国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
2000 巻, 124 号
選択された号の論文の20件中1~20を表示しています
  • 国際政治理論の再構築
    田中 明彦
    2000 年 2000 巻 124 号 p. 1-10,L5
    発行日: 2000/05/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    International Relations Theory is in need of reconstruction. The end of the cold War is usually invoked to justify such need. But other factors are also relevant. First, the objects of IR studies are undergoing rapid changes: trends of globalization as well as those of anti-globalization, democratization and human rights protection, increasing activities of multinational organizations and NGOs, problems of “failed states” and persistance of civil wars, prospects of non-proliferation, traditional security as well as “human security, ” and so on. IR studies need theoretical frameworks to deal with such diverse phenomena. Second, academic debates conducted over the last two decades, mostly in North America, now appear to enter into a new, more productive phase of incorporating diverse ontological and epistemological approaches. The field could explore increasingly more diverse objects of study as discussed above with more open-mined viewpoints than in the 1980s when a narrow academic debates between “neo-realism” and “neo-liberalism” dominated the field. Third, theorybuilding activities in Japan is also in need of reconstruction mainly because theoretical gaps between Japanese IR studies and North American ones have been widened over the last two decades. While North American scholars were engulfed completely with the debates between neo-realism and neo-liberals and are now being challenged by the rise of constructivism, most theoretically inclined Japanese scholars paid relatively little attention to either trends of North American IR studies; their concerns were more to do with world systems dynamics and implications of decline of American hegemony. It is about time to narrow the gaps of academic concerns and start joint activities to reconstruct IR Theory. The following ten articles are all attempts to respond to such challenges.
  • 国際政治理論の再構築
    石田 淳
    2000 年 2000 巻 124 号 p. 11-26,L6
    発行日: 2000/05/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Constructivists conceptualize the ontological relationship between agents and social structures as follows: structures constitute and regulate agents through their intersubjective understanding while structures are created, reproduced, and possibly transformed by their practices. In this sense, agents and structures are mutually constituted. Arguing that the rationalist ontology of international relations fails to fully grasp the sociality of international relations, constructivists offer their account of the intersubjective basis on which peaceful change of global politics such as the end of the Cold War takes place.
    Constructivists claim that rationalism is weak in two respects. First, since rationalism, the Waltzian rationalist ontology in particular, views agents as ontologically prior to structures, it would be hard pressed to explain where the identity and preferences of an agent originate. Second, since rationalism neglects how interaction forms the identity of an agent, which in turn shapes its preferences, it would have difficulty in understanding the way in which international interaction generates and possibly change the preferences of an agent. However, as this articles reveals, the gap between the constructivist research agenda and their rationalist counterpart is not as wide as the constructivists' critique of rationalism would suggest. Indeed, it would be a struggle for the constructivists to show that the analytical scope of their ontology fully encompasses that of the rationalist ontology.
  • 国際政治理論の再構築
    三浦 聡
    2000 年 2000 巻 124 号 p. 27-44,L7
    発行日: 2000/05/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The last quarter century has witnessed a rising scholarly interest in international institutions. Various reviews of the study have identified several schools of thought. Popular among them is a variable-focused typology: power, interests, and ideas, which in turn produces a neorealism-neoliberalism-constructivism trilogy. Also widely accepted is a distinction based on ontology, epistemology, and methodology, the schism of which is between rationalism and constructivism.
    While building on these works, I pose different questions: How can we conceive of actions and institutions, and how are we to characterize and explore the relationship between them? I would argue that we can answer them in three ways, namely, instrumental, deliberative, and cognitive approaches to international institutions. Appropriating insights of “new institutionalisms” in social sciences, I develop these approaches by explicating three faces of concepts such as rationality, interaction, communication, decision-making procedures, compliance, interests, and ideas.
    Relying upon the logic of consequentiality, instrumentalists focus on actors' calculation and ask how institutions intervene in the process. Actors live under uncertainty so that exchange of private information becomes an important aspect of strategic interaction. They regard institutions as various types of information and as procedures for aggregating various interests. Institutions are only one among many instruments, and actors utilize them as long as they serve their own interests.
