国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
1998 巻, 119 号
選択された号の論文の20件中1~20を表示しています
  • 国際的行為主体の再検討
    大芝 亮
    1998 年 1998 巻 119 号 p. 1-10,L5
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Re-examination of the roles of states and transnational actors has become one of the major themes of international studies in the 1990s. There are three reasons for this: first, the possibility of war outbreaking between the great powers has greatly decreased in the post-Cold War period. It has caused a decline of states as major actors in international relations because the most important function of states had been to engage in wars. Second, the globalization of world market has also contributed to the decline in the role that states play in the world economy: the globalized market has pressured states to reform their domestic governance into global-standard ones. States are losing their power to adopt the domestic systems as they see fit. Third, as the concept of a global civil society becomes discussed more and more, academics as well as practitioners want to normatively examine the roles of states and transnational actors in the future global civil society.
    The following analytical viewpoints may be helpful to re-examine the role of states and transnational actors. First, actors in international relations should be analyzed from the three dimensions of politics, economy, and civil society rather than the dichotomy of “states vs. non-states”. Second, the interaction between actors and structures should be analyzed even in the analysis of actors. Third, the idea of “governance without government” can suggest a useful typology of various actors.
    Ten other articles are included in this volume of International Relations. The first two (Shotai and Sueuchi) deal with the relationship between regional organizations, states, and local authorities: Shotai undertakes a case study on Belgium while Sueuchi focuses on the case of British Columbia in Canada. Miyajima analyzes transnational networks of Chinese and Korean ethnic groups. The following two (Miyawaki and Shigemasa) focus on the relationship between international organizations and NGOs: Miyawaki deals with the UN and OSCE, while Shigemasa analyzes CSCAP. Oyane and Sakai examine the impact of transnational actors in the economy: Oyane investigates the role of the business community in US-Japan relations while Sakai clarifies the role of consumer groups in formulating an international agreement. The last three articles (Otsuru, Katsuma, and Yokota) analyze respectively the role and function of NGOs in democratic assistance, development, and environment. All of these articles examine the role of states/transnational actors, focusing on the interaction between systems and actors.
  • 国際的行為主体の再検討
    正躰 朝香
    1998 年 1998 巻 119 号 p. 11-25,L6
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    “Federalism” is a concept aiming to cope with both unity and diversity, while “federation” is a political system that realizes this concept. So far federation has been rarely dealt in the field of international relations, because federalization of a certain state has little influence on nation-state system. But federalization should have an important meaning in the development of the transnational integration. This paper aims to reconsider federation and subnational actors (federal entities) in the context of European integration.
    As Europe stepped toward integration, subnational actors (regions or local authorities) have gained more effect on the EU decision-making, for example, in the field of regional policy by establishment of the Committee of the Regions. This tendency is based on the “principle of subsidiarity”, which got widely noticed in the late 1980s and was expressed in the Maastricht Treaty. Subsidiarity has become an important concept for supporters of federalism movement in the European integration.
    In Belgium, four constitutional revisions have been made over thirty years to transform the formerly centralized unitary state into a federal state, as a solution for the serious conflicts between two liguistic groups, French-speaking and Dutch-speaking. The most important feature of the Belgian federal system is the existence of two different federal entities, that is “Region” and “Community”. The former is based on the territory and has its competence concerning regional economy, industrialization, environment, and so on, while the latter is related to language and culture, having its competence about education, language policies, and other personal matters. Moreover, Belgian subnational governments got the privileges to participate in the Council of Ministers of the EU concerning issues that relate to the competence of federal entities.
    Federalism and federation have more important meanings for international relations today. Federalization of a certain state causes an increase in the number of actors and makes the relations among actors more complicated and cooperative.
  • 国際的行為主体の再検討
    末内 啓子
    1998 年 1998 巻 119 号 p. 26-39,L7
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The field of international relations suffers from level-of-analysis problems in which researchers have faced great difficulties in integrating international, national and subnational politics. Our research interests in the field, however, encompass states, international institutions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which act beyond the lines dividing international and national politics. This results in transnational relations. It is now crucial that we understand the complex nature of international relations beyond traditional levels of analysis-international, national, subnational. Accordingly, studies need to integrate analyses on international institutions, states, and subnational actors.
