As the title shows, this volume is dedicated to the study of the US-Japan Security System with emphasis on both aspects of continuity and change. Although the system was a product of history it has also been a major driving force of history in the post-war period. It is in the mixture of continuity and change that the system has survived the challenge of history.
In general, the system is often understood as a byproduct of the Cold War headed by the US and the then USSR. Indeed, the system cannot be discussed without reference to the Cold War. The US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty which serves as the core of the system was signed in September 1951 as a corner stone in the US strategy of deterrence against the USSR. Nevertheless, the system in reality is more complicated than just being a byproduct of the Cold War. It is in essence a political community—a relationship that exceeds the legal stipulations of the treaty. Otherwise the system would have collapsed with the end of the Cold War. The treaty originally signed by Shigeru Yoshida in 1951 and revised by Nobusuke Kishi in 1960 has brought sbout the system that functions far beyond the original terms. The latest “Redefinition, ” reflecting the reality of US-Japan power relationship is also a product of the system.
This volume is an attempt to examine the US-Japan Security System with emphasis on its aspects of continuity and change from theoretical, historical and empirical perspectives. It contains two groups of articles. The first group consists of six articles—(that of Sakamoto, Uemura, Gabe, Hirayama, Kan, and Kojo), with emphasis on historical observations and analyses. The second group consists of four articles—(that of Iwata, Muroyama, Kamiya, and Tsuchiyama), with emphasis on theoretical arguments and with predictions for the future. Hopefully these two groups of articles will serve as the two main pillars in our understanding of various aspects of the US-Japan Security System.

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Kumao Nishimura, Director of the Foreign Ministry's Treaty Bureau at the time of the conclusion of US-Japan Security Treaty, later characterized the nature of the Treaty as follows:
“The Security Treaty, in short, secures the defense of Japan, with Japan providing the facilities and the United States providing the military. It is a cooperation between goods and men.”
This paper examines how this “cooperation between goods (facilities, i. e., bases) and men (the military)” came to be re-recognized in the revised Security Treaty of 1960 regarding its treaty area and prior consultation.
Responding to a persistent criticism within Japan that the original Security Treaty was a one-sided, unequal treaty, the United States government decided to revise the Treaty into a more mutual one in 1958. Japan, however, could not even appear to promise to defend American territories because of its Constitutional restrictions. Both governments realized that the real mutuality of their security relations lay in the “cooperation between goods and men.” Still, it was not an easy task to express such “cooperation between goods and men” in a mutual treaty in the light of other mutual security treaties, Japanese Constitution, and the strategic needs of the United States.
Regarding the treaty area, the United States government suggested “the Pacific, ” with Japan acting in the extent possible under its Constitution. Japan objected to this, and in the end, the mutual defense in the “territories under the administration of Japan” was decided upon. The clever part of this is that the actions for mutual defense in that treaty area can be explained to the Japanese public as the exercise of the right of individual self-defense, while at the same time they can appear to the United States as that of the right of collective self-defense.
The point of prior consultation regarding the use of bases was to make the Treaty appropriate to a cooperation between two equal sovereign states while not diminishing the effectiveness of the “goods” part of the cooperation. The United States, while presupposing its free use of the Okinawan bases, accepted prior consultation and a certain degree of limitation on the use of bases in mainland Japan. Secret arrangements were made, however, with respect to the two main issues of prior consultation, issues of the introduction of nuclear weapons, and of the military combat operations in case of emergency in the Far East: one arrangement pertained to the entry of nuclear-armed vessels into Japanese ports and waters, and the other, the exemption from prior consultation of the United States military operations under the United Nations Command in case of emergency in the Korean Peninsula. These arrangements were necessary to make the bases in Japan remain attractive to the United States.
It seems that the ambiguous elements in the revised Security Treaty, as shown in the above, were a result of trying to give appearance of a normal mutuality to the essentially asymmetrical mutuality of “cooperation between goods and men.”