    The deliberative approach adopts the logic of appropriateness and argues that actors match their choices not with expected consequences but with situations they find themselves in. Actors live in a world of multiple and potentially conflicting roles and rules. Appropriateness of actions, therefore, can be contested so that common standards need to be established in the process of deliberation. Consensus constitutes the basis of communicative action. Actors can change their conception of appropriateness—norms and rules—while transforming their own conception of interests and identities through socialization. Institutions construct the practice of deliberation, serve as reasons for action, and situate deliberation within the overall decision-making process.
    Cognitivists, with the logic of orthodoxy, explore how actors perceive the world as they know it, and argue that institutions make social cognition possible. Actors live under an ambiguous world. As templates for cognition, schema, scripts, frames, and symbols enable actors to divide the world into many components, to categorize and classify themselves to formulate their identities, and to make the world meaningful. Actors can strategically appropriate these templates from the “cultural toolkit” and construct historical narratives, through which they transform the tools themselves.
    I conclude with considering some implications of this typology for the furure of theories of international institutions. I propose that we should view rationality as “embedded, ” and inquire conditions under which a particular mode of rationality is dominant. Also, I suggest a need for elaborating and expanding the “theoretical toolkit” presented herein.
  • 国際政治理論の再構築
    土山 實男
    2000 年 2000 巻 124 号 p. 45-63,L8
    発行日: 2000/05/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Thucydides has been considered as the father of the realist theory of international politics. Most realists believe that the phrase in the Melian dialogue in his History of the Peloponnesian War—“The strong do what they can and the weak must suffer they must”—is the essence of realist theory and was Thucydides' own position.
    This article tries to rectify such a view of Thucydides. I shall present a more nuanced view of his History based on the studies of the late Professor Michitaro Tanaka, the expert on Greek philosophy in Japan, and Professor Masaaki Kubo, who is one of the best Japanese translators of Thucydides, as well as on recent researches which have appeared mostly after the end of the Cold War, conducted by international relations specialists.
    Special attention is paid to four incidents in History, namely, the Mytilenaean debate, the Pylos incident, the Melian dialogue, and the Sicilian expedition. Between the incidents at Pylos and Melos, I shall argue that Athens gradually lost prudence, and became “fundamentalist”, to use Michael W. Doyle's word. At Melos, Athens reached “the last level of intellectual sclerosis” (Kubo), and the result of sclerosis was the tragedy of the Sicilian expedition in which Athens lost more than 60, 000 soldiers, including Demosthenes and Nicias. Then, the question is why Athenians lost their realistic eyes in international affairs. I shall present two answers: from a short term perspective, the accidental success at Pylos led Athens to expect more success to follow, and from a long term perspective, the fear of the consequences of loss led Athens' leaders to take overly ambitions actions.
    Considering the History in this regard, I believe that Thucydides was critical of Athens' behavior at Melos, contrary to the view conventionally held. In the end, I identify Thucydides with the line related to “defensive realism, ” i. e., the Thucydides-Rousseau-M. Wight/J. Herz-R. Jervis/R. N. Lebow line, not the Thucydides-Machiavelli-Hobbes-Morgenthau-K. Waltz line. I find that in the History his logic went well beyond realism. Though I still believe that realism is going to remain in the mainstream of international relations, the logic of realism in the 21st century should be reconstructed in line with the “Thucydidian realism” presented in this article.
  • 国際政治理論の再構築
    岡垣 知子
    2000 年 2000 巻 124 号 p. 64-88,L9
    発行日: 2000/05/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The essay seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the international thought of Thomas Hobbes by reexamining his Leviathan and by reevaluating his views on human nature, war, and international relations in light of the current theories of international politics. Although in the study of political theory Hobbes has been most commonly known as a precursor of liberalism, advocating the right of self-preservation of individuals, his political thought has long been regarded as belonging to the “realist” paradigm in the field of international politics, which has been considered as contending with the “liberal” paradigm. One of the objectives in the essay is to fill in this gap that exists in the interpretations of Hobbes between political theory and international politics.
