国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
2000 巻 , 123 号
選択された号の論文の17件中1~17を表示しています
  • 川端 正久
    2000 年 2000 巻 123 号 p. 1-12,L5
    発行日: 2000/01/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    When African states gained their independence in the 1960s, it was hoped that the standard of living would begin to rise. But in fact, the opposite has happened. The news from Africa has been mostly bad. Africa is known as a continent in crisis. Brutal dictatorship, violence, corruption, civil war, refugee, famine—all these have been too common features of Africa. Africa is said to be a continent which depends for its survival on donor's development assistances and non-governmental organization's humanitarian supports. The theory, which is called Afro-pessimism, puts forward to explain the African crisis include the following—neocolonialism, poor leadership, corruption, nepotism, patrimonialism, tribalism, illiteracy, overpopulation, and disease.
    Though there are many obstacles and reasons, on the other hand, optimistic views are emerging. According to these views, Africa is a continent of bright hope, rich in natural and human resources. Factors of the Afrooptimism are the political democratization and economic growth, and the emergence of civil society. One kind of Afro-optimism is called an ‘African Renaissance.’ It is possible to paint a more hopeful picture of several pillars of the African Renaissance, which are the following.
    Firstly, political democratization is the main pillar. Popular movements have forced governments towards democracy. Secondly, a new generation of leaders is emerging. They hope that economic development will lead to better living standards and greater democracy. Thirdly, many countries are beginning to see real economic growth. The World Bank concluded that Africa's economic performance was improving. Fourthly, foreign investment and trade are growing in many parts of Africa. It is a new tendency that Asian investors are moving in African market. Fifthly, Africans evolve their own civil societies grounded on indigenous foundations. The civil society is an important factor in the democratization process. Sixthly, there are tendencies of resolution of conflicts by their own initiatives and means. Seventhly, regional economic cooperation is spreading.
  • 遠藤 貢
    2000 年 2000 巻 123 号 p. 13-29,L6
    発行日: 2000/01/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The focus of this article is recent development of arguments on the concept of ‘civil society’ in its African context. Although the concept has been used in a variety of contexts, there is no consensus about the exact meaning of ‘civil society.’ In this article, the main purpose is not to determine the content of ‘civil society, ’ but to exploit changing socio-political realities on the African continent by reviewing the transformation of discourses on ‘civil society’ in Africa in the 1990s.
    A French Africanist, Jean-Francois Bayart, first introduced this concept in African studies in the early 1980s. However, it was only at the end of 1980s that this concept was popularly used to refer to a variety of actors engaged in the process of democratization. Being stimulated both by democratization in reality and articles by Michael Bratton who emphasized the importance of studies concerning state-society relations in Africa in the coming age, there emerged several research projects related to the concept of ‘civil society.’
    In the early 1990s the concept of ‘civil society’ was adopted by donors in the policy documents of international organizations, who regarded the process of democratization necessary and wished to promote it through supporting ‘civil society’ against their historical experiences in the Western World. However, many African specialists have interpreted this as a sort of imposition of the Western version of civil society as ideology.
    A Nigerian scholar, Peter Ekeh, developed one of the counter-arguments against this neo-liberal version of ‘civil society’ above. He expanded the sphere of ‘civil society’ to the area so-called ‘primordial public, ’ where associations based on ethnic and ‘traditional’ identities are working. A recent argument developed by Nelson Kasfir shared a lot with Ekeh's in his definition of the concept of ‘civil society.’ Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz raised a criticism against the utility of the concept in the context of Africa, where the state and society are so intertwined.
    In conclusion, the following points were raised. The changing discourses of ‘civil society’ clearly showed us the transformation of both socio-political realities in Africa especially in terms of democratization and academic interests. Regarding the latter, some scholars' interests have changed from the state-‘civil society’ relations to social relations and creation of democratic values in the sphere of ‘civil society’ per se. This diversification of interests made the concept of ‘civil society’ more ambiguous. It is necessary for scholars to realize both the usefulness and danger surrounding the concept of ‘civil society.’
