent advance both to the north and the south” as the basis for the IDP. Subsequently the “overseas” offensive strategy was established, comprising the continental offensive strategy and the naval offensive strategy. This eventually led to the grand military designs of maintaining 50 divisions in wartime and of establishing the ambitious 8:8 Naval Ratio.
    It would be taken for granted that the agreement between politico-military leaders is a precondition for the setting of the national strategy. But, in the case of the IDP, there was no prior consultation between the government and military leaders, and the military will was simply imposed on the prime minister, thus completely disrupting the traditional consensus-building process.
    This fundamental lack of coordination between the government and the military had an inherent danger of drifting Japan on a future collision course to fight a full-scale war with all the world powers.
  • 田嶋 信雄
    1996 年 1996 巻 112 号 p. 189-191
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 増田 弘
    1996 年 1996 巻 112 号 p. 192-194
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 劉 傑
    1996 年 1996 巻 112 号 p. 194-195
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 藪野 祐三
    1996 年 1996 巻 112 号 p. 196-197
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 石川 卓
    1996 年 1996 巻 112 号 p. 197-201
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 大木 毅
    1996 年 1996 巻 112 号 p. 201-202
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 児玉 克哉
    1996 年 1996 巻 112 号 p. 203-204
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 志村 尚子
    1996 年 1996 巻 112 号 p. 205-206
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 小島 朋之
    1996 年 1996 巻 112 号 p. 211
    発行日: 1996/05/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
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