This article consists of four sections. In the introductory section, Professor Kamo categorizes the present interpretations of transformation in world politics into the following two theses: thesis of cyclical change, represented by Kenneth N. Waltz, and thesis of fundamental change, exemplified by Francis Fukuyama. Professor Kamo tends to suggest that the latter thesis seems more relevant, but that it is necessary for us to examine more extensively the real feature of international political transformation within the context of an emerging complex interwoven development of globalism, regionalism, and nationalism.
In the second section, Professor Kamo raises the following seven fundamental questions to be discussed at the Joint Convention: 1) how the nature of the nation-state system and the characteristics of nationalism have been transformed and will be changed at global as well as at regional levels, 2) if the nature of the nation-state and the nature of nationalism are obviously in the process of changes which are more or less found in the international relations among the highly advanced countries, 3) how similarly of differently the change in the nature of competition between advanced countries would actually function in various international relations among the highly advanced countries, 4) how relevant the thesis of democratic peace is in our search for a peaceful international regime, 5) whether nationalism could be superseded or replaced by regionalism and/or by globalism, 6) whether nation-states can overcome the dynamics of “power politics” in the post-Cold war era, and 7) how the nation-states in Asia are actually changing their thinking and behavior in terms of nationalism, regionalism and globalism.
Through raising those seven questions and assessing some tentative answers developed by many prominent scholars, Professor Kamo suggests that the transformation of world politics has not been fully analyzed by paying sufficient attention to regional differences and impacts of complex developments of globalism, regionalism, and nationalism. In other words, the changes in international political structure are not as simple as those preceding analyses. At the end of the second section, he takes up the example of Japan and suggests that there are many cases demonstrating inertia of old political and societal elements of Japan in terms of culture and social structure.
In the third section, Professor Kamo attempts at a more specific and penetrative examination of contemporary structural characteristics in the Asia-Pacific region. He strongly points out that East aria still has a very salient hegemonic concentration of power resources with the growing Chinese power posture in comparison with Europe. According to Professor Kamo, one of the most significant trends in 1990s is multipolarization or polycentralization. Based on this analysis, he concludes that it is urgent for us to establish more democratized and multilateral regime of international cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.
In the last section, he moves to the future role Japan should play in the 21st century. According to him, one can clearly see the power political nature in Japan's reaction to the so-called “China-threat-thesis” and “Yuji arguments, ” but the Japanese should not cope with the situations by following power political rules of the game. He argues, instead, that Japan should attempt seriously to contribute to building an international political environment more suitable to institutionalization of multilateral cooperation and to persuade China to join less power political rules of the game. Professor Kamo finally remarks, “we, the Japanese, have never needed to search for the ‘choice for the future’ ahead of the times, as seriously as today.”

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First, I would like to propose the endogenous theory, which is not yet complete, as a working hypothesis. This concept appeard almost simultaneously in the East and West around the middle of the 1970s. I would like to apply this concept to the study of China, of Asis, and of international relations.
If we consider the perspective of the endogenous development, it appears that China only changes slowly due to its historical tradition. At the same time, however, we cannot ignore the fact that China is gradually undergoing endogenous change due to stimulation from foreign countries. For example, electoral systems are gradually being introduced into China's traditional guided democracy. A more objective legal system is being mixed into China's political organizations which have been based on the control of individual leaders.
In Japan the historical development of political culture is the same. As Tooru Sagara wrote, to the Japanese, the ultimate form of the universe is not a superhuman personality, but rather the spontaneous act of creation itself. That which comes into existence is both absolute and relative. The “now” that comes into existence can be affirmed as the “eternal now”. So I recognize that the Japanese Constitution of post war period has represented an “eternal now” which could be changed but not easily be changed.
So each nation or culture might have its own particular and regional tradition but, at the same time, might have developed with stimulation from outside. This development can be relatively universal and global. An important thing, however, is to recognize the fact that the development from inside is much more fundamental.
Historically, Western nations have moved forward with citizen's uprisings and economic revolutions based on endogenous factors that had been fostered within their own societies. Today, even if the West is gaining a new awareness of Asia and in corporating Asian influences, this will definitely not take the form of an easternization of the West. Rather this will develop as an endogenous modern reform within Western societies, in a similar pattern to the East. It will only be possible for the East and West to continue to stimulate one another in a productive manner if they each independently recreate and redevelop their own values. The mainstream of international relations of the 21st century will be the continuous creation of globalism based upon regionalism.

