During the past five decades, the most impressive intellectual achievements in international relations have been accomplished in the area of security studies. These include the studies of nuclear deterrence and arms control, alliances, crisis management, and the decision-making processes of major crises and wars. A galaxy of scholars, such as Bernard Brodie, Arnold Wolfers, John H. Herz, Henry A. Kissinger, Thomas C. Schelling, Hedley Bull, Alexander L. George, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., have undertaken to deal with these security problems.
Yet, as the Cold War has ended, security concerns have faded out considerably. As a result, some believe that we have come to the end of the history of security and that, therefore, “security studies are dead.” Is this true?
Eleven articles, including mine, try to answer this question one way or another. In my article, I shall attempt to define the concept of security, which has remained ambiguous to the present time. Special attention is paid to the relationship between security and power based on the studies of Harold Lasswell and A. Wolfers. Second, I shall trace the formation of the security concept in tandem with the birth of the nation-state system. Third, I shall examine whether we should expand the security concept to include such issues as economic and environmental problems with the end of the Cold War.
Finally, I shall give some introductory remarks on the other ten articles in this volume. The first three articles deal with the concepts on the international system level: namely, security regime (Yamamoto), three global security frameworks (Inoguchi), and international anarchy (Ishida). The next three analyze renewed concerns over environmental issues (Ohta), human security (Kurusu), and total nuclear disarmament (Umemoto). The next two articles (Sakai and Nakanishi) focus on domestic debates on Japanese security policies. The last two articles (Fukushima and Ueta) analyze the role alliances play in stabilizing/destabilizing the international system. Most of these articles are suggesting that we should go beyond the traditional bounds of security studies. Interestingly, however, none of them propound the end of security.
Hopefully, this volume will provide a ground plan on which to locate redefined security concepts and policies in the years to come.

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The purpose of this article is to identify the types and functions of security regimcs—a set of norms, rules and institutions in security areas. The basic thesis in this paper is that the types and functions of security regimes depend on the types of the international political system and thus on the types of distribution of preferences of individual nations. Four types of international political systems are deduced by utilizing the two dimensions of the nature of the security threats to a group of nations. Security threats lie either outside the group or inside. Security threats are either specific or unspecific (or uncertain). If a specific threat exists outside the group, the international system is adversarial and the structure of interests tends to be zero-sum in nature. In such a suituation, there will be no chance for security regimes to form (except for possible regimes within alliances). If a group of nations “internalize” threats and if the threats are specific, then the international system will be characterized as a regulated balance of power. In such a situation, secuity regimes will form in specific areas and their functions will be to avoid an unbearable and/or inadvertent war. The type of games which appear in this situation will most probably be a serious prisoners' dilemma game.
When threats lie outside the group and are unspecific, then the group will form an alliance and/or a regime which is directed toward the unspecific threats outside. NATO and the US-Japan alliance after the Cold War and “non-proliferation” regimes will be good examples. The game structure will include a suasion game as well as prisoners' dilemma games. When a group of nations internalize the threats and when the threats are not specific, then the group will tend to form a concert system (and in some cases, collective security). A concert system regulates rather overall relations, tends to be informal and seems to be predicated on the game of stag hunting. A prohibition regime which prohibits prodution, possession and use of a certain weapon is inclusive, non-discriminary and thus very similar to environmental or human right regimes.
Security regimes do not have military capabilities by themselves except for alliances and collective security but usually do play indispensable preventive roles.