    This paper attempts to overcome the levels-of-analysis problem by focusing on the economic policy of British Columbia (B. C.), as a non-state actor, in relations to Canadian foreign economic policy within Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Despite the fact that foreign policy belongs sorely to the federal jurisdictions, among the federal and provincial governments in Canada, B. C. has been the most active in developing cross-Pacific relations (i. e., trade, investment, and cultural relations).
    British Columbia, a province on the Pacific coast, historically cultivated relations within the Asia Pacific region. First, over years, a number of immigrants from Asia arrived in the province and established informal social cultural relations. As a result, business relationships developed between the province and Asia Pacific. Second, the Asia Pacific region includes the United States and Japan, the largest and the second largest markets for B. C. goods and services. Therefore, it has been essential for the B. C. economy to pursue business opportunities in the region of which it is a part. Third, B. C. has difficulties in expanding its relatively small markets within Canada due to the geographical distances to the markets of Central Canada and due to the competition with other provinces producing similar products. Foreign markets such as those in the United Sates and Japan are indispensable for creating jobs. Accordingly, the B. C. government pursues Asia Pacific markets, pressures the federal government for policies encouraging Asia Pacific relations such as APEC, and was willing to secure economic opportunities at the 1997 Vancouver APEC meeting.
    “The Asian Flu, ” the economic recession starting from the currency crisis in 1997, immediately resulted in some damage to the B. C. economy. The economic problems in Thailand and South Korea did not directly affect the B. C. economy. However, the recent recession in Japan substantially cuts imports from B. C. The province was more exposed to these Asia economic fluctuations in comparison with other provinces. Under the recession, B. C. pursues opportunities in the United States market under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and also carefully awaits recovery in the Japanese market. This is a two front strategy.
    This strategy focusing on APEC, which includes the United States and Japan, demonstrates how non-state actor such as a province locates itself within the Asia Pacific region and pursues a strategy within the domestic setting as well as within international institutions. Unless we take account of the B. C. transnational historical relations, it is difficult to explain why B. C. has been willing to develop relations within the region. Without explaining B. C. relations, it is also difficult to capture the nature of Canada-APEC relations. Under this situation, our research interests need to encompass APEC-an international organization, Canada-a state actor, and British Columbia-a subnational actor.
  • 国際的行為主体の再検討
    宮島 美花
    1998 年 1998 巻 119 号 p. 40-54,L9
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In the past, international relationships literally meant relationship among nations. In 1970s, the theory of Transnationalism insisted that more attention should be paid to the effects of transnational actors on IR. Today, intercivilian relationships on the global level have become much more complex and diverse than ever before. For example, in the Asian region today, the Ethnic Chinese are found residing in almost all the countries throughout Southeast Asia, and so are the Ethnic Koreans, though mainly in the Far Eastern nations.
    Thus the purposes of this paper is: first of all, to present an observation on these two ethnic groups: the Ethnic Chinese and the Ethnic Koreans, who are engaged in borderless international economic activities, backed up by each ethnic group's international solidarity deriving from each ethnic homogeneity, and then to make an unprecedented attempt at regarding these two ethnic groups as “transnational actors”, not as mere minority groups residing in each one of the Asian countries they inhabit. These two ethnic groups, play an important role of linking together many of the East Asian nations, each one of which uses different languages, has different cultures, and is in different stages of development, while they, at the same time, keep enhancing their own identities as the citizens of each nation in East Asia they have chosen to live in. In this sense, their activities have become a strong driving force to develop many regions of East Asia and conributed to creating economic interdependence among East Asian nations.
    In spite of such indispensability of these two ethnic groups' transnational activities nad roles in East Asia, the theory of Transnationalism have never been able to explain these two ethnic groups as transnational actors. This paper, therefore, will also discuss the reasons why the theory of Transnationalism has been unable to regard these two ethnic groups as candidates of transnational actors, and then will attempt to present a new perspective, which pays attention to the concept of identity.
    Until this day, the theory of Transnationalism has never been able to present discussions beyond the old definition of an “actor”. This paper will, therefore, argue that the old definition of an “actor” now needs to be reconsidered from the viewpoint of “identity”, in the hope that doing so will help enhance the discussion of non-state actors.