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After the decline of the Western industrial civilization becomes clear, some people will try to find a new answer in Asian civilization, notably in China's tradition and experiences. This attempt, to my mind, is difficult to achieve in the near future.
Modern China has not been and will not be in a position to offer an “alternative paradigm” to save human beings from difficulties arising from modernity, because China has followed the Western and Japanese paths of modernization. From the 19th century on, they have been humiliated by their national disaster of being subordinated to the developed nations in the West and even to Japan. Therefore, they have been trying to catch up and surpass the advanced West. The means they adopted in this process were quite modern in the Western sense. Especially in the field of international relations, where they have felt national humiliation most clearly, they have tried to emulate the Powers in the 19th century and early 20th century. For that reason, they are most classically “realistic” in their approach to this rapidly changing world.
They tend to stick to power politics with military power as the main source of “power.” They are strict over non-intervention in internal affairs of other sovereign nations. They try to build a homogeneous nation out of the old Qing Empire. Thus, the perception gaps between Chinese images of their place in the world and their deserved future place in the 21st century, on one hand, and the changing and groping world, on the other.
So far as the main trend in this direction continues, it is difficult to imagine that we can find a new source of desirable future image of the world in China's experience. Rather, when the world is changing, China will become a conservative factor in the way of a possible transformation.
It is neccesary, therefore, to integrate the country into the changing international society, before we can expect a new contribution from China.

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What about regional solutions to regional security questions? After the United Nations has experienced both successes and setbacks in dealing with a series of post-Cold War regional crises, the inter-relationship (or the appropriate balance) between global (i. e. the UN) and regional mechanisms to manage and to help resolve these conficts has become a recurring subject for discussion. And it is especially so in the Asia Pacific region. The rather anomalous security environment of which is exemplified in the duality of “hub-and-spokes”-type bilaterals alliances (à la the US-Japan alliance) and multilateral security frameworks (like the ASEAN regional forum, or ARF).
In fact, the tension between global and regional mechanisms, and the applicability thereof, was evidenced from the very beginning of the drafting of the UN Charter. They are both “collective” measures which can involve military options. But they are distinct in that the former can be called, in its ideal form, a system of “collective security” based on the principle of universality and inclusiveness while tha latter, being naturally limited in its membership, can be characterized as that of “collective self-defense.” Conceptually these two logics are supposed to be mutually exclusive, but in reality the function of regional security mechanisms can be found somewhere in the middle ground between collective security and collective self-defense. For example, the post-Cold War NATO has changed the nature of its functions and so has the bilateral alliance between the US and Japan, both of which are assuming the stabilizing role as “public goods” beyond collective self-defense.
In the Asia Pacific region, the anomaly of the security environment has not permitted us to envision a region-wide collective security mechanism encompassing all the relevant countries that is firm enough to capture especially commitment from the four regional major powers—the US, China, Russia and Japan. On the other hand, a series of efforts toward what might be called “cooperative security” undertaken regionally which are not predicated on military enforcement do contribute positively to enhance confidence-building. In this period of transition, security in the region will entail a complex of security mechanisms composed of “hub-and-spokes”-type alliances with growing “public goods” role and informal multilateral “cooperative security” dialogue rather than building a hard security regime in the Asia Pacific. Coupled with these developments, however, it would be most productive to pursue concerted diplomacy among the three major powers (the US, China and Japan). It is certainly a long way to draw political contours that fits the Concert of Pacific Asia, but that seems the most plausible option available to these three countries in the twenty-first century.