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The US-Japan Security Treaty which was concluded in September 1951 and considered to be of a one-sided nature by the Japanese people was fully revised and superseded in 1960 by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. However, the Japanese government did not revise the basic defense program to fit the new treaty. The new treaty did not bring about a new security relationship for the two nations nor a new defense policy for Japan, and as a result, US-Japan security remained as before.
Prime minister Nobusuke Kishi came up with “Nichibei Shinjidai (a new era of US-Japan relation)” as a catchword when he visited President Dwight D. Eisenhower for talks in June 1957. In August 1958 Kishi and Douglas MacArhtur II, then US Ambassador to Japan, agreed to replace the US-Japan Security Treaty with a new one, that would be consistent with the interpretation of Japan's constitution which does not permit Japan to send its forces overseas.
Since Japanese rearmament remained at a moderate pace under the Kishi administration, Japan still only has a limited defense capability against external aggression. The US was not satisfied with Japan's defense capability. The US government hoped that Kishi's leadership would help the defense build up.
While the Japanese government negotiated a new treaty with the US Embassy in Tokyo, a new six-year defense plan called Akagi Koso (Akagi's Plan) named after the then Director General of Defense Agency, Munenori Akagi was prepared in the Bureau of Defense Policy, which aimed at building a self-reliant military power. When the plan was announced by Akagi in July 1959, the details were not yet worked out, and it was still unofficial. In January 1960, Prime Minister Kishi visited Washington again to sign the new security treaty and said that Japan's initial defense plan would end that year and a second defense plan was being developed. The new plan would be based upon the new treaty. In spite of his remarks, after the new treaty was concluded, the self-reliant defense plan began to be called off. Finally, the Defense Agency made a fresh start and drew up another five-year defense plan. It was approved by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet in 1961.
The US military's first priority was to continue the use of their bases and facilities in Japan for logistic support of the combat forces. The new treaty included a commitment by the United States to aid in the defense of Japan and the operational use of US bases, in return for Japanese agreement to allow the United States the use of its bases in Japan for defense of the Free World position in the Far East. Japan's alignment with the United States remains relatively close, and in some respects was strengthened, rather than weakened, as a result of the full-scale revision of the treaty. Nevertheless, since Kishi fell short of the US expectation of the defense build up, the US government recognized that Japan's defense build up was going to take time and would not come about suddenly. The so-called “New Era” of US-Japan security relations is yet to come.

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Public opinion in Okinawa has rallied around the goal to restore normalcy of daily life that has been menaced and virtually destroyed by the noise created, accidents caused, and crimes committed by soldiers from the US bases. The US bases have been stationed on Okinawa since the beginning of the US occupation in 1945. In order to improve relations between the bases and the local communities, the Okinawa Prefecture government has petitioned for a revision of the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement.
The US bases in Japan and Okinawa are justified in Article 6 of the Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty, signed on January 19, 1960. Under Article 6, both governments then signed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) on the same day. The new Mutural Security Treaty was a revision of the original Japan-US Security Treaty, signed in Tokyo on February 28, 1952.
Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty excluded Okinawa from the arrangement that both countries would act jointly for the common defense against an armed attack. Indeed, the United States insisted on full control over Okinawa in order to maintain the free use of bases to launch attacks, including the use of nuclear weapons. Thus, Okinawa fell under the sole control of the United States. In 1972, when the administration of Okinawa was reverted back to the Japanese government, the Mutual Security Treaty ensured that the United States could retain its US bases under conditions of the SOFA that applied to US forces in mainland Japan.
This essay will analyze the negotiation process of revising the Japan-US Security Treaty, Administration Agreement, and related agreements. It also intends to review the role of US bases on Okinawa in terms of security questions in East Asia and Southeast Asia. Moreover, this essay will assess the decisions made at the time of the reversion. This essay will conclude that the US bases on Okinawa, were placed on Okinawa in order to address legitimate security concerns of the time. As such, the US has been assured of free and unlimited use of the bases and, at least theoretically, the right to establish nuclear weapons on Okinawa. The agreement—under the auspices of SOFA—between Japan and the US continues to ensure the freedom of action by the US military.

