During the hectic days of the late 1980s, when the Cambodian conflict was dragging its heels to the negotiated settlements, only a few observers, if any, were so optimistic about the future role of ASEAN as to expect this regional body would play a pivotal role in forging a structure of peace and stability n the Asia Pacific region. A decade later, in the late 1990s, when ASEAN is taking the initiative to promote confidence- and security-building measures through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), skepticism has not vanished regarding the real capabilities of ASEAN: some observers magnify intra-regional discord among member countries, others discredit the ARF's potential of conflict resolution. The primary objectives of this volume are, therefore, to evaluate ASEAN without falling in optimistic or pessimistic perspectives, to identify its weaknesses as well as strengths, and, in short, to know what ASEAN is all about. This volume consists of ten articles including an introduction. In this introductory chapter, I first give a brief sketch of ASEAN's development by dividing it into five periods: embryonic, take-off, politicization, maturation, and leap-forward. Special attention is paid on the regional and international settings and ASEAN's major achievements in each period. Secondly, I try to identify factors that impede our understanding of ASEAN as it is. Three sets of dichotomies regarding Southeast Asian history introduced by Prof. Donald K. Emmerson provide us with as excellent framework: diversity vs. unity; originality vs. reliance; and continuity vs. change. Thirdly, I summarize ASEAN's achievements and limitations or, in other words, its strengths and weaknesses in domestic, regional, and international dimensions. Finally, I try to provide a comprehensive framework which hopefully enables the readers to comprehend and appreciate the significance of ASEAN in a proper perspective. This framework shows, in a nutshell, a real ASEAN is most likely to be put somewhere in between a favorable/optimistic viewpoint on the one extreme and a critical/pessimistic viewpoint on the other extreme. This conclusion may sound too simple as well as axiomatic but, as a matter of fact, we used to lean to either of these extremes from time to time. This is primarily because, more often that not, ASEAN has appeared as a Janus, advocating, for instance, self-reliance to keep regional security while, at the same time, revealing its reliance on the American military presence in the region. Lest one should fall off balance, those critics should recall how poor, divided and conflict-stricken Southeast Asia was prior to the establishment of ASEAN. Those favorable observers must, on the other hand, recall the severe fact that the ASEAN countries simply lack power to manipulate the extra-regional great powers such as the U. S., China and Japan without their consent or acquiescence.
It is widely believed that ASEAN used to be an anti-communist alliance in its nature with close relations with United States policy in Asia. This article aims at negating this image of ASEAN through an attempt to show that ASEAN was different from other cold-war-related regional organizations in Asia. In April 1965, the Johnson administration began to support Asians' efforts to formulate a framework for regional cooperation. Under a strong U. S. influence, Asian initiatives created such organizations as the Asian Development Bank, the Asia and Pacific Council, and the Southeast Asian Ministerial Conference on Economic Development in 1966. In the following year, ASEAN was created by predominantly anti-communist governments including such allies of S. E. A. T. O. as the Philippines and Thailand. It is, therefore, natural to associate ASEAN with U. S. -inspired, anti-communist Asian regionalism. A careful look at the formation process of ASEAN does not support this presumption. U. S. policy-makers welcomed ASEAN, but they did not advise any prospective participants to create a new anti-communist organization. Nor did ASEAN participants attempt to make the organization on integral part of U. S. anti-communist strategy. On the contrary, ASEAN governments tried to disassociate themselves with U. S. policy. Furthermore, in its first few years, ASEAN proved to be useful in dealing with disputes between members. ASEAN was by and large a product of mutual concerns of participants, rather than U. S. influence.