  • 国際的行為主体の再検討
    宮脇 昇
    1998 年 1998 巻 119 号 p. 55-69,L10
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In pursuing the effectiveness of implementation of human rights norms in international relations, it becomes increasingly important to research and perceive human rights NGOs activities. In this dimension, international regimes theory could deal with non-state actor, such as human rights NGOs. For example, Professor Virginia Haufler explaines that nongovernmental organizations can participate in regimes and play an important role to set standards of regimes. This article attempts to analyze the status of NGOs within regime theory, and the relation between the activities of NGOs and the development process of human rights regimes.
    In the light of the case study of the United Nations (UN) human rights regime, which has norms of various documents including Universal Declaration of Human Rights and has decision-making procedures including Commission on Human Rights, it is evident that in the process of regime formation we can find the prospects of making NGOs play important partners of state actors. But in the process of fixation process of regime, human rights committee excluded NGOs from reports and discussions of concrete situation of human rights violations. From the end of 1960's, NGOs' role to promote the effectiveness of regime norms is evaluated within the new decision-making procedures of UN human rights regimes. And, in my research, the UN human rights regime restricted domestic NGOs from joining the ECOSOC organs in accordance with the elimination of capabilities and speciality of NGOs, such as ex-category I, category II, and Roster. These classification of NGOs seems that states-actors influence human rights regime of UN bodies to restrict the influence of NGOs activities in the international dimensions of human rights.
    The CSCE (the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, now the OSCE) process had no evident rule to include human rights NGOs, so called Helsinki Group, within the CSCE human rights regimes, which left lots of such NGOs in the Eastern Europe and Soviet Union depressed. In the fixation process of the CSCE human rights regimes in the 1980's, NGOs had more and more networks to cooperate with each other. In the post-Cold War era, the CSCE found human rights NGOs more active in solving the conflicts violating human rights. The CSCE admitted human rights NGOs to their conferences, while making rules and procedures to include NGOs within the regime so that important information on human rights violations, especially ethnic conflicts, which are collected by NGOs should be readily available to them.
    In both cases I offer three suggestions. Firstly, when human rights regime varies from the fixation process to development process, regimes evaluate activities of NGOs. Secondly it goes institutionalization of regimes to let NGOs take part in regime-procedures in order to manage information of human rights violations and in the process of standard-setting. Thirdly the activities of human rights NGOs to investigate human rights issues, that is, to promote effectiveness of regime, become larger, in spite of the differences of formation process between UN and the CSCE.
  • 国際的行為主体の再検討
    重政 公一
    1998 年 1998 巻 119 号 p. 70-94,L11
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    One of the primary characteristics of contemporary security politics in the Asia-Pacific region is the intensification of emerging multilateral security cooperation mechanisms. These are comprised of both ‘track one’ intergovernmental and ‘track two’ non-official channels. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) are the most prominent of these channels and this article examines the roles and functions of the CSCAP as a mechanism facilitating second-track diplomacy. It suggests two theoretical foundations, which can be applied to evaluate the CSCAP's significance. Both “epistemic community” and “constructivist” theories of world politics are employed as appropriate frameworks.
    It has been argued that the effectiveness of second-track diplomacy is its informality and inclusiveness, allowing concerned parties to participate more easily in a dialogue on sensitive issues. They therefore serve as useful alternative for official diplomatic bargaining. In the Asia-Pacific context, the CSCAP, which takes a ‘participatory’ approach to regional security, is more inclusive in its memebership than the AKF, as it encompasses security-issue researchers at various institations. However, little effort has been made to apply theoretical suppositions relevant to the CSCAP expertise and to test them empirically. To do so may allow us to better illuminate why a more inclusive and participatory security mechanism could help facilitate multilateral security cooperation.
    This article emphasises the need to grapple with the ideational factors underlying this second-track diplomacy, namely the power of ideas, knowledge, and cognition. These factors can be operationalised by the application of epistemic community and constructivist approaches, neither of which should be treated as mutually exclusive. Both share ontological propositions which can be usefully applied in assessing the relative effectiveness of intersubjective understandings upon power, interest, and identity in international relations.