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American policy toward Korea, as followed by the administrations of Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower, was shaped in the face of a continuous dilemma caused by the two distinct evaluations of the situation in the Korean Peninsular. One of these was a strategic evaluation of the necessity for a reduction or elimination of the US military commitment to South Korea based on the belief that Korea was not strategically important in terms of the overall struggle with the USSR, and the other was a political evaluation of the need to avoid the adverse political ramifications in the Far East and the rest of the world should Korea fall to the communist bloc following an American withdrawal.
Following the outbreak of the Korean War, the Truman administration entered the war as part of the UN forces under the terms of the UN's collective security system. This decision was a reflection not only of a political necessity to prevent the Korean Peninsular from falling to the communists but also of the American Government's desire to avoid an independent US military commitment in Korea. In addition, the subsequent decision of the Eisenhower administration to conclude a mutual defence treaty with South Korea, which resulted in an expansion of the US military commitment in Korea, was designed to achieve the participation and cooperation of the administration of Syngman Rhee in the armistice negotiations, a process the South Koreans had been opposing.
Meanwhile, Japan assumed a position of crucial importance in US Far Eastern policy as a bulwark against futher communist expansion. America sought Korean neutrality as this would make it possible to reduce or terminate its military commitment in the peninsular. However, at the same time, by negotiating the Japan-US Security Treaty, America aimed not only to guarantee Japan's place in the anticommunist world but also to open up the possibility of Japanese rearmament and hopefully to obtain Japanese contribution to the defense of freedom in the Pacific region.
However, the Japanese government refused American requests to build up its military potential because of factors such as its economic fragility and the contemporary domestic political situation. Ultimately America was left with no choice but to adopt a policy of emphasizing political and economic stability in Japan instead. Meanwhile, the political conference with Communist China and North Korea broke down and the plan for a neutral Korea collapsed, with the result that the division of Korea into North and South remained unchanged. As a consequence, the US started to consider, instead of Japan, South Korea, which was developing into a military power, as a potential contributor to the security in the Far East.
As a result, it could be argued that South Korea has taken on Japan's security obligations, while Japan now tends to consider South Korea essential in terms of its own security. At the same time, relations between Japan and S. Korea have become susceptible to any change in the US military strength in the Far East.

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The US-Japan Security Treaty was originally intended to deal with the threats from the Soviet Union and the Communist China. The end of the Cold War, therefore, meant the disappearance of such threats, which in turn would have seriously questioned the basic rationale for its existence. Nevertheless, not only does the treaty (system) continue even after the Cold War ended but it seems even further reinforced as the ‘redefinition’ process beginning in November 1994 indicates. This article intends to explore some of the important historical changes occurring in the 1960s that were presumed to have contributed to the treaty (system)'s continuity and transformation.
The paper will particularly focus on the emergence of regionalism in Asia in the mid-1960s in the context of the Vietnam War during the Johnson administration and its impact on US-Japan relations involving the security treaty. It is argued that the bilateral security relations tied together by the treaty (system) was often strained by the US policy in the Vietnam War but the war also contributed to the creation of both domestic and external conditions in the Asia-Pacific region where the United States, under the policy of regionalism, made strenuous efforts to pressure Japan to play a larger role in promoting the economic development and political stability of the non-Communist Asian countries. Such role was what the Ikeda and Sato administrations and the Japanese people were prepared to accept as they tried to give concrete expression to their rising consciousness and desire for Japan to play a greater international role. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato was particularly conscious that the reversion of the Ryukyu Islands would be impossible without meeting the US needs and expectations; that is, to support President Johnson's war efforts in Vietnam as well as to accept Japan's larger role in Asia. To that end, Sato and his supporters tried to overcome the Japanese domestic opposition to America's war in Vietnam and Japan's assumption of larger responsibilities associated with the American war efforts. The Johnson administration wanted the Sato government to recognize Japan's regional responsibilities as well as the relationship between Ryukyus settlement and its own and regional security. As the Sato government increasingly accepted such US definition of the role of the security treaty, the treaty's functions expanded to the extent that Japan supported and supplemented the US Cold War efforts on a regional scale. The mutually supplementary relationship in the security field was made possible as Washington, while recognizing the legal and political limitations in Japanese politics, defined Japan's role in Asia increasingly in economic and political rather than military terms. The newly inserted article II of the revised 1960 security treaty was an expression of the compromise between the two differring conceptions of security that eventually enabled Japan to make contributions to the “common defense” of the “free world.” This compromise also largely explains the continuing existence of the security treaty (system) after the Cold War was over.