Why could ASEAN agree to the establishment of AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) in a short time, comparing with PTA (Preferential Trading Arrangements) which had been agreed previously? In other words, why did ASEAN need to agree to the Free Trade Agreement in a short time? In addition, why wouldnot AFTA be realised on schedule? To give answers to these questions, this article focus on arguments as follows: 1) To compare AFTA with Economic Cooperation scheme before AFTA: Especially, I focus on the difference between AFTA and PTA which has been improved at ASEAN Manila Summit in 1987. As I try to gine light on the character of AFTA, the agreement of AFTA is not necessarily the best choice for economic cooperation. 2) To argue the implication between the agreement of AFTA and the agreement of NAFTA (The North American Free Trade): I try to regard the agreement of AFTA as a policy resposnse to the agreement of NAFTA. 3) To argue the implication between the implementation of the CEPT (Common Effective Preferential Tariff) scheme for AFTA and the trade liberalization among APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) members: I try to regard the implementation of the CEPT scheme for AFTA as a policy response to the legalistic and institutional approach prefered by Americans for trade liberalization among APEC members. This article concludes that AFTA is not a means of trade liberalization in ASEAN, but the political instrument to effect trade liberalization in the Asia Pacific Region. Therefore, ASEAN may be the regime which cooperates with each other to deal with external countries.
ASEAN will be composed of ten countries in the near future. The forms of government in the ASEAN countries is conceptualized as authoritarian regime for development. Authoritarian regimes in ASEAN take many forms such as military regime, single-party dictatorships, the ruling coalition, personalist autocracies, and absolute monarchies. They refuse the concept of Western democracy claiming that it does not bring stability and development for developing countries. The authoritarian characteristics of the Indonesian government and the Malaysian goverment are analyzed in this paper. The Suharto government is called the “New Order”. Suharto controlled the army, the bureaucracy, and the business community. He is supported by Golkar, which is a corporatist group that includes the entire bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the business sector. Golkar has won six elections overwhelmingly since the advent of the New Order. He promotes the economy for development in Indonesia based on the authoritarian system which is supported by the army, technocrats, and Golkar. The Mahathir government is supported by an UMNO-led coalition of parties representing the three ethic groups. The Malaysian government has promoted the New Economic Policy which eradicates poverty and channels more of the nation's wealth to the Malays during 1971-1990. Mahathir attempts to complete his developmental policies through some visions such as “Look East policy, ” “Malaysia Incorporated, ” and “Vision 2020.” The purpose of his authoritarian regime for development regime is to realize the ethic balance after the disturbance of 1969. His popularity becomes higher and higher because of his leaderships. This was seen in the overwhelming victory of the 1995 election. Finally, the middle class is growing in ASEAN. Do they contribute to democratization in their own countries? In the case of both countries, they are conservative generally because their consumptive lives depend on the developmental government. However, I conclude that the degree of democratization between the two becomes greater and greater because of the size of population, the characteristics of leaderships, the rise of the middle class, and the distribution of economic development.
In recent debates of Asia-Pacific security, multilateral talks such as ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) or confidence-building measures, growing trends in this region, are often considered to be subordinate factors for security. Two major arguments explain this situation. First, emerging security trends are perceived in the context of ‘Cooperative Security’ or Multilateralism, which always needs some conditions or restricts. Second, many analysts tend to emphasize the difference between Asia-Pacific and Europe and be pessimistic about the future of this region. This article questions these dominant perceptions and seeks to develop a framework of analysis for studying Asia-Pacific Security through examining the experience of Europe, especially OSCE (the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe). After reviewing the recent development of ARF, it challenges ‘Cooperative Security’ arguments for the lack of consistent definition, confusion between means and goal, and inability to explain the dynamism of international politics. Another important point this concept fails to cover is the function of a multilateral security framework. Multilateral security framework is often regarded as ‘Multilateralism’ which assumes idealistic conditions. But the critical implication of the OSCE process is that multilateral security framework plays an important role in creating a stable international environment. One can see two processes in multilateral security framework. Avoiding war through confidence-building measures is one part. The other is process of sharing security perceptions and creating codes of conduct or norms among states. The multilateral security framework, therefore, should be categorized as a multilateral ‘preventive approach’ while an alliance is ‘counter approach.’ It is also meaningful to clarify the correlation between these two approaches. Although it is true that the former may not replace the latter, one should realize that they are not in a trade-off relatioship. Multilateral security framework should be analyzed as ‘preventive approach’ which has different function from ‘counter approach.’ Both have merit and demerit and we need both of them for the rational and effective pursuit of security. ARF is said to have much ‘weakness’; variety of participating countries, ineffective decision-making procedure, and lack of force. But seen from the preventive approach perspective, ARF has quite similar features to OSCE, specially in its beginning period. All the ‘weaknesses’ of ARF were and are seen in the OSCE process. ASEAN may also play a coordinating role which non-alignment and neutral countries have played during the cold war OSCE Process. Although Europe and Asia-Pacific surely have different history, background, and environment, the functions of the multilateral security framework and the analytical framework of security have much in common between the two regions. ARF, preventive approach, and Asia-Pacific security in general should not be studied with value-oriented concept of ‘Cooperative Security, ’ Multilateralism or too much emphasis on the difference from Europe. What is needed is further research for a theoretical framework based on the above argument and the role of ASEAN should be recast along this direction.
Throughout Second and Third Indo-Chinese war period to post Cambodian war era, the ASEAN countries intensified military cooperation and arms buildup. This paper examines “ASEAN solidarity” by looking at ASEAN countries' military cooperation and arms buildup. It divided into three parts. The first deals with bilateral joint military exercises among the ASEAN countries, which began in 1972. The second is discussion of some features of military expenditure. This part points out the gaps and or lags of the ASEAN states' defence spending. The third is concerned with arms procurement policies and patterns of the ASEAN countries. This part points out the features, such as multiplesource acquisition and dependence on some major countries.
Until the late 1980s, Vietnam had lacked a consistent policy toward non-Communist South-East Asia. The leadership in Hanoi maintained a dichotomic and military-centric world view so that it tended to overlook its South-East Asian neighbours and their regional organisation, that is, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Vietnam's main foreign policy objective in the region was to consolidate the “special relationship” among the three Indo-Chinese countries, even at the expense of undeveloped ties with the ASEAN countries. In 1989, however, Vietnam began to vitalise her South-East Asian policy to “neutralise” Cambodia without hampering her security interests there. The 13th Resolution on foreign policy adopted by the Politburo on 20 May 1988 put forth the idea of comprehensive security based on “economic strength, military capability appropriate for defense, and expanding international cooperation.” Indonesia's collaboration with Vietnam in sponsoring regional diplomacy that excluded China and Thailand's desire to “turn Indo-China from a battlefield into a marketplace” had encouraged then Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, one of the main advocates of the 13th Resolution. Although the principal role in the Cambodian peace settlement was assumed by the Permanent Five of the United Nations Security Council, this did not discourage Vietnam from developing a new relationship with ASEAN. There seemed to be two main reasons. Firstly, Chian's heavy-handed policy in the South China Sea implied that bilateral negotiations with China would hardly be sufficient to maintain the balance of power at sea. Secondly, Vietnam has good reasons to promote the integration of Indo-China into ASEAN to stabilise the region without making unilateral and military commitments again. In fact, the Party Secretary-General Do Muoi insisted in June 1992 that Vietnam should “expand, deversify, and multilateralise” her external relations. Also, Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam in October 1992 made an important remark: “Global security is indivisible.” Vietnam's admission into ASEAN in July 1995 was an epoch-making event in South-East Asian politics. This healed all remaining divisions left by colonial rule and the Cold War in South-East Asia. It is questionable, however, to what extent ASEAN will be able to share security interests with Vietnam in coping with China in the South China Sea and stabilising Cambodia.