    The first section describes the membership, organizational framework, and the expected functions of the CSCAP, by drawing on that grouping's Charter adopted in 1993. The second component explores the two theoretical perspectives cited above and their relevancy in understanding the CSCAP. These two perspectives should not be uncritically applied, however, to the multilateral security discourse now emerging in the Asia-Pacific region. Critiquing both the epistemic community approach and the “third-image” constructivism approach, this section offers a synthesis between the two theoretical approaches, namely a “constructive epistemic community”.
    The third section examines the three variables required for the emergence of such a community. These are: (1) uncertainties; (2) interpretation; and (3) implications for institutionalization. To trace the development of the CSCAP since its inception in 1994 in an empirical context, the Australian CSCAP and the Maritime Cooperation Working Group will be employed as case studies.
  • 国際的行為主体の再検討
    大矢根 聡
    1998 年 1998 巻 119 号 p. 95-112,L13
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Undoubtedly, firms are actors in international relations. However, the degree of their presence as actors is not clear. The problem is how much impact firms have on the central actor, government or state, and how much influence they exert on international phenomena. This paper analyses this question through a case study of the semiconductor trade conflicts, especially the Japan-U. S. frictions. That is, it examines how Japanese and American firms-government relationships have shifted and influenced international governance over the semiconductor trade.
    The semiconductor trade developed under the GATT regime. The GATT regime was “embedded liberalism” and under common liberalism it approved some different firms-government relations of each nation. American firms and the government strongly supported free trade, which made their relationship weak. However, the Japanese firms-government relations were though their support for free trade was soft.
    In the late 1970s, when the Japanese semiconductor export to America had expanded rapidly, some American firms began to criticize Japan not only for the quantity of her export but also for its industrial policy assisted by the Japanese firms-government connection. Their influence increased by traditional coalition-building, lobbying, and offering of the new idea, the structural impediments in Japanese markets. This idea questioned the availability of the GATT regime. Then it increasingly penetrated into/through the American government, and the Department of Commerce connected it with the orthodox liberalism and convinced the free traders. In Japan, the power of the firms were restrictive, which permitted the Ministry of International Trade and Industry to lead them. To solve the struggle, MITI attempted to respond to the demands of the American side, by using the industrial policy type intervention. However, faced with opposition from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese government adopted more moderate intervention. Consequently, in July 1986 both governments introduced voluntary import expansion (VIE) as a “numerical target” and export price restraints (VER), and solved the conflict through the governmental interventions.
    These measures were also adopted between South Korea and the U. S., as well as Japan and EC, which was developed into sub-regimes. Thus, consequently, the composite trade governance was established in which the GATT regime and the sub-regimes coexisted. It at least had capabilities to keep the order in the semiconductor trades, with some managed outcomes, though partially.
    The Japan-U. S. conflicts recurred, disputing the extension of the agreements. As some Japanese and American firms were dissatisfied with the governmental interventions, both governments modified the agreements. VIE·VER sub-regimes were stabilized by the modification.
    In 1995, the issue of the renewal of the agreement arose again. With this background, the World Trade Organization (WTO) regime was created to strengthen liberalism, which dramatically enlarged firm-level cooperation between Japan and U. S. Japanese firms were willing to respond to this trend and suggested an idea of a new regime, “World Semiconductor Council”, which they attempted to achieve through a private diplomacy. MITI accepted the idea. It didn't mean that the government resigned its role, but instead it proposed a new governmental regime, “Global Government Forum”. In America, though firms maintained their power, the structural change fragmented their standpoints. As a result, the government could not take a clear stand. Accordingly, WSC·GGF sub-regimes based Japanese idea was constructed and the international trade governance was reorganized. The bilateral framework was practically diminished.
    The conclusion is that: in the field of high technology, firms' political influence, which made government policy and international governance chang
  • 国際的行為主体の再検討
    境井 孝行
    1998 年 1998 巻 119 号 p. 113-126,L15
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Guidelines for Consumer Protection were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1985. The Guidelines constitute a comprehensive policy framework outlining what governments need to do to promote consumer protection. They are designed for all governments, particularly those of developing countries be used in structuring and strengthening consumer protection policies and legislation. The International Organization of Consumers Unions (IOCU), which initiated the development of the Guidelines, had a strong impact on the establishment of the Guidelines, by making a triple coalition with the G-77's Representatives and the international bureaucrats of the United Nations. The IOCU's strategy was to recruit specialists and lobbyists in consumer protection from various consumer movements in different countries, mostly the U. S.. The IOCU succeeded in instituting the Guidelines in the United Nations through the strategy of resource mobilization.