  • 佐藤 誠
    2000 年 2000 巻 123 号 p. 30-43,L7
    発行日: 2000/01/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    ‘The Third Wave’ of democratization worldwide finally reached the African continent in the 1990s. If democratization of the Third World is essentially the establishment of civil society (Kiichi Fujiwara), we could investigate the democratization of Africa by analysing the formation process of its civil society. The debate on civil society in Africa became popular in the 1990s, after the frustrations experienced by the structural adjustment policy of the World Bank and the IMF. Thus, some people argue that the role of civil society, and NGOs in particular, was consciously emphasised by the World Bank and the IMF which wanted to turn people's attention away from their failure.
    From the viewpoint of African indigenous societies state and capitalist economic system were both imposed from outside by European powers. In analysing civil society in Africa we first need to recognise this alienated character of state and economic system. G. W. F. Hegel clearly recognised autonomous character of civil society from state, and saw civil society as an arena for realising private economic interests. K. Marx followed the latter point and regarded civil society as bourgeois economic relations. In contrast, A. Gramsci differed civil society from ecnomonic relations, arguing that both civil society and political society constituted the state. In African debate J. -F. Bayart sees civil society as fundamentally confronting with state, while V. Azarya stresses cooperative relations between civil society and state.
    Some people like Kiyoaki Hirata stresses the ‘private’ character of civil society against the ‘public’ character of state. P. Ekeh argues that there are two publics in Africa, primordial public and civic public, and that dialectic relations between the two publics constitute African politics. His argument is important in that it indicates the existence of something ‘public’ other than state. Others like M. Bratton and M. Swilling put civil society somewhere between private and public. We could call this the third realm as ‘common’ realm, where civil society is situated.
    The roots of civil society organisations in South Africa date back to the Apartheid period. While white people enjoyed a liberal democratic system to a certain stage with various autonomous organisations within their community, various black organisations including trade unions, student oraganisations and civics were developed rapidly at the very end of Apartheid period. Since the establishment of ANC government in 1994 civil society has been officially recognised and has participated in the policy formulation process. Among various civil society organisations NGOs are most active, the number of which are estimated as between thirty and eighty thousand.
    Civil Society will continue to play an important role in South Africa. Yet, we also should recognise that diversification and stratification among various civil society organisations is now emerging. The corporatist negotiation system between labour, capital and state like NEDLAC even may have a danger of excluding poorer segments of the society, considering the fact that 43% of Africans are simply unemployed. It is a serious question for both state and civil society who will stand proxy for the poorest of the poor.
  • 望月 克哉
    2000 年 2000 巻 123 号 p. 44-59,L9
    発行日: 2000/01/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    A development agenda has been brought forward by the Bretton Woods institutions through the structural adjustment era. The concern for good governance is shared among donor communities as a key element which mediates between economic adjustment and political transition. It is believed to create a socio-political sphere in which the agenda will be operationalized. However, donors are skeptical for the performance of African states in pursuit of the agenda. Because they started under democratic constitutions and failed in keeping such institutional frameworks. They invited institutional decay, authoritarian rule, and the collapse of central authorities. African states were even more weakened through the structural adjustment process in the 1980s.
    The political impacts of structural adjustment are once more examined here. Sustainability of reform is depending on policy changes which facilitate new actors to get political benefits in society, and political support must be employed to balance those who lost from such policy change. Alternation of political actors occurred in various level of the society, though aspects are different from place to place. After the end of Cold War, transnational communications and transactions were extended and strengthened further in the world. These contributed to building common understandings and values for the global society. Human rights and environment al issues are two special fields of advancement. They sometimes generate strong political leverages for popular demands. As an example the Nigerian popular movement in the oil-producing region is described in detail.
    Cross-boarder activities are increasing in both the formal and informal sectors. In the African continent trans-nationalization of formal economic activities is still slow-paced. On the contrary informal transactions have been popular and continued for a long period. Political impacts of illegal activities are far more serious than expected. A built-in mechanism of corruption will lead to the criminalization of state agency itself. And such state system will nurture criminal organizations which commit transnational crimes like smuggling, drag-trafficking and money-laundering. Although positive development of transnational activities are welcomed, the negative side of trans-nationalization shall be watched with keen interest.
