国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
2000 巻 , 125 号
選択された号の論文の18件中1~18を表示しています
  • 「民主化」と国際政治・経済
    恒川 惠市
    2000 年 2000 巻 125 号 p. 1-13,L5
    発行日: 2000/10/13
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The end of the Cold War contributed to the heightening of interest in democratization among the students of international politics and economics. This is not only because the demise of the Russian and East European regimes strengthened the ideological hegemony of Western democracy but also because an increasing number of national and international actors came to get involved in the process of democratization in the developing and transition-economy countries.
    However, the actual effects of such involvement have been much less than expected as demonstrated by the cases of Peru, China, Myanmar, Kosovo, and Central Asian republics. Such failures are partially due to the lack of systematic and theoretical research on the effects of prodemocracy involvement of foreign actors.
    Theoretically, the assessment of the effects is closely associated with how we understand the consolidation of democracy. The advocates of the Lipset hypothesis will emphasize the importance of the assistance for economic development. However, the Lipset hypothesis is applicable only to a part of Asia. The transition approach of Schmitter & O'Donnell's, on which many of the contemporary foreign involvement are based, also has difficulties in explaining a long-term consolidation. The consolidation of democracy requires that the contending parties come to believe that they cannot exterminate their enemies and, therefore, need to make compromises and accept fair-play rules. This kind of situation can usually emerge only after the parties experience a long exhausting conflict or suffer from a traumatic event such as war or tyrannical repression. Therefore, foreign involvement needs to be of the kind that helps the contending parties learn, in the long run, how to live together peacefully. In this sense, the assistance from outside can only be secondary to the time-consuming efforts of the contending parties themselves.
    As for the effect of democratization on international politics and economics, “democratic peace” is the subject most widely discussed among the students of international politics. However, it faces many criticisms including the one that emphasizes common preferences rather than a democratic “dyad” as a major variable to explain peace. The specialists of political economy and economics have shown interest in the relationship between democratization on the one hand and the integration into the world economy through neoliberal policies on the other. Some people regard them as contradictory while others believe they are complementary. Still others take the middle ground.
    Since the field is new, many sub-themes in the field are full of controversies. We need to accumulate more research both on the impact of international involvement upon democratization and on repercussions of democratization on international politics and economics. The following ten articles represent the first step of this effort. The first six articles deal with effects of international environment and involvement upon democratization in China, Vietnam, Jordan, Benin, Central Asian republics, and postwar Germany. The following two articles analyze international involvement more generally. Our last two articles, on the other hand, touch upon how democratization affects international politics focusing on Southeast Asia and China.
  • 「民主化」と国際政治・経済
    毛里 和子
    2000 年 2000 巻 125 号 p. 14-30,L6
    発行日: 2000/10/13
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    On June 4 1989, the People's Liberation Army suppressed the democracy movement, in which political reform from above mingled with students' protest against corruption, inflation and undemocratic policy. Reformists just drew up The Grand Design for Political Reform (GDPR) at the 13th Party Congress and were implementing it, when the democracy movement died prematurely.
    There then appeared to be an international democratic wave. System reform in East Europe, Perestroika under Gorbachev and democratization in Taiwan and South Korea developed almost simultaneously. The paper analyses why the democracy movement in China was wrecked under the international situation which would be favorable to promote democracy.
    The paper describes how reformist leaders and elites evaluated the international environment, through analyzing the drawing process of the GDPR which had decisive meaning for dismantlement of the Party-State system, and international news of The World Economic Herald which had a great influence upon reformists.
    According to the O'Donnell/Schmitter's argument, after a separation of authoritarianism into hawks and doves, once the latter declares for liberalization, then the democratization process will begin. In China, however, only a few reformist leaders were eliminated from power. Regime transformation did not occur. In my opinion, there were three causes as follows:
    (1) The GDPR itself was drawn by the brains who had only personal connection with Premier Zhao Ziyang and his aide Bao Dong. They did not succeed in involving the Party, bureaucracy and local leaders. So, we can certify that reformists hardly had a power base which could divide the power structure.
