国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
1998 巻, 118 号
選択された号の論文の19件中1~19を表示しています
  • 米中関係史
    宇佐美 滋
    1998 年 1998 巻 118 号 p. 1-8,L5
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Sino-U. S. relationship are for Japan the most important third country relations. Within the triangular relations between China, U. S. and Japan, if Sino-U. S. relations change in a good direction or bad direction, Japan is bound to be affected and has to adjust her relations with the other two. Historically when Japan failed to adjust properly to the changes of this delicate framework, Japan's security and prosperity was in danger. Therefore, we have to be very careful about changes of this configuration.
    But traditionally American attitudes toward China were unique, emotional and changeable with diversified extreme images between good and bad about China and the Chinese. According to a famous China scholar, Harold Isaacs, such extreme images appears dominant and irresistible according to cyclical patterns. When a certain mood becomes predominant it becomes extremely difficult for a scholar to resist it. This is a unique trap. After the Nixon shock in 1971 we experienced a very euphoric period of Sino-U. S. relations. Many scholars believed if we had done better, we could have normalized relations with Communist China in 1949. Such an argument about “Lost Chances” was enthusiastically supported by many scholars. But later the mood changed. Besides such psychological traps I mention other elements which relate to the development of the study of Sino-U. S. relations.
  • 米中関係史
    篠原 初枝
    1998 年 1998 巻 118 号 p. 9-26,L6
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    W. W. Willoughby was a political scientist at the Johns Hopkins University. He was one of the founders of the American Political Science Association, established in 1903, and played a significant role in the formative period of political science in the United States. His field was political philosophy, with an emphasis on the notion of sovereignty, which, to Willoughby, expressed the supremacy of the State will, its territorial integrity and independence.
    Although he was not a specialist on China, the experience as a legal advisor to the Chinese government from 1916 to 1917 led him to study the complex treaty system in China. He published a widely read book entitled Foreign Rights and Interests in China in 1920, in which he argued that foreign rights such as the settlements or ‘special interests’ exercised by the Powers were a limitation on China's sovereignty. At the Washington Conference of 1921-22, he was a counselor to the Chinese delegation and drafted the Ten Points, which set the fundamental principles for China's demands. Willoughby regarded the Washington Conference as a victory for China, because for the first time China was dealt with as a sovereign state and acquired a status equal to the other powers.
    Willoughby also served in the Chinese delegation at the League of Nations during the Opium Conference of 1924 and in 1931 when Japan invaded Manchuria. He cultivated a close relationship with Sao-ke Alfred Sze, a Chinese diplomat who had been the Chinese Minister to the United States. Every time Willoughby served China, Sze was a member of the delegation. Sze declared that Willoughby's advice was of “great value” to enhancing Chinese views.
    In the field of international law, Willoughby emphasized the need for moral principles. For example, he argued that Japan's Twenty One Demands, which had been signed under threat of force, contradicted the fundamental principle of international law, because it was against the principle of mutual cooperation. This stance led to the issues of morality and ethical principles being discussed by other scholars of international law, who in turn supported China's position vis-à-vis Japan.
    Willoughby was successful in presenting the view that China was a sovereign state. No matter how chaotic the domestic conditions might be, Willoughby saw China a single state, and this intellectual framework in reality helped China to preserve its territorial and administrative integrity. For China, Willoughby was a valuable friend who constructed objective and academic arguments for the Chinese cause. On the other hand, Willoughby found in China the opportunity to prove his theory and develop principles of international justice.
  • 米中関係史
    青山 瑠妙
    1998 年 1998 巻 118 号 p. 27-45,L7
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Research on Sino-American relations on the eve of the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) mainly tends to be divided into two distinct approaches: the ideological approach and the situational approach. Both of these approaches, however, focus on the trilateral relationship between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union within the context of the Cold War framework. In order to avoid an overestimation of the influence on China of the Soviet Union or the environment of the Cold War era, I would instead like to analyze Sino-U. S. relations on the eve of the founding of the PRC through the lens of Communist China's understanding of and actions toward America, mainly in light of China's regional perspective.