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The purpose of this article is to examine what kind of logic was behind the demand of defense burden-sharing toward Japan by the United States in the late 1950s and 1960s. This article presents the following viewpoints. First, US demand of defense burden-sharing was colsely related to the problem of US balance of payments deficit from the late 1950s. Second, in order to better understand the problem of US-Japan defense burden-sharing in the late 1950s and 1960s, it should be analyzed in the context of US policy towards the allied nations, rather than just in the context of bilateral relations.
In the late 1950s, in the face of gold outflow the Eisenhower administration began to realize that the balance of payment deficit would impose serious problem on the United States. This administration created the scheme of burden-sharing among the allied nations. This scheme was reinforced by Kennedy administration, which claimed that the US balance of payments deficit would restrain US policy of protecting “the Free World, ” thus harm not only the United States but also the allied nations.
In this context, the US administrations tried to defend dollar position by focusing on two points expanding US export to increase trade surplus, and reducing external spending, in particular, foreign aid and military expenditure. The US administrations asked the allied nations to share the cost of US foreign aid and military spending. This is the origin of the burdensharing scheme. In other words, since the late 1950s the allied nations were asked to increase foreign aid and military spending. For evaluating which country should share the burden, the US applied two economic measurements; balance of payments surplus and sufficent foreign exchange reserves.
West Germany was the main target of the US demand of defense burdensharing because of the large US military presence in West Germany and its rapid recovery of economy in terms of balance of payment surplus and large foreign exchange reserves. The United States started to ask West Germany to share the defense cost as early as in the late 1950s. The negotiation of offset payment agreement between Germany and the US shows the US tough policy towards West Germany.
In contrast, the US did not put much pressure on Japan to share the defense cost until the mid-1960s. This US lenient attitude toward Japan compared to policy towands West Germany was partly because of Japan's domestic political instability relating to the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 and partly because of Japan's economic indices which were short of US criteria; balance of payment deficit and small foreign exchange reserves.
However, in the mid-1960s, the US demand of defense burden-sharing toward Japan increased because Japan's economic situation had improved. The demand was intensified by the US increased involvement in the Vietnam War. Japan, as well as West Germany, was asked to buy US arms and US Treasury bill to contribute to improve US balance of payment. Since this period, the US claim that the United States provided “public goods” for “the Free World” became problematic for the allied nations.

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In the wake of the Cold War, the largest security challenges are dangers posed by regional powers, and dangers posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At this time of uncertainty, US leadership is essential for world peace.
For the US, East Asia is a region of growing importance. The Pacific Rim countries are collectively America's largest trading partner. The confrontation and conflict that are recurrent reality in the region, however, make US military presence an essential element of regional stability. And for both regional security and US glogal interests, an alliance with Japan is necessary.
The presence of US forces in Japan affords their rapid deployment to trouble spots in East Asia and as far as the Persian Gulf in the event of a variety of contingencies. Their stationing here is also cost-effective, thanks to Japanese financial support.
The counterproliferation initiative of the Clinton Administration may have made Japan the most important ally of the US. The two countries must work in tandem to strengthen the present non-proliferation regime. Japan could make important contributions to the Theater Missile Defence project of the united States. The context for the Japan-US connection also includes North Korea's nuclear development and exports of missile technology to ‘rogue states’ in the Middle East, which are serious threat to Asian and global security.
The bilateral alliance was reaffirmed with the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security announced in April 1996. Close cooperation between the two countries, it was agreed by Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton, is the most effective framework for the defense of Japan. The Declaration also clarified that Japan would not seek sutonomous defense capabilities. Further, the continued commitment to the alliance was reiterated at a time of debate over Okinawa, with Japan pledging its continued contribution for maintenance of US forces in Japan. The adjustment and realignment of US bases that is now underway will not result in any substantial change in overall US force structure.
The redefined alliance includes one important change, being a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation by both countries. The development of contingency plans for future military conflicts in East Asia is now a key security agenda in the bilateral cooperation. The controversial issue here is Japan's military support of US forces in regional crises. Japanese government policy has been one in which the Self Defense Forces might be used only in the event of a direct attack on Japan.