    (2) Political pressure from the outside world surpassed domestic political capacity. It may be natural that tremendous democratic pressure from outside causes a violent reaction.
    (3) Institutionalization and organization of counter-power under the authoritarian regime would be a formative factor of domestic political capacity. But, in 1986-89, China had none of these factors.
  • 「民主化」と国際政治・経済
    中野 亜里
    2000 年 2000 巻 125 号 p. 31-44,L7
    発行日: 2000/10/13
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper aims to clarify the meaning of the idea of “democracy” in the Vietnamese socialist context and to measure the foreign and domestic impacts on democratization in recent Vietnam
    After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of the socialist model, the Communist Party of Vietnam restricted the influence of the “bourgeois democracy” of the former socialist countries and denied political pluralism with in a multi-party system. Whereas “socialist democracy” was discussed and implemented, based on the idea that the Communist Party represented the people, the “democratization” in Vietnam meant strengthening the leading role of the party.
    Hanoi's leaders gave priority to economic democratization rather than political democratization. Economic democratization means implementation of the market economy system. According to the Vietnamese authorities, the national planned economy before Doi Moi is “undemocratic” and the “socialist-oriented market economy” after Doi Moi in which the national sector plays the leading role is “democratic.”
    The communist leaders also had to restrict the Western influence in the process of normalization of relations with the United States. The 8th National Congress of the Communist Party launched the strengthening of “the principle of democratic concentration” so as to maintain domestic stability and Communist Party rule.
    The government in Hanoi took firm attitudes against the requests for democratization by the Western countries and international organizations. As a newcomer to ASEAN, Vietnamese authorities insisted on “the Asian way” in the idea of democracy as well as in the problem of human rights. These attitudes have not been changed, even after the economic crisis in Asia which took place in July 1997.
    While the foreign pressure for democratization could not change Hanoi's attitude toward political renovation, the domestic actors gave certain impacts on the party rule. The main actors of democratic movements are: (1) critical figures in the Communist Party, (2) intellectuals outside of the party, (3) religious leaders, (4) peasants and rural residents, and (5) overseas Vietnamese. Especially some critical figures inside of the party and the peasants' uprising in rural areas during the 1990s promoted the construction of “rural democracy” as well as the campaign of “criticism/self-criticism” and readjustment of the party.
    Due to its historical experience, Vietnamese society has not developed citizens who might form critical power against the government. However, in the development of global communication network and demands for social justice and equality in the market economy, Hanoi's leaders have been forced to try political democratization.
  • 「民主化」と国際政治・経済
    北澤 義之
    2000 年 2000 巻 125 号 p. 45-60,L9
    発行日: 2000/10/13
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Scholars of comparative politics have paid relatively little attention to the processes of democratization in the Middle East. Western specialists on the Middle East were equally likely to overlook the subject and so were scholars in the region itself. This was due in part to the lack of sustained democratic practice in the Middle East and in part to the presence of other political preoccupations (nationalism and the Arab-Israeli conflict among others). With time, however, the situation has experienced a sea change. This change was motivated by academic shifts within the social sciences and by greater attention to democracy by Arab intellectuals starting in the mid-1980s.
    In the 1970s, Middle East countries developed themselves by Oil Money. In the 1980s, those countries had no choice but to introduce Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) initiated by IMF to cope with the foreign debt, while social gaps and social uncertainty emerged because of the contradiction of development policy. Opposition to austerity measures of SAP led to riots, through which the new middle class demanded a democracy. Trying to get support for SAP, each government promised democratization. It seems that Jordan has much in common with other Arab non oil-producing countries on the process of democratization. In that sense, Jordan's experience could be explained by the theory of “rentier state”. It is argued that not only oil-producing countries but also non oil-producing countries (“semi-rentier state”) can divert social pressure for reform by “purchasing” social actors through economic reward.