  • 井上 一明
    2000 年 2000 巻 123 号 p. 60-76,L10
    発行日: 2000/01/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this essay is to examine the regime transition; from authoritarian and socialistic to democratic polity and market orientated economy in African states on the basis of the arguments about “Globalizing Democracy, ” and “Global Democracy.”
    As David Held and Anthony Meagre show, today, goods, capital, people, knowledge, images, communications as well as crime, culture, pollutants, drugs, fashions and beliefs, readily flow across territorial boundaries. Transnational networks, social movements and relationships are extensive in virtually all areas of human activity. The existence of global systems of trade, finance and production binds together the prosperity and fate of households, communities and nations across the world. It might be possible to call these phenomena “Globalization.” It might be quite impossible for African states to avoid such wave as “Globalization” and “Globalizing Democracy” in the contemporary global situations even they try to do. In this situation, the hypothesis of my argument is that the wave of “Globalizing Democracy” or “Global Democracy” will lead the African states to political instability when they still can not establish the institutions. As a case study of this theme, Zimbabwe is taken up in this essay.
    External actors have been putting pressure on African states for the regime transition implicitly and explicitly since the end of Cold War. External actors, the IMF and the World Bank especially, and the donor countries, have been making effort to democratize their polity and liberalize their economy. But the rapid liberalizing economy will also deteriorate economic and social situations in African states. The Zimbabwean case shows that as a result of economic liberalization and democratization, the rich were richer and richer, and the poor were poorer and poorer. The social stratification has been accelerated drastically. After the rapid expansion of political participation, many political parties emerged but could not sustain themselves because of their institutional weakness. The people's interests were deserved and their frustrations accumulated. On the other had, the political parties could not articulate and aggregate people's interest. It led to social and economic disturbances and to political instability finally.
    African states are in the middle of “Globalization.” But if the rapid “Globalizing Democracy” is leading them to socio-economic disturbances and political instability, external actors will be required to accept their step by step reform from the middle and long term perspective.
  • 牧野 久美子
    2000 年 2000 巻 123 号 p. 77-90,L11
    発行日: 2000/01/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article examines the political roles of the Christian churches in South Africa under apartheid. In the context of the “civil society and democracy” debate, it is often argued that churches as constituent elements of civil society contributed to the democratization process which took place in many African states from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. Meanwhile, churches have often, implicitly or explicitly, supported undemocratic political regimes which can be described as “neopatrimonial.” As for South Africa, churches are said to have played a “prophetic, ” or “midwife, ” role in the anti-apartheid struggle and the following democratization process, yet it is also well-known that Dutch Reformed Church (Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk: NGK) supported apartheid and provided its theological legitimatization. This article tries to examine both the positive and negative sides of political engagement by the churches, with special focus on the internal dynamics of the churches.
    Though the strong influence of Christian ideals could be easily seen in the earliest stages of the African political movement, churches under apartheid did not take a strong oppositional stance for long. In the 1980s, however, as the anti-apartheid political movement became radical and the oppression by the state harsher, Christian organizations such as the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and the South African Catholic Bishops' Conference (SACBC) got deeply involved in the political struggle. Archbishop Desmond Tutu and other Christian leaders took the initiative in major political campaigns such as Standing for the Truth Campaign in 1988 and the Defiance Campaign in 1989.
    This apparent politicization of churches in 1980s has been often explained based on the schema of “Church versus State.” However, when we carefully examine ecclesiastical documents that have political importance, such as the Kairos Document of 1985 for example, it seems clear that the changes in church attitudes toward the apartheid state stemmed from strong sentiments held by Christian leaders that the South African church was in deep crisis; many people were leaving the churches because they were disillusioned with these churches, which did not stand firm against, or even supported apartheid.