This article examines the role of ASEAN in the new order building process in the Asia-Pacific region within the context of U. S. overall policy toward the region after the end of the Cold War. Today's Asia-Pacific region is in the middle of a protracted transitional period from the end of the Cold War to a new order which will eventually replace the Cold War order but has yet to take shape. The process is characterized by a dual structure of flux: a shifting balance of power among major powers, and the increasing capacity of ASEAN countries to influence the order building process at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Seen this way, ARF embodies a restructuring of relations between external powers and smaller ASEAN countries. In this context, U. S. Asia-Pacific policy under the Clinton administration was presented as a comprehensive one, emphasizing bilateral alliances and U. S. forward deployed forces, on the one hand, and multilateral security cooperation at ARF, on the other. A catalyst of this comprehensive approach was a long-term concern about an emerging China, in which the importance of ASEAN has steadily grown. ASEAN countries clearly recognize that they cannot affect the final result of the balance of power game among big powers. Nonetheless, as long as today's transitional process continues, ASEAN can play a role in engaging external powers in their initiatives at ARF. For ASEAN to succeed in this, some extent of institutionalization of the ARF process is inevitable. With ARF covering the entire Asia-Pacific region, the “ASEAN-way” of building a Southeast Asian community by informal gradualism now faces an important turning point.
Postwar Japan's role in Southeast Asia has been predicated on two main factors: the orientation of Japanese foreign policy conditioned by a degree of U. S. involvement in Southeast Asia, and Japan's capabilities. By utilizing the two factors, the following four, options of Japan's Southeast Asian policy will be accrued. Concomitantly, the contour of Japanese foreign policy toward the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) can be divided into the four periods which correspond to the above options. The first period is called “the U. S. -first policy” during the 1950s and 1960s where Japan's Southeast Asian policies were induced largely by American cold war policy and Japan's limited capabilities. During this period, intertwined with the American cold war strategy, Japanese policy toward the region began to foster a triangular relationship, linking U. S. capital, Japanese technical know-how and Southeast Asian raw materials. Accordingly, the reparations settlement became an integral part of this diplomacy and soon served as the catalyst for Japan's economic intrusion into the region. Through the reparations negotiations, thus, Japan's first coherent policy toward Southeast Asia emerged, and it continued after the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. The second period is called “the bridge-building policy” of the 1970s reflecting Japan's Asian orientation and limited capabilities. This period evolved around the so-called Fukuda Doctrine which has the following characteristics. First, the Doctrine established a systematic framework for Japan's political conduct in the region, as exemplified by the bridge-building approach to ASEAN and Indochina until 1980. Secondly, Japanese contacts with ASEAN as a viable regional organization have been developed. Thirdly, Japan's policy toward the North-South problems has become more constructive. As a result, the second period rendered two features: (1) Japanese foreign policy was changed from passive to active involvement in the region with increasingly political intentions, and (2) Southeast Asian demands and interests played an increasing role in Japanese decisionmaking, with the apparent exception of trade issues. The third period is called “the active policy” of the 1980s where Japan with increased capabilities was willing to get involved in Southeast Asian political affairs including the Cambodian conflict. Japan, in particular, intended to coordinate its policy with ASEAN to bring about tangible effects on regional affairs. It should be noted that through joint efforts to resolve the Cambodian conflict, Japan came up with several unique policies, such as financial support for PKO, human contributions to the political settlement as well as the comprehensive development of the Indochinese countries. All of these positive policies were finally culminated in the Tokyo conference on Cambodia in June 1990, which paved the way for its final resolution. The fourth period is called “the Asia-first policy” of 1990s where Japan is expected to play a larger role in the region due to the two reasons. First, the major reduction of American presence in the region has compelled Japan to do something politically, and second, the expectation of ASEAN on Japan's greater role has risen. The East Asian Economic Caucasus (EAEC) is a case in point here. Japan's ASEAN-first policy, however, has encountered a vehement objection from the United States, thereby dragging Tokyo into a policy dilemma. Whether or not Japan can really pursue its ASEAN-first policy remains to be seen.