    However, “rentier state” theory should be treated carefully to avoid being overdeterministic in linking oil wealth with authoritarian rule. Studies on democratization of Jordan need to be refined through its social peculiarity colored by Jordanians of Palestinian origin (Palestinians) and Jordanians of Trans-jordanian origin (East Bankers). Recruited for the army and security apparatus, East Bankers were the main prop of Hashemite monarchy and were “bought”, in a sense, by the state through pensions and subsidies. On the other hand, Palestinians were watched by Mukhabarat (intelligent office) in order not to disturb public order, but permitted to perform economic activities freely. It would be possible to conclude that Palestinians were “bought” in exchange for economic freedom in a broader sense. But because of their non-national economic activity and their passive attitude toward Jordan's internal affairs, regardless of their position as the mainstream of new middle class that is usually expected to be the core of democracy. Considering the fact that the new middle class plays a very important role in the democratizing process in other countries of the region, they are, so to speak, citizens turning their backs on society.
    This ethnic element should be taken into consideration when we put Jordan into a category of “semi-rentier” state. Two events which occurred at the end of the 1980s showed that Jordan was facing structural changes. They are Jordan's decision to give up its sovereignty over the West Bank in 1988 and the riots of southern Jordan. The former changed Jordan's position over the Palestine Problem and paved a way for the trial of national unification between Palestinians and Jordanians in the East Bank. The latter represented socio-economic change for Jordan, which was considered to be divided between pro-governmental Jordanians and economy-oriented and non-political Palestinians. Both events constitute domestic conditions for democratization.
  • 「民主化」と国際政治・経済
    鈴木 亨尚
    2000 年 2000 巻 125 号 p. 61-78,L10
    発行日: 2000/10/13
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The aim of this article is to investigate the democratization of Africa, in particular, the one in the Republic of Benin in recent years. So, first, by investigating the theory of liberal democracy by Robert A. Dahl and the theory of participatory democracy by Hannah Arendt, and by introducing “the theory of structuration” of Anthony Giddens into theories of democracy, we try to show a framework of participatory democracy based on “the theory of structuration.” We claim that if actors (people) have a will to democratize, they can do it, in spite of political and economic constraints. Second, by analyzing “shifting involvement” of Albert O. Hirshman and some concepts such as “reciprocity” and “governance” of Goran Hyden, we would like to illustrate how people begin to pursue a democratization.
    Third, we would like to explain how Benin saw its political transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. Benin became independent as the Republic of Dahomey from France in 1960. After the sixth coup d'état since its independence, Mathieu Kérékou was inaugurated as President in 1972. His government adopted Marxism as the ideology of the unity of the people in 1974, and not only introduced a legal one-party system but also changed the name of the state to the People's Republic of Benin in 1975, and officially adopted a Marxist constitution in 1977. They generally call this period the time of “revolution”. However, as Chris Allen appropriately suggested, the government was not, in fact, a Marxist regime. Marxism was only an official ideology, and the revolution was nothing but formal. Because of the poor economic policy and corruption of the government, the economy sharply deteriorated and the government went bankrupt in the 1980s. At the time, the government lost its legitimacy, and some people in the civil society mobilized themselves for the “renouveau démocratique.” They used the conceptual relationship between a national conference and popular sovereignty to carry out successfully and peacefully a revolution. We may call this type of democratization the democratization as a revolution, and we consider that it is an alternative to liberal democracy.
    The Conférence nationale des forces vives was held from the 19th to 28th of February 1990. Delegates declared the conference sovereign, dissolved the National Assembly, and stripped President Mathieu Kérékou of most of his authority. The conference also set up an Conseil de la République headed by Monsignor de Souza, the Archbishop. of Cotonou, to act as a legislative body for a one-year transition, and appointed Nicephore Soglo, a former World Bank official, as Prime Minister to head an Interim Government and prepare for the first multiparty elections since independence.
    Fourth, we try to explain the political situation after the conference such as the enactment of a new constitution, the elections of the National Assembly and the President. Soglo won the presidency in the 1991 election. However, Soglo later lost it because he did not seem to be eager to make an effort to prevent corruption and Kérékou returned to the post in the 1996 election.
    Lastly, we want to suggest that, if people have a will to democratize, they can do it, and that, to democratize, they need a strategy to use culture and knowledge.