    From the end of 1948 to around the first month of 1949 the Chinese Communists finalized the conception and shaping of the foreign policy for their new China, which was endowed with a combination of flexibility and principle. Communist China's choice of the Soviet camp occurred in the midst of tensions between itself and the U. S., while at the same time it had drawn close to the Soviet Union. Thus, the Communist Chinese merely had a single option.
    From the summer of 1946 to December of 1948, however, the Communist Chinese entertained a hope that U. S. policy would change, even as they drew closer to the Soviets. Indeed, their policy towards America at this time was rich in flexibility. Applying the situational approach, we see then that we cannot say that no possibility for building friendly relations existed, since China had certain hopes that rested on America's China policy. From March 1949 onward, Communist China's foreign activities were bound by the Soviet Union and ideology. Thus the ideological approach is rather effective for analyzing this time period. Nonetheless, Communist China possessed both a flexibility and an autonomy in conducting its foreign affairs which placed utmost priority on its own national interests; they hoped to chart a course to improved relations with the U. S.—albeit with certain conditions attached. However misperceptions on the part of both sides doomed any improvements in their ties.
    On the other hand, Communist China had been actively promoting trade with capitalist nations, including the United States, and trade between the two countries had been developing rapidly. It is possible that these close economic ties could have reached their political relationship if it had not been for the outbreak of the war on the Korean Peninsula.
  • 米中関係史
    湯浅 成大
    1998 年 1998 巻 118 号 p. 46-59,L8
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    There are two main streams of thought concerning the studies of Sino-American relationship; one argues America's China policy from the context of the U. S. -Soviet-China strategic triangle, the other stresses the importance of America's domestic politics in the formation of its China policy. This article tries to add another perspective on the analysis on Sino-American relationship: the interaction of U. S. China policy and its Taiwan policy.
    In late 1948, the Truman Administration began to re-examine the strategic importance of Taiwan. As NSC37/1 (Jan 19, 1949) noted, the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the basic aim of the U. S. should be to deny Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores to the Communists. However, there was a slight difference between them. The State Department also wanted to deny Taiwan to the Chinese Nationalists in order to keep some options open in the case of a Sino-Soviet split and subsequent Sino-American accommodation in the future, while the military establishment was indifferent to such political implications. The JCS insisted that overt military commitment in Taiwan would be unwise at that time, but the U. S. should bolster the Nationalists forces and collaborate with them if amphibious operations were launched from mainland China.
    When the Korean War broke out, the U. S. Government dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait not only to protect against an attack by the Communists but also to block any Nationalist action in the strait. In this situation, the difference between the State Department and the JCS still continued. Secretary Acheson tried to avoid a deep commitment to Chiang Kai-shek, but the military was establishing a strong relationship through the military aid and advice programs to the Kuomintang Forces. However this difference ceased. The alternative forces to the Nationalists did not emerge in Taiwan, the State Department, therefore, had to commit itself to the Kuomintang government however reluctantly, which was one of the reasons why Sino-American relations were not improved after the Korean War, even though the U. S. Government sought various chances for rapprochement with China.
  • 米中関係史
    袁 克勤
    1998 年 1998 巻 118 号 p. 60-83,L9
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In February 1953, President Eisenhower told Congress and the world that the United States would continue to defend Taiwan against invasion from Communist China but would give Nationalist China freedom to take aggressive action against the mainland. After this so-called “unleash” declaration, the Administration told Nationalist China not to act without concurrence of the US, and at the same time began to reassess China policy to make a new hard-line. Planning of new policy was finished in NSC166 and NSC146 in 1953 and revised in NSC5429 in next year.