    In other words, it can be said that it was the NGK's legitimation of apartheid on biblical ground that made churches change. In the theology of the NGK, or what the Kairos Document called “State Theology, ” apartheid was regarded to be the will of God and the anti-apartheid struggle was seen to be of the anti-Christ, for the Bible says “You must obey the governing authorities.” What the Kairos theologians condemned directly was not the apartheid state but the church based on State Theology. For proper understanding of the politicization of the churches, it is necessary to look not only at relations between churches and the state, but also at the internal struggles within the ecclesiastical circles.
  • 戸田 真紀子
    2000 年 2000 巻 123 号 p. 91-109,L12
    発行日: 2000/01/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this article, we will show the roots of ethnic conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Rwanda in 1994, 500, 000 to 1, 000, 000 people were murdered in about three months. Since the military coup d'état of October 21, 1993, Burundi is experiencing a genocide, too. Several dozens die every day. Hundreds of thousands are either in exile or are living under harsh conditions in camps inside the country. Too many people have lost their lives in Angola, Liberia, Congo-Kinshasa, Nigeria, Sudan and so on. Since independence, why have such a large number of ethnic conflicts taken place in Africa? We discuss three topics.
    Firstly, there are two myths that are obstacles to our understanding Africa properly. One is that pluralism in African states causes ethnic conflicts. It is not true. Much in Africa is quiet, stable, and functioning. Ethnicity itself does not necessarily generate ethnic conflict. We can see many cases that show peaceful coexistence of different ethnic group. The other is that there is ethnic antagonism since pre-colonial era and it causes ethnic conflicts. When the genocide started in Rwanda, most journalists explained it as the ‘tribal’ battle for ‘500 years’. Historical research shows this explanation does not work. The ‘Hamitic hypothesis’ is totally denied today. Ethnic identity is not eternal but changeable. In many cases ethnic nationalism we see today appeared in 1950s when African elites started to think ‘who governs the state’.
    Secondly, what causes ethnic conflicts in Africa is the collapsed state, not ethnicity. The mark of state collapse is the breakdown of law and order. The collapsed state is also controlled by a small privileged group coming from one region, one ethnic group or one clan. This group uses the state as a tool to get personal or group benefits. Their concern is not people's welfare, but how to divide the national cake. Even genocide is the last tactics for the privileged group to sustain their power. Systems that permit the control by one ethnic group or region, such as the system under the First Nigerian Republic, may result in ethnic conflicts.
    Thirdly, the international community has responsibility for the African conflicts. As to Rwandan genocide in April 1994, at least, France, Belgium, USA and UN are blamed for not attempting to prevent genocide, because they knew the preparation of genocide in 1993 or at the beginning of 1994 already. The Big Powers have supported dictators economically and militarily for a long time. The international community also has responsibility to regulate the considerable flow of small arms towards Africa.
  • 青木 一能
    2000 年 2000 巻 123 号 p. 110-126,L14
    発行日: 2000/01/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In the 1990s after the end of the cold-war, the African Continent has been covered by a current of political democratization and economical liberalization. It can be said that most African states have experienced a second independence because of these structual changes of potlitical and economical regimes. However, these structual changes have created social unrest and violent clashes between the peoples in many African states. As a result, Africa has had many internal conflicts in the 1990s.
    Therefore, the current spate of African conflict is precipitated by a crisis of political legitimacy in the African state, and the need to manage change and provide transition to a stable state with responsible and legitimate government. African leaders began to think in innovative institutions to manage the continent's challenges, particularly internal conflict. In accordance with them, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and a number of regional organizations in particular faced new challenges as Africans and others pressed them to take on more responsibilty for managing conflicts and the cosequent humanitarian crisis.
    In this article, I have tried to refer to the establishment and development of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) of the OAU. At the June 1993 summit in Cairo the OAU approved the creation of the mechanism which is oriented as an operational arm of the secretary general with the advice of the newly created Central Organ to provide legal authority between OAU summits. Since the establishment, this mechanism has worked for ten conflicts in Africa though its effects were not so functional and effictive because it has the many limitations of OAU charter, and scarce funding. Therefore, the mechanism has to resolve many problems in the near future. If African states are able to resolve them, its mechanism will be very functional and it is the most important institution for managing conflicts in Africa. The purpose of this article is to refer to the development and problems of the OAU mechanism for managing conflicts.