    The typical interpretations of political thought of Hobbes as “realist” in international politics are: 1) Hobbes considers war as a lasting feature of international relations; 2) Hobbes takes a pessimistic view on human nature as endlessly seeking power after power; 3) Hobbes applies the analogy of the state of nature to international relations. The essay argues that Hobbes' “war” simply means the conditions where peace cannot be guaranteed in the long term, and therefore, should not be taken literally, that Hobbes is rather an optimist especially with regard to the potential of human reason that could work toward peace by agreeing to establish “Leviathan”, and that his analogy of the state of nature applies to the individual state behavior, but not necessarily to international relations.
    The prevalent misunderstanding of Hobbes in the field of international politics is at least partly attributed to the tendency to regard realism and liberalism as dichotomous theories of international politics, which exaggerates the realist aspects of Hobbes to the last degree. A more careful reading of Hobbes reveals more optimistic, moralist, liberal, and peace-loving components in Hobbesian political theory than are currently recognized. This leads us to conclude that a coherent, clear “Hobbesian paradigm” is difficult to establish in the study of international politics. Rather, his contributions to the theories of international politics have been sporadic, though undoubtedly important.
    What we owe most to Hobbes are his deductive methodology and his insightful political concepts such as the relativity of power, the notion of time, and his rational egoistic image of a state, which still provide us with useful fresh tools of analysis in today's international politics. We should also note, however, that the historical context in which Hobbes lived limited him to focusing mainly on domestic politics. His image of international relations in Leviathan is at best a primitive, dynastic one, where no clear distinction between international and domestic politics is made. Hobbes lived in a historical period where the notion of international system had yet to exist.
  • 国際政治理論の再構築
    篠田 英朗
    2000 年 2000 巻 124 号 p. 89-107,L11
    発行日: 2000/05/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This papers aims to illustrate the implications of constitutional thoughts in light of the changing nature of state sovereignty in international relations. In so doing, it takes a theoretical and historical approach to the problem of state sovereignty, while examining divergent literature in the field of international relations, international law and political theory.
    The paper claims that the concept of state sovereignty has been transformed according to changes in domestic as well as international society. Constitutionalism is one of the major political thoughts which have affected the concept of sovereignty, although the discipline of international relations has paid little attention to the topic. This paper identifies constitutionalism as a political tradition often expressed in the term “the rule of law.” It represents a political view according to which there is a higher set of norms above political power. This does not necessarily require the existence of a written constitution. Constitutionalists are usually skeptical about any form of “the rule of man, ” but do not go so far as to abolish sovereignty completely. They believe that sovereignty should be subject to a higher law. This tradition explains political history in Britain after the Glorious Revolution, as well as the discussions on the establishment of the United States concerning the doctrine of divided and limited sovereignty. This tradition of constitutionalism characterized by its commitment to the rule of law may be found in the international field too, which the scholars of the English School tried to prove by referring to “the Grotian Tradition.”
    International constitutionalism strongly arose among Anglo-American intellectuals after the First World War. However, their tendency that pointed to the establishment of an international government was destined to be betrayed by reality. This paper argues, following the English School scholars, that the presupposition predominant among interwar scholars was “the domestic analogy.” The failure of international constitutionalism in the interwar period was a result of the analogy between men and nations, between domestic and international society, that must lead to the extremely difficult attempt of establishing a world government. It is no wonder, therefore, that current critics of realism and sovereignty avoid talking about any form of world federation.
    This paper then claims that a new form of international constitutionalism in the present era does not hold the domestic analogy, but rather tries to implement human rights and other traditional constitutional values directly. The paper discusses the norms of jus cogens in international law and the discourses on global civil society as examples of such a new trend. The former shows that there is a higher set of international norms binding upon sovereign states, which is more or less derived from traditional values of constitutionalism. The latter illustrates that the limitation of state sovereignty in international society is based on the distinction between the spheres of the state and civil society, which is the very foundation of constitutionalism.