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This paper focuses on three types of regionalism (mega, macro and sub) in East Asia and the Asia Pacific Region, utilizing them as an analytic framework. It is composed of five parts. The first is an introductory section dealing with the definition of East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region and concepts related to regionalism. The second section addresses the question of homogeneity and heterogeneity of nations situated in East Asia in order to examine the possibility of an EU type of regional integration. The third section probes subregionalism in East Asia, after having pointing out various patterns of development which are prerequisites for subregional development. The fourth section probes into the prospects of the APEC as a megaregional attempt, and also indicates some problems associated with this so-called “open” regionalism. The fifth section investigates Japan's role in regional attempts in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific. The paper ends with a summary of the above discussions.
We define three types of regionalism, based on (1) the number of actors, (2) leadership, (3) stages of economic development, (4) production relationships, (5) cultural identity, (6) level of regionalization and/or integration and (7) institutional formality. In the Asia-Pacific we have three types of regionalism to consider in theory, although we miss the second type in practice. The first type is subregionalism, the second macroregionalism and the third megaregionalism. While a EU type of macroregionalism is less probable, subregionalism has been more active and dynamic, and megaregionalism, expressed in APEC, is more or less probable. But regionalism is one thing and regionalization is another. Regionalization without regionalism has been very remarkable in the macro-region of East Asia.
Different levels of economic activities are involved in subregionalism and megaregionalism. Subregionalism is based on a vertical exchange of production elements, and megaregionalism is supported by a mixture of a vertical and a horizontal division of labour, although classical theories of integration presuppose a horizontal division of labour among nations. Thus a determinig factor is whether those nations can proceed to a higher lavel of division of labour, even if it would remain vertical. Another important factor of megaregionalism in the Asia-Pacific is a balance of autonomy of East Asia and dependence on the US in the economic sphere.
APEC must be open to the people in this region, we need some international framework to improve human rights situations in East Asia, without which all regional attempts will proceed at the sacrifice of the weak or oppressed.

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In the last decade of the twentieth century, we are witnessing major surges of transnational flows of people, goods, money and information all over the world. The Asia-Pacific region is not only no exception to but it is leading the trend which seems certain to continue into the twenty-first century with an ever more accelerating speed. It presents a dilemma to conduct international exchange activities against such a torrential tendency. It is a dilemma between phenomena and activities. This essay is an attempt to help solve this dilemma, by trying to understand the nature of the phenomena, at the same time presenting an overview of the development of international exchange activities in Japan during the postwar period.
Outstanding of the recent phenomenal changes in international society is the historic change in transnational flows of people. Since the beginning of the 1970's, people cross national boundaries quite easily flying by jumbo jets. Thanks to advances in international transportation and telecommunications technology, it is now possible for us to keep our ethnic ties while we move globally. Based on this kind of observations, the author maintains that today international society has a multi-layered structure and the individual a personality with multiple identities, and that this is the most important factor we must bear in mind when considering the prospect of international exchanges today and tomorrow.
Faced with such phenomena, in our engagement in international exchange activities, we will be more concerned with both the universality and the distinctiveness of cultural elements. Adopting the new concept of “kyosei, ” in the age of global migration, we will live together with people of different ethnicities and cultures, mutually respecting cultural differences with tolerance.

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This article presents a case study on impacts of the ongoing changes in the international system on the domestic politics of advanced industrial nations. The case concerned is Japan, a nation with one of the largest and most trade-dependent economies in the contemporary world, and yet one that has so far been relatively closed and often characterized as neomercantilist. Following in the footsteps of Peter Gourevitch's seminal 1978 article, this study focuses on the two enduring elements of nation-level politics, i. e., regime type and coalition pattern, rather than on specific political events or policies.
There is broad consensus among Japanese scholars and others that the end of the Cold War and the rise of the East Asian economies are having as significant impacts on Japan's domestic political-economic structure as on those of other advanced industrial and industrializing nations. Opinion is divided, however, on how genuine and fundamental those impacts actually are. Some argue that they extend to the basic values and goals of Japan's economic strategy, and, hence, are likely to change the pattern of domestic coalitions and regime type. Pointing to the entrenched nature of the Japanese system, others predict that changes will remain cosmetic and superficial.
Based on the information and ideas collected through personal interviews and informal conversations with Japanese business, labor, and bureaucratic leaders in the spring and summer of 1996 and a documentary survey of political, business, bureaucratic, and labor leaders' statements and writings published in the 1995-1996 period, this study examines whether and how leaders in various walks of life in Japan perceive changes in the power relationships among the partners of the ruling coalition and dominant policy network. It goes on to analyze how they view the impacts of such changes upon the so-called mercantilist policy patterns and relate these developments to the end of the Cold War and the challenges posed by East Asian economic growth and integration.