  • 「民主化」と国際政治・経済
    深川 美奈
    2000 年 2000 巻 125 号 p. 79-95,L12
    発行日: 2000/10/13
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    John J. McCloy, the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany, wrote to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles when Konrad Adenauer won the election of parliament in 1953: “We cannot in my judgment, lift our hand and influence from the internal German developments. The roots of sound parliamentary behavior are not deeply enough embedded in German soil for us to take a different position. This is a great step forward domestically but German nationalism and its demoniac counterparts have not been completely exorcised.” Why did he point out that German society was not yet democratized after more than five years of defeat? This paper deals with the formation of democratization policy of American military Government and its successor, the American High Commission. It focuses on the period from defeat of Germany (May 1945) to June 1952 in which American democratization program ended at the local level. I pay attention to the formation and development of denazification policy by both the American Military Government and German and re-education (re-orientation) program by Kreis Resident Officer of Land commission. In this paper, I divide the period into four parts according to its peculiarities. I examine how American policies developed and why these policies failed finally. American Military Government carried out denazification and re-education on purpose to democratize German society. How and where did Americans locate democratization policy after a switch in economic recovery policy in 1947?
    Denazification in the American zone was carried out with initial severity. In applying the rough-and-ready procedure to Germans, the consequences have been more than ordinarily severe. Proof of this action can be seen in the dismissal not only of those whose removal was required by the directive but also of those in whose case discretion was allowed. Since the influence of Nazism was rather stronger than American authority had predicted, American officials realized that denazification could not be accomplished without German help.
    German law, entitled “For Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism, ” which was enacted on March 5, 1946, classified ideological offenders in terms of past guilt and future danger and tried to assess penalties proportionate to the guilt and danger. But the number of cases to be handled by judicial machinery was amounting to the great majority of the adult population that the process of rectification was slow as the complications accumulated. Germans were not satisfied with prohibition and restriction of employment.
    Though process of denazification was promoted by amnesties and amended law, staffs of local authority on denazification could not deal with the cases of major offenders. As a result, the ex-Nazi forces which succeeded in rehabilitation were much more than those who were politically purged.
    It was estimated that denazification policy ended in failure or was not completely carried out. However, the matter was not so simple for the democratization in postwar west Germany. Although denazification was not completely carried out as a whole, it contributed to change in the German top leadership in the postwar era. American army authority appointed the persons on the “White List, ” who were anti-Nazi or non-Nazi, and could be pro-American to the post of leadership after the examination of denazification. They proceeded to democratization with collaboration with the American Military Government. Hence, antidemocratic power could not be strong when the Federal Republic of Germany was establised.
    Nevertheless, denazification of the middle class was not fully carried out. Since the influence of Nazism mostly penetrated into the middle class, it was impossible to eliminate the influence completely by denazification.
  • 「民主化」と国際政治・経済
    湯浅 剛
    2000 年 2000 巻 125 号 p. 96-114,L14
    発行日: 2000/10/13
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    There are two channels for Western countries to participate in the regimet-ransition movements in the former Soviet Union States (FSUS): Interstate bilateral relationships on the one hand and international organizations for transition support like OSCE/CSCE (Organization/Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe), IMF and EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) on the other. These Transition-Support Organizations (TSO), which include FSUS as member states, had a common purpose during the 1990's: How to stabilize the transition to the new politico-economic regime (democracy and market economy). These norms, with the background of the Western ideas, are important even for the FSUS to establish the legitimacy of their rule.
    TSO in this article, especially OSCE, can be defined as organizations that mainly use soft powers in contrast with a hard-power organization like NATO. Although they cannot operate with hard power or resources which can have immediate and forcible effects, TSO try to infuse values and institutions of democracy and the market economy through soft-power methods such as monitoring elections, dispatching long-term missions for peace-keeping, advising and financing for institutional reforms.
    This article focuses on the following three points to examine the relationship between FSUS and TSO.