  • 国際政治理論の再構築
    青井 千由紀
    2000 年 2000 巻 124 号 p. 108-122,L12
    発行日: 2000/05/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this thesis is to offer a theoretical explanation of humanitarian intervention, and to examine the legitimacy of such actions. This thesis will argue that humanitarian intervention can be explained by the co-existence of two systems of legitimacy for state actions: Ethical Legitimacy, and Power Legitimacy. Ethical Legitimacy is the legitimacy of state actions based upon human rights and humanitarian concerns. Power Legitimacy is the legitimacy of state actions based upon the geo-strategic concerns of sovereign states. It will be argued that through the practices of the UN Security Council in the post-Cold War era, which allowed for reinterpretations of the UN Charter provisions, it has become permissible for states and the UN to intervene in internal humanitarian crises, overriding sovereignty. Yet, the imperatives of ethical legitimacy are both reinforced and challenged by those of power legitimacy, which determine the political processes of intervention.
    This thesis also puts forward a procedure-oriented assessment of the international legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. As a result of ethical legitimacy being strengthened, humanitarian intervention has become permissible at the level of principles, while the legitimacy of intervention tends to be more frequently determined by procedural issues—the political process of decision-making, the procedure of intervention and its effectiveness.
  • 国際政治理論の再構築
    宮岡 勲
    2000 年 2000 巻 124 号 p. 123-136,L13
    発行日: 2000/05/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article first addresses the complex concept of norm legitimacy. For the question why states comply with international norms, neorealism attributes compliance to the unilateral imposition or threat of military and economic sanctions, while neoliberalism focuses on norms' economic functions of, for example, reducing transaction costs. These rationalistic approaches contrast with a reflective approach in which the concept of norm legitimacy serves as a measure of how strongly norms pull states to voluntary compliance without depending on force or self-interests. In this article, drawing on Beetham's work, I advocate that the concept of norm legitimacy be understood in the intersubjective contexts of ethical values, scientific views, legal validity, and consent by a majority of states in the international community.
    Under an analytical framework of ethical, scientific, legal, and political legitimacy, this article then examines Japan's response to an international prohibitionary norm against large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing during the period from 1989 to 1991. First, Japan did not see the norm ethically legitimate. On the one hand Japan embraced the conservation value that allowed catching creatures sustainably that did not face extinction or threat of extinction. On the other hand the prohibitionary norm reflected the preservation value that called for the maximum protection of marine mammals and sea birds. Second, Japan publicly contested the scientific legitimacy of the global driftnet moratorium. Scientific uncertainty allowed Japan and the United States to take opposing interpretations. Third, Japan did not contest the legal legitimacy of the norm, which emerged out of the Law of the Sea regime, since there were no specific provisions for or against the ban on fishing gear. Fourth, Japan decided to comply with the norm in late 1991 when it became certain that the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) would adopt a resolution by a large majority to recommend the cessation of high seas driftnet fishing.
    This article also briefly pays attention to the normative force of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions. From the above limited case study, it could be argued that political legitimacy is an important factor in norm compliance when there is neither ethical, scientific nor legal agreement with regard to the legitimacy of the norm in question. In this sense, the UNGA is a global forum to generate the “general will” of the international community. One of the possible propositions withdrawn from the above case study is that a state will not vote against a UNGA resolution if it finds no or only a few other countries will do so. According to Marin-Bosch'es research on votes in the UNGA, however, one to three negative votes were cast in the twelve per cent of the resolutions adopted between 1946 and 1996. This article briefly tries to explain this anomaly.