  • 鈴井 清巳
    2000 年 2000 巻 123 号 p. 127-142,L15
    発行日: 2000/01/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The fourth Lomé Convention is to expire in February 2000. To build a new relation between EU and ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries, the European Commission is busy preparing for designing the Post-Lomé Regime. When Lomé I was signed in 1975, it was called the “Symbol of International Cooperation, ” or “Model of North-South Dialogue”. But since 1975, international circumstances have changed fundamentally, that is the end of the Cold War and the drive of Globalisation, and both the deepening and widening of European integration has progressed very much. In addition, the bargaining power and unity of “The Third World” has declined or disappeared. In these situations, it is said that the Lomé Convention is out of date, so it should be reformed or replaced according to the new situations.
    There have been many discussions about Lomé. When Lomé I was signed, some critisized it ideologically as “Neo-colonialism” or “Neo-Capitalism”, while others appreciated its progressive devices for meeting NIEO doctrines, in recent years there has been a consensus that Lomé is a framework of EU-ACP relations. But there is another consensus that Lomé must be reformed, because it is said, the “Partnership” principle has been eroded by Conditionalities, “Democracy, rule of law, human rights, good governance”, or paternalism replaced partnership, or Lomé's role is only “richesse oblige”, or keeping the fundamental structure of Lomé intact seems the wisest available course because there appeared to be no alternative. My fundamental standpoint of view is that the European Union's policies toward developing countries, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, are essentially built in the EU's ultimate destination, “European Construction”, or Political Integration, which European decision-makers have stressed in various occasions. So, if Lomé is obsolete, Euro-African relations shall be reconstructed in a new fashion.
    The EU's preparation for designing its post-Lomé regime started in September 1998. The European Commission has released two Communications which are to be discussed. These are the “Green Paper” and the “Guideline”. The Guideline shows that global agreement or framework agreement are to be negotiated to 2000, and after that regional agreement will be negotiated from 2000 to 2003. In former negotiations idealistic principles, such as partnership, would be discussed. Though it is said that Africa is marginalized, Europe won't abandon the continent with unmeasured potentialities. Lomé will be reformed into plural, i. e., bilateral, multilateral, regional and sub-regional agreements, within the framework or overall agreement, which will lead Europe to further integration.
  • 森川 純
    2000 年 2000 巻 123 号 p. 143-160,L16
    発行日: 2000/01/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    To achieve the goals of political stability and economic reconstruction in Africa, both individual and collective self-help efforts by Africans themselves are essential. However, a considerable number of the problems Africa faces today have their historical origins outside the continent and the improvement or deterioration of the situation in Africa is closely linked to the behaviour of outside forces.
    African international relations must be considered in terms of their significant and real political implications. Japan's relationship with Africa must also be considered in that context. Although it is not generally known, Japan established its relationship with Africa at the beginning of the 20th century, mainly through the spheres of trade and commerce. Yet the expression once prevailed in Africa that “While China exports Mao Tse-tung's thought, Japan exports Sony and Toyota”. As an external actor in Japan's African international relations, Tokyo's position was considered minor even in comparison with China and India and certainly well behind that of Western Europe and the USA.
    An exceptional aspect of Japan's role was as one of the main backers of the white racist regimes from the middle of the 1960s which naturally brought about strong criticism both inside and outside of Africa. Tokyo's typical behavior was to quietly follow the European and American lead but this has drastically changed with the coming of the Post Cold war era. In 1993 (and 1998) Japan sponsored, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development. By organizing this conference in Tokyo, Japan was able to demonstrate to the outside world that it has the will and capacity to act as a global power for the stability and prosperity of the post Cold war world.
    This article aims to reveal the decision-making structure employed in Japan's. African policy, reexamine the historical development of Japan's African policy and clarify problematic aspects of Japan's past policy so that a mutually respectful and beneficial relationship can be established between Africa and Japan in the 21st century.