    First, the article explains what Western norms like democracy have for the maintenance of politico-economic order in FSUS. TSO attempt to introduce and stabilize democracy and the market economy, and present the support programs for FSUS in accordance with these norms, while FSUS also define themselves as democratic countries. This article points out the “dogmatization” of democracy in FSUS. The concepts like democracy and the market economy are utilized politically in FSUS although they have estranged from the reality just as the concept of communism did during the Soviet era. On the other hand, FSUS also accepted the Western concepts because they are afraid of being marginalized in the international community.
    This article also examines one concrete problem: How TSO have contributed to the maintenance of order in FSUS during the 1990's. At the beginning of the decade, economic TSO like IMF believed that FSUS would be able to shift their regimes smoothly if only TSO introduced some monetarist programs. However, the monetarist view can find few friends today in FSUS. TSO's task for the future in the region is to find an alternative policy that can take the place of the monetarism.
    Third, this article examines how the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs is treated by TSO. As OSCE members declared at the Budapest Summit in 1994, the member states including FSUS welcome the OSCE missions to promote democracy. However, if OSCE or other TSO try to strengthen their current level of involvement, FSUS may demand a redefinition of the principle. In this sense, TSO is always in the process of transforming their structure and their roles.
  • 「民主化」と国際政治・経済
    東郷 育子
    2000 年 2000 巻 125 号 p. 115-130,L15
    発行日: 2000/10/13
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    When grave human misery such as genocide is committed in a country, should international society intervene regardless of sovereignty? To intervene in the domestic affairs of another nation has been illegal under the regime of traditional International Law. Recently, however, if a certain government seriously violates human rights of his citizens, or rulers clearly do not have the ability to govern, and the media reports of human catastrophes which arouse public opinion around the world, international society has enough and justifiable reasons to intervene in the concerned state.
    The Gulf War was an important turning point in several respects that brought reform in humanitarian intervention of the Post-Cold War era. First, international society, especially the major powers, showed they could cooperate in taking military actions under the leadership of the United Nations. Second, the bases of permitting humanitarian intervention matured and the media performed an important function in this trend. Third, in order to realize intervention and persuade public opinion, various efficiencies of intervention, such as “zero casualty” and air raids, as a major strategy, have been important.
    Success in the Gulf War introduced a more positive concept of humanitarian intervention. Namely, humanitarian intervention does not solely point to military intervention as a means of conflict resolution, but also includes broader methods such as humanitarian actions to prevent conflict itself and peace-building efforts after conflicts.
    There still remain some questions regarding humanitarian intervention. For example, how should we set the standards to intervene? How can the operators maintain humanitarian neutrality and justice? What is the goal, and to what extent should intervention go? Only after we overcome these questions will the potential to build accountability for humanitarian intervention develop.
    Humanitarian intervention in the 21st century must operate under the recognition of human conscience and social justice. At the same time it must pursue not self-interest but universal interest. In the medium to long term, humanitarian intervention must eliminate structural conditions and bases of human rights violation. In the long run, it must contribute to peace building and help the concerned state become independent as a modernized and democratized society. All actors who intervene-not only nations, but also regional organizations, international organizations, NGOs, and citizens-should be responsible for this final goal. The question of how we should undertake humanitarian intervention in this global society is indeed to understand how these actors intervene and work functionally in each role to assist the concerned state suffering human misery.
  • 「民主化」と国際政治・経済
    岩崎 正洋
    2000 年 2000 巻 125 号 p. 131-146,L17
    発行日: 2000/10/13
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In this paper, I will examine democratic assistance in the democratization process. First, I will focus on democratization at the national level and then will extend the scope of my argument from national to international level to discuss the relationship between democratization and international relations. In my argument, I will show what has been the democratic assistance from foreign countries (or international organizations) to democratizing countries during the period of “The Third Wave” of democratization. To conclude my argument, I will present the following points to be further considered when we examine the relationship between external actors and democratization.
    (1) Who are the actors of democratic assistance?
    (2) What are the styles of democratic assistance?
    (3) Does democratic assistance deal with the transition phase or the consolidation phase of democratization?
    (4) Is democracy really consolidated in the democratizing countries?
    (5) Is there any connection between the assisting country and the democratizing country?
    (6) Do political institutions really matter for stabilizing democracy?