    The IOCU has been working with specialists and lobbyists in the consumer movements since the IOCU gained consultative status in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1963. When draft Guidelines for consumer protection appeared in 1983, strong opposition came from the international business community and a number of industrialized countries, notably the American government. Then, the IOCU recruited the former special assistant to the American president for consumer affairs to persuade opposition groups, mainly the Reagan Administration. This intervention had a political impact.
    As the new transnational model explains, the domestic structures of the states and international institutionalization might be mediative factors to determine the ability of transnational agencies to bring about policy changes. However, the structural explanation does not address the issue of the motivation or power that transnational agencies need in order to effectively have a policy impact. The effectiveness of these policies will be determined by how well these agencies are able to mobilize their resources. Their success depends on the ability of movement organizations to garner support among politically powerful individuals. The consultative status in ECOSOC and the collaboration with Third World Representatives are important, but merely mediative, for the achieving of IOCU's goals. The decisive factor is whether or not transnational agencies such as international consumer movements succeed in mobilizing local resources.
  • 国際的行為主体の再検討
    大津留(北川) 智恵了
    1998 年 1998 巻 119 号 p. 127-141,L16
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    As an increasing number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are involved in international activities and the political influence these activities bring about becomes unnegligible, we are faced with a question of these private organizations' political accountability, not only on the recipient side but on the donor side as well. Among such organizations, we find a non-traditional category of NGO, called QUANGO (quasi-autonomous NGO), which operates independently of government but still is funded almost exclusively by government. One of QUANGO's characteristics is its positioning in between the state and the civil society. This combination of the public nature and the private nature makes QUANGOs double-faced actors, thus further complicates the question of their political account-ability.
    This article takes up the case of National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a QUANGO established by the U. S. government to specifically promote democracy wolrd-wide. NED is a private organization with an autonomous Board of Directers, but appropriated its fund from the U. S. government. NED was created partly to replace unpopular covert operations with open, private ones, thus avoiding the direct link between democratic assistance activities and the governmental role. NED's creation was also supported by the positive argument that democratization is best implemented by the initiative of the civil society.
    The development of NED until the end of Cold War showed that the positive use of private initiatives was overshadowed by the avoidance of government's accountability question. Congress actively approved democratic assistance fundings to NED, which just passed from NED to individual NGOs. NED Board could not have much control over these policy implementations, even though it was supposed to be an autonomous decision making body. The most obvious case was the assistance activity for Poland, among which more money passed through NED than autonomously decided upon. Some other assistance programs followed the similar procedural pattern. Such pattern gave an impression that NED was only nominally autonomous, but actually delegated governmental activities without political accountability.
    The end of Cold War and the wider acceptance of democracy at least on the surface, however, put an end to such negative utility of NED as QUANGO. QUANGO, in the end, is not a state actor, even though it was sometimes used as such. NED now faces a new challenge of justifying its very existance, but this seemingly ironic situation also makes a new opportunity for NED. Given its freedom from special interests, NED as a civil society actor can present that QUANGO is better positioned to autonomously balance the private interests of NGOs, thus introduces the concept of political accountability which is not necessarily enbedded in the civil society from the beginning. As the question of NGOs' legitimacy increases its importance, given their active involvement in international activities, what renewed mandate of QUANGOs may contribute to the civil society needs close attention.
  • 国際的行為主体の再検討
    勝間 靖
    1998 年 1998 巻 119 号 p. 142-155,L17
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper analyzes the influence of the U. S. NGO, the ACCION International, on the Bolivian government in changing its microenterprise finance policy. It explores how ACCION succeeded in establishing an unprecedented commercial bank in Bolivia in 1992, that is, Banco Solidario conducting solidarity group lending method in offering small credit to low-income people without collateral capacities. Examining the process of ACCION's transnational activities, this paper contributes to theories of the behavior of development NGOs in international relations.