    The objective of new policy was to “reduce the power of Communist China in Asia even at the risk of, but without deliberately provoking war”. Obviously, the new policy was more agreesive than that of Truman Administration. For reducing the power of Communist China, Eisenhower Administration decided to encourage and assist Nationalist China to raid the mainland and attack its merchant shipping. To justify this action the Administration thought it would be wise and declared that the Nationalist Government is the only Chinese Government and the war between the Nationalist and the Communist being a civil war, was not a threat to international peace. This meant the new policy was aggressive but a ‘one China’ policy.
    But as the first Taiwan Strait crisis occured in autumn 1954, Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles found they were in a difficult situation. If they continue to assist the Nationalist aggressively, they would have to enter the war against Communist China. If not, they should admit that Nationalist China is actually a government of China but not the only government. Dulles said to NSC it is unwise to go into the war for some small islands, the ‘two Chinas’ policy would be better than the hard-line, because with this policy the US can commit itself only to Taiwan and the Pescadores and not to small islands near to the mainland. Taiwan is not a part of China, Dulles said, an ultimate outcome would be the independence of Taiwan and the Communist China might agree to it in the future. Dulles suggested and the NSC agreed that the US take the situation to the UN Security Council, on the ground that the war between Communist China and Nationalist China was not purely a civil war, Communist China's action being a threat to international peace. At the same time, NSC decided to conclude a mutual defense treaty with Nationalist China that would be applicable only to Taiwan and Pescadores.
    Nationalist China welcomed the mutual defense treaty. Actually they had asked the US to conclude such a treaty many times before even after Dulles had rejected their suggestion. But when they asked for the treaty they did not forget that they were ‘Nationalists’, they stressed that they were the government of China and against any ‘two Chinas’ policy.
    The US-Nationalist mutual defense treaty was concluded in December 1954. Dulles thought the treaty was a step to divide Taiwan from China and independence of Taiwan which would be in the interest of the US.
    The traditional China policy of the US was not to divide China. In the Cold War the US decided to divide China because they believed it was the best method to prevent Taiwan from falling into the Communist's hands. But ‘two Chinas’ policy was not confined to the Cold War. Even after the Cold War ended, ‘one China or two Chinas’ is and will continue to be the most difficult problem in Sino-American relations.
  • 米中関係史
    松本 はる香
    1998 年 1998 巻 118 号 p. 84-102,L11
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    On September 3, 1954, Chinese artillery began shelling one of the Kuomintang-held islands, Quemoy (Jinmen). The Eisenhower administration ordered the 7th Fleet to recommence patrolling the Taiwan Strait. It was the beginning of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. However the United States did not take a thoroughly pro-Taiwanese stand when the Crisis broke out. The U. S. faced, as Dulles put it, a “horrible dilemma” over the policy toward the Crisis. The Eisenhower administration felt that if the U. S. directly defended Quemoy and other offshore islands against China by force, it would have induced the outbreak of an US-China War, like the Korean War. On the other hand, if the U. S. overlooked Communist China's use of force in the Taiwan Strait, the so called anti-Communist countries defense line —which runs from the Aleutians through the Japanese Islands, South Korea, the Ryukyus, Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands, the Philippines, part of Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand— would have been broken down by China, and furthermore, by the Soviet Union. However at the beginning of the Taiwan Strait Crisis, no consensus existed in the U. S. Government about whether the offshore islands were substantially related to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands which the U. S. had made consistently clear to protect, after being informed of the deneutralization of Taiwan in 1950.
    The Eisenhower administration decided to make a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. U. S. -Taiwan treaty negotiations began in November 1954. The U. S. considered that the purpose of the treaty was to bring about a cease fire, and to commit to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands and other related territories, so as to create a deterrent to Chinese military action in the Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, the U. S. exercised effective control over Kuomintang offensive military operations, formalizing the understanding that without mutual consent, the Kuomintang would not take any offensive action which might provoke retaliation by China, leading to the invocation of the treaty.
    On December 2, 1954, the U. S. signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. The treaty required the U. S. and Taiwan to: (1) Maintain and develop “jointly by self-help and mutual aid” their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and Communist subversion directed against them “from without, ” (2) Cooperate in economic development, (3) Consult on implementation of the treaty, and (4) Act to meet an armed attack “in the West Pacific area directed against the territories” of either the U. S. or the Republic of China, including Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands, and “such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.”