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In this articla the author argues that into the new millennium three competing frameworks govern the global security framework; Westphalian, Philadelphian and Anti-Utopian. The Westphalian framework was the dominant framework for the last two centuries especially this century. It is characterized by state sovereignty as its basic premise, order within and anarchy without as a systemic feature, and balancing and bandwagonning as its behavioral modalities. The Philadelphian framework existed in the United States between its colonial period and the Civil War. It has been resuscitated globally in the last quarter of this century in quite a resilient fashion, incorporating much of the Westphalian framework into it. It is characterized by popular sovereignty as its basic premise, liberal democracy as its systemic feature, and binding and hiding as its behavioral modalities. The Anti-Utopian framework existed until the mid-20th century as the colonialist framework. It has been revived as it has remolded itself as a global, humanitarian mission undertaken by major powers international organizations non-governmental organizations, by stripping itself of its erstwhile territorial aggrandizement component. It is characterized as loss of sovereignty as its basic premise, failed or failing states as a systemic feature, and hollowing out and collapsing as its behavioral modalities. These three frameworks compete vigorously in all actors of global politics and the manifestation of varying weights in the coming evolution of global politics needs to be carefully analyzed in order to see the shape of global politics in the next millennium.

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Realists regard the anarchic structure of international relations as exogenous constraints on the foreign policy decisions of sovereign states. They do not explain but assume anarchy. They explain, instead, that the absence of centralized authority, which enforces international agreements, hinders the efficient solution of political conflicts among states, as in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. But why is this anarchy as an inefficient institution sustained by rational actors? Why don't the rational states attempt to establish international institutions that would facilitate the centralized making and enforcement of international agreements?
They do not do so because the centralized making of agreements would fail to serve their common interest for the following four reasons even if the centralized enforcement would serve their common interest. First, the decentralized control of information by sovereign states can be a bargaining advantage. Second, even if states comply with agreements without centralized enforcement, as in the case of policy coordination, they often have divergent preferences over which policy to choose as a common policy. Third, it is extremely difficult to establish a centralized authority which clearly defines property rights beyond national borders even if the clear definition of property rights could improve the efficiency of decentralized bargaining over the regulation of economic activities with international externalities, as Ronald Coase argues. It is because the international definition of property rights is expected to generate serious distributional consequences. Fourth, developed and developing countries have divergent interests in agreements that would have redistributional effects among them.

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The issues of acid rain, the depletion of the ozone layer, global warming and its effect on sea-level rise and climate change are fostering world recognition that environmental degradation has become a threat to human society. On the other hand, while the loss of forest and wetland due to human development is rapidly depriving fauna and flora of their niche around the world, the widespread use of chemical fertilizer and pesticide as well as the destruction of local commons result in the exploitation and erosion of top soil. Hence human beings themselves have become a threat to the earth's ecosystem. However, we can all at once neither abandon modern agriculture nor cease to be dependent on natural food resources from the rivers and seas to feed the ever growing world population. Among the peoples in developing countries, poverty is the prime cause of environmental destruction not development.
How can we protect and, at the same time, utilize our global common properties such as water, air, and top soil? How can we establish a sustainable society based on regional and generational equity? It seems the discipline of international relations, like other academic fields, at least needs to incorporate the aspect of a global-level of analysis into its perspectives.
Shedding light on the connection between the concept of security and environmental problems, this paper searches for a new research direction in the field of international relations. First, the concept of security itself is briefly examined. The meaning of the term security differs in various issue areas including military, political, economic and social issue areas and thus security concerns also differ among these areas. Next, the term environmental security is scrutinized in comparison with the general concept of security since the connotation of environmental security can mislead research activities and our recognition of environmental problems per se.
Finally, the main body of this paper categorizes recent achievements on the relationships between security and environmental issues into three perspectives. One of them is a traditional perspective that perceives the significance of environmental problems in conjunction with politico-military disputes. A second one consists of an ecological perspecive and comprehensive security that urge the discipline of international relations to adapt itself to global environmental changes. Eclectic perspectives between these two are those of international diplomats or other practitioners who are engaging in environmental issues, and liberal regime theorists who seek a possibility of global governance without an international government.