    At the micro level where organizational decision-making is analyzed, ACCION was able to pursue its mission to assist the self-help efforts of the poor as a grass-roots support organization (GRSO), that is, NGOs assisting grass-roots organizations. Because of its organizational sustainability brought by the successful fund raising, ACCION could focus its activities on the obligatory action reflecting its cultural value as a voluntary organization.
    At the intermediate level where inter-organizational relations are analyzed, ACCION successfully built a coalition to influence the Bolivian government. First, ACCION established a counterpart GRSO called PRODEM in Bolivia, receiving funds from Bolivian influential bankers and other development organizations. PRODEM provided limited credit service as a non-financial organization, while seeking to establish a formal financial institution dedicated to offering full financial services to microenterprises. Second, within its framework to develop private sector in Bolivia, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) supported the activities of PRODEM and encouraged its initiative to establish Banco Solidario. Although ACCION was resource dependent on the USAID as a public service contractor, it was fairly independent from the USAID's political power. Third, international development organizations promised their equity investments in the new bank and pressured the Bolivian government to deregulate so that the establishment of Banco Solidario would be allowed. Therefore, ACCION's coalition building was effective in persuading the Bolivian government to reform its financial systems.
    At the macro level where organizational environment is analyzed, ACCION was fortunate to pursue the establishment of Banco Solidario during the period when neo-liberalism and the “Washington Consensus” were increasingly accepted by the Bolivian policy-makers. Because of this favorable policy environment, ACCION's activities were not resisted by the Bolivian government.
    This case study suggests that, when a GRSO is organizationally sustainable, it will be able to focus on its cultural value in order to pursue its social missions. The successful operation of PRODEM shows that establishing an intermediary counterpart GRSO is an effective tool to channel and amplify transnational influences to a specific country. Coalition building with relevant local and international organizations is important for policy change, but a GRSO may incur some resource dependence on other organizations that may exercise political power. Lastly, policy environment may become critical constraint for GRSOs in exerting transnational influences.
  • 阪口 功
    1998 年 1998 巻 119 号 p. 170-191,L20
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The epistemic community approach is prevalent in the analysis of global environmental issues. However, Litfin criticizes the approach and argues that it neglects the fact that politics incluences science just as science influences politics. As an alternative, she presents what she calls a discursive approach. Discourses are formed through interpretation of scientific knowledge and give, in turn, a concrete meaning to scientific knowldge. The discourses defined in this way, she argues, specify the policy domain, i. e., the domain of policy options. According to this approach, the dominant discourse plays an important role in regime formation.
    But, Litfin's discursive approach contains many problems and defects. Firstly, even though she insists that discourses delimit the policy domain in her case study of the ozone layer protection regime, she does not clarify the extent to which the discourses delimit the policy domain. Secondly, she failed to demonstrate how much influence the discourses have on actor's preferences and thus behavior. The purpose of this paper is to examine these issues which she left out from the discursive approach.
    First of all, I divide a process of global environmental regime formation into four stages: the knowledge formation stage; the discourse formation stage; the negotiation stage; and the decision-making stage. Then, I will demonstrate that factors such as scientific knowledge, discourses, interests and power have different influences depending on individual stages. As a case study, I choose the ivory trade regulation regime in Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). African Elephant had been listed in Appendix II and mangaed under the ivory export quota sytem (ITQS). But, because the elephant population continued to decline, they decided to list African Elephant to Appendix I (i. e., the ivory trade was banned) at the 7th COP (Conference of Parties) in 1989.
    The results of the analysis are the following. As far as the scientific knowledge is concerned (i. e., during the knowledge formation stage), there was no significant change in the population of the African Elephant between 1987 band 1989. Despite of the unchanged data (scientific knowledge), the recommendations of the expert groups of African Elephant had changed over time between 1987 and 1989. They recommended to just to tighten the ITQS in 1987. But, in June 1989, they recommonded totally to ban the ivory trade. Finally, they made recommendation to ban the ivory trade except for three Southern African countries at the 7th COP in October 1989. Scientific knowldge it self cannot explain such changes. As Litfin pointed out, the decision-makers accepts the scientific knowledge through discourses. And, the dominant discourse which is formed at the stage of discourse formation plays the role of delimiting the policy domain. In our case, the dominant discourse had shifted from the total ivory trade ban to the partial trade ban before the 7th COP, excluding the tightening of the ITQS.