    Mutual Defense Treaty Article VI specified that, in addition to Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands, the treaty would be applicable to “such other territories as may be determined by mutual consent.” In addition, Article VII gave the United States the right (by mutual consent) to deploy its armed forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands for the purpose of their defense. In a word, the treaty did not obligate the United States to protect the offshore islands, while still leaving it free to do so.
  • 米中関係史
    滝田 賢治
    1998 年 1998 巻 118 号 p. 103-117,L13
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    It may be safe and fair to say that international relations in East Asia has been influenced to a great extent by the U. S. -China relationship during the 25 years since the rapprochement between them in 1972. This article first divides these years into four periods and then analyzes the characteristics and conditions of the relations in each period. The Four periods are as follows: I. from 1972 when both nations were reconciled to each other to 1979 when they established diplomatic relations. II. from 1979 to 1985 with the end of the new Cold War. III. the period from 1985 to 1991, which witnessed the process of the dismantling of the Cold War. IV. the 1992-97 period that may be characterized by “the world's only remaining superpower American”.
    The U. S. policy toward China during the period I was a very strategic one as it was crafted by Nixon-Kissinger on the basis of U. S. global strategy. U. S. policy became more and more strategic as détente between U. S. and Soviet Union was set back in the second half of the 1970's. During the new Cold War, U. S. -China relations deteriorated and deteriorated solely due to the Reagan Administration's Taiwan-oriented policy. Since China was just going to reconcile itself with Soviet Russia, the U. S. was forced to make great concessions to China and promise it the transfer of military technology.
    The outbreak of the Gulf war compelled the U. S. to make more compromises with China because China's support was indispensable at the UN Security Council in order to impose sanctions upon Iraq and then attack it. The U. S. Congress severely criticized the Bush Administration's conciliatory China policy and began to use China's MFN as a political weapon. As the Clinton Administration has subordinated “human rights” to “economy” in regard to China policy, the U. S. Congress has politicized China's MFN and will continue to adopt the same stance.
  • 米中関係史
    伊藤 剛
    1998 年 1998 巻 118 号 p. 118-132,L14
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper examines how the “Taiwan issue” was dealt with by the U. S. and the Japanese governments at the time of Sino-American rapprochement and Sino-Japanese normalization in the early 1970's. Given the Soviet threat, Chinese leaders downplayed the “one China” principle, demanding that the U. S. and the Japanese governments admit Taiwan as a part of China, while at the same time making space for them to continue their security commitment to the island. In terms of the triangular formation of China, the U. S., and Japan, the sudden change in the Sino-American relationship transformed the triangular formation from the stable U. S. -Japan security tie containing the PRC, into a more ambiguous direction in which the United States was the “pivot” and the other actors were U. S. “wings.” During the process of Japan-China nomalization, the triangle also shifted a fashion in which the three states had positive relationships with each other.
    As far as the U. S. decision-making process was concerned, the Nixon-Kissinger policy toward the PRC, by exploiting the Sino-Soviet split, sought leverage over the Sovier Union and China with an eye to ending the Viernam War. In this perspective, American policy-makers did not intend to alter the security partnership with Japan. In fact, the Nixon administration used the U. S. -Japan Security Treaty in order to assuage China's fear of Japan's anticipated military expansion and nuclear development, should the U. S. military forces have been withdrawn from Japan. Since U. S. decision-makers considered their China policy separately from American relations with Japan, the Nixon administration did not expect the hasty resumption of Sino-Japanese relations.
    The sudden Japanese overtures to China were thus perceived by U. S. government to presage the making of more intimate Sino-Japanese relations. In response to Japan's approach to the PRC, the Nixon administration indicated some unease and irritation toward Japan.