  • 中嶋 啓雄
    2000 年 2000 巻 123 号 p. 161-174,L17
    発行日: 2000/01/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    For more than a century and a half, the Monroe Doctrine, which championed civil liberty in the so-called “Western hemisphere” and asserted mutual non-intervention between the Old and New World, has been a crucial factor in making American foreign policy. To this writer's understanding, it somehow survived the end of the Cold War.
    Consequently, a large number of studies on the Monroe Doctrine have appeared in the field of American diplomatic history. Few of them, however, examined the implementation of the Monroe Doctrine right after its promulgation in 1823. None seems to have analyzed it fully.
    Therefore, this essay focuses on how the Monroe Doctrine was applied to American diplomacy in the 1820s, especially her policy toward Latin America. At the time, matters that related closely to the Monroe Doctrine came into question. They are: (1) a resolution in the House of Representatives introduced by Speaker Henry Clay supporting the principle of non-intervention (by European powers in Latin America) of the Monroe Doctrine; (2) overtures from Columbia, Brazil, and Argentina, each proposing an alliance or partnership with the United States against reactionary powers of Continental Europe; and, above all, (3) the first Pan-American congress (the Panama Congress) initiated by Colombian President Simon Bolívar.
    Contrary to the Monroe Doctrine, the United States government took a quite negative attitude toward these questions. The reason was that, even relating to Latin America, the United States, still a young nation, continued to adhere to the established isolationist policy which had been adopted in connection with Europe, because Latin America had been in the European spheres of influence. And also, in relation to the Panama Congress, the United States did not want to commit itself to Pan-Americanism led by Latin American countries owing to its desire of establishing hegemony in the Americas. The former style of American foreign policy may be named negative “unilateralism” and the latter style can be labeled positive “unilateralism.”
    Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the Monroe Doctrine was practically forgotten in American foreign policy. In that sense, the Monroe Doctrine may be called a “pledge without commitment.”
    The Monroe Doctrine, which had declared the United States to be a guardian of newly independent Latin American republics, was revitalized in the mid nineteenth century, when the United States committed itself to territorial expansion in the American Continent, excluding the influence of England and France. Later, it became what is called an “invented tradition” of American foreign policy when the United States, having become a global power, assumed a paternalistic but imperialistic posture toward Latin America at the turn of the century.
    The historical development of the Monroe Doctrine indicates that sometimes deeds have betrayed ideals in American foreign policy.
  • 竹村 卓
    2000 年 2000 巻 123 号 p. 175-194,L19
    発行日: 2000/01/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The conflict that occurred between Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 1955 was resolved through the O. A. S. The process of resolution of this conflict seemed to be the same as that of the conflict between these two republics in 1948. But the international environment surrounding these two conflicts differed very much. Why on the surface did they seem to be the same?
    There was a struggle between democracy and dictatorship in Central American and the Caribbean Basin area at that time. It was very difficult for the Eisenhower Administration to formulate and govern its' policies. Especially after the Guatemalan Crisis in 1954 when the intervention of the United States was very well known. In 1955, the Department of State under Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had to take sides with and support the legitimate “liberal and democratic” government of Costs Rica in consideration of the world-wide reaction.
    The conflict in 1955 showed the complicated structure of the international environment. In such an environment even the officials of superpowers including Secretary Dulles never have “free hands”. No one can dance alone in the world arena.
  • 浅野 亮
    2000 年 2000 巻 123 号 p. 195-204
    発行日: 2000/01/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 佐々木 雄太
    2000 年 2000 巻 123 号 p. 205-208
    発行日: 2000/01/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 木村 卓司
    2000 年 2000 巻 123 号 p. 208-211
    発行日: 2000/01/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 川崎 剛
    2000 年 2000 巻 123 号 p. 211-214
    発行日: 2000/01/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 川端 正久
    2000 年 2000 巻 123 号 p. 215
    発行日: 2000/01/28
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
feedback
Top