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This article attempts to clarify the concept of human security in relation to the current debate on what the primary referent of security is and whose security comes first. Then the traditional concept of security closely identified with the military affairs of states, as well as the relatively new concepts of societal security and global security will be examined in contributing to the theoretical development of human security.
Although ‘human security’ is a word originally coined in the UNDP's Human Development Report 1993, the idea that individual human beings should be the ultimate referent of security has been asserted by some schools of thought. Ken Booth argues for recasting security in terms of ‘emancipation’ from social inequality and oppression, which seems to be mostly shared by the UNDP's Report (human rights and development approach). For sociologists like Anthony Giddens, individuals face globalized risks arising from more abstract system of modernity challenging the continuity of their very identity. Among global governance school, Richard Falk advocates humane governance for all individuals as well as peoples.
Threats to human security include broad range of issues covering from social violence to military conflicts, from poverty to environmental degradation, or from racial discrimination to the loss of identity. I argue that concern with human security becomes especially acute in the following situations. (1) Inability or non-existence of a government (‘failed state’) tends to result in poverty, famine, ethnic conflict or flow of refugees. (2) On the contrary, in case of excessive level of state intervention (a ‘maximal state’ like Nazi Germany), a state itself becomes a source of threat to its citizens. (3) Military conflicts and wars among states are of course the most dangerous threat to the existence of individual humans. (4) Threats to human identity could be examined in terms of identity of various social groupings which individuals belong to. (5) Some threats to human life may be caused by activities diffused throughout the globe, which include destruction of ozone layer, overpopulation and international terrorism.
This paper concludes, first, the human rights and development approach which places individuals at the center of security studies serves as the core for further theorization. Second, the role of states and of national security for individual human beings, however, should be clarified and incorporated into the theory of human security. Then, multi-layered analysis in which we also examine security of social groupings and the planet is to be introduced.

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The elimination of nuclear weapons as a long-term goal, as advocated by the Stimson Center, the Canberra Commission, and the National Academy of Sciences, has drawn considerable attention in the West in recent years. This tendency has arisen from the perceived decline in the utility of nuclear forces along with the growing awareness of the costs and risks associated with them. While the necessity for deterring Russian attack by the threat of nuclear retaliation has diminished, the political and economic instabilities in the former Soviet Union make it urgent to prevent the accidental or unauthorized launch and the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the promotion of nuclear reductions. As long as nuclear weapons remain in national arsenals, they have the potential of offsetting the undisputed superiority in conventional military capabilities that the West (the United States in particular) has come to enjoy. The viability of the nuclear nonproliferation regime rests on whether the nuclear-weapon states can meet the rising expectations on the part of the non-nuclear weapon states regarding the former's disarmament obligations. The economic and social burdens imposed by nuclear armaments including their impact on the environment and human health have increasingly been appreciated.
On the other hand, the case for total nuclear disarmament presented in the reports of the three organizations mentioned above has to clear a number of theoretical hurdles before its validity is established. First, while they premise phased reductions of nuclear forces on increased cooperation among nuclear-armed powers, the strengthening of the nonproliferation regime, and a credible verification system, those reports say little about how to obtain these conditions except for asserting that the very process of nuclear disarmament would facilitate the task. More important, the proponents of nuclear abolition should pay more attention to the possibility that the curtailment of the U. S. nuclear arsenal might encourage the spread of nuclear weapons if it lessens the security of its allies or enboldens its regional adversaries. The views of the “proliferation optimists” and of those who favor the role of nuclear weapons in deterring the use of chemical and biological weapons must also be countered more convincingly. Last but not least, a theoretical foundation must be sought for the preservation of cooperation among major powers after the elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved. While international relations scholars generally agree that the presence of nuclear arms critically contributed to the “long peace” after World War II, a consensus has yet to emerge as to whether factors such as the spread of democracy, the growth of economic interdependence, and the development of collective security would effectively eliminate the possibility of war among major powers in the absence of nuclear weapons.