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The first Ukrainian state already has lasted five years. But it does not mean the end of long dreamed of statism, but the beginning of hard ways for building a nation.
The border of Ukraine has a peculiar character. Almost all border lines were drawn by dividing regions, each of which comprised historically one region. This condition also makes the task of building a nation difficult.
In the western part of Ukrainian border, such regions are Galitsia, Carpathian, Bukovina and Bessarabia. If you turn to the east, there are two divided regions, the Donbass and the Slobidska Ukraine.
The Ukrainian border was made by dividing regions that caused difficulties in building the Ukrainian nation-state. Because of the dividing the regions automatically made Ukrainian Diaspora or irredenta outside Ukraine. In Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Moldova and Russia, Ukrainians have been living as a minority group. At the same time the opposite sides, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Moldova and Russia, consider the regions which were incorporated with Ukraine their irredenta. Between Ukraine and Russia there is another but major border dispute on the Crimean Peninsula.
Ukraine herself is divided into two parts, Eastern and Western. The Western part of Ukraine, called Galicia, has some characteristics which are not seen in other parts of Ukraine.
On the contrary to the Galicia, eastern and southern parts of Ukraine have different characteristics. The Donbass and Crimea belong to these regions. These regions have strong tles with Russia although they belong to Ukraine. The Crimea, now an autonomous republic in Ukraine, belonged to Russia until 1954. A part of the Donbass was belonged to Russia before the 1917 revolution as the Don Army District.
The contrast between the West and the East in Ukraine can be seen on the map. There is an interesting piece of evidence to show the dichotomy between the West and the East. It shows the change of support for the first president Leonid Kravchuk and the second president Leonid Kuchma. In Ukraine we can hear a new Ukrainian proverb, saying, “Ukrainian Presidents born in the East will die in the West”. This proverb well explains the dichotomy between the East and the West in Ukraine.
For Nation-building in Ukraine there are some obstacles in terms of integration of people into one consolidated group. Ukraine is divided not only by geography but also by culture and identity.
Language problems may be the most visible problem in today's Ukraine. The second obstacle for the integration of the Ukrainian nation-state is religious splits among the people. Ukraine is, of course, a secularized state. But the history of the suppression of national churches such as the Uniate Church (Ukrainian Catholic Church) and Ukrainian Orthodox Church made these churches political factors.
Ukrainians have failed to form a nation-state. Russians have also failed to form their own nation-state. Russians have always been a subject of a big empire, first the Russian Empire and next the Soviet Union. Above all things they carried out their mission to build and maintain an empire. Ukrainians, in contrast, are eager to build their own nation-state, not an empire. This is an identity difference between two nationalities. And this difference reflects the dichotomy in Ukraine between the East and the West.
The geopolitical position of Ukraine in the International arena has been a factor of difficulties for the building a nation state. For Ukraine, located between the West and the East, between Germany and Russia, inevitably it has been geopolitically in either a buffer zone or a battleground. In the Northern War in 18th century, the Napoleonic War, Crimean War, World War I and World War II, Ukraine was one of the major battlefields. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union the region which includes the territory of Ukraine became a battlefield between Europe and Russia b