    (7) What is the viability of democracy in democratized countries?
    Thus, this paper focuses on the democracy promotion activities in the international relations. Elections in democratic countries legitimatize their political regime. Therefore, if we think of political regimes in democratizing countries in terms of the model of electoral democracy, we will be able to grasp the meaning of the concept of ‘democracy’ better. Elections are the transmission belt whereby people's will is communicated to the smaller number of persons who actually make law. In the model of competitive elitist democracy, elections have a very important role as the tools of democratization.
    The transition is the interval between one political regime and another. Transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative. It is characteristic of the transition phase that the rules of the political game are not yet defined. Not only are they in constant flux, but they are usually arduously contested. In the democratization process, then, elections offer contenders an opportunity in which they struggle for power.
    Adam Przeworski regards the transition to democracy as the liberalization process of authoritarian regimes and their replacement by democratic forms of political organization. According to Przeworski, any regime needs “legitimacy” and “support, ” or at least “acquiescence” to survive. When a regime loses its legitimacy, it needs to reproduce legitimacy or it will collapse.
    What is more important for the stability of any regime is not the existence of legitimacy of this particular system, but the presence or absence of preferable alternative regimes. The legitimacy of authoritarian regimes can be improved over time, while democratic alternative regimes are always regarded as more legitimate. Therefore, if an existing authoritarian regime loses its legitimacy, we can expect that the transition to a democratic regime will be set in motion.
    The first stage of the transition process is characterized by rapid disintegration of existing political institutions, the proliferation of various political movements breaking into the political arena, and the establishment of transitory power arrangements. Although democratic elections are conducted, consolidation of democratic political order is only one possible outcome.
  • 「民主化」と国際政治・経済
    藤原 帰一
    2000 年 2000 巻 125 号 p. 147-161,L18
    発行日: 2000/10/13
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Much has been made of the claim that democracies do not fight each other. This claim met more skeptical eyes outside the United States, if only because the argument shared an annoying similarity with another argument once shared by supporters of communist parties: communists do not fight each other. So much for wishful thinking and self-deceit.
    Peace, after all, has been observed among autocracies as well as by democracies; that does not mean, however, that regime-types do not matter. Regime-types, with distinctive characters in their decision making process, may cast influence over political decisions in international relations, even when they fail to dictate black-and-white outcomes such as the absence of war. If both autocracies and democracies may sustain ‘peace’ at given points, then, how are they different?
    This leads to the question of this paper: can we distinguish significant patterns of behavior between autocratic peace and democratic peace? In this paper, I make an attempt to answer this question by comparing two most salient examples of autocratic peace, the Congress of Vienna and ASEAN. The former is important because it provided a model of balance of power to the realist school, while actually sustained by the threat of domestic upheaval; the latter is interesting because, among regimes that were undemocratic to say the least, a certain status quo has been somehow maintained.
    Differences between early 19th century Europe and late 20th century Southeast Asia should be only too apparent. The Congress of Vienna and ASEAN, however, do share some institutional characteristics. Both were formed under the specter of revolution, the revival of the French revolution and the spillover of the Chinese revolution respectively. It was the fear of domestic challenges to political power, rather than the simple fear of overseas aggression, that held both regimes intact.
    Both were sustained by a group of regional elites who were under little influence from domestic interests or public opinions. In Vienna, it was the Kings and the Nobles of each country who were all part of an extended family due to centuries of inter-marriage: an international society was more real than civil societies in the days of Vienna. ASEAN leaders lacked such kin relationship, but were all bound by secular interests that stemmed from a common agenda, that is, a non-communist and authoritarian path to state-formation.
    Both regimes aimed at policy coordination of secular interests, disregarding transcendent norms or beliefs. Vienna aimed for the Concert of Europe with little religious beliefs or legal institutions; ASEAN, composed of Islamic, Buddhist, and Catholic societies, worked on a harmony of secular interests devoid of religion or political ideology. And both regimes imposed minimum constraints on the policy pursuit of individual states, non-intervention as the golden rule.