    Finally, this article concludes by pointing out that states and norms affect and even constitute each other. States tries to institutionalize international norms at an international organization for a political purpose: legitimizing their own behaviors and delegitimizing those of other states. On the other hand, international norms, once institutionalized in the international community, affect state behavior by reminding policymakers of a sense of political obligation as a member of the community. A norm, after its institutionalization, also becomes a constitutive norm: a standard of behavior to locate states “in” or “out of” the international community. Taking this view, I regard the rationalistic and the reflective approaches to international relations as complementary rather than alternative.
  • 国際政治理論の再構築
    大庭 三枝
    2000 年 2000 巻 124 号 p. 137-162,L15
    発行日: 2000/05/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Since Erikson theorized the concept of identity in psychology, it has been applied to other academic fields such as sociology and political science. Especially in the 1990s, identity theory has been introduced to IR theory and much academic writings has argued on the importance of the concept of identity in international relations from several viewpoints. The purpose of this article is to develop a frame of reference to the concept of identity in IR theory.
    This article, firstly, tries to clarify what “identity” means. “Identity” means the contents of self-identification—one's thinking about “what I am” or “what we are”. About the concept of identity, there are two important points. The first point is that other members in the society should recognize one's insistence about his/her own self-identification. Without the recognition by other members in the society, one's self-identification is only equal to his/her self-image. The second point is that the definition of “I” or “we” simultaneously defines “the other” and the difference between “I”/“we” and “the other” tends to be emphasized.
    Secondly, this article surveys literature focusing on identity in international relations in the 1990s, for example, arguments by Wendt, Katzenstein, Campbell, Neuman and others. Then it points out that most of them overlook the existence of “double contingency”. For meaningful arguments over “identity”, “double contingency” should be considered and possible gaps between one's perception about the content of self-identification and the other members' should be explicitly dealt with. When such gaps exist over one's self-identification, he/she often falls into “identity crisis”. The above arguments hold true with respect to collective identity.
    Finally, this article takes Japan and Australia as examples of identity crisis in international society and describes how national leaders and intellectuals have tried to overcome such crises.
  • 国際政治理論の再構築
    山田 敦
    2000 年 2000 巻 124 号 p. 163-177,L16
    発行日: 2000/05/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    How does economic globalization affect nation-states and international relations? This heated controversy has entered its third stage. The first stage was dominated by those studies that emphasized the uncontrollable world market forces and the inevitable decline of the state. Counterarguments soon emerged at the second stage, which asserted that globalization was just a myth and that the state had not become impotent but rather had expanded its roles. Today, at the third stage of the debate, the central issue is shifting from the decline-or-not type of question to a more nuanced one. Many studies today emphasize both the changes and continuities of the state. They see the state transforming itself, diminishing some parts of its functions and roles while maintaining or even increasing others, in order to adjust to the changing circumstances in an era of globalization. A major task at this stage is to specify which parts of the state are changing toward what directions, and why.
    This article offers a parsimonious theoretical model which explains how the state is now transforming itself in the realm of technology policy, pushed by technological globalization. Its main claims are threefold. First, the technology policy of major nations today is moving toward “neo-technonationalism” which is a hybrid of the old techno-nationalism and technoglobalism. Neo-techno-nationalism is a manifestation of how the state is currently adjusting itself strategically in order to promote technological innovation more efficiently, in an increasingly integrated and competitive world.
    Second, neo-techno-nationalism is rising because of the “glocalization”—the coevolution of globalization and localization—of technology. For a better understanding of state transformation, it is necessary to see the effects of both globalization (global diffusion of technology) and localization (local accumulation of technology). The two forces are dialectically changing the international political economic circumstances in which states are competing and cooperating with each other.
    Lastly, in constructing a theoretical model which connects the rise of neotechno-nationalism (the dependent variable) and the development of glocalization (the independent variable), we can specify which part of the state's roles in promoting innovation is shifting toward what direction and why. The model of this article advances a set of hypotheses that explain the logic and the direction of four general changes in the state's roles, showing how “glocalization” is working as a strong driving force for overall state transformation.