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Japan is one of the world largest donors in international development assistance. One of the policy approaches of the Japanese government toward the official development assistance (ODA) is to respond to the “new” agendas of international development that have been discussed in the 1990s. One of them is the concern about gender in development programs, which is widely known by the terms of Women in Development (WID) and Gender and Development (GAD).
This paper consists of two parts. The first part is an analysis of Japan's approach to issues of development and gender in the ODA, focusing on two government agencies for international development. The fact that Japan started implementing the “new” agenda of development was the outcome of pressure from the international donor community. Moreovor, the disconnection of national policy on gender equality and the policy on development assistance, as well as the separation of concerns about international development and that on gender issues among NGOs, hindered Japan's adoption of WID/GAD approaches. Today, Japan's approach to development and gender shows plurality at multiple levels and aspects of development assistance, reflecting the diverse functions of implementation and the complex trends and actors involved.
The second part is the discussion of Japan's approach to development and gender from the perspective of postmoden feminism, paying attention to the unique spatial and historical position of Japan. The postmodern feminist critique is that WID/GAD thought widens the North-South divide by ignoring diversity within women and imposing cultural imperialism of the North.
Descriptions of Third World women and their cultures found in Japan's official development assistance acknowledge the value of local culture and diversity of women. However, the descriptions do not fit the criteria identical to the postmodern feminist critique: they tend to be methodological and technical rather than conceptual, without a structural analysis in a global political economic context. Moreover, Japanese women are not in the position that they can sympathize with Third World women just because they share similar traits—non-Western, non-white. Discussions of WID/GAD among Japanese women should include a critical examination of the position of themselves in a global context.

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The Asia-Pacific region is facing several challenges and tasks which demand collective efforts by the regional countries; among others, establishing multilateral regional frameworks to manage the changing power relations and the increasing economic interdependence among the regional countries.
Given its diversity and the lack of experience in collectively formulating a regional order, APEC and ARF have put more emphasis on establishing regularized dialogue processes rather than on establishing tightly organized institutional structures for regional cooperation, Both forums basically focus on confidence-building processes through formal and informal dialogues on the practical and achievable rather than the desirable.
APEC and ARF base their stratagic assets on two factors: knowledge (soft power) and diffusion of networks of key actors. Structural (Organizational) flexibility and informality encouraged the diffusion of knowledge and the formations of networks among key actors of the region, through which to encourage economic liberalization and military transparency on a voluntary basis.
Among other things, the APEC processes will make a great contribution to “injecting” the principle of open and liberal trade and investment into the region in a non-confrontational way. However, it will be difficult for the region to reach to some binding agreement on the “deeper” integration (adjustment) issues such as the harmonization of economic policies. In politico-security affairs, because of its essentially political and diplomatic approach to the problem of “power”, and because of its ultimate lack of power to put constraints on the strategic interactions among the major powers, ARF has its own intrinsic limitations as a regional security regime.
However, through its strategy of “nesting” the regional arrangement to the existing international arrangements such as global non-proliferation regimes, Asia-Pacific regionalism could be strengthened and become more mutually binding in specific issue areas.

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In this century, Europe has undergone three sweeping changes accompanied by huge devastation and reconstruction: the First and Second World Wars, and the fall of the Communist regimes. Japan was involved in the reconstruction of Europe after the First World War and has been engaged in it since the end of the Cold War. As a defeated country under Allied occupation, Japan had no role in Europe after the Second World War. During the Cold War era, Japan and the West European countries belonged to the Western Camp and were the allies of the United Sates. However, until the end of the Cold War, Japan and the West European countries had no significant political relations, while before the Second World War, Japan had European allies under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Tripartite Alliance.
Since 1989, the role of Japan in the reconstruction process has been different from its role after the First World War. In the 1920s Japan's role was political as it had no economic means. As a Permanent Member of the League Council, Japan was involved in various political decisions such as the Aaland Islands, Upper Silesia, and other issues. Since the end of the East-West military confrontation in Europe, Japan has mainly played the role of “stability provider” by economic means, thus may be called a “soft security provider” to Europe. As for Russia, Japan is the number three contributor to the various Russian assistance programmes and is the No. 1 contributor among non-European and non-American powers to former Communist countries.
Since 1990, Japan has developed various frameworks for political consultation with major European countries and institutions: bliateral politicomilitary consultations with the UK, Germany and France; structured dialogues and consultation with the EU; special participating status in the OSCE; observer status in the Council of Europe; exchanges with NATO. In 1996, Japan on the one hand, and Germany, the UK and France on the other, launched “action plans” for concrete consultation and cooperation.
This reconstruction process at the turn of the century is providing Japan with a great opportunity and a lesson to take a more responsible and political role in building a new international system in cooperation with European countries and institutions. The same thing can be said for the Europeans. While the European Union is on its way to assume a global role and responsibility, its closer relations with Japan will help Europeans to widen their views and external policy.

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