    In spite of the lack of institutional norms and sanctions, or any clear and present foe to ally against, both regimes successfully preserved peace in the region for over three decades. An impressive achievement, but challenges emanated from within.
    The Congress of Vienna ended with the revolutions of 1848 and the flight of Metternich. ASEAN nations have gone through a wave of democratic revolutions that shattered authoritarian rule in the Philippines (1986), Thailand (1992), and Indonesia (1998). The paper claims that such domestic changes have put the more secular and elitist policy coordination of ASEAN in limbo at the moment, with ominous signs for the future.
  • 「民主化」と国際政治・経済
    武田 康裕
    2000 年 2000 巻 125 号 p. 162-179,L20
    発行日: 2000/10/13
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is twofold: to make a frame of reference for understanding the causal mechanisms that regime transitions tend to associate with external use of force, and to examine within this framework the military operations of China after reforms and opening-up.
    Conflict initiation is a product of interaction between motivational factors in the state level and opportunity-related factors in the systemic level. In order to explore mutual relationship between the domestic dynamics and the international environment, this paper adopted the analytic approach of comparative politics and international politics combined. By focusing upon the political struggle within the ruling bloc, it approaches to the knotting points between the systemic level and the state level.
    The key theoretical argument consists of two points: (1) The modality of divisions within the ruling bloc are motivational factors in determining whether the transitional regime succumbs to the temptation of a diversionary use of force; (2) The structural uncertainties of international system are opportunity-related factors which convert a potential for diversionary use of force into reality. Then the proposition is stated as follows: the probability of a transitional regime engaging in a hostile military action increases in two following conditions: (1) The ruling bloc is vertically divided between conservatives and reformers who are roughly equal in power; (2) The level of regional order is low in the multipolar system of relatively equal states.
    China embarked on military operations in the Spratly Islands and Taiwan Straits in 1988, 1992, and 1995 while holding up independent peace diplomacy toward neighboring countries. Neither rational choice model nor organizational process model has successfully explained the reasons for a discrepancy between conflict behavior and cooperative diplomacy. While the former overestimates internal cohesion within the party leadership in the period of regime transition, the later underestimates party control over the military in the Leninist state. This paper concludes that Chinese military operations were diversionary actions for the state leaders to restore party unity.
    In 1988 and 1992, Deng Xioping initiated naval operations over the Spratly Islands claimed by Vietnam to win the military's support, and then to beat off conservatives' challenge to the reform policy. In 1995, Jiang Zemin stood firm with the Philippines and Taiwan to let the military stay away from the intraparty struggle for leadership succession. The difference in subjectivity between two leaders was derived from changing nature of party-army relations associated with professionalism in the military. While Deng could maneuver potential rivalries between the professional officers and political commissars, Jiang had to be responsive to demands by the professional military. Both state leaders were risk-acceptant in that they recognized the structural uncertainties of regional system as an opportunity of provoking militarized actions.
  • 政策理念公定化における意識と個人
    川村 陶子
    2000 年 2000 巻 125 号 p. 180-196,L21
    発行日: 2000/10/13
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The official concepts of foreign cultural policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, formalized in three policy papers issued in the 1970s, preempt the philosophy of cultural activities in the interdependent and globalized world of the late 1990s. In the three papers, the German government does not actively constitute a “national culture” through presenting publicly authorized cultural elements to people in foreign countries, but it rather promotes transnational relations by encouraging free activities by various social actors across national borders.
    The formalization of these uniquely “liberal ” concepts —or, the “reform” of foreign cultural policy— resulted from multiple factors at different levels of the policy process concurring during the period from the late 1960s to the early 1970s. Although students of German politics might be tempted to regard the “reform” as a variable dependent upon general political change such as the formation of the social-liberal coalition and Willy Brandt's new Ostpolitik, the reality of policymaking and the content of policy papers, such as the key idea “enlarged concept of culture”, cannot be explained by such a parsimonious model.