  • 国際政治理論の再構築
    瀬島 誠
    2000 年 2000 巻 124 号 p. 178-194,L17
    発行日: 2000/05/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The end of the Cold war poses a number of theoretical questions about the international order. The computer simulation put forth in this paper examines whether and how an international order emerges in a chaotic international system.
    This simulation uses an international system of six by six countries. In each turn, every country plays games with neighboring four countries. A country uses one strategy selected among eleven strategies. In the same way, each country has its preferred game matrix, selected among seven game matrices. In a game between two given neighbors, the game uses a single game matrix chosen between the two game matrices of the two competing countries. The accumulated absolute gains of each country determine which game matrix to be chosen: As one country becomes more powerful, the chance becomes higher for the matrix of the country to be used in the game. After a certain number of turns given as a parameter, countries review the past performance of the strategy and the game matrix, in terms of the criteria set in the simulation. There are two types of countries, absolute-gains (AG) seekers and relative-gains (RG) seekers, and they use different criteria, absolute gains and relative gains, respectively. Sometimes they shift the strategy and/or the game matrix if they deem it necessary to do so in order to improve or to defend their positions in the system.
    Below are some of the findings in this simulation. Our common sense proved true: as the number of AG seekers decreases, so does the population of “nicer” strategies. Yet, sometimes it did not. Though another tournament predicted that weaker strategies, such as “tit-for-tat” and “alwayscooperate, ” would exterminate in all RG game, the result was that such weaker strategies remain unperished. The most striking in the simulation was that in all RG countries system coordinative game matrix has become predominant in the end. The population of coordinative game decreases as the number of AG countries decreases until the AG population reaches ten percent in the system. In all RG systems, however, the population of coordinative games increased and counted 28% in the system, followed by chicken games (18%), prisoners' dilemma games (14%) and deadlock games (10%). This outcome is contrary to the prediction of mainstream IR theories, and needs to be explained. One of the reasons for this anomaly might be related with an interesting finding that more powerful countries prefer coordinative games, and that such “coordinative” countries tend to be located side by side. This latter point might imply that some “regional orders” of coordinative games emerge in a chaotic world of all RG seekers.
  • 一八四〇年代後半のイギリス外交と長老政治家
    君塚 直隆
    2000 年 2000 巻 124 号 p. 195-208,L18
    発行日: 2000/05/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    After the February Revolution in Paris in 1848, a Provisional Government, headed by Alphonse de Lamartine, was set up, and proclaimed a new republic. His first desire was the complete development of the alliance with Britain and her assistance that would give advice to the Northern Three Powers (Austria, Russia and Prussia) not to embarrass the pacific course of the French government by any hostile demonstration. On the one hand, Lamartine asked Lord Palmerston, British Foreign Secretary, to be a balancer between France and the three Powers through the British Embassy in Paris. However, on the other hand, he implored the old Duke of Wellington, seventy-eight at the time and had already retired from the forefront of British party politics, to recognise the spirit of the Revolution and also the legitimacy of the provisional government through his own message or letter directly. Why did the head of the revolutionary French government choose a ‘General of the past’ as a key person of European international politics in the age of serious revolutions?
    This article indicates the complexity of British party politics in the second half of the 1840s and also her feeble diplomatic position in European international relations on that same time by investigation of the political character of the Elder Statesman.
    Following the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, both the Conservatives and Whigs were fragmented and split into several groups. Thereafter, Lord John Rusell, the Whig prime minister, often consulted Wellington upon various subjects, and even asked old Duke for help to maintain his own government when he had to encountered a serious censure at the House of Lords, over the Portugal question in June 1847, for Wellington had enormous power and influence in court, parliament, and the Conservative Party even after his retirement from the leadership of the House of Lords in June 1846.
    Simultaneously after Palmerston returned to the Foreign Office in June 1846 there was an immediate deterioration in relations with France over the Spanish marriage question, and have compelled Guizot, the French Foreign Minister, to make his peace with Metternich, the Austrian Chancellor. For instance, when a serious dispute had broken out in Switzerland from 1846, though Palmerston suggested an international conference, all the other European Powers ignored his advice and interfered on the Catholic side. Therefore, until the February Revolution broke out in Paris, British diplomatic role as an European balancer deteriorated and Palmerston was driven into the ‘unsplendid’ isolation.