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The Japan-US security structure was built up under the situation of East-West Cold War and Japan's loss of self-defense capability after World War II. In its structure, the role of the US Forces stationed in Japan is “directly” to defend peace and stability in the Far East; while Japan's role is to provide the US Forces with bases free of charge and to support them by sharing expenses for the USFJ as well as to guarantee them freedom of actions. Thus, Japan “indirectly” contributes to the maintenance of international peace and security not only in the Far East but also in the world.
The Japan-US security system functioned well as it was essentially designed to deter the then USSR threat in the region. Under such strategic environments, the Japan-US security system can militarily cope with the threats by means of Japan's “individual right of self-defense” and the “indirect supports” given to the USFJ mentioned above. However, with the end of Cold War the security environments have changed. During the Gulf War Japan could not carry out military action in that region. Japan's huge contributions based on the principle of “indirect supports” under the Japan-US security system were hardly appreciated. It even invited criticism at home and from abroad that Japan was playing a “check-book diplomacy.” Obviously the Japan-US security system malfunctioned.
Nevertheless, for the US the security system with Japan is becoming increasingly important since the world's economic center was shifting from the West to the Pacific-Asia region and the US still feel the necessity of its military control over the region. Furthermore, most immediately there is the suspicion that North Korea might be developing nuclear-weapons and there is also the concern that Japan might eventually take an independent policy from the US. Indeed, there is also a worry that China might become a threat in the region in the future. At the same time, the US itself is facing the fiscal constraints to reduce its defense expenditures. Under these circumstances, it becomes logically the central US purpose to create a new Japan-US security system based on “collective defense” and “direct supports”.
But the US military presense in the region that is a key element of the new “Definition” will be reduced and the US will gradually lose the military control in the region. On the other hand, Japan will grow into an independent strategic nation and China will become a real powerful state. For the stabilization of East Asia a new framework of multilateral security system is indispensable. Such framework will ensure the US's constructive commitments in the region, China's constructive participation, Korean Peninsula's stabilization and Japan's assuming the role of an independent political actor without provoking the suspicion of the neighboring nations. In the long run, Japan's security system will be based on the UN's global security system a regional security system closely connecting with it and Japan's own exclusively defense-oriented defense system. One can forecast that the Japan-US security system will gradually change into a political, rather than military alliance.

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This article attempts to show theoretically why the US-Japan Alliance remains and will remain a central component of the Asia-Pacific security system in the post-Cold war era. The main arguments of this paper can be summarized as follows:
1) Multilateral security cooperation is still at an embryonic stage in the Asia-Pacific Region. Among the three types of multilateral security cooperation, common, collective, and cooperative securities, only cooperative security is expected to develop in this region in the foreseeable future.
2) A cooperative security system will not be able to maintain regional peace by itself even in a fully developed form; because, it cannot cope with militaly conflicts by itself once it fails to prevent them. Cooperative security attempts to prevent military conflicts among the regional states by measures that are neither confrontational nor coercive, and does not envisage collective enforcement actions. A cooperative security system, therefore, must be complemented by another mechanism that can deal with military conflicts by military means.
3) Theoretically, there are at least seven candidates for such mechanism. They are: hegemony; a collective security system; a NATO-type collective defense system (multilateral alliance); a concert of great powers; self-help; a bilateral alliance other than the one between the US and Japan; and the US-Japan Alliance. Except for the US-Japan Alliance, however, none of these options are feasible in the Asia-Pacific in the foreseeable future.
4) Most of the countries in the region in fact share the understanding that the US-Japan Alliance is indispensable for the maintenance of regional peace. It is widely recognized that the US-Japan Alliance is the most important framework to secure the US commitment to East Asia in the post-Cold War era.
5) It can therefore be predicted that a cooperative security system in the Asia-Pacific, however it develops, will go always hand in hand with the US-Japan Alliance in the forseeable future.
The article concludes that the most desirable way to maintain peace in the Asia-Pacific in the foreseeable future is to build a multi-layered security system which will consist mainly of two components that complement each other, i. e., the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a cooperative security system which will promote mutual understanding, mutual trust and mutual reassurance among the regional states, and the US-Japan Alliance as a reassurance among the regional states, and the US-Japan Alliance as a mechanism which will cope with military conflicts if the ARF fails to prevent them. In this multi-layered system, the cooperative security system and the alliance system will be mutually reinforcing, rather than mutually exclusive. For the ARF, the US-Japan Alliance will represent a reliable insurance against failure of preventive diplomacy. Without such an insurance, preventive diplomacy cannot work effectively. For the US-Japan Alliance, the successful preventive diplomacy efforts by the ARF will contribute to reduce significantly the work loads of the alliance partners and the costs they have to bear.