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This essay intends to analyse the formative process of discourses on international politics in post-war Japan, and by doing so shed light on the hitherto neglected aspects of Japanese political thought. Most of previous studies have understood discourses on international politics in post-war Japan as a simple dichotomy, realism/idealism, and paid little attention to the intellectual contexts in which these discourses had their own roots; While “idealists” have searched for their identity in that Japan was reborn as a “peace-loving” nation after the end of the Pacific War, “realists” have acused the “idealists” of being naive. Both of them, however, seem to have overlooked or possibly masked from what kind of historical background discourses on international politics in post-war Japan had emerged and to what extent post-war discourses had been influenced by pre-war ones. Therefore, this essay will uncover the complicated relationship of political thought between post-war and pre-war Japan.
Chapter I “Morality, Power and Peace” treats how relationship between morality and power in international politics was argued during the early post-war era. Dogi-Kokka-Ron (Nation Based on Morality), the dominant discourse on peace immediately after Japan's surrender, insisted that Japan search for morality rather than power and by doing so exceed the principle of sovereignty, characterestic of modern states. In spite of its appearance, however, Dogi-Kokka-Ron contained echoes of philosophical argument of the Kyoto School which had advocated morality of Japan's wartime foreign policies vis-à-vis Western imperialism. Thus Maruyama Masao and other leading intellectuals, who belonged to the school known as Shimin-Shakai-Ha (Civil Society School), tried to differentiate their arguments from Dogi-Kokka-Ron and create another discourse on morality, power and peace. Since the Kyoto School had criticised harshly the modernity and nationalism during the Pacific War, Shimin-Shakai-Ha's undertakings resulted in reestimation of the modern nation-state. This chapter further elucidates Shimin-Shakai-Ha's ambivalent attitudes toward power and norm in international politics with special reference to its understandings of the concept of the equality of states.
Chapter II “Regionalism and Nationalism” focuses on Royama Masamichi's argument on regionalism. Regionalism was a difficult topic to handle during the early post-war era because it could bring to mind the idea of the Great East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere during the Pacific War. Royama, founder of the study on International Politics in Japan, was one of the rare figures who continued to advocate the significance of regionalism. This chapter surveys Royama's argument on regionalism from the mid-1920's to the mid-1950's and investigates how his concern about development and nationalism of Asian countries appeared within the framework of regionalism. Royama's argument is also suggestive for better understanding of the context in which the “Rostow-Reischauer line” surfaced in the early 1960's.
Chapter III “Collective Security and Neutralism” elucidates several aspects of this issue which have not been hitherto fully investigated. Whether positively or negatively, neutralism in post-war Japan has been understood as a typically “idealistic” attitude toward international politics. However, the context in which the concept of neutrality was understood and argued in the early post-war Japan was more complicated. Discourses on neutralism at that time had still echoes of the controversies over collective security during the inter-war years. The Yokota-Taoka Controversy which took place in the late-1940's witnessed the continuity of pre-war and post-war arguments on this issue. This chapter, therefore, focuses on the Yokota-Taoka Controversy and analyses its impact on the following arguments of

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The recent upsurge of the interest in the fundamental questioning of “what is security” has led to the reevaluation of the Japanese notion of security, which has emphasized its comprehensive nature. On the other hand, Japanese approach to security has been viewed as characteristically equivocal on the affairs related to the military.
This paper attempts to find out the sources of these characteristics of the Japanese notion of security in the historical experience of Japan from the period of the First World War up to the 1970s, when Japanese policymakers and scholars first expressed the Japanese notion of security in the words of “comprehensive security.” Interpreting the famous article by Konoye Fumimaro which denounced the Anglo-American pacifism as nonmilitary form of economic oppression, this paper reflects the basic threat perception of Japan in the interwar period. This threat perception was left unresolved because of the inability of the Japanese political regime to discover an optimal combination to achieve economic development and security within the international political-economic setting. Ultimately Japan resorted to the hopeless military method and was thereby forced to define its minimum core value in the word “Kokutai.”
The basic objective of Yoshida Shigeru who led the postwar period was to keep the “Kokutai” viable politically and economically, while making it compatible with the international environment. The result was the new Constitution which stipulated the Emperor as “symbol, ” a high priority on economic development and international liberalization, a desire to increase its internal policing capability while averting the remilitarization at least for the immediate future, and the dependence of Japanese external security on American protection. These policy choices succeeded in resolving the question of keeping domestic stability while preserving cultural core values and rapid economic development, but it also left ideas on military affairs ambiguous.
This ambiguity was set into a new context in 1960s and 1970s. Some scholars came to recognize the need for Japan, which was rapidly achieving an economic power status, to formulate a conscious security policy including, though not limited to, its military aspect. However, the role of the military in power politics was changing, as the nuclear capabality proved rather incapable of forcing the American will on the North Vietnamese. In addition, several economic shocks in the early 1970s made the Japanese public realize the interdependence of their lives with international politics, but the perceived threat was predominantly socio-economic. The notion of “comprehensive security” which stemmed from these setings thus contained an internal conceptual conflict: on the one hand, the subtle combination of method and objective, both military and non-military, is the required political skill for the contemporary security; on the other hand, the effort to decrease and, if possible, negate power politics may be the ultimate security policy in international society which becomes increasingly interdependent.