    By tracing the history of the policy process, especially the development of the philosophy of cultural relations itself, one can recognize two factors which were of vital importance for the formalization of new concepts: the changing identity of policymakers, which lay at the base of the very formation of the Brandt government, and the reform initiative within the policy process taken by Ralf Dahrendorf, then the Parliamentary State Secretary of the Foreign Office. On the one hand, the quest for a new “FRG-identity” in the transition period of postwar international relations, which also meant the quest for a new Federal Repubulic open toward the world and contributing to international cooperation, was embodied in the “enlargement of the concept of culture” in the new philosophy. On the other hand, Dahrendorf influenced the making of the policy papers not only in the sense that he took the first step in the “reform” process of the Foreign Office, but also that the opposition party in the Bundestag felt obliged by this popular sociologist to organize a parliamentary inquiry committee for foreign cultural policy, which would produce a thorough report supporting the core of liberal ideas proposed by Dahrendorf himself.
    Although Dahrendorf left the Foreign Office within 10 months, he played a decisive role in the formalization of new concepts because Dahrendorf, with his progressive liberal theory and distinguished career in the Anglo-American social scientific field, personified the new identity and reform-mindedness of FRG-policymakers at that time. The fact that he could not stay in office for a long time indicates that the genuine Reformeuphorie was transient, but the timing for his initiative was good enough to get the “reform” started. The new concepts of the official FRG-cultural relations are not the byproduct of Brandt's new Ostpolitik, but, through the personality of Dahrendorf, rather reflects the Zeitgeist of the time, which sought for democracy and open-minded transnational cooperation in a changing world.
  • ポスト冷戦外交の「予行演習」
    若月 秀和
    2000 年 2000 巻 125 号 p. 197-217,L23
    発行日: 2000/10/13
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this essay is, firstly, to analyze how the Japanese government coped with the international situation before the Fukuda Doctrine was announced and how the government aimed at a continuation of détente and secondly, to evaluate the essence and significance of the doctrine, with a greater focus on Mr. Fukuda's diplomatic idea, namely omnidirectional-peace diplomacy. The doctrine was announced during his visit to Southeast Asia in August 1977. The basic principles are (1) to reject the role of a major military power, (2) to establish reliable relationships with Southeast Asian countries, and (3) to contribute to the building of peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia by cooperating with ASEAN and its member countries in their own efforts to strengthen their solidarity and resilience, while aiming at fostering a relationship based on mutual understanding with the nations of Indochina.
    The essay consists of five sections. In the first section, I review the international circumstances surrounding the Fukuda Doctrine, where so-called “détente” and unstable international relations were mixed. In the second section, I review the omni-directional-peace diplomacy which Mr. Fukuda advocated. Based on the US-Japan relationship, this policy was intended for friendly relationships with all countries, refusing to be a major military power. And this idea was a major influential factor in making the basic nature of the doctrine. Japan's intention to overcome the structure of the cold war was also another influential factor for the doctrine. In the third and fourth sections, I explain concretely how relationships with ASEAN and the countries of Indochina were established before the Fukuda Doctrine was announced. Mr. Fukuda's insight and leadership, together with the accumulation of steady contacts with those countries by officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, enabled the announcement of such diplomatic policies for Southeast Asia. In the fifth section, I review the essence and significance of the Fukuda Doctrine. The doctrine stabilized international relations directly after the Vietnam War. It consolidated the foundation of Japan's diplomacy for Southeast Asia and strengthened the feeling of togetherness among free nations. Though Japan could not prevent the diffusion of Soviet-China enmity to Indochina and the new cold war in 1980s, the doctrine left a legacy for Japan's diplomacy and international society after the cold war
  • 加藤 陽子
    2000 年 2000 巻 125 号 p. 218-220
    発行日: 2000/10/13
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 木村 修三
    2000 年 2000 巻 125 号 p. 221-224
    発行日: 2000/10/13
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 石田 淳
    2000 年 2000 巻 125 号 p. 224-227
    発行日: 2000/10/13
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 矢田部 順二
    2000 年 2000 巻 125 号 p. 227-230
    発行日: 2000/10/13
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 恒川 惠市
    2000 年 2000 巻 125 号 p. 240
    発行日: 2000/10/13
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
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