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Why did Japan enter three alliance systems in this century? What are the Japanese rationales in forming those alliances, the US-Japan alliance in particular? Are Japanese rationales in forming and staying in alliance the same as those of its Western allies? If not, how and why? Finally, why does the US-Japan alliance survive the Cold War under which the alliance was formed?
This article tries to give answers to these questions from three different perspectives, namely, realism, liberal-institutionalism, and constructivism. Realists see alliance as a function of balance of power/threat, which means a state will be allied to a weaker side in terms of power/threat. Some realists offer an opposing view, called bandwagoning, which means a small or threatened power goes with a big or threatening power. Liberal-institutionalists argue that modern alliances such as NATO and the US-Japan alliance, are institutions rather than a product of balance of power politics or a “marriage of convenience”. Focusing on domestic norms and identities, constructivists find the rationales of alliance different from the two schools mentioned above.
I argue in this article that Japan's rationales in entering an alliance are basically bandwagoning not balancing. Because of Japan's logic of bandwagoning Japan will stay on the current US-Japan alliance even after the power balance collapsed as the Cold War ended. This article also analyzes Japan's “alliance dilemma” and explains its implications to Japan's alliance behaviors. Liberal-institutionalists and constructivists also offer their reasoning why the US-Japan slliance will continue to make sense even after the Cold War.
To conclude this article, I predict that the US-Japan alliance will continue to exist for at least a decade, though we still do not know exactly what role the alliance will play in the years to come.

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I will consider the recruitment of Japanese advisors with regard to Dr. Ariga Nagao, who served as advisor for legal matters to Yuan Shikai over a long period of time. Through an analysis of the specifics of employment for Japanese advisors and of the role Ariga played in the formulation of the Republican Constitution in the Early Republican period. I will attempt to reevaluate his historical significance in modern Sino-Japanese relations.
The assumption in March 1913 of the position of advisor on legal matters for Yuan Shikai by Dr. Ariga Nagao, a professor Waseda University in Tokyo, was a milestone in Sino-Japanese relations. The Japanese response to his hiring as advisor was by no means passive. Insofar as the appointment was entangled with a variety of Japan's vested concerns, its significance can be simply summarized as national selfinterest.
In August 1912, Yuan Shikai proposed that Ariga Nagao be employed as advisor. According to surviving sources, Ariga's selection was pushed by three parties. First, Japanese Imperial Army Colonel Banzai Rihachiro, advisor on military affairs to Yuan Shikai since the late Qing, recommended Ariga. Secondly, Ariga was highly recommended by members of the Legislative Bureau who had previously studied in Japan. Thirdly, the Australian journalist G. E. Morrison, who was serving as presidential advisor, recommended Ariga.
During his tenure in China, Ariga followed strictly the wishes of Yuan Shikai as he devoted his energies to implementing a constitutional monarchy. At first Ariga devoted his efforts to the Constitutional Research Discussion Group, whose deliberations were compiled in the work Guanyi xianping, then translated into Chinese and distributed to the public. In addition, responding to Yuan Shikai's criticisms of the provisional constitution, Ariga drafted three articles that were translated into Chinese and presented to Yuan Shikai: “A Viable Plan for a Republican Constitution, ” “The No-Cofidence vote Crisis” (October 1913) and “A compilation of Errors from the Draft of the Constitution” (November 1913). In sum, within the short period of a few months, Ariga as Legal advisor made a valuable contribution to Yuan's machinations against the revolutionary forces.
Three points not touched upon in previous research can be made with regard to Ariga's activities from the perspective of Sino-Japanese relations. First, Yuan tried to use his Japanese advisors as a means to smooth relations with Japan. This approach is best represented by the dispatch of Ariga to Tokyo after Japan issued the Twenty-One Demands in an attempt to sway the elder statesmen of Japan. Second, the drafting and enactment of the Republican Constitution were inseparable from Ariga's activities. Although previous researchers have debated endlessly on the model for the Republican constitution, they have made almost no reference to Ariga. But, as I have noted in this paper, Yuan Shiaki listened carefully to Ariga's suggestions before incorporating the Japanese model without reservation into the Republican constitution. It is no exaggeration to say that research on Ariga Nagao presents a valuable perspective on both Republican history and modern Chinese legislative history. Third, we cannot ignore the fact that those who studied in Japan and came back to China to play a major role in drafting and revising the late Qing constitution continued to play a central role into the Republican era. In addition, after a temporary disruption during the 1911 revolution, Japan again exerted a profound influence on Chinese politics, economics, and education as the activities of Japanese advisors employed by the Republican administration again brought the efficacy of the Japanese model to the attention of the Chinese. To put it another way, after the fall of the Qing dynasty Japanese influence continued to penetrate deeply into China, carried on by these advisors. Any consideration

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