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There have been many controversial perspectives concerning relations between the distribution of power and stability within the international system. Among such perspectives, two seemingly contradictory theories, the balance-of-power theory and the hegemonic-stability theory, are the more prominent frameworks applied. The balance-of-power theory argues that an even distribution of power creates a more stable system, whereas the hegemonic-stability theory asserts that a preponderance of power is conducive to creating a stable system.
This article attempts to resolve the contradiction between these two theories by re-examining alliance structures within both theories. There are three different interpretations of balance-of-power theory that assert nations balance against power, while the hegemonic-stability theory suggests that an alliance forms around the hegemon. By combining these arguments, we can deduce four different alliance patterns: namely, coalition; two-parties' balance; multi-parties' balance; and hegemony. Coalition is the alliance pattern formed against the strongest nation. Two-parties' balance is that formed between two parties checking each other. Multi-parties' balance is that formed among three or more parties checking one another. Hegemony is that formed with the strongest nation. Though these four alliance patterns have been treated separately, by using logics of alliance formation, it is possible to explain them in a consistent and coherent way.
Re-examination of relations between the distribution of power and stability within the international system in terms of alliance structures enables us to integrate the balance-of-power theory and the hegemonic-stability theory. Whether a nation prefers autonomy or security affects its alliance strategy. If a nation prefers autonomy, it is a risk-taker and generally chooses the balancing strategy; namely, to ally with a weaker power in the system, whereas if a nation prefers security, it is a risk-averter and generally chooses the bandwagoning strategy; namely, to ally with a stronger power in the system. The combinations of nations' preferences determine what kind of alliance relationship or alliance structure is formed, which in turn affects the stability in the international system.
The three-nation-model and four-nation-model show that contradictions between balance-of-power theory and hegemonic-stability theory derive from the fact that alliance structures assumed by each of theories may be both stable and unstable, depending on combinations of nations' preferences. The analysis suggests that an approach which constructs conditions of the system by combining nations' attributes is effective in analyzing relations between the distribution of power and stability within the international system. Though the result of the analysis is applicable only to a three or four nation system, it may suggest some implications which may be used to apply to more than four nations systems and further empirical studies.