    At the negotiation stage, three compromise proposals were presented. But, the copromise proposal based on the dominant discourse was rejected by Zimbabwe who demanded to exclude the eight Southern African countries from the ban for the sake of the regional solidarity. Finally, at the collective decision making stage, those countries which had strong preferences on the ivory trade issue casted their votes mainly on the basis of their primary (e. g., economic) interests. And, those primary interests were constituted irrespective of the discourses. As the result, the total ivory trade ban, which was far from the dominant discourse, was decided upon. The influence of deiscourses decreased dramatically when they entered into the negotiation and decision-making stages.
    Discourse has much explanatory power to delimit the policy domain. However, at the negotiation and decision-making stages, it failed to
  • 斎藤 聖二
    1998 年 1998 巻 119 号 p. 192-208,L22
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Japan's entry into World War I is often said to have been at the behest of its ally, Britain. The First World War began on 28 July and Britain entered the war on 4 August. Three days later, Britain requested Japan to remove the German fleet from Tsingtao (Qindao) in China as Britain wanted protection for its merchants ships sailing the coast of China.
    However, even before that, Japan had already begun to believe that it would become involved in the war after learning on 2 August that Russia, with which Japan had concluded an entente, would be going to war with Germany. The Minister of the Navy had sent an order to the commander of the Second Fleet to prepare for deployment. The “strategic plan” for the removal of the German fleet from Tsingtao was already being hammered out by the next day. The army also had begun preparing its own battle plans. From 4 August, the entire navy had already begun concrete preparations for fighting the Germans in Tsingtao. Preparations for the Second Fleet were completed along with those for the expeditionary force on the tenth day of that month. The request from Britain came when these preparations were already underway. It is, therefore, clear that Japan's entry into the war was not simply a result of the British request.
    The army, the navy, the bureaucracy of the Foreign Ministry and powerful politicians were all as eager to join the fight with Germany as the Foreign Minister. Leading politicians from the older generation and elderly statesmen (genro) were more cautious, but this proved to be more of an exception. It was the hope of the Foreign Minister and those that agreed with him that by chasing Germany out of China Japan would be able to establish hegemony over the Far East, strengthen its cooperative relationship with China, and furthermore, be able to improve its international standing by maneuvering to be one of the victor naitions after the war. Japan was given a concrete excuse for participating a war in Europe with the appearance of the British request. It is said that the Foreign Minister at that time tried to keep the genro out of the decision process. However, what was more important than anything for him was not the elimination of the genro from this process but to enter the war as quickly as possible.
    Until now, opposition voiced by part of the navy has been cited as evidence of the entire navy's reluctance to joining the war. However, it is not possible to understand the events after 2 August through that kind of interpretation. Furthermore, since the navy were busying themselves with plans forestablishing a central headquarters, it is difficult to say that Japan's entry in the war was a passive event. Although there was some disagreement among the genro and part of the navy, the Japanese-German war in Tsingtao was a war that was unanimously advocated by the cabinet and that was voluntarily started with the same purposes, ambitions and plans as any other war. The war did not happen because of coincidental request from a foreign government; the Japanese government was able to make use of the British request to further its own aims. Even if the Tsingtao war had not occurred, there can be little doubt that Japan would have taken on Germany at some point given Japan's intentions.
  • 田所 昌幸
    1998 年 1998 巻 119 号 p. 209-212
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 川端 正久
    1998 年 1998 巻 119 号 p. 212-214
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 末澤 恵美
    1998 年 1998 巻 119 号 p. 215-217
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 古城 佳子
    1998 年 1998 巻 119 号 p. 217-220
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 倉田 秀也
    1998 年 1998 巻 119 号 p. 220-223
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 児玉 昌己
    1998 年 1998 巻 119 号 p. 223-227
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 村島 滋
    1998 年 1998 巻 119 号 p. 227-230
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 大芝 亮
    1998 年 1998 巻 119 号 p. 237
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
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