    Specifically, it wondered, during the Sino-Japanese resumption process, whether Japanese leaders would agree with PRC officials on excluding the clause on protecting Taiwan from the 1969 U. S. -Japan Joint Communiqué, in which Nixon and Sato agreed on a need to protect the “Far East” after the U. S. government returned Okinawa. In the event of a future rupture in U. S. -PRC relations, the U. S. government continued to be interested in keeping Taiwan as an important outpost. Moreover, after Tanaka became Prime Minister in July, 1972, his pledge of nomalizing Sino-Japanese relations worried U. S. officials, who feared the terms of the normalization. Their concern regarding Taiwan continued until Nixon and Tanaka discussed the Japanese government's nomalization with the Chinese at the Hawaii summit in August-September, 1972.
  • 米中関係史
    中逵 啓示
    1998 年 1998 巻 118 号 p. 133-148,L15
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Throughout years Deng Xiaoping's so-called open-door policy began to add a new facet to the security issue-dominated US-China relations. The dynamism of the market started altering bilateral relations. Since late 1980s, negotiators of the two countries had to vie with each other often over economic issues such as textile trade, market access, protection of intellectual property rights, and China's entry for GATT/WTO… Among these issues, the textile friction was selected and discussed in this paper, because the issue was the harbinger of continuous economic friction between the US and China.
    An important economic context of world's textile industry was the clear shift of relative advantage from developed nations to developing countries. A rapid increase of textile exports from China to the US during late 1980s symbolized the phenomena. Indeed the disadvantage of the US industry was evident since 1960s and US textile trade associations began lobbying to let the government restrain the inflow of import textile products. The effort resulted in an international agreement for textile trade regulations, namely the Multi-Fiber Arrangement and various bilateral agreements between US and the export countries.
    Meanwhile, in China, the rise of the textile industry was caused not simply by low labor cost alone but also assisted by close relations between Mainland and Hong Kong in terms of investment, production, and merchandising. Because of this rapid increase of production capacity, China exceeded its textile export quota, which was agreed between US and China, through illegal transshipment of textile products mostly via Hong Kong. The fact shows the difficulty of managed trade in competitive markets such as textiles. What was happening here was a struggle between US industries and Chinese companies in order to capture bigger market shares not by commercial competitiveness but by other means such as legal-political regulations and illegal exports. The result was trade friction between US and China.
    Then, through bluffings over trade sanctions and other means, US government pressured China and the Hong Kong authorities to reinforce their custom offices to eliminate the transshipment. It meant another trade regulation after the export quota system. But it was virtually impossible to eliminate the transshipment, because too many countries and companies were involved in the transshipment activities and easily changeable labels were the only means to confirm the original places of production. A punitive reduction of China's export quota by US government was also against the market trend of China's production increases. Therefore, like water overflowing from a filled dam, Chinese textile products continued to seek markets either through legal or illegal means.
  • 米中関係史
    宇佐美 滋
    1998 年 1998 巻 118 号 p. 149-165,L17
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This thesis examines the causes of diplomatic troubles between China and the United States over the Sino-U. S. Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy a greement concluded first during President Reagan's visit to China in 1984. At the time the U. S. government wanted good relations with PRC in order to compete with the Soviet threat under a very severe confrontational situation. At the same time U. S. electric businesses strongly needed China's vast market to sell their nuclear plants, because of the slump caused by Three Mile Island accident. Therefore, for those two reasons the Reagan administration was eager to conclude an agreement during his trip to China as one of his diplomatic achievements. But unfortunately the agreement initialed by both nations was a defective product. China's pledge not to proliferate the atomic devices, technologies and materials to irresponsible and dangerous third nations such as Pakistan and Iran was not clear enough to satisfy a suspicious U. S. congress. Press revelations that the pledge by China was not clearly stated in the agreement but rather vaguely stated in the words of the toast by Chinese premier Zhao during the welcome party held in the White House caused a sensation in the Congress.