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Immediately after the sweeping changes in Europe in 1989, the CSCE was expected to play a significant role as a European-wide forum. However, its role has been marginalized by NATO and its mission has turned out to be conflict prevention, while NATO has become the core of the multi-layered security structure in Europe. It was not the OSCE which had a role in stabilizing the effect of NATO enlargement, but it was NATO itself. In May 1997, NATO and Russia agreed to the Founding Act, and established institutionalized cooperation between them. Due to its eastward enlargement, NATO has developed cooperative security structures, such as the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in its outskirt, while keeping its collective defense among member-states intact.
After the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the disintegration of the USSR, NATO members had no intention of disbanding the alliance. Due to the end of the East-West military confrontation, NATO has undergone “transformation.” Crisis management has become its new mission, which includes non-article 5 operations in its “out-of-area” where NATO members' security might be threatened. The emergence of European security and defense identity (ESDI) has been another challenge to NATO. NATO has gradually changed its force structures in order to meet its traditional and new missions.
NATO itself has influenced non-NATO countries by way of the innovative PfP. NATO has helped establish a democratic army and civilian control system in the former Soviet bloc. These countries which wish to be NATO members have introduced NATO procedures and has tried to enhance interoperability with NATO forces. NATO is transforming the non-NATO countries' military system by way of a cooperative security approach. The basis of this approach has been established in the CSCE/OSCE for more than twenty years.

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It should not be ignored that the British Government played a critical role in making the US-Japan Alliance between 1948-1950. Britain was a “coordinator” of concerned countries in the Asia-Pacific to make the postwar security framework.
While the “German problem” dominated the other security issues in the postwar Europe, the “Japan problem”, namely haw to secure with and against Japan, overshadowed the other security issues in the early postwar Asia-Pacific. The US government tried to create a Pacific pact, which covered the “off-shore islands chain” in the Asia-Pacific. However, the British Government thought it unrealistic, since only America could secure the region militarily. No other Powers could play such a role in place of America, and it did not seem effective to make such a group in this region as the interests were considerably divergent. Therefore, it was thought by the British Government that the US-Japanese bilateral defense pact was the best measure to create the security framework in the region. Thereby Japan would be contained and secured by the US forces in Japan, and the both sides of the Japan problem could be solved. Despite the preponderance of power, and depite the responsibility in the region, and also despite the authority to create it, the US Government alone could hardly achieve the postwar peace settlement of the Asia-Pacific, without this significant influence of the pragmatic British diplomacy.

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Until their complete withdrawal from the Philippines in 1992, the U. S. forces have been regarded as a symbol of America's continued domination in its former colony. Similarly, the U. S. -Philippine Military Bases Agreement of 1947, which legitimized America's use of Philippine bases after decolonization, has been generally considered as one of the conditions that the exsuzerain state compelled its ex-colony to accept in return for granting independence.
Such interpretations are based on the fact that the United States did maintain its military presence in the Philippines (which certainly had been a major factor of their “special relationship” in the colonial period), and that the stipulations of the agreement became a target of intensified Filipino nationalism after independence. By exploring the U. S. policymaking process with regard to the Philippines and Philippine bases during the immediate postwar years, however, one should have a different view.
When the United States decided in the 1930's to decolonize the Philippines, it was regarded as a burden from a military point of view, a vulnerable defense zone in case of war in the Pacific. The United States altered its policy during the Pacific war, having been unable to prevent the Japanese occupation of the Philippine Islands. It came to militarily commit itself to its former colony: defense as well as the strategic use of the Philippines. However, as wartime policies and situations were gradually dissolved, the United States again found the defense of the Philippines a burden, militarily as well as financially. As a result, the U. S. policymakers decided by the fall of 1946 to withdraw all Army units and retain only a few naval bases in the Philippines, and excluded them from America's postwar Pacific strategic base system.
The U. S. -Philippine Bases Agreement of 1947 granted the United States the right to use Philippine bases. Both Army and Navy bases were retained, requested by the Philippine government, who strongly desired the presence of the U. S. forces as a security measure. The stipulations were the product of bilateral agreement, in which the United States made considerable concessions compared to its early drafts. It cannot be denied that these conditions were still unequal, reflecting the unequal partnership of the two nations. But it must be also noticed that the United States did not have neocolonialistic intentions when they signed the agreement, and that there was certainly a possibility for them to dissolve their colonial military bondage. The United States did attempt to minimize its military commitment to the Philippines.
The intensification of the cold war from approximately 1949 on changed the attitude of the United States. The strategic importance of the Philippines resided not in itself, but it was indeed subject to the situation of world politics.

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