    Under these conditions Lamartine had to find some other person whose opinion expressed ‘that of true majority of the aristocracy and people of England’ from whom the French public could receive whose letter as ‘a guarantee for peace and future security’ and also who had great ‘influence at Vienna, Petersburg and Berlin’. Such a great person was not Queen Victoria or Lord John Russell, but the old Duke of Wellington.
    Wellington represented ‘Great Britain’ at the time of the dual crisis in and out of that country when party politics was confused and the Vienna Settlement was undermined in the latter half of the 1840s.
  • 都丸 潤子
    2000 年 2000 巻 124 号 p. 209-226,L20
    発行日: 2000/05/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper examines how and why the rapprochement of Malaya and Japan after WWII occurred relatively swiftly, despite the legacies of Japan's wartime occupation. The rapprochement began in trade, and developed through Japanese participation in Malayan iron mining and Japan's accession to international organizations such as ECAFE, Colombo Plan and the GATT. It eventually reached the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations following Malayan decolonization. Most of the existing literature on postwar Japan's relations with South-East Asia focuses on the American cold war strategy to keep Japan anti-communist. By looking at Malaya that had been under the British imperial control until the end of the 1950s, this paper attempts to shed a new light on the role of Britain and her Asian policy in facilitating the Japanese return to South-East Asia.
    Though having helped the early resumption of Malayo-Japanese trade, the British, especially the Board of Trade officials and Lancashire industrialists, came to oppose the rapprochement in almost every form, out of fear of Japanese competition in their South-East Asian stronghold. However, by the autumn of 1954, their opposition was gradually overcome by recognition that Britain was unable to assist Malayan development entirely on its own, with her tight manpower and finances stretched worldwide. The British authorities also recognised the urgency of Malayan development as a part of their programme of smooth decolonization which would preserve as much British influence as possible. Here, the British officials in Malaya and Japan played an important role in persuading their metropolitan colleagues to admit Japan's participation in Malayan development to shoulder British imperial obligations.
    Meanwhile, Japanese premiers such as Yoshida Shigeru and Kishi Nobusuke saw closer relations with Malaya as one means of breaking free from the deference to the United States in economic reconstruction and regional foreign policies which dated from the Allied Occupation. They also wanted Japan to be welcomed back to international society by the Asians without being seen as an American pawn. They thus embarked on a new South-East Asian policy in closer cooperation with Britain.
    The Malayan leaders, gaining authority as decolonization proceeded, saw Japan as a new Asian partner and model in their efforts to secure complete independence from Britain. Especially, the Federation of Malaya's first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and Kishi played important roles in completing bilateral diplomatic rapprochement by 1961. However, not all outstanding issues between Malaya and Japan were settled in the rapprochement process as the so-called ‘blood debt’ issue arising from Japan's wartime occupation reveals thereafter. The continuity in prewar and, postwar Japanese involvement in Malaya in terms of personnel and their interests also seemed to leave Malayans suspicious about Japanese intentions.
  • 飯田 敬輔
    2000 年 2000 巻 124 号 p. 227-231
    発行日: 2000/05/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 野上 和裕
    2000 年 2000 巻 124 号 p. 231-234
    発行日: 2000/05/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 土佐 弘之
    2000 年 2000 巻 124 号 p. 234-238
    発行日: 2000/05/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 宮下 豊
    2000 年 2000 巻 124 号 p. 238-241
    発行日: 2000/05/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 芝 健介
    2000 年 2000 巻 124 号 p. 241-244
    発行日: 2000/05/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 高原 孝生
    2000 年 2000 巻 124 号 p. 244-247
    発行日: 2000/05/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 田中 明彦
    2000 年 2000 巻 124 号 p. 248
    発行日: 2000/05/12
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
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