    And the failure by the administration to give the full text of the agreement to Congress and to let the Ambassador Kennedy who negotiated the agreement to explain the process further aggravated the situation. The Reagan administration secretly tried to re-negotiate with the Chinese government but failed and was deadlocked by the hard-nosed Chinese refusal. Therefore, inept diplomacy and poor handling of the Congress and the high handed attitude of Chinese government combined destroyed the agreement. Later the effort to reactivate the agreement was revived and the agreement was enacted at the time of the visit by Chinese State Chairman, Li Hsian-nian in 1985. But before the agreement brought significant results, the Tiananmen Incident in June 4, 1989 destroyed the agreement again by the imposition of economic sanctions by the U. S.. Chairman Jiang Zemin's first official visit to the U. S. last year finally reactivated the agreement and paved the way for the U. S. atomic plant to the Chinese market. But behind such a change, were many factors: the end of cold war, China's reform policy, energy shortage caused by a economic expansion, environmental change, reevaluation of atomic energy as a clean source of energy, recognition of the technology gap with the U. S. and need for help from the U. S. Recognition of such elements prompted the Chinese government to make effort to comply with the international norm of nonproliferation by joining the Non-proliferation treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency, and Zangger Committee and by enforcing strict domestic control regulations.
  • アメリカ政府の政策過程
    西岡 達裕
    1998 年 1998 巻 118 号 p. 166-180,L18
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper treats the policy process of U. S. atomic diplomacy in 1945. During the Second World War, the United States was engaged in the development of atomic bombs. The project was treated as top secret, becoming public only when the first bombs were used against the Japanese. At that time a Presidential statement was supposed to be made.
    Even after the end of the war, however, President Truman declared no definite foreign policy regarding the atomic bomb. The reason was that during his stay in Potsdam he had judged cooperation with the Russians not to be practical at least in this matter. Truman and his Secretary of State, James Byrnes, decided to monopolize the bomb, anticipating that the monopoly would render the Russians “more manageable.”
    At the London meeting of foreign ministers held in September, Byrnes talked “with the implicit threat of the bomb in his pocket, ” a tactic that met with no success at all. Truman and some of his advisors started doubting the wisdom of Byrnes' atomic diplomacy. In October, Truman made it clear that the U. S. would undertake the problem of international control of atomic energy.
    In Washington, some opponents of Byrnes' diplomacy advocated approaching the Russians directly and more frankly, while Byrnes still wanted no approach at all. In November, Truman, who thought he must go forward but do so slowly, expressed his hope for atomic disarmament and proposed the establishment of an advisory commission within the United Nations Organization. This was the very step the opponents of Byrnes were most afraid of, because the Russians would regard it as a means to gang up against them. As was expected, the State Department repeatedly heard the news that the Russian people blamed the U. S. for threatening them with the bombs. In the end, the U. S. proposed another meeting of foreign ministers.
    Thus the Moscow conference was scheduled for December 1945 and a policy committee for the conference was set up. Draft proposals were elaborated, including a proposal for bilateral negotiations. At this time, both Truman and Byrnes realized the need for liberal proposals which could help build mutual confidence between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. But such proposals were not submitted to the conference, for American Congressional leaders were violently against them.
    In Moscow, the Russians agreed to the establishment of the U. N. Atomic Energy Commission. But they did so because they could ensure their veto power on any recommendations it might make. Despite the apparent success of the Moscow conference, the wheel of the nuclear arms race was rolling steadily by the end of 1945.
  • 上垣 彰
    1998 年 1998 巻 118 号 p. 181-187
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 三船(石川) 恵美
    1998 年 1998 巻 118 号 p. 187-189
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 中居 良文
    1998 年 1998 巻 118 号 p. 190-192
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 永綱 憲悟
    1998 年 1998 巻 118 号 p. 192-196
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 力久 昌幸
    1998 年 1998 巻 118 号 p. 197-202
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 黒沢 文貴
    1998 年 1998 巻 118 号 p. 202-205
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 渡邊 啓貴
    1998 年 1998 巻 118 号 p. 205-208
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 宇佐美 滋
    1998 年 1998 巻 118 号 p. 209
    発行日: 1998